


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# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, WHITEHALL, S.W.1





PERIODICAL COLLECTION



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**THE  
CAVALRY JOURNAL**


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# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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JANUARY 1912

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## THE TRAINING OF A REMOUNT

BY LIEUTENANT S. J. HARDY, *Royal Scots Greys.*

### INTRODUCTION.

'Horses are taught not by harshness but by gentleness.'—XENOPHON.

The horse is one of the most timid animals, and during the period of breaking must be treated with the greatest kindness. Once ensure mutual confidences between man and beast, and the task of the breaker is comparatively simple.

'It only needs the gentleness of a woman to call into operation all equine good manners, whereas harsh words and cruel usage convert a timid and inoffensive animal into a vicious brute.'

The making of the horse's temper, for good or evil, depends on man, who has the opportunity of making his slave either obedient with kind treatment or vicious by cruel usage.

Colts dread to approach objects they have never seen before, and are afraid of any objects that they anticipate may give them pain.

Rarey, an American, in 1858 trained horses most successfully on a system based on the three following principles:—

*Firstly.*—That the horse is so constituted by nature that he will not offer resistance to any demand made of him which he fully comprehends, if made in any way consistent with the law of his nature.

*Secondly.*—That he has no consciousness of his strength beyond his experiences, and can be handled according to our will without force.

*Thirdly.*—That we can, in compliance with the laws of his nature,

by which he examines all things new to him, take any object, however frightful, around, over, or on him, that does not inflict pain, without causing him to fear.

Rarey always inculcated the doctrine of kindness to horses; he fully recognised their nature, and he attempted to allay their fears by bringing them in close contact with objects of their aversion and by showing them that no injury or pain could be inflicted by them.

Let the horse once recognise there is no cause for fear, and he will become docile, and obey with pleasure the orders of his rider.

The great difficulty in training a horse is to make him understand what we want him to do, which is no easy matter, because a horse, contrary to what is generally supposed, has only a small supply of intelligence, which does not include the power of reasoning.

His only well-developed mental quality is his memory, which is particularly acute, and should therefore be specially utilised.

The horse is, of course, capable of great affection, and the obtaining of this plays an important part in his training.

The human voice has a great influence on a horse, but it is only the tone which he remembers.

In dealing with Army horses it must be remembered that from three to four years old is the average age at which a remount commences his training: and the class required is a deep, short-legged, short-backed, good barrelled horse, of the hunter stamp, with substance and quality, true action, and going quite clear of the joints.

Naturally we do not always succeed in obtaining for £40 horses of the above stamp. We must therefore take into consideration the conformation, condition, temperament, and intelligence of each individual horse.

Most remounts arrive in what is known as 'dealer's condition,' which has the deceiving effect of making a horse look as if he was well built up, whereas he has probably never known what a decent feed of oats is like, or experienced regular exercise.

Thus it is essential to remember that with horses in the above condition, their muscles are naturally to a great extent undeveloped. Careful feeding and grooming are therefore most important with the young horse.

Let us now consider the uses to which Army horses are put, for on that must be based our system of training.

A troop horse must march long distances with a heavy weight on his back, without losing condition. Then he must be used to exposure and privation; be capable of being ridden with only one hand at all paces and over all manner of country, in company and alone; be indifferent to the noise of firing, and able to stand still as well as gallop. In fact we require the hardiness of a Basuto pony, the handiness of a polo pony, the steadiness of a good hack, and the spirit and energy of a hunter.

Having taken into consideration the physical and mental capabilities of the horse, the material available and the standard required, we can proceed with our system of training, the fundamental principle of which we can express in one word, 'Progressive.'

The physical and mental training must proceed conjointly. Individual study must be made of each horse, his capabilities realised, and his efforts rewarded. One must not expect too much of a horse, his education must advance step by step. Great patience is required, especially in the early training.

The education of a horse depends entirely on the manner in which the rider applies the principle of reward and punishment; the appropriate application of the latter being even more essential to success than that of the former. When a horse deserves punishment, he should receive it with an amount of severity proportionate to the offence. A horse's intelligence enables him to connect his action with the punishment it provoked. On this account, if punishment is not administered at the precise moment the fault is committed, it will lose all its good effect, and will be an element of confusion in the memory of the animal. It is better not to punish him than to do it too late.

One should always try and discover the motive for disobedience; it will either be caused by pain or viciousness.

Just as punishment should promptly follow disobedience, so also reward should promptly follow obedience. All horses, even the most impatient, accept a pat on the neck.

'Making much of the horse gives him confidence, by placing the rider in direct contact with him otherwise than by impulsion.' (Fillis.)

As the body is gradually built up, so must the exercises be gradually increased, both in duration and scope, until the horse is ready for the 'finishing' which will fit him to enter the ranks after a course

of training lasting from eighteen to twenty-four months, according to his rate of progression.

But fundamentally and behind all theories it is the trainer and not his system that makes a horse a good or bad one.

This human element enters very deeply into the training of young horses, and it is sometimes lost sight of. Yet it is the most important, though the least tangible, of all the things which go to educate an animal.

In considering a system of training, however, we should not legislate for the 'horseman born.' Such a man can no doubt train his horse on any, or no, method. But it is quite certain that the majority of people are not born horsemen.

And it is equally certain that almost anyone with patience and practice can learn to train a horse. And when trained, the average man's horse is more suitable to the indifferent horseman than the horse trained by the brilliant horseman, whose animals are often too highly sensitive for anyone not equally skilled.

It is for this reason that it is a good thing to have a regular and systematised method of training.

We therefore wish to emphasise the necessity of a uniform method of control; this is especially important in connection with military horses and men, where both are continually changing.

A system carefully thought out is bound to defeat haphazard methods in the end.

But before entering into the details of his training, it might be as well to note some of the characteristics required of a successful trainer.

We use the word 'trainer' and not 'breaker,' because the 'horse-breaker,' as he is often with justice called, is a man who drives out, with whip and spur, all the good equine qualities, and converts a naturally quiet and kind animal into a brute.

Although the horse is a timid animal, he must be controlled by a man of courage. Timidity must not be approached with timidity, for, if such takes place, the notion of dread is at once communicated to the young horse, whose perceptive faculties are always on the alert to protect himself against mischief.

Men without nerve are useless as trainers.

It is equally important for trainers to have patience, determination,

and tact. The better their hands and seat and the more practical their knowledge of the horse's temperament, characteristics, and capabilities, the better their chance of being really successful trainers.

The system of schooling horses of the late William Sherley, of Twickenham, one of the most celebrated horsemen of his day, was comprised in one word—'kindness.'

#### 1ST STAGE.

Every horse varies considerably in age, condition, education, conformation, soundness, character, and temper; for this reason the trainer should at once set to work to study the nature of his remount, so that he can realise what it is reasonable for him to expect of it.

The training is commenced by handling the horse, leading him about on both sides, accustoming him to the sound of your voice, educating his brain by showing him as much as you can, in the fields and on the roads.

During this stage it is an excellent plan to give your horse sugar, or handfuls of corn, every now and then.

In the early training of a remount the use of the voice is invaluable.

A horse quickly learns to obey sharp, distinct words of command; such as 'Whoa,' 'Trot,' 'Walk,' &c., if given in the same tone of voice, this being most essential.

The voice has a calming effect on a horse: and when once a horse gets to know your voice, you can, by using it in the above manner, not only make him obey certain commands, but also steady and calm him when nervous or excited.

Just as a dog does, he will soon be able to distinguish between your tone of voice when pleased or angry with him.

It is therefore most important that you should accustom your remount to the sound of your voice.

During this period the horse should be trained with an ordinary jointed snaffle in his mouth, the reins tied in a knot and allowed to lie on the neck, the trainer leading him about by means of a leather rein attached to the lower ring of the back strap.

By adopting this method there is no danger of causing injury to his sensitive mouth, when a horse plays up or attempts to break away, according to the usual custom of young horses.

As soon as your horse has grown accustomed to being led about

on both reins, to being handled, and becomes quiet, and has learnt to stand still and walk on, then his training may be advanced a step further. But the next stage depends on the nature, condition, and age of your horse.

For horses that are too weak to carry a man at this period, a course of 'Long Reining' is advisable. But for those which are strong enough and sufficiently tractable, this period may be dispensed with, and 'Backing' may be proceeded with.

But as most remounts come under the former category, and not the latter, we propose to proceed with our training by making use of the 'long reins.'

This stage may be divided up into four periods as follows:—

The 'roller' is now put on, care being taken not to buckle up too tightly, and a sharp look-out kept for possible galls. The long reins are fastened to the head collar, and the horse lunged on either rein.

It is essential that the rein should be constantly changed and an equal amount of work done on each.

The trainer must never work his horse too hard, or keep him trotting round and round on a circle; this only sickens him and makes him feel giddy. Practise at halting, standing still, and moving on, to the word of command must also constantly be carried out.

The horse should be frequently made much of and rewarded with lumps of sugar occasionally.

Every five or ten minutes allow the horse to stand still and rest.

The work should only be done at the walk and trot, and the horse should never be sweated.

After a few days of this, the time depending, as it does throughout the whole of his training, on the progress of the horse, the next period may be commenced.

The long reins are now attached to the snaffle, so that great care must be taken to avoid injuring or deadening his sensitive mouth.

Similar exercises may be carried out as in the first period, though the duration may be slightly increased, say, to about an hour and a quarter.

The saddle may now be put on with the roller over it, the same precautions being taken to avoid galls. The outside rein is passed over the horse's neck, and the training proceeded with. We can now do a certain amount of forward work, which has the great advantage



of teaching your horse to move straight forward, a point that will be dealt with later on.

The stirrups are allowed to hang down, and the outside rein passed over the back and round the quarters. We can now make him change from one rein to the other on the word "Change" being given.

Up to this point, our training should take place out of doors as much as possible, providing that the weather is suitable. The Riding School deadens the intelligence of the horse, whereas out-of-door work gradually develops his brain and improves his education.

The advantages and disadvantages of the long reins can now be discussed.

The use of the long reins has a disciplining effect. Throughout the various periods the horse is taught to obey, and to realise the complete mastery of his trainer.

They also to a certain extent balance the horse, the pressure of the outward rein preserving him for the use of the leg. But perhaps the great advantage of them lies in their power of advancing the training of the horse, until he is strong enough to bear the weight of a man on his back.

But long reins must be properly used, otherwise they do more harm than good.

Unless they are in the hands of an experienced man, the horse is apt to lean on the snaffle, swing his quarters out, and turn his head in.

The reins are heavy (leather reins weigh 4 lb., web over  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lb., and rope is unsuitable for the purpose, as it is liable to gall a horse and your fingers, especially if he breaks away), so that mechanical means should be resorted to in order to keep the animal's head in the correct position (passing the reins through the turret, or even through the stirrups, certainly lightens the weight on the mouth).

There are certain hints which may be found useful in long rein driving, a few of which are enumerated below.

(a) The driver should never wear spurs, owing to the danger of catching the reins in them.

(b) The whip, if used at all, should always be held point downwards in the opposite hand to which the horse is working.

(c) Never use the whip unless the horse refuses to move on, and even then the sight of it will generally be sufficient to make him move forward. If he refuses to do so, touch him lightly and care-

fully behind, because any roughness or abruptness is apt to make him resist.

(d) Never order a horse to halt, walk, or trot, when he shows signs of doing so; make him do it when *you* want him to, and not when *he* wants to.

(e) When you wish to handle the horse, go up to him quietly, drawing in the reins as you do so; never allow him to come to you.

(f) Always accompany the horse, and never follow him. Place yourself so as always to keep the horse between the lungeing rein in front and the whip behind, thus forming a triangle. The hands and reins constitute the apex and sides respectively, and the horse the base.

(g) Hold one or two coils of the reins in the hand to which the horse is working.

(h) Wear good stout gloves, or you will cut your fingers badly.

As soon as you can consider your horse fit to carry your weight, and 'perfect on either hand and he doth set his trot comely and stately, you may venture to put the saddle on him.' (Browne, 1624.)

#### 2ND STAGE.

We should now take the horse into the Riding School and commence to 'back him.' To do this the trainer should have at least one assistant, if not two.

Providing that the horse is quiet, the best method is to proceed as follows.

One assistant holds the head by a rein attached to the back strap, the other assists the trainer to gradually raise his weight off the ground on to the horse's back, until the body is gradually in its place on the saddle. The horse should be made much of and talked to in a soothing voice throughout the proceedings, and it is advisable to give him a handful of corn.

If he shows any disinclination to move forward, he should be turned either to the left or right; everything should be done to keep on friendly terms with him.

As De Mauleon remarks, if he will not do a thing in one way, another should be tried.

As soon as he goes quietly the rider should dismount very gradually by taking both feet out of the stirrups and lowering himself slowly on to the ground.

In the case of a very timid horse, which will not allow the trainer on his back, it is a good plan to adopt Rarey's method of strapping up one of the forelegs with a stirrup leather, and then either placing a dummy on his back or the trainer himself. In any of the methods for backing a horse, the great point to remember is that, whatever happens, don't allow your horse to throw you. This has a very bad moral effect on the horse, and will put him back in his work; if once he finds he can get rid of you, he will always be liable to repeat the experiment.

For the first few lessons the rider should only be mounted for a few minutes at a time, in order that the muscles may gradually become accustomed to the great and unusual strain placed upon them.

Whilst working on the long reins the horse has to a certain extent been taught to balance himself. The additional weight of the rider now being placed on his back, he finds that the balance which he acquired is to a certain degree lost, and muscles which came into use in acquiring that balance have a fresh strain put upon them.

We must therefore content ourselves with making the horse walk straight forward, using the legs only for putting him in movement, and keeping him straight, and up to the snaffle.

We shall thus give him time to get accustomed to carrying the additional weight of the rider's body, and gradually adapt his balance to suit the new conditions.

It would be as well to say a few words on this most important subject of balance.

The colt instinctively learns to balance himself from birth; by raising or lowering his head and neck he shifts his weight backwards and forwards, and does not feel it any more than we do ours; but when he is ridden, some fifteen-stone weight is placed over and behind his centre of gravity, and he has to adjust himself to the new conditions: this, and the undeveloped state of the muscles of his back and limbs, account for his awkward gait when first mounted.

Our object therefore is to make the horse carry his head in the best position for balancing his weight at all paces, or, in other words, 'placing the horse's head.'

This work is carried out through the combined action of the legs and hands. The legs, by compelling the horse to move forward, drive and keep him up to the bit. The pressure of the leg should be lively and springy and applied with the leg drawn back, *behind* the girth.

The rider must endeavour to preserve the sensibility of the horse to the leg, by avoiding anything in the nature of a dull clinging pressure.

If the trainer is quite certain that a horse is lazy, and that the laziness is not due to weakness or indisposition, an early introduction to a blunt spur is advisable—otherwise it is best not to wear spurs.

A light flexible cane may be carried to supplement the use of the leg, rather than as a means of punishment.

The hands, through the reins and snaffle, regulate the position of the horse's head and neck, by bringing pressure to bear on the tongue, the bars of the mouth, and the corners of his lips.

This pressure should, of course, be as light as possible, or the mouth becomes bruised or injured and eventually callous.

The best way to raise his head is as follows. Place the reins one in each hand, passing through the fingers, and with a gentle upward and jerky movement combined with the forward pressure of the legs, gradually raise his head, relaxing the pressure as soon as he has done so, only retaining sufficient feeling on the mouth to make him maintain this position.

Then reward him, give him his head, and allow him to rest the muscles of his neck, on which an unaccustomed strain has been placed.

When the horse carries his head as required at the walk, a little trotting and circling may be attempted, care being taken to make the circles large or the turns wide, with the hindquarters following in the track of the fore-limbs.

Always make your horse stand still when mounting or dismounting; the earlier this is accomplished the better. Remember that it is just as important a part of his training as any other exercise.

As much work as possible should be done in the open, though it is advisable to keep in the School until the rider is satisfied that his horse will not attempt to get him off. Work on the roads is good for young horses, but very little trotting should be done or splints will result.

Elementary jumping may now be commenced, but the whole subject of *jumping* is dealt with in the Appendix.

Though it is impossible to lay down a fixed time, it will probably take from six to nine months to arrive at the stage where the horse's head has come into place and he goes freely up to the snaffle.

We can now proceed with the third stage.

## 3RD STAGE.

We can now lengthen the duration of our lessons, say, up to two hours, and work further away from stables. With the exception of, say, half an hour in the School for two mornings in the week, all the work should, so far as the weather permits, be carried on out of doors.

Mr. Fillis' motto, 'Toujours en avant,' should always be borne in mind. The objects of training your horse moving straightforward and on good going are as follows:—

(1) That most of the work which you require your horse to do will be moving forwards, *not* sideways, backwards, or on the circle.

(2) That it is easier and quicker to train a horse whilst moving forward, for he is less liable to try and 'play up'; every time this happens much valuable time is wasted.

(3) That it is simple, and therefore you are less likely to upset his temper; thus man and horse *quickly get into sympathy and on good terms with one another.*

(4) That it is easier for the horse while advancing to balance his own weight and that of his rider.

(5) That you are training his mind as well as developing his physical powers; continually advancing over fresh ground accustoms him to new surroundings and makes him more sure-footed.

(6) That your horse is less liable to go unsound during the course of training by working him to his front:—

(a) He is not so liable to knock one leg against the other.

(b) He is less liable to strain or twist the joints or tendons.

(7) That it is easier to preserve and maintain the *natural high carriage of the head*, and thus from the commencement he learns to carry his own head instead of relying on his rider to carry it for him. Undoubtedly one of the reasons he carries his head better is due to the fact that he is taking an interest in the continual change of surroundings, and therefore does not get tired of his work. Notice how a horse, old or young, pricks his ears and lifts his head when he sees a pack of hounds.

(8) That you are *less likely to spoil his mouth* and temper owing to the simplicity of the work.

(9) That you balance and collect him naturally by going up and down gentle inclines. This assists the free movement of the shoulders, develops and builds up muscle in the right places.

(10) That *you teach him the leg* by keeping him from sniping about under you, gradually pressing him forward with your legs, and induce him to walk straight with the lightest feeling on the mouth.

In conclusion let it be clearly understood that the above remarks are in no way intended to depreciate the usefulness of work in the School or open Manege. But too much of this work has a deadening effect on the intelligence of both men and horses. Too much circling and turning has a cramping effect on the horse's action.

For the above reasons, therefore, the training in our opinion should be carried out on these lines, and with that idea we can now commence the important stage of mouthing.

Mouthing consists of :—

(1) Suppling the head and making it turn from the poll of the neck.

(2) Making the head turn to one side or the other, the neck remaining straight.

In both cases the bend must be accompanied by a yielding of the jaw.

If the bend is towards the withers, the flexion is called 'Direct,' if to one side, 'Lateral.'

Great patience is essential in making a horse mouth. Some never will on the snaffle, in which case you must wait until they are bitted.

Very few horses mouth correctly at first, and you can only make them by proceeding very gradually on the following lines :—

First keep his neck straight by means of the left rein in the case of right flexion, and both reins in direct flexion. As soon as the horse relaxes his jaw, the mouth loses its sensitiveness, and he becomes in hand, and quickly learns that obedience is rewarded.

It must be remembered that the mouth is extremely sensitive, and that mouthing will at first cause, at all events, a feeling of discomfort. While if a steady strain is kept on the reins in the hope of making the horse relax his jaws, the mouth soon loses its sensitiveness, becomes hard, and the horse leans on the hand.

In the flexions, too, the horse's head and neck are required to take positions which are not natural to them, and if the muscles called into play are kept too long in constrained positions a spirit of opposition is aroused, which may affect the horse's temper. This is especially the case with horses which have the head and neck set on wrong.

Always perform the flexions on the move, or the horse will not go freely up to his bit.

The horse, having now learnt the flexions, can be readily 'collected,' and in this condition should be frequently worked both at the walk and trot, and whilst turning and circling, but only for a short time, and he should frequently be given his head and allowed to walk free.

The term 'collected' has been defined as follows:—

*At the halt.*—Standing up to attention with all four legs underneath him, with his weight equally distributed, ready to move in any direction as directed by the rider.

*On the move.*—Limbs well under him, and in such a way that, although on the move, he is ready to act in any way in obedience to an altered desire of the rider.

We can now commence the canter, but until the horse is bitted, the canter cannot be expected to be very collected. The best way to make a young horse canter is from the 'trot short,' by applying in rather an exaggerated manner the aid for canter.

At first the canter should be made on the straight, and afterwards in large circles. Never make your horse canter by increasing the pace of the trot. But always try to make him strike off on the application of the aid. It is too early to expect him to canter from the halt, or to change the leg; that must come later on.

A little reining-back is a useful exercise; by bringing him back on the haunches it lightens his forehead, but little should be done owing to the strain on the hocks.

The best way to teach him is to dismount and rein him back on foot, a few steps at a time, treading on his coronets if necessary to make him pick his feet up, the voice being used to assist.

Half-halts or checks, followed by forward movements, are also most effective, and the bending lesson may be taught.

All these exercises must gradually be increased both in duration and standard, the period varying from six to nine months.

No fixed rule can be laid down as regards the time at which a horse should be bitted, but as soon as he moves freely and collectedly at all paces, does a figure of 8, and flexes on the snaffle, carries his head high, if anything on the high side (as the bit tends to lower the head, and once this has been done, it may take months to correct the fault), we may proceed to bit him.



## 4TH STAGE.

We will suppose that we have decided to bit the horse.

If a light double-bridle is not available, take the Regulation bit, with the reins on the snaffle-ring and top bar.

Certainly don't use a curb for the first few days, during which you should not ask too much of your horse. Just a few simple forward movements, until the horse accustoms himself to the new bit.

You must be very careful to be as light as possible with the hands, and avoid giving him any pain with the increased power which you obtain.

If the horse takes kindly to it, you may put the curb chain on, but only very loosely at first, keeping a sharp look-out for pinches, chafes, or bruises. (On the other hand, if you think it wiser put him back for a little on the snaffle.)

You can now gradually ask more of the horse and perform the following exercises:—

Cantering and circling, half-passage, bending, figure of 8, reining-back, Regulation paces, elementary skill-at-arms, &c.

The more you train your horse on the 'Toujours en avant' principle, the freer your horse will move, both as regards going up to the bit, and moving in a collected and balanced manner. Beware of your horse getting cramped in his paces, especially at the canter. To avoid this, ride him up and down hills, occasionally give him a nice steady gallop, but never race him.

Take him out in the country, ride him up and down steep banks, to bring him back on his hocks; show him strange sights, take him into farm yards, villages, &c.; ride him over rough ground; all these exercises develop his brain, strengthen his body, and improve his cleverness, making him handy and sensible.

Every other day or so take him into the School, for not more than half an hour, gradually bringing him on to what we shall call the finishing stage.

It is a good plan to commence lessons with a good ten minutes' trotting. Firstly, it gets their backs down. Secondly, it starts them straight and brings them back to the hand. Thirdly, this gait supple a horse best, and the legs are stretched without straining them.

Such exercises as are enumerated below are best done to com-

mence with in the School, though part of every lesson should be carried out in the open.

1. Bending lesson; the horse being bent from the poll in the direction in which he is going.
2. Half-passage and passage, flexing on the bit.
3. Striking off at the canter, changing the leg, figure of 8, and Serpentine.
4. Turning on the haunches and centre, reining back.
5. Ladies' chain.
6. Accustomed to firing, motors, aeroplanes, crowds, cheering, flag-waving, &c.
7. Simple troop drill, leaving and passing through the ranks, measured distances, led horses.
8. Skill-at-arms, dummy-thrusting, revolver shooting.
9. Galloping—in pairs and then in line.

The above are a few of the many exercises through which the remount should be put, and according to the age and condition of the horse, the advisability of working him in the Squadron depends.

If possible, it is desirable to train your horse to cover comparatively long distances, accustoming him to the weight of a fully-equipped military saddle, providing that the work be such as would improve his condition and not prematurely break him down.

If opportunities exist, the horse might be practised in swimming, and taken out with the hounds.

All horses that are sent to the ranks before they are six years old should be saved as far as possible, and left at home on long field-days or manœuvres.

#### SUMMARY.

'If the head of a horse is well regulated, you may afterwards manage him as you please, provided his nature and strength will admit of it; for should you not secure his head, it is impossible ever to make him a complete horse, since you have only your hands and heels to manage him, otherwise the most essential parts will fail you.' (Duke of Newcastle.)

In training a horse for the Army two points must be remembered.

1. The average stamp and quality of a remount.
2. The object aimed at, *i.e.* a horse capable of being ridden with only one hand by an average horseman, under every conceivable condition.

With these points in view, some practical and progressive system, such as has been outlined, is essential.

Naturally no fixed rules should be laid down, but a system based on sound principles must be carried out, varying in its method of application according to the age, nature, and condition of each individual horse.

Firmness, patience, and common-sense are essential qualities in a trainer.

There are periods of the training in which great perseverance and patience is required. But providing that too much is not asked of the horse, time will, in nearly every case, fully reward one.

He who wishes to succeed as a trainer must be prepared to meet with many disappointments and possibly accidents.

There is a 'conclusion' at the end of the Duke of Newcastle's famous book, and we cannot do better than copy it verbatim, with apologies.

'You ought to be well informed that the art of horsemanship cannot be collected together in a proverb; nor can there be one universal lesson, as many desire in this art, any more than a universal medicine is an ointment for all wounds. For my part, indeed, I am very sure that there is nothing universal in horsemanship, nor in anything else that I know. If this work pleases you, I shall be thoroughly well satisfied; if not, I shall be content in my own mind; because I know certainly that it is very good, and better than anything that you have had before of the kind.'

#### APPENDIX.

First of all, don't overdo it. Remember that a horse must be gradually built up, and his muscles are not strong enough at the beginning.

Secondly, endeavour to make your horse like jumping, and then he will not cause trouble through refusing.

Lord Harrington at Elvaston teaches his yearlings to jump by making them pop over a low rail to get to their food, increasing the height of the rail as their strength and age progresses.

So with remounts, we can send them either singly or in pairs (making them follow an old horse, who is a good performer, is an excellent practice) down the jumping lane, rewarding them at the further end by a handful of oats or a carrot.

In this way we can teach the horse to associate jumping with pleasure and not with pain.

If you use a whip at all, use it sparingly. Avoid frightening.

Never ask him to do more than he is capable of. Make your jumps small at first, even a pole laid on the ground is sufficient, and gradually increase the obstacle.

Horses can be lunged over small jumps with sliding wings, great care being taken not to job or injure their mouths. As soon as the horse jumps freely and is fit to stand it, the trainer may ride him over small jumps, endeavouring to make the horse go slowly and collectedly up to the jump, and take off from his hocks.

You will find at first that the horse will pitch on his forehand.

To enable him to get back on his hocks, and jump correctly, it is a good plan to move on circles near the jump, then take him up to the jump, rein back a few lengths, and then set him at it.

This method has the double advantage of making him jump off his hocks, as well as preventing him from rushing.

We may now dispense with the wings; this is important, as the horse is thus taught that he must take the place selected by his rider.

Various other forms of jumps can now be used, such as a wall, open ditch, stile, gate, &c.

In the case of a young horse shaping badly at his jumping, we should always try to arrive at the cause.

It is very often due to some weakness or injury, so that jumping actually causes him pain. In which case it should at once be stopped, until the hurt is remedied.

The whole course of jumping must run progressively and in unison with the remainder of his training.

The trainer must realise the temperament of the horse, as his jumping depends a great deal on it.

Some won't jump in cold blood, and others will.

Lastly, remember that the two chief causes of a horse refusing or jumping badly are :—

1. Jumping is associated with pain, either in the mouth or through some physical weakness.

2. Lack of determination in the rider.

'Osses are queer critturs, they know when you are frightened as well as you do.'—(Surtees.)

*'THE CAVALRY JOURNAL' COMMITTEE.*

A MEETING was held at the Royal United Service Institution on December 1, 1911. Present: General Sir John French (in the chair), Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell, Major-General E. R. Allenby, Colonel F. V. D. Wing, Colonel C. W. Trotter, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Leetham. Letters of regret for non-attendance were read from Colonel J. Vaughan, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Yardley, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bauchop.

The Managing Editor submitted his report on the working of the Journal for the past year, and the financial statement (since circulated to O.C.s of Cavalry Regiments), which was considered satisfactory and approved. The accounts show a substantial increase in the credit balance of the Journal.

The committee expressed their approval of the whole get-up of the Journal, particularly with regard to the printing and the excellence of the illustrations.

Lieutenant-Colonel N. M. Smyth, V.C., 6th Dragoon Guards, was appointed sub-editor for South Africa. The managing editor was instructed to write to Major-General A. J. Godley, C.B., the Commandant of the Defence Forces of New Zealand, asking him to kindly undertake the editorial duties in that Dominion during the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bauchop, who is now at the Staff College in England.

The question of the lack of articles contributed to the Journal from the Colonies was considered. Sir Robert Baden-Powell, who is starting on a tour of the world shortly, kindly undertook to interview the Colonial editors with regard to this matter when visiting the respective Colonies.

The question of publishing articles criticising the existing conditions of the Cavalry Services was discussed, and the committee decided the course of action to be adopted in future with regard to the same.

It was decided to allow individual non-commissioned officers and men to purchase single copies of the Journal at the price of 1s. (post free) one month after date, such applications to be made to the Managing Editor.

A cordial vote of thanks was accorded to the honorary editors and sub-editors for their valuable services during the past year.

## **' WORTHY OF THEIR STEEL.'**

BY COLONEL E. A. HERBERT, M.V.O., *late 6th Inniskilling Dragoons.*

It is generally acknowledged that Cavalry of the future will use the rifle far oftener and with greater effect than was ever contemplated a few years ago, and that this can be done without detriment to the chief characteristic of the arm, that of making full use of the horse to close with the adversary when mounted, thus still retaining what is generally known as the Cavalry spirit.

While recognising the importance of the rifle, Cavalry fully realise that if they can get at, or even threaten, the enemy with cold steel, the moral effect will be out of all proportion to that which under ordinary circumstances would be inflicted by the rifle. It is not, however, contended that better results may not at times be brought about by a combination of the two, or that occasions will never arise in which the best effect may not be attained by rifle fire alone. Still the fact remains that Cavalry, like Infantry, are taught that in the end cold steel will be the deciding factor in a modern battle.

Apart from any armament, Cavalry have a great asset in their horses, as the mere fact of being galloped at is in itself sufficiently disconcerting to affect the steadiest of troops. To what extent this may be so depends on their morale and whether physically exhausted at the moment they find themselves likely to be ridden over, and, although the horse alone may be the chief asset to the Cavalry soldier, his arms cannot be ignored.

No fault can be found with the present pattern sword, designed as it is for thrusting; still, in the charge the lance is undeniably a superior weapon, not only to kill with, but its moral effect is far greater.

It may be safely assumed that anybody, whatever branch of an Army he belonged to, had he to be ridden over, would infinitely prefer the process to be by Cavalry armed with the sword rather than the lance, and probably anyone carrying a sword, but no lance, sitting

down to ride in a charge, and finding he was galloping against lances, would wish his luck had carried him against swords.

Further, if it had become apparent to him in sufficient time that all his adversaries were not armed with lances, but some had swords, might there not be the inclination, if it was possible to do so, to shear off and ride for the swordsmen in preference to the lancers? Given a lance, he would consider he had a good sporting chance, whereas with a sword it might occur to him the handicap wasn't quite fair, and that it might be preferable to reserve his energies, in the hope of meeting his opponent on better terms at some future time. What is Colonel Henderson's opinion? 'Science of War,' page 67, we read:—

'We have seen that a rifle is indispensable. A sword, it is generally admitted, must be carried by every mounted man as the best means of protection against a sudden charge; and the rifleman is useless without a bayonet. Controversy is thus confined to the lance, and it may be said at once that the lance is undoubtedly a far more formidable weapon, even if it is not in reality more deadly than the sabre or revolver. Although there are many objections to it, such as its weight, its inconvenience in scouting and detached duties, the time taken up in mastering it, its uselessness in the *mêlée* or in the hands of a second or reinforcing rank, and the fact that its killing power depends altogether on the momentum of the horse, its moral effect is so great that a force carrying it is irresistible in the shock; so much is this the case that it may be doubtful whether a Cavalry armed only with swords and revolvers, if opposed with one armed with lances, would not absolutely decline to cross weapons in the saddle.'

Colonel Henderson then goes on to say: 'Good Cavalry must be trained to use the lance as well as the sabre and rifle,' but that in mountainous and enclosed countries the lance would be an 'intolerable encumbrance.'

This, the opinion of a strictly impartial critic, sums up clearly and concisely the chief points for and against the lance

Its being an impediment to dismounted action and revealing the position of the mounted men carrying it, is dealt with by Sir John French in his preface to 'Cavalry in War and Peace,' and he considers these objections of such minor importance that they need not be considered. That a contrary opinion was held during the South African War does not matter, because this war is held to be abnormal. As to



the lance being useless after the first onslaught, and but an encumbrance in a *mêlée*, does this really signify? History tends to show that one side or the other will give way before a determined charge, that is, one side will turn about, break up, or disperse in some way or other. Whichever happens, it means the victorious Cavalry has accomplished its work, and the subsequent *mêlée*, represented at peace training by men circling round one another, matters but little. Far better after a charge that all should endeavour to rally as quickly as possible and be ready for any emergency, instead of spending valuable time in individual combat, which can have no appreciable effect on the general course of events. If, however, a sword be considered indispensable, it can be carried as well as the lance, the chief objection being the additional weight on the horse, and making a third weapon in the use of which a man has to be trained.

Sir Douglas Haig, in 'Cavalry Studies' (Jhelum), maintains 'that no contact scientifically entered into should end in a *mêlée*,' and General von Bernhardt, in 'Cavalry in War and Peace,' page 121, draws attention to the teaching of Frederick the Great, with which he is in entire accord. It is, 'The attack should not lead to a *mêlée*, but to the breaking up of the enemy.' Bernhardt further shows that long and indecisive attacks ending in a *mêlée* are of little use. On page 175 he says: 'Our lance is an excellent weapon for the charge.' On the other hand, he adds 'that in the close turmoil of the fight it is difficult to handle with success,' or if it goes too far through the body it is difficult to extract and is then unserviceable.

As to the difficulty of using a lance in a 'close turmoil,' otherwise a *mêlée*, we are told that fighting of this kind has but little real effect on the ultimate result of a Cavalry contest.

In a recent number of the 'Militär-Wochenblatt,' General von Gelbsattel criticises a prize essay on 'The best means of arming modern Cavalry,' by an Austrian officer, who maintains the sword is superior to the lance.

With this General von Gelbsattel is not in agreement. He is of opinion that the objections raised against the lance as being an encumbrance, difficult to manage when riding under trees, liable to break, amount to little and can be overcome, or at any rate, minimised.

He strongly insists that the lance is the best weapon, and on this assumption holds that, since the Germans are armed with it, they will

be able to drive even a superior force of Cavalry without lances off the field.

Captain A. Gray, Fourteenth U.S. Cavalry, in 'Cavalry Tactics,' p. 28, says :—

'The lance cannot be used to advantage in a close-wooded country such as is found everywhere along the Atlantic coast. The greatest use of the lance is in the shock. In the *mêlée* the sabre possesses a decided advantage.'

Although, according to Captain Gray, in the War of the Rebellion the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry was the only regiment armed with the lance, it was never used in shock action, and was soon laid aside, no doubt for the reasons given in the above extract.

These few quotations have been taken from writings of practical men, all of whom, while recognising the power of the rifle in the hands of Cavalry, advocate nevertheless the lance for shock action.

What is the opinion of the regimental officers? After all, they should be the best judges. No doubt, a certain number would argue against the lance, that the prerogative of being armed with it belongs to Lancer regiments, and that in South Africa it was found an encumbrance.<sup>1</sup> But, supposing these same officers had to meet European Cavalry straight away, would they not wish they had been armed with the lance?

Those who might hold a contrary opinion must always remember that, even supposing shock tactics did not avail, the lance could always be dispensed with, as was done in the South African War, and fire tactics adopted, provided the peace training had been such that the use of the rifle by mounted troops was thoroughly understood.

It will be said the Cavalry soldier is expected to be trained in so many subjects that time does not allow of making him efficient in all. His training includes reconnaissance, mounted drill leading up to the charge, fire tactics, swordsmanship, and many other minor accomplishments, and if a lance be given him the difficulty will only be increased. Lancer regiments find it possible to train their men, and so did Dragoons and Dragoon Guards when they had the lance. What they

<sup>1</sup> The real objection to carrying the lance in South Africa was that the British horse were generally so badly fed that the Boers could gallop away from them, and therefore the lance was regarded as an encumbrance during the main campaign. Later there were many occasions when regimental officers would have given anything for lances.—Ed. C. J.

did before they will very soon do again. The greater portion of a man's time is given up to mounted drill, though instruction in swordsmanship forms a very important part, and with what result? Watch a charge, even in peace time, with nothing to excite or upset the men. How many will be riding with the sword point directed at the imaginary enemy? The swords are at all angles.

Take the lance, even the most inefficient in its use can always hold it with its point towards the enemy; indeed, when riding, closed up, knee to knee, it is almost impossible to hold it otherwise. Some of the time now given to the sword could more profitably be spent with the lance, without to any extent affecting the efficient use of the former in a charge.

It must be remembered that previous to the South African War all Cavalry regiments, Hussars excepted, were armed with the lance. For some months after the war had been in progress the lance was still carried, but gradually, as the character of the fighting changed, the Boers began to scatter, and irregular warfare became the order of the day, the lance dropped out. It has never resumed its place of importance in the armament of our Cavalry, or the whole of the Cavalry would have been armed with it, instead of limiting its use to Lancer regiments.

After the South African War, for a period in our training, concealment and stalking the enemy were much in vogue, with the idea of damaging him unawares and of protection to ourselves. For these methods it can easily be understood the lance became to be considered an encumbrance. For a time it seemed to have been forgotten that tactics suitable for scouting or for acting against a scattered adversary could never stand against armies trained as modern armies are to act in masses, and overwhelm the enemy by mere force of numbers. It is now recognised that the only method of meeting masses is to bring masses against them; temporary and local advantages may be gained by other means, but no complete victory will be possible.

Assuming, therefore, that in future campaigns the large armies of Continental nations will be employed more or less in concentrated bodies, it follows that, sooner or later, they will have to come into the open, and stand up to one another as was done in former times, and, all things being equal, the best morale and greatest determination will win.

The abolition of the lance might be understood if all fighting was to

be after the standard of the South African War, but this having been admittedly abnormal, there seems to be no justifiable argument against the lance. It cannot be denied that it is to a certain extent an encumbrance when the rifle is used, and that troops armed with lances are more difficult to conceal than if they lacked them, but at the same time the advantages are so great as to outweigh all such objections.

What are the advantages claimed for the lance? Briefly, they are: When opposed to an enemy armed with the lance and trained to ride at his opponent whenever he can possibly do so, the lance becomes a better weapon than the sword. Or, again, if the Cavalry, having successfully accomplished its *rôle* in the opening phases of a campaign, has been kept massed as a general reserve, ready to be launched at the critical moment into the main fight, the advantage of the lance should make itself felt.

Having regard to the uses to which presumably our Cavalry may be put, and that it is destined to act against Cavalry armed with the lance and trained to the highest degree to shock action, there seems to be no adequate reason why the lance was abolished, or that, having been abolished, it should not be reinstated in the position it occupied before the South African War.

Turning to the arms available for Cavalry when employed dismounted, it may be expected that rifle fire would be made use of in the following instances:—

In the opening phases of a campaign to drive detachments of enemy out of temporarily-held positions, or on occasions when it became necessary to deny certain positions to the enemy. Affairs of outposts and night operations would also be the occasion for dismounted action, while possibly in the fight of all arms Cavalry might be compelled to fight on foot and away from their horses. In such cases what arms has the Cavalry soldier?

He has his rifle, and nothing more. In the attack, after having by means of rifle fire forced his way to a certain point, he has no great inducement to close with his adversary. In the defence, if suddenly rushed, he can fire his rifle and then possibly use it as a club; but he has no special means, such as the bayonet would give, of retaliating when at close quarters with his adversary.

In an Infantry fight it is an accepted theory that, generally speaking, good troops will not be driven from a position, excepting by use

of cold steel, the chief use of the rifle being to allow of the attack forcing its way to sufficiently close quarters and so shatter the defence that the bayonet may be brought into use. Again, in the defence it may often be expected that the attack will only be driven back by the use of a counter attack at the right moment, when once more the bayonet will have to be depended on.

The culminating point in the Infantry soldier's training is this hand-to-hand fighting, and by means of the bayonet they have it in their power to carry out their ideal—a bayonet assault.

In the Cavalry the incentive cold steel gives to close with the enemy does not exist, and the great moral effect on troops of merely having a steel weapon in the hand is wanting. It is certainly in the power of Cavalry to fire point blank into the enemy's face, or to club their rifles, though with troops armed with the rifle alone, and who realise the enemy can be damaged by fire from a distance, practically to the same extent as at a point-blank range, there is always a chance that the final determination to advance to the assault may be wanting. This is perhaps the greatest asset a steel arm possesses, that, to be able to use it troops know they have to close with the enemy, which probably means victory when once accomplished.

Is there any good and sufficient reason that Cavalry who may at times be called upon to fight in the same manner as the Infantry have to do, should be handicapped in not being provided with the bayonet? There is surely no cause to fear that a Cavalry, already trained to shock and to rifle tactics, if given a bayonet, will at once lose the Cavalry spirit and degenerate into inferior Infantry, and that therefore it should not be so armed.

The ideal armament would seem to be a lance for the charge, and if the sword was abolished some form of bayonet which could if necessary be used in its place in a mêlée, and also made to fix on to the end of a rifle for use in its ordinary and legitimate way.<sup>1</sup>

If some form of bayonet could be devised on these lines, the sword might be abolished as long as the lance was carried, or, if it was considered necessary to retain the sword, the bayonet need only be of the ordinary type—carried on the man. As to the weight, the sword being abolished, the only addition would be the difference in weight between the sword and the lance, plus the weight of the bayonet; but the latter

<sup>1</sup> This idea is advocated by Lord Roberts in his preface to *War and the Arms Blanche*.

being carried on the man and not attached as a dead weight to the saddle, would considerably lessen this disadvantage. Moreover, if weight was the only objection, it might be possible to lighten the equipment, and thus compensate for the slight increase of weight.

The chief objection to its adoption would probably be that the Cavalry soldier has so many weapons to master it would be out of the question that he should ever be taught to be an expert bayonet fighter.

The reply to this is that no great amount of training would be necessary to be able to use the bayonet for ordinary fighting purposes. The fact of a man being trained with the lance or sword would to a great extent give him an insight into handling the bayonet, and very little additional training would be necessary. Even in the case of the greatest experts with this weapon the chief requirements are physical strength and determination to go for the adversary. These attributes should be common to all well-trained troops, irrespective of any particular arm.

However, even if proficiency was never attained, the moral effect of having cold steel always at hand would of itself be a great incentive in urging the dismounted Cavalry soldier to close with the enemy. Further, it should result in the Cavalry man having greater confidence in himself, and thus add to his independence, which should be a special characteristic of the arm.

It might be urged that if he had a bayonet the Cavalry soldier would have greater inducement to fight on foot than is the case at present, and what is known as the Cavalry spirit might suffer in consequence.


To a properly trained Cavalry and leaders who can draw a just balance between the use of shock and fire action and who recognise that to overthrow the enemy is their sole end and aim, there should be no danger in arming Cavalry with the bayonet; on the contrary, it should give them an advantage the British Cavalry does not now possess, and, above all things, give them greater confidence in their own powers, without which no victory can ever be looked for.

The Yeomanry question has not been touched upon, but the arguments in favour of the bayonet for Regular Cavalry would apply even more forcibly to them, because they have no steel weapon of any kind. Being destined to fight in England, there would so seldom be an opportunity for shock tactics by masses of troops, it is considered

that the short time available for training is more profitably spent in training other than shock.

Still it is quite conceivable that small bodies of the enemy trained on different principles and armed accordingly would, trusting to luck, just ride at their opponents. It is not profitable to discuss what might then happen; suffice to urge it cannot be a sound policy that anyone who is destined to kill, no matter to what arm he belongs, should be turned out, in the hopes of his being able to do so, without a steel weapon of any kind. For this reason alone a bayonet on the lines advocated should be welcome to the Yeoman. He would, at any rate, be better off when dismounted than he now is, and when on his horse he would have a weapon that could be used either as a sword, or, when attached to the rifle, as a lance.

If highly trained armies require the incentive, which a steel weapon undoubtedly gives, to close with the enemy, how much more does this apply to our Territorial Cavalry, who, although destined to meet Continental troops, have not their advantages in training, discipline, or even armament?



*L. Vallet del.*

*By kind permission of Messrs.  
Firmin-Didot & Co., Paris.*




*WHITEHALL.**THE HOME OF 'THE CAVALRY JOURNAL'*

THE Banqueting House, Whitehall, now the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution, and the home of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, is the only remains of the palace occupied as the London residence of the kings of England from Henry VIII. to William III.

Hubert de Burgh built a residence here in the thirteenth century, which he bequeathed to the Convent of Black Friars, in Holborn, who sold it in 1248 to Walter de Grey, Archbishop of York. For nearly three centuries it was the town residence of the prelates of that see, Wolsey being its last archiepiscopal occupant. During this period it was called York House. The old palace at Westminster, which had been the seat of the English kings from Edward the Confessor downward, had now become dilapidated; and as soon as Henry VIII. had dispossessed the proud and magnificent cardinal, he himself took possession of his official mansion, in which he soon made numerous alterations. It comprised a space between Charing Cross and the Sanctuary at Westminster, bounded by the Thames on the east and the wall of the palace park on the west. By the time of James I. this palace of Henry's had become unfit for the residence of the Sovereign, and in 1606 James commenced pulling it to pieces, intending to erect new buildings, and a large banqueting-room had been already finished, when a fire occurred, in 1619, which was so destructive that James now determined upon entirely rebuilding the palace, and Inigo Jones was commissioned to make the designs.

The present existing Banqueting House, commenced in 1619, and completed in two years, at a cost of £17,000, was the only part of the proposed edifice which was executed. Whitehall was the residence of James I., Charles I., Charles II., Cromwell, and James II. In 1691 a considerable portion of the royal residence was destroyed by fire, and in 1698 another fire occurred which proved still more destructive, leaving only the present Banqueting House and some small buildings, including two gateways. Rubens was invited to Whitehall by Charles I. He painted the ceiling of the Banqueting House, for which work he

received £3,000. Charles collected with great taste and judgment some of the finest works of art in Europe. His collection at Whitehall comprised four hundred and sixty pictures, including twenty-eight by Titian, eleven by Correggio, sixteen by Julio Romano, nine by Raffaele, four by Guido, and seven by Parmegiano. During the Civil War these treasures were seized and ordered to be sold for the benefit of Ireland and the North; but those which contained representations savouring of superstition, as pictures of the Virgin, were ordered to be burned. To the credit of Cromwell, when the times had become more peaceable he exerted himself to restore the collection of Charles; and we are indebted to him for the Cartoons of Raffaele, which he re-purchased.



WHITEHALL—THE BANQUETING HOUSE—1649.

In the Banqueting House were held some of the many fêtes and masques of the time of James I., whose bust by Le Sueur stands at the northern end; and it was used for like revelries in the days preceding the Civil War. To the Green Chamber of Whitehall Palace, on that chill Tuesday morning of January 30, 1649, his Majesty King Charles I. walked firmly between the files of soldiers from his last night's resting-place in St. James's Palace, where he had been from noon on the previous Saturday. Here he was allowed to be alone for some time with the faithful Juxon, who gave him the Sacrament. Thence he passed through the Banqueting House, and out of a window of the vestibule, on to the scaffold in the open street, erected in front of the building. After the execution the body was brought into the Banquet-

ing House, and here Cromwell came at midnight and spent a prolonged period of solitary musing at the side of the deceased monarch. From the Banqueting House the body, after being embalmed, was removed to Windsor for interment. An inscription on brass has been placed in the hall to recall the tragedy.

It was in this same building that Oliver Cromwell in 1657, in addressing the Parliament which he had summoned, made his famous speech declining the Crown which had been offered to him by a party of his adherents. And in this hall, on the restoration, Charles II. received the felicitations of both Houses of Parliament, while they received from him assurances of future well-doing. When James II., restless and uneasy, was waiting for what he must have felt was at least a possible fate, he ordered a weathercock to be placed where he might learn with his own eye whether the wind was Protestant or Papist. The wind turned Protestant and James took his departure; the weathercock still stands on the end of the Banqueting House. On February 13, 1688, both Houses of the Convention waited on the Prince and Princess of Orange in this hall to offer them the Crown, and the same day William and Mary were publicly proclaimed King and Queen.

On the accession of the Hanoverians the Banqueting House assumed a new rôle, for the Government turned it into a chapel. In it the ceremonies connected with the distribution of the Sovereign's Maundy benefactions took place annually until 1890. One of the last public acts of King William IV. was the reopening in state on April 30, 1837, of the Chapel Royal, and from that date to the last day of 1890 the building, though never consecrated, was utilised for religious purposes.

In 1895 the Banqueting House was by the command of Queen Victoria handed over to the control of the Council of the Royal United Service Institution for the purposes of a museum of naval and military exhibits.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL has been published at the Institution since its commencement in 1906.

A. L.





**INTERIOR—THE BANQUETING HALL—WHITEHALL.**

**The Royal United Service Museum.**





TROOPER THOMAS BROWN.

*TROOPER THOMAS BROWN,  
OF  
DETTINGEN FAME.*

BY CHARLES DALTON, F.R.G.S.

THIS valiant dragoon was born at Kirkleatham, in the North Riding of Yorkshire, about 1715. His father was a blacksmith. Tom Brown was apprenticed at an early age to a shoemaker at Yarm. When George II. cast in his lot with the Queen of Hungary's cause, in 1742, 16,000 British troops were ordered to embark for Flanders in the summer of that year. Each corps in the expeditionary force had to be brought up to war strength. The King's Own Dragoons (Honeywood's) had for many years been a favourite regiment with Yorkshiremen. Since 1712 the lieutenant-colonelcy had been held by a native of Halifax, who had a partiality for his own county as a good recruiting ground. Thus it was that Tom Brown enlisted in the King's Own Dragoons. A few remarks about Brigadier-General Joshua Guest, the lieutenant-colonel of this corps, in 1742, may be of interest, as his extraordinary career has been omitted in the regimental records. He commenced life as an ostler at Boroughbridge, and enlisted in 1685, then aged twenty-three, in a Dragoon regiment (probably the "Third"). He was commissioned cornet in the 3rd Dragoons, 1704, and lieutenant-colonel in 1712. For his distinguished service he was permitted to retain his post in the regiment long after he had been promoted a brigadier. When his corps embarked for Flanders, Guest did not accompany it, being in his eightieth year, but continued on full pay until July, 1743, when he was retired on half-pay. It is recorded of Guest that it was his habit to send out food to the sentry outside his door, remarking: 'I remember when I stood sentinel I often had abundant cause to envy those at dinner inside.' In 1745 Lieutenant-General Guest was sent to Scotland as Governor of Edinburgh Castle, which he held against Prince Charlie and the Jacobite forces. He died in 1747, and achieved Westminster Abbey.

On arrival at Ostend, the King's Own Dragoons marched to Lierre, near Antwerp. For over six months the British troops and their allies (Austrians, Hanoverians, and Hessians) in the Low Countries were kept inactive and uncertain of their objective. The forward movement did not begin till February. On March 23 (new style) a council of war was held by Lord Stair, at Aix-la-Chapelle, when all the British generals agreed unanimously to the proposed immediate march into Germany. Two months later, the army encamped at Hochst-on-the-Main, near Hanau, and then marched to Aschaffenberg. There is no need to touch upon the superior strategy of the French Commander-in-Chief, as the British and their allies broke through his 'mousetrap' (*souricière*) at Dettingen, on the memorable June 16 (old style). The King's Own Dragoons (then generally called 'Bland's') charged the French Household Cavalry no less than three times during the aforesaid sanguinary engagement. It was in the third charge that Private Tom Brown immortalised himself. The best account of his doughty deeds is given in *The Gentleman's Magazine* for October, 1743:—

'Private Thomas Brown, late of Bland's Regiment, had two horses killed under him as they were forming themselves into the line before they engaged the Gens d'Arms (*sic*), sword in hand. Just as he was going to dismount, to take up the Standard which had been dropped by the cornet, who received a wound in his wrist, he had two fingers of the bridle-hand chopped off, at which time his horse took fright and ran away with him, quite to the rear of the enemy, before he could stop him. In the meantime the Household Troops were disputing the Standard with us, and had formed a circle in order to take it, which they soon succeeded in, they being nine deep, to our three. As the Gens d'Arms, in possession of it, was riding to secure it in their rear, our brave Dragoon immediately formed a design of re-taking it, and for that purpose made a feint as if he was retreating towards his regiment, at about eighty yards distance, with his pistol hanging to his wrist, when on a sudden he made furiously towards the Gens d'Arms and, presenting his pistol, shot him through the head. The Standard happened to fall into his arms; otherwise he would not have had time to dismount for it, upon which he clapped it between his legs and rode as fast as he could through the ranks of the enemy, in doing which he received five wounds in his face, head, and neck, two balls lodged in his back, three went through his hat. and he rejoined his regiment in



a very weak condition, as may be imagined, who gave him three huzzas on his arrival. He was about six weeks ill of his wounds, and came over in the *Mary* yacht from Rotterdam, which brought his Grace the Duke of Marlborough, and now does duty in the Horse Guards.'

Another account says: 'His nose and upper lip were nearly severed from his face; a terrible gash, from the top of his forehead, crossed his left eye. . . . He stood five feet eleven inches. George II. offered Brown a commission in the army, but his not being able to write prevented his acceptance of it. The King placed Brown near his person in the Life Guards. As the balls in his back could not be extracted he was obliged to quit the Service. He had a pension of £30 per annum, and died at Yarm, of his wounds, January, 1746, aged thirty-one.'<sup>1</sup>

Under date of 1871, a Yorkshire historian and topographer writes: 'Mr. George Smith, farmer, Kirkleatham, grand-nephew of the "bold Dragoon," has in his possession the identical sword with which Brown fought his way through the enemy's ranks—the blade of which is a yard long, straight, with a brass hilt, basket shaped.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hone's *Year Book*, London, 1832, p. 727.

<sup>2</sup> Sheahan's *History and Topography of the North Riding of Yorkshire*, vol. ii., p. 798.





## MACHINE GUNS WITH CAVALRY

### THE GERMAN REGULATIONS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE KAISER MANŒUVRES, 1909

(Translation of an article by Lieutenant P. Boeresen, 5th Roumanian Hussars,  
in the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*.)

THE duties of machine-gun units, attached to the advanced Cavalry of an Army in the field, demand great mobility and highly developed fire discipline. They must, therefore, be thoroughly imbued with the Cavalry spirit.

Their tactical operations will generally fall under the following heads, viz :—

1. Taking part in dismounted fire action; thereby reducing the number of cavalymen to be dismounted.

2. Attachment to reconnoitring and other detachments having special duties to perform. In Austria, such attachment of machine guns will with advantage take the place of the rifle battalions formally attached to Cavalry forces.

3. Co-operation in Cavalry action proper. The attachment of machine guns to advanced troops, combined with a full use of their mobility, will often make it possible to bring fire to bear upon the hostile Cavalry before the shock takes place; thus contributing to decisive results.

Whereas machine guns with Infantry can only hope to surprise the enemy by means of good use of the ground, the rapidity and mobility of Cavalry machine guns (ever on the lookout, in common with all mounted troops, for fleeting opportunities) are important factors in favour of gaining success in unexpected attacks.

The range, power, and concentration of machine-gun fire conduce to great and rapid effect at a given point; though the difficulties of ammunition supply make prolonged fire action, at unsuitable targets, inadvisable. In the case of action being prolonged, and the machine

guns subjected to Artillery fire, they may be withdrawn out of action and husbanded for the decisive moment. An example of this occurred on the third day of the manœuvres (September 15).

An instance of machine guns enabling a Cavalry force to break down hostile resistance at certain occupied points occurred on the first day of the manœuvres.

‘Werder’s Division had begun to advance, at about 11.50 a.m., *via* Stachenhausen (which had been evacuated by the enemy) and Ginsbach on Krautheim. On its being reported that Alt-Krautheim was occupied by the enemy, orders were received by the advanced guard, about 12.30 p.m., to seize the village and the Jagst bridge beyond it, while the main body deployed near Ginsbach. The weak hostile parties, however, at once evacuated Alt-Krautheim. The first resistance offered was beyond the bridge, on the railway, to deal with which two dismounted squadrons deployed from the exit from Alt-Krautheim, supported by a machine-gun detachment, which rode up to the heights to the north-east of Krautheim, and by a battery on the heights north-west of Unter-Ginsbach. The enemy’s resistance was broken by 1.15 p.m.’

The following is a striking example of the action of the same machine-gun detachment in covering the repair of the demolished bridge:—

‘The repair of the bridge was carried out under cover of the fire of the machine-gun detachment. . . . At 1.45 p.m. the advanced guard was ordered to cross the Jagst. The Olga Dragoon Regiment and one machine-gun section advanced under cover of the fire of the two remaining machine-gun sections and of the battery, and quickly drove back the weak parties of the enemy. The machine-gun sections then galloped across the bridge alternately, so that their fire was not interrupted. . . .’

The officer commanding the machine guns must be acquainted with the general situation and with the Cavalry commander’s intentions. During the manœuvres under discussion, a ‘communication officer’ of the 3rd Machine Gun Detachment was constantly with the Divisional Headquarters. He mostly had at his disposal a well-mounted ‘one-year volunteer.’

The machine-gun detachment was frequently brought up for action, especially when the Division met with the slightest opposition on the


march or when dismounted action was contemplated. With a rear-guard, machine guns were used very much as with an advanced guard. They usually marched last and covered the retirement of the other arms. But in that case they require an escort of at least a troop, to cover their flanks and to protect the ammunition wagons during the process of limbering and unlimbering. The German Cavalry Regulations (p. 504), however, limit the necessity for an escort under such circumstances to intersected or broken ground.

In the Austrian Manœuvres of 1908 cyclist companies were attached to the Cavalry Divisions for escort duty with the machine guns. This arrangement worked well; though the *Deutsche Offizierblatt* (No. 23 of 1909) remarked that it scarcely seemed applicable to the rôle of Cavalry Divisions immediately on mobilisation, owing to the absence of permanent *cadres* of cyclist troops. The drawback of having no Cavalry escort with machine guns was unpleasantly obvious on the last day of the manœuvres; the example also proves the disadvantage of undue separation of single machine-gun sections.

'On September 17, at daybreak, the advance of hostile Infantry against Werder's Division, at Schweigern, was apparent. Urach's Brigade (of that Division) held the western edge of Schweigern with the machine guns. . . . About 6 a.m. the Brigade fell back towards Dainbach, under cover of repeated carbine fire and one section of machine guns. The Commander of the Brigade (Herzog Von Urach) had that morning, at Schweigern, divided his machine-gun detachment into two parts; one section, at the railway station, was to hold small bodies of Cavalry and Infantry, coming from Epplingen, in check, while the other two sections were posted at the western exit from Schweigern. As the dismounted Cavalrymen fell back from the western edge of the village (under pressure of the threatening advance of the enemy's Infantry) and retired in the direction of Dainbach, under cover of the fire of the two machine-gun sections referred to, no Cavalry escort remained with the machine guns thus left behind. Even the direction of the Brigade's retirement was not communicated to them, as the 'communication officer' was only able to take the order himself to the section at the railway station. So the machine guns fell back, in thick fog over a bad road, by way of Bobstadt-Neunkirchen, and, as might have been expected, they were surprised, while in columns of route, about 900 yards to the west of Ulttingshof, by a hostile squadron, and

This example shows the result of failure to comply with the regulations laid down, to the effect that the constant attachment of a few

MAP I.



a. 1st phase of fight.  
b. 2nd       "       "  
c. 3rd       "       "  
d. 4th       "       "  
b'. Deployment of Bavarians.

The co-operation of machine guns in Cavalry action is illustrated

by the great attack of the 'Blue' Cavalry Corps delivered against the 'Red' Cavalry Division on September 15.

'In the *bataille de rencontre*, between the "Blue" Bavarian (Gebaattel's) Division and the "Red" (Starckloff's) Division, at height 375, close to the south-west edge of Erfeld (*vide* Sketch Map 1 (a) and (b)), the result—owing to the superiority of the "Red" force and the advantage it possessed from the nature of the ground—might have been disastrous for the Bavarians, except for the machine guns and horse batteries (of Werder's Division), which were immediately brought into action, and thus saved the situation (*vide* Sketch Map 1 (a)).

'Werder's Division had come up, about 12.45 p.m., from Erbsenberge<sup>1</sup> through Altheim. At the bifurcation of the roads leading to Erfeld and Waldstetten respectively, the Divisional Commander<sup>2</sup> directed one Brigade (Knoezer's) with the Artillery to move, on the right, along the road to Erfeld; while the other Brigade (Urach's) with the machine guns marched, on the left, by the road leading to Waldstetten.

'Towards 1.15 p.m., as Urach's Brigade debouched from the northern edge of the wood, he saw a long column of hostile Cavalry away to the north-west of him, moving along the road from Waldstetten to Erfeld. The Divisional [*sic*] Commander ordered up the machine guns at once in support of the advanced guard. They came into action at about 1300 yards' range and continued firing at the hostile column for about 25 minutes. Almost simultaneously, dismounted men of the Olga Dragoon Regiment occupied the edge of the wood to the east of the road (*vide* Sketch Map 1 (a)). This unexpected and combined fire would, in the judgment of the umpires, have caused the enemy heavy loss. But, as so often happens in manœuvres, the enemy (owing to a strong contrary wind) knew nothing about this overwhelming fire having been opened upon him; the fire of the machine guns and the dismounted men was then turned upon his attacking squadrons.

'The 26th Dragoon Regiment had remained on horseback and advanced towards the enemy. Notwithstanding the rapid developments of a Cavalry engagement the machine guns (owing to their being in advance and to a flank of their Cavalry as it went forward) were able to take up three consecutive positions and to continue firing

<sup>1</sup> About 2 kilometres south-west of Altheim. <sup>2</sup> With a view to facilitating deployment.

until immediately before the collision occurred (*vide* Sketch Map 1 (a), (b), and (c)).

'About 1.30 p.m. the other (Knoerzer's) Brigade, moving along the road towards Erfeld, debouched from the wood and saw the fluctuating fight in progress on height 375. The battery was at once brought into action at the edge of the wood and fired upon the hostile batteries (which were thus compelled to change front), while the Brigade advanced from the flank against the hostile Cavalry (Starckloff's Division) (*vide* Sketch Map 1 (b)).

'The latter was unable to deliver a timely and combined counter-attack against fresh troops and was driven back in a northerly direction. As it fell back it was once more attacked by the regiments of Urach's Brigade and came under the fire of his machine guns from two separate positions (Sketch Map 1 (c)).

'The umpires decided that the Cavalry Corps was not in a position to carry out an immediate pursuit, so a pause in the fighting ensued.

'Urach's Brigade then advanced to height 415, to the east of Waldstetten, and from there his machine guns were able to bring their fire to bear upon the retiring enemy.'

This almost classic example admits of many deductions being made—most of which will be found in the German Cavalry Drill, Part III. The presence of the machine guns with the advanced troops, the use made of their great mobility, the good choice of positions, &c., are all points worthy of notice. The independent and prompt action of the officers commanding machine guns, during a Cavalry engagement, as well as timely measures with a view to various eventualities, must also be noted.


Another example of the support of a Cavalry attack by machine guns (as also of their action against hostile machine guns) occurred on the afternoon of September 16 (*vide* Sketch Map 2).

'After the Bavarian Division had extricated itself, not without severe loss, from the unexpected fire of a hostile Cavalry Division on the heights on both sides of Hohenstadt, it succeeded in re-forming behind the heights lying to the south of Enbigheim. The "Red" Cavalry Division did not pursue, though small parties pushed forward east of the railway in a southerly direction. This advance of the hostile Cavalry caused the Corps Commander to order Werder's Division

(about 3.30 p.m.) to support the Bavarian Division on the ground lying to the north of Berolzheim.

'General Werder's Division thereupon promptly advanced with three regiments and machine guns, while the battery was left (covered by one regiment) in its original commanding position (Sketch Map 2).

'Immediately to the south of the small wood on the Berolzheim-



- a. Original position of Werder's Division.
- b. Speidel's Division after the unexpected outburst of fire.
- b.' Artillery of Speidel's Division.
- c. Artillery of Werder's Division.
- d. Attack of Werder's Division.
- e. 30th Brigade.
- f. Artillery of 28th Infantry Division.

Enbigheim road, part of the "Red" Cavalry Division (*i.e.* 30th Brigade) was met with, on its way back to Hohenstadt. Notwithstanding its prompt reinforcement by part of the 28th Brigade and machine guns it was driven back towards Hohenstadt.

'Pursuit was not allowed by the umpires, as hostile artillery on the heights north-west of Hohenstadt opened fire upon Werder's Division.

'The 3rd Machine Gun Detachment, without seeking cover or any other advantage, opened fire where they were (from the carriage) upon the advancing hostile Cavalry. As the enemy's machine guns came into action on the south-east edge of the Fohberg, fire was directed upon them, in order either to silence them or, at all events, to divert their fire from the Cavalry.'

Now it appears from the German Cavalry Drill as if Artillery only should be treated in that way. But episodes in the manœuvres show that hostile machine guns can also be combated in the same way. It should be noted that the hostile Cavalry attacked the machine guns in the most correct manner. It endeavoured to 'hold' the machine guns, with the smallest possible force, in order to divert their fire from the main body. Only about one squadron of 'Red' Dragoons charged in single rank from several directions at once. But as the other squadrons were driven back, this squadron was obliged to fall back as well.

An instance of machine guns contributing to the success of Cavalry against Infantry occurred on the first day of the manœuvres.

'General Werder's Division heard from Obendorf, on which it was advancing, about 4 p.m. (*vide* General Manœuvre Map) that hostile Infantry was on the heights east of Ballenberg. As that Infantry was soon seen to be advancing over the heights, and deploying, the Divisional Commander ordered his machine guns and battery to open fire from a position west of Oberndorff, while the Division attacked.

'The charge was launched about 4.45 p.m. against the hostile battalion, to whose assistance a large part of a second battalion hurried up. Owing to the excellent preparation by the machine guns, the charge was adjudged to have been successful, though owing to the casualties suffered and the arrival of hostile Artillery on the heights east of Mersingen, the umpires decided against the fruits of victory being enjoyed.'

The following example shows the increased power of dismounted Cavalry for holding a given frontage if supported by machine guns:—

'On September 15, after the "Red" Cavalry Division had been driven from the field (*vide* example above and Sketch Map 1), in view of the advance of hostile Infantry columns from the westward, the Cavalry Divisions were ordered, about 3.20 p.m., to occupy the edge of the plateau west [*sic*—? east] of Waldstetten; General Gebattel's



Division to the north of the road leading to Erfeld, and General Werder's Division to the south of it.

'Owing to the superiority of the enemy's Artillery fire, the edge of the plateau was held by thin firing lines, the main body and machine guns being held back under cover; while the batteries were also withdrawn out of hostile fire.

'About 4.30 p.m. the advance of hostile Infantry towards Waldstetten declared itself, and the Divisional Commander (Werder)—Geb-sattel's Division had been sent meanwhile towards Altheim—sent one regiment of each brigade into the firing line and brought up the machine guns into position awaiting eventualities (*vide* Sketch 1 (d) and (d 1)). The battery also re-opened fire upon the enemy's Infantry.

'In view of the enemy's superior strength the Divisional Commander decided to break off the engagement (about 5 p.m.) and fell back on Gerichtsstetten. Soon after the heights east of Waldstetten were evacuated they were crowned by hostile parties, and Artillery fire was directed upon the Cavalry rearguard as it fell back. The enemy, however, did not advance in force beyond Waldstetten, so that about 6.15 the Cavalry Division was able to halt for the night on the northern edge of Gerichtsstetten.'

Machine guns acting on the defensive should usually avoid prolonged action and await a decisive moment, when the line of the enemy's main advance has declared itself; whether they should be held back in reserve, or be placed ready in position, must depend upon circumstances. The chief factor is a good open field of fire.


The fourth day of the manœuvres afforded an example of the employment of machine guns in a previously prepared defensive position (*vide* Sketch Map 3).

'The 27th Infantry Division was to attack the line Bretzingen-Erfeld (from the direction of Pulfringen-Brehmen), on September 16. It had been originally intended that the Cavalry Corps should co-operate on the left flank of that Division; but owing to reports of strong columns of hostile Infantry moving (from Mudau) on Buchen, the Cavalry Divisions (with a view to delaying the enemy's advance), received the following order: "The Bavarian Division will occupy the heights south-east of Altheim, fronting westward; the Württemberg Division will occupy the heights to the north-east of that village (Altheim)."

'Towards 9.30 a.m. strong detachments of (hostile) Infantry were seen between Rinschheim and Altheim, which took cover in a northerly direction from the fire of the Bavarian batteries, machine guns, and dismounted men.

'Similarly, towards 9.45 a.m. strong masses of hostile Cavalry were seen to the north-west of Altheim, moving by the main road (*chaussée*) leading to Waldürn, and fire was opened upon them by the Artillery, machine guns, and dismounted men. It is obvious from this incident

MAP 3.



*Explanation.*

- a. Defensive position of Werder's Division.
- b. Defensive position of Speidel's Division.
- c. Attack of 29th Infantry Division.
- d. Artillery of 29th Infantry Division.

that machine guns may usefully be employed from the very outset of a defensive action, if they can command important lines of approach, or bring unexpected fire to bear upon large and compact masses of hostile troops coming up.

'About 10 a.m. the appearance of fresh hostile Artillery and Infantry in the hollow up which the Altheim-Waldürn main road runs made it fairly obvious that the enemy intended to deploy his column (the 29th Infantry Division, which had come up by way of Rinschheim) towards his left with a view to attacking the Altheim heights.

‘Between 10 and 10.30 a.m., after various hostile columns had been more than once subjected to machine-gun (and other) fire, their deployment came under the carbine fire of both Cavalry Divisions. (It is this phase of engagement that is indicated on Sketch Map 3.) Apparently, the enemy intended to direct his main attack against the heights held by Werder’s Cavalry Division.

‘About 10.45 a.m., in view of the enemy’s development of superior force, General Werder’s Division evacuated its position and fell back.’

Emphasis is laid, in the Cavalry Drill Book, upon the employment of machine-gun detachments without sub-division. The manœuvres, however, afford a number of examples of the employment of separate sections. For instance, in the engagement of September 15 (referred to above; Sketch Map 1 (d)).

‘General Gebssattel’s Division, about 4.10 p.m., occupied a position on the heights east of Altheim, with one brigade on each side of the road from Gerichtsstetten (the third brigade being held in reserve). The machine guns were divided between the two brigades in front line.’

Again, on the fourth day of the manœuvres, a regiment of Dragoons was sent forward with one section of machine guns only. After a successful action against one or two hostile companies, the Dragoon Regiment rejoined its Division. Such employment of single machine-gun sections is authorised in the Machine-Gun and Cavalry Drill Books, though the use of single isolated machine guns is forbidden. On the other hand, it is laid down that only under exceptional circumstances will it be advisable to concentrate several machine-gun detachments together. Two machine guns together at a given point will usually afford the best results.

The following example of such employment of two machine guns may be cited:—

‘On September 15, General Urach’s Brigade went into billets at Gerichtsstetten about 6.15 p.m. In addition to patrols, one machine-gun section was pushed forward towards Erfeld and was posted in a mill about halfway between that place and Gerichtsstetten. Another section was posted at the south-eastern exit from Gerichtsstetten. The latter repulsed a hostile squadron, which came up about 1 a.m., with heavy loss.’

The second example is as follows:—

‘Late in the evening of September 16, information was received to

the effect that hostile Infantry was in the vicinity. The security of the billet in Wolchingen was increased by posting a machine-gun section at the exit of the village towards Angelthürm (*vide* General Map of Manœuvres).

Several small hostile forces, both Cavalry and Infantry, were kept at a distance by the fire of that section until about 8.30 p.m., when a strong Infantry advanced guard (followed by a long column) made its appearance. The advanced guard was compelled to halt; but at last, on the development of superior force, the machine-gun section at the western exit of the village (as also another section which had come into action on the southern slope of height 342, immediately north-west of Wölchingen) was forced to fall back.'

In conclusion, the following remarks and observations are offered :—

In view of the latest opinions with regard to the dismounted action of Cavalry, according to which not only carbines but bayonets will play an important part in any future war, the work of Cavalry machine guns in connection with such dismounted action must be taken into consideration. The German Cavalry machine gun is considerably heavier than that used with Infantry, and it seems questionable whether it could be carried for any distance by the gun's crew (as laid down in the Machine-Gun Drill Book), so as to keep up with any advance by 'rushes,' made by dismounted men using their carbines. In the present writer's opinion, the best solution would be the introduction of a light Maxim machine gun for the Cavalry. At present the weight of the gun is such that the team of four horses only is inadequate. In many cases the horses were overworked and incapable of bringing the guns up over bad ground as quickly as was desired.

In the example cited above (Sketch Map 3), where two machine-gun sections were put out of action, the latter came up as fast as possible to where the third section was already in action (and apparently hard pressed); it was only possible with the greatest exertions to get two machine guns into position on the height and with two extra horses (taken from the ammunition wagons) hitched to each gun. Those machine-gun sections by the end of the day had covered over 30 miles altogether.

The weight per horse is greater than with Horse Artillery, and the mobility of machine guns, therefore, is less than that of Cavalry or of

Horse Artillery. A third pair of horses is necessary if the machine guns are to be capable of accompanying Cavalry over all kinds of ground.

According to the *Deutsche Offizierblatt* (No. 34 of 1909), three armoured motors armed with machine guns took part in the manoeuvres under consideration. One was a Daimler, with an armoured superstructure manufactured by the Remscheider Steel Works. The two others were built by the French firm, Charron, Girardot & Voigt for Russia, and had been purchased from there by Germany.

According to the *Lokal Anzeiger* (September 4, 1909), one vehicle was a German Mercedes car, armoured by the workshops of the communication troops. These three motor machine guns were accompanied by a Bussing motor wagon, carrying ammunition. It is suggested that such machine guns might be used with a Cavalry Division in night operations (when a searchlight would be affixed to the car above the gun) for the defence of special points or for rapid action against flanking movements, &c.

An article in the *Militär Wochenblatt* (No. 6 of 1909) considers that such motor machine guns might be valuable adjuncts to the advanced Cavalry of an army for extended reconnaissance. They would, it is claimed, be effective against heads of hostile columns, &c. advancing, while even strong bodies of Cavalry met with on the road would be almost powerless against them.

## *THE GERMAN CAVALRY MANŒUVRES OF 1911*

BY CECIL BATTINE.

It is easy to foresee that the term of service of Infantry will be still further reduced at any rate in Germany and France, and consequently that the Cavalry will be looked upon as the essentially professional arm while the others are approaching nearer and nearer to what used to be called a Militia Army. In Germany the horse soldier serves three years instead of two. In France every squadron has a proportion of professional non-commissioned officers and troopers, and it has already been found expedient to increase them. The writer was fortunate enough to be present at the Army Manœuvres in Germany in which a powerful force of Cavalry, including the Guard Division, took part. In peace the Cavalry of the Guard is the only organised division of Cavalry. Before the Army Manœuvres the Cavalry had a special concentration, to which the Kaiser invited Sir John French, and which took place in July, just as the negotiations concerning Morocco were approaching a critical phase. The Army Manœuvres took place on the borders of Mecklenburg and Pomerania, due north of Berlin, and were abruptly terminated before their conclusion on receipt of the diplomatic Note in which the French demanded the Protectorate over Morocco, since agreed to by Germany. The operations were reckoned to begin on Monday, September 11, and the idea was an invasion of Germany from the shores of the Baltic, of which invading army (Red) two corps were seeking to attack the flank of the defenders (Blue) in the Elbe Valley. Two Blue corps were detached to hold them in check. At the outset the Red invader was more concentrated than the defender, one of whose divisions, the 41st, occupied a line of observation along the coast. The remaining three divisions, all of the Guards corps, were on the march, and were south of Prenzlau. The independent Cavalry of Red consisted of but a single brigade, 15 squadrons; Blue, however, disposed of the Guard Cavalry division, 28 squadrons. Red sent his independent

Cavalry to cut connection between Blue defenders and their main army to the westward. Blue used his division to hold in check the Red advance by hanging on the enemy's flank and fighting dismounted. One opportunity was found in three days' operations for a mounted attack on an important scale, for German manœuvres seldom pass without one such attack.

From many points of view the manœuvres were disappointing to those who sought information about German methods and German tactics. The political situation was so grave at the time that the principal anxiety of the chief of the army must have been absorbed in preparing for the rapid dispersal of the assembled army corps at any moment rather than on mimic warfare. The terrain, too, was cut up by lakes and woods in a remarkably degree, although traversable by Cavalry where these obstacles did not exist. The woods, which in war would have furnished priceless cover to the mounted arm when lying in wait for its prey, were not permitted to be used except on rare occasions. The fear of destroying the copses by fire after the extraordinarily dry, hot season was probably the reason. The operations therefore inevitably wore a listless appearance, and the unreal conditions reacted with especial force on the Cavalry. It was nevertheless apparent that great progress had been made in the handling of Cavalry to fight on foot without relinquishing the *rôle* of mounted shock, and also the combined action of the squadrons and machine-gun batteries gave evidence of patient rehearsal, and of considerable grip by unit commanders of sound battle tactics.

For the first time in Germany aeroplanes were used at manœuvres and accomplished results which left no doubt as to their usefulness in war. The advance of an army along main roads by day can no longer be hidden from the observation of its enemy, however efficiently the duty of screening and outpost be performed. In order to make an approach march unknown to the foe darkness, or at any rate the cover of woods or mountain passes, must be utilised. The new invention has a most important bearing on the *rôle* of Cavalry, for not only is its so-called strategical duty vastly curtailed, and on important eventualities altogether eliminated, but its utility as a fighting arm is proportionately increased. The comparative feeble action of Cavalry in modern battles has been due to a number of circumstances, such as the non-existence of competent chiefs, the superstitious dread of modern firearms, and the

tendency to employ the squadrons skirmishing on foot, instead of decisively on horseback, so noticeable in the American Civil War. But unquestionably the principal reason has been the demands made upon the arm in executing detached duties, with the object of concealing and protecting the march of the Infantry and Artillery. So exhausting have these duties proved, and so likely to scatter the Cavalry when the decisive moment arrived, that when the chance has occurred for such decisive attacks as Murat was wont to deliver with ten thousand riders at a single throw, the available mounted force has rarely exceeded one-tenth of that strength, the effective, in fact, of a single battalion of Infantry. The same horses cannot be ridden many hundreds of miles across country with from 18 to 20 stone on their backs on detached duties, and also be available for decisive action as if they had marched serenely along the road to the field of battle, like Napoleon's Cuirassiers. With the extension of the modern battlefield, Cavalry will often prove to be the only reserve capable of reaching a given point in time to save a critical situation. If it can fight on foot as well as on horseback; and if scouting is principally confided to aerial reconnaissance, its power on the battlefield under brave and skilful commanders will be as great as in the wars of the Empire. So the chiefs of the German Army believe, and the care they take of their Cavalry regiments demonstrates their adherence to this creed.

The German Cavalry is better mounted than any other in Europe. It has plenty of horses, and its leaders consider it more important to have enough horses than to have an insufficient number exquisitely groomed. Horses are not put into the ranks of the squadrons until they are old enough to stand the strain; consequently they last longer, and the horsing of the German Cavalry costs much less than ours, in proportion to respective size. Great care is devoted to the training of horses, and all regiments have attained remarkable accuracy of movement in manœuvre. They march well, deploy quickly, and are able to change formation or position with great speed and smoothness. Squadrons are taught to attack in line, column, or in 'swarm,' which may be a swarm of open files closing on the objective, or a swarm created by the necessity to charge before the column has deployed into line. While accuracy and even rigidity is demandel at manœuvres, leaders are taught to use their squadrons in action as required. No sealed pattern exists for battle. There may be several lines of échelons



of varying strength. The attack on horseback may be prepared and supported by fire of machine guns and dismounted squadrons. A great tendency is observable to substitute machine gun sections for the *rôle* hitherto theoretically assigned to Horse Artillery. But even in 1870 the horse batteries were generally found engaged in the general line of Artillery and helping to form the 'ribs' of the German line of battle.

It is not to be assumed that the German Cavalry is faultless. Fortunately other people make mistakes besides ourselves, but it is no part of our business to assist the rulers of continental States by criticism of their armed forces, friendly or otherwise. On the one hand, it is of the most urgent importance to notice what they do as well or better than ourselves, and to take advantage of the knowledge if we can.

At manœuvres the squadrons are weak, seldom averaging more than 90 horses in the ranks, and often less. The equipment on the whole is good, and the horses endured the long hours under arms without considerable casualties. The perfect military saddle has yet to be invented, nor can it be said that we have much to learn from the Germans in turning out our squadrons; yet we might even in this respect pay attention to their logical and practical methods. For as a rule they do nothing for scenic effect, but everything with an eye to its real purpose. This year the army still wore its traditional uniforms; the red, green, black, blue, and white tunics of the horsemen enlivened the whole manœuvre area. Next year we shall probably see the new grey-green service tunic with which all troops are already provided.

All German Cavalry is armed with both sword and long lance of hollow steel. While the possession of the lance carries with it important moral and material advantages, it may be doubted whether it is worth retaining, unless the cavalier can count on it as his one shock weapon. It is under consideration to add a knife, which can be used as bayonet for night work, to his armament, and having regard to the comparative rarity of mounted charges three steel weapons seem excessive. As in other armies, the leaders of Cavalry show considerable variations in initiative and tactical skill. The average age of the squadron chief is greater than in England, but somewhat less than in France. Apart from the numerical superiority which impresses confidence in the ability to act in masses, the principal element of strength of the German Cavalry, as compared with our own, depends upon the

intellectual capacity of the corps of officers, drawn as far as possible from the aristocracy and selected for their mental as well as their physical superiority. In Germany it is not considered incongruous for a good horseman to be well acquainted with military history, nor for a Cavalry leader to know the circumstances in which his arm can be used with deadly effect. The mind of the officer has been more carefully cultivated and his military intelligence more generously encouraged than elsewhere. He is expected not only to know the theory of his profession, but to be able to teach others, and to give his orders tersely and unmistakably, as well as rapidly to digest a military situation. The whole training of a German boy of the class which provides the corps of officers is planned to prepare him for his vocation. His technical training is thorough and gradual, so that before he exercises the authority of an officer he has been taught how to play the part. The officers, in short, of the German Cavalry are brought up for the purpose and do not drift into the regiments by some accident, and the status of an officer commands the prestige and general respect which in England is generally accorded to the successful business man.

It is probable that the social system by which the upper classes in Germany to a great extent live in such cities as Dresden, Munich, Frankfort, and Cologne, where there are not only excellent schools but also every facility for musical and artistic education, tend to raise the intelligence of the German aristocracy so that the leadership of the army, as well as the predominant position in the other great services of the State, is still in their hands. Country life as practised in England, our love of travelling, and the independence of character engendered by the English scheme of upbringing and education, have important advantages; nor is it to be supposed that the young German officer is superior in every respect to his English confrère, in spite of the incontestable superiority of the system under which he serves. But no wise or patriotic writer wastes time in criticising the weak points of foreign armies; it is enough for us to note their points of superiority to be imitated or surpassed.

Since it is evident that the German commanders intend to use their Cavalry to fight rather than to screen or scout, it becomes very interesting to ascertain how they propose to solve the difficulty of marching a powerful mass of horsemen near enough to the point of action without exposing it to destructive long-range fire. The work of the Cavalry

at this year's manœuvres threw no particular light on this problem. The neglect of the woods to conceal the approach march, and the somewhat ponderous and slow movements of the Cavalry masses, disclosed no particular aptitude for panther-like springs after skilfully stalking or lying in wait for the prey. On the other hand, German tacticians teach that the field of battle of the near future will offer fine targets to Cavalry attacks on a great scale. Battles will tend to assume the type of the Mukden struggle, a long line of hostile forces extending for tens of miles, which will gravitate in groups round points of the highest tactical or strategical importance, leaving gaps in the army through which Cavalry will be able to penetrate if the opportunity is keenly desired and keenly watched for. The greatly increased fire power of the arm, the substitution of machine guns for Horse Artillery, and the confusion and exhaustion to be expected in Infantry troops after long fire fights, are all factors of increasing importance in contemporary warfare, and give generous scope to the Cavalry leader who has both daring and swift appreciation of the phases of a contest. The retreat of the Russian army from Mukden presented the most tempting opportunity for a mighty stroke which has been seen in modern war. It would perhaps have reproduced the effect of Murat's pursuit after Jena, or Blücher's after Waterloo. We are all too apt to magnify the material and mechanical instruments of war over the moral influences, whereas it is the latter which alone produce decisive results.

Wars between the great Powers have not become impossible, but at any rate have become comparatively rare. Armies therefore cannot be kept in good health by the exercise of repeated service in the field. We must fall back on historical study, on a well-trained imagination, and on frequent comparison with the hosts of Europe if we are even to know how we stand and whether our troops can still hope to contend successfully in the national duels of the future. Moreover, the real value of troops is approximately known to neighbouring States. Even in profound peace the efficiency, warlike spirit, and valour of an army contributes not a little to furthering the national policy, and, incidentally, in guarding the peace so often endangered by the eloquence of well-meaning, but uninstructed, politicians at home and abroad.

## THE NEW ITALIAN 'CAVALRY TRAINING'

BY COLONEL H. C. WYLLY, C.B.

THE new training manual for the Italian Cavalry consists of three parts. Part I. deals with the individual training of the Cavalry soldier, and is divided into two portions—training on foot and mounted. Part II. is concerned with the training of mounted bodies; while Part III. treats of saddle-fitting, equitation, &c.

The tactical part of the manual is very concise, and contains nothing beyond the fight of the troop or squadron; it is stated in a note that the rules for the tactical employment of larger bodies will be found in a chapter of a manual which has still to appear. The regulations for the training in patrol duty, and for the schooling of the horses, were not found at all in the former manual.

### ORDERS IN REGARD TO FIELD TRAINING

Such training is to commence with simple changes of formation, after which exercises against a skeleton enemy and an opposing force may be proceeded with as follows:—

1. The skeleton enemy—single horsemen with flags, directed by an officer—should not move out of a walk. They are only required to mark the points upon which the attack is to be directed.
2. The skeleton enemy may then be composed of small detachments, equipped with flags representing the various arms; these detachments also are only to move at a walk, and as may be ordered by the director of the training.
3. This may now consist of small bodies representing four times the actual strength; they are commanded by a staff officer, who directs their manœuvre and pace. Galloping is, however, forbidden.
4. Finally comes the training or manœuvre of two opposing Cavalry bodies of equal strength.

The Italians lay special stress upon the particular form of combat manœuvre which they call '*manovra libera*.' This is the training

whereby a unit commander is given his particular 'job,' the actual execution of which is left to his own initiative, e.g. employment as an offensive or defensive flank, as a reserve, &c.

The aim of the mounted combat is the charge. The direction of the attack depends upon the arm to which the enemy belongs, upon the objective of the attack, the existing tactical situation, and the nature of the ground. To ensure surprise it is of the first importance that such formation should be employed as best favours the rapid and concealed approach. Ground which is under fire must be crossed at full speed. The actual attack is made up of a succession of phases, which naturally follow one another very swiftly, and together complete an action of which the *shock* is the most important component. The regulations distinguish the different phases as follows: The preparatory manœuvring for position, the approach, which last culminates in the deployment for the charge, the *shock* which is followed by the *mêlée*, the pursuit, and the rally. The manœuvring for position usually takes place beyond the hostile sphere of activity. It should take a form which ensures extreme mobility and rapid change of direction, and the formation may, according to the size of the Cavalry body, be the close column, the squadron column, or the double column.

For the *approach*, open column is best, or, in the case of a number of squadrons, the line of columns.

Such formations are certainly not specially flexible, but they adapt themselves easily to the ground. In very broken country the 'loose formation' may be employed instead of column.

The *shock* is the decisive phase of the action; it should therefore be employed at the moment when the horses are in full possession of their powers, the command 'charge!' being given only at a comparatively short distance from the enemy. For the shock, line is the most effective formation, but it must not be adopted too early in the case of large bodies of Cavalry.

The extended order attack is not easily manageable, and is of small moral effect; but its employment tends to diminish losses. Except when surprised, it should always be adopted against Artillery and Infantry, or it can be used to conceal the 'close order attack' following in rear of it.

In the *mêlée* all cohesion is lost. Each rider must throw himself upon the enemy nearest to him; the *mêlée* continues until one side is overthrown.

The *pursuit*, being a continuation of the *mêlée*, is at first confused, with no formation, parties and detachments rallying to their front. The rally after the attack must be carried out with the greatest rapidity and energy. When pursuing the rally should be to the front; in other cases to the rear; and if defeated by Cavalry it should be obliquely to the enemy's front, so as to avoid the full effect of fire.

In the case of surprise the commander should attack in whatever formation he can most readily assume.

Against Cavalry the trot must be maintained as long as possible, so as to save the horses for the full momentum of the charge.

Against Infantry the main *desiderata* are surprise and the opportuneness of the attack; when the opponent is hard pressed by hostile Infantry, is disordered, or running out of ammunition. If a surprise attack is impossible, then an extended formation should be adopted.

In the combat against Artillery care should be taken to attack this arm on the march, or when limbering up or unlimbering. Against guns in action extended order should be employed, the reserve attacking the escort in extended or close order, according to whether the escort is Infantry, dismounted or mounted Cavalry.

*As escort to guns.*—When acting as escort to guns, Cavalry may be posted in front, in rear, or on a flank. Should the guns be in action, the escort should be stationed on the dangerous flank, covered from long-range fire and protected from surprise by a number of observation posts. A Cavalry attack must be met by the charge, or by a mounted attack supported by carbine fire.

*Dismounted training.*—In the dismounted training also the distinction is observed between close and extended formations. In close order the smallest unit is the troop, in extended order the half-troop. In quick time the pace is 120 paces at 29.5 inches, in double time 170 paces at 35.4 inches in the minute.

*Extended order formations.*—For the dismounted combat; in the dismounted fight the squadron is the unit, and either the *whole* squadron dismounts and is then divided into firers and horse-holders, or only a part of the squadron dismounts, when the half-troop remaining mounted (usually not more than one) forms the mounted support. Dismounting is by half-troops. Prior to dismounting the carbine is disengaged from the saddle and the cartridges removed from the off wallet. The parties ordered to dismount form line, extending to one-pace interval; the commanders are informed whether the led horses are to remain where

they are or are to follow in rear. In the first case the *whole* troop dismounts, and there remain with the led horses only one non-commissioned officer and one man of each file not armed with a carbine. Lancers rest their lances against trees, or buildings, or plant them upright in the ground four or five yards in front of the horses. In the second case—where the led horses are to follow—all men remain behind who are not armed with the carbine, and also sufficient of the others as may be ordered by the troop-leader, to ensure there being one horseholder to every four horses. (It will be noticed that dismounting preparatory to the fire-fight seems to be rather an unnecessarily long procedure in the Italian Cavalry.) Individual fire only is employed.

Dismounted action is to be resorted to when the *terrain* does not permit of the employment of Cavalry mounted, or when it is considered that the support of the mounted attack by fire will best obtain the result desired, and especially in a decisive battle, when there is no other means of taking part in the action of the other arms. When dismounted, the extended order formation only is made use of as a rule.

*The dismounted fight.*—Cavalry should dismount under cover from the enemy's fire as far as possible. When the squadron commander has made himself acquainted with the general situation, terrain, ranges, &c., he must decide whether he shall dismount all his men and put all his carbines from the outset in the firing line; whether a mounted or dismounted reserve is to be kept in hand; which particular objective is to be made for; the point of the attack; how the support is to be brought up; and how the led horses are to be cared for. According to the decision he comes to on those points must clear and definite instructions be issued. The troops told off for the fire-fight advance until they reach the spot whence fire is to be opened or until the hostile fire obliges them to reply, when they take up the formation ordered, and themselves open fire. The fire-fight becomes a series of short, lively outbursts of fire, directed at the enemy when he offers a suitable target, and with intervals between the firing. Rushes should be made, usually by half-troops, and at the double; but if cover is available the advance may be in quick time, or the men may creep forward. Rushes may also be made by half-troops, or by groups of three or four men. The normal length of the rush is fifty yards.

The reserve is used to reinforce the firing line either by strengthening or prolonging it, and for this purpose must remain close at hand,

so that it may be called up when required. Reinforcing the reserve is as a rule by order of the commander of the dismounted body, but may be carried out on his own initiative by the reserve commander should a favourable opportunity present itself.

If it is impossible to drive the enemy from his position by fire or by the use of the mounted support, he must be assailed with the bayonet, the assault being carried out by any troop which can get near enough to reach the position in one rush.

The pursuit is carried out either by fire, by the mounted reserve, or by a body which can rapidly re-mount.

The defensive should be carried out in a good, carefully chosen position, artificially improved as far as possible.

In retreat the men mount by troops under cover of the mounted support, which is responsible for the security of the flanks and the safeguarding of the led horses. Its place is near the led horses and in rear of the party engaged dismounted. The commander must not wait for orders, but must act on his own initiative. In dismounted work the proper conduct of the led horses is a matter of the very first importance; the commander of this party must be constantly in touch with the dismounted party. Should the enemy retire, the led horses must be brought forward; if his own party retreats, whoever is in charge of the led horses must remain at the halt with the horses disposed by troops.

Emphasis is laid upon the need of maintaining not a rapid, but a well-aimed and controlled fire; there is only one description of fire—individual. The ranges are 'short' up to 600, 'medium' from 600 to 1000, and 'long' over 1000 metres.

*Marches and march practice.*—Throughout the year a practice march should take place, so that the horses shall always be fit for whatever exertions may be demanded of them. At all and every season of the year the Italian Cavalry must be able to perform a march of thirty miles at a walk and trot, but the distance is to be gradually increased until by the autumn the horses should be able to march sixty miles without becoming exhausted.

The normal pace is eight kilometres (about five miles) an hour, but patrols may be expected to cover ten kilometres in that time. The regulations lay down that the trot should not be employed during the first fifteen minutes from the start, nor in the last twenty minutes before the close of the march. March-training must commence in the



squadron, be carried on among a number of squadrons, and be completed in the regiment. Officers and men should be always in marching order, and the weight on the horse should be gradually increased until he carries the full service kit. Such marches should be made the occasion for the training in the duties of reconnoitring and reconnaissance.

*The training of the horse.*—A properly conducted system of training produces that condition in the horse which fits him to endure the greatest strain without injury to his general health. As a rule this condition is brought about by the everyday work required of him in the regiment, from the spring training of the recruit to the manœuvres of the autumn. The *aim* of the training is to make all the horses equally efficient and capable of prolonged effort, and it may be considered satisfactory if the horses, having trotted for thirty minutes and galloped for at least two kilometres (about 2100 yards), still have enough left in them for a charge.


Horses under six years old need not be thus trained, since they are not required to turn out for manœuvres.

*Training in patrol duty.*—This includes: 1. Instruction in the study and use of ground. The soldier must receive practical instruction in the recognition of the military character of ground, especially as regards obstacles, cover, &c.

2. Instruction in finding his bearings in a strange country. The end to be aimed at is that he should be able to find his way over unknown country without a map, especially that he shall find his way back to his starting-point when employed as a despatch rider. He must be given all kinds of useful hints, e.g. not to inquire, 'Does this road lead to "A"?' but rather, 'Where does this road lead to'?

3. He should be taught the practice of his powers of observation, of those signs in particular which denote the presence or proximity of the enemy, such as tracks, clouds of dust, &c., and the lessons which may be deduced from them. In the instruction of non-commissioned officers the end to be aimed at is to educate them to be efficient patrol and out-post commanders. Of importance is the ability to read a map, to form a correct judgment of a situation, to know what reliability may be ascribed to reports, together with knowledge of the capabilities of his horses. This instruction should for the most part be given practically by the squadron commander.

N.B.—These regulations contain no mention of the employment of machine guns with Cavalry.



**BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B.**

1812-1858.



**"JACOB'S HORSE."**  
(Sind Irregular Cavalry.)

**BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B.**

(The Seidlitz<sup>1</sup> of the Sind Army.)

BY CAPTAIN H. GARBETT, R.N.

BORN on January 11, 1812, John Jacob, the future Warden of the Marches in Upper Sind, was the fifth son of the Rev. Stephen Long Jacob, vicar of Woolavington, in the county of Somerset. He came of a cultured and studious family, many of whose members, before and since, have risen to eminence and deserved well of their country, one of his brothers becoming headmaster of Christ's Hospital, while the present Bishop of St. Albans is a cousin.

As a boy Jacob is described as having been 'a fine-spirited young fellow, fond of fighting and far away the best horseman on the countryside.' All the lessons and schooling he had came from his father, who, being a man of small means, taught his own boys, and when John obtained his cadetship he went straight from Woolavington to Addiscombe, the celebrated military college of the East India Company, which in its day sent so many distinguished soldiers to the Indian Army. In January, 1828, he obtained his commission as second lieutenant in the Bombay Artillery, and the same month sailed for India, fated never again to set eyes on his native land. For thirty years he was to serve in India, and so absorbed did he become in his work that he never once took a furlough, although twenty years of his time was spent in a climate which has been well described as infernal. After landing in Bombay he passed seven uneventful years with his regiment, and was then detached on a small command; three years' civil employment under the Collector of Gujerat followed, and in May 1836 he was promoted to lieutenant, by which time he had become proficient in Oriental languages.

<sup>1</sup> So named by Sir Charles Napier in a letter to his brother Sir William Napier, the historian.

Authorities quoted: 'General John Jacob,' by A. Innes Shand; 'Sepoy Generals,' by C. W. Forrest, C.I.E.

On the outbreak of the first Afghan war in 1838, he was ordered with his battery to join the army of the Indus, then assembling under Sir John Keane. Landing at Kurrachee, at that time only a small fishing village, he accompanied the Bombay column as far as Sukkur, and he soon had an opportunity of showing the metal of which he was made. Keane had no sooner passed the Bolan than the wild Belooch robber tribes closed in upon the rear of his force, attacking his line of communications, cutting off convoys, and murdering messengers, so that news from the front was only received at doubtful intervals. The safety of the army was endangered, for the strength of the troops left in Upper Sind was insufficient to furnish escorts. The Political Agent made futile efforts to bribe the chiefs to allow safe passage through their territory, but they were deaf to all persuasion; for not only did they find plundering a highly profitable employment, but they considered their cherished independence menaced by our invasion. At last, although it was the height of summer, it was decided to send a small force from Sukkur and Shikarpoor to operate against Beja Khan, the head of one of the principal clans, a fearless and dashing warrior, and a born guerilla leader.

Jacob had been left behind at Sukkur with Lieutenant Corry, of the 17th Regiment, in charge of a detachment of European soldiers, composed apparently of riffraff drafted from the different regiments at the front. As the only Artillery officer then in Upper Sind, he was charged with the duty of organising a scratch battery, and selecting forty of the least ineligible, he marched about Midsummer Day for Shikarpoor, having sent his guns forward by water. 'The season,' wrote Jacob afterwards, 'was one of intense heat, which had never been equalled since Europeans brought thermometers into Sind. The average temperature in the hospital shed at Shikarpoor was one hundred and thirty, and on several occasions the mercury marked twelve above that. Even at midnight the wind appeared like a blast from a furnace. Such was the atmosphere in which British soldiers were sent forth for the first time against the wild tribes of Eastern Beloochistan.' On the first day's march of ten miles Corry and seven of the soldiers succumbed to sunstroke; four others were sent back to Sukkur on camels, only to die on the road, and the remaining men, on the verge of mutiny, were clamorous to return; but Jacob making them a stirring appeal animated them with something of his own

indomitable spirit, and encouraged them to persevere. Though under canvas during the day and only marching at night, four more died before Shikapoor was reached, after three short marches. It became evident to the authorities that operations at that season were impracticable, so the expedition was temporarily abandoned, and for three months longer Beja Khan and his tribesmen had free hands to work their will with Keane's convoys and communications.

Early in October a fresh expedition was organised under Major Billamore, who received orders to proceed to Cutchee and operate against the hill tribes, and, although with very inadequate means at his command, he brought it to a successful conclusion. Billamore's force consisted of only some five hundred native Infantry and a bullock battery of two 24-pounder howitzers, with a 6-pounder gun, as it was thought, with reason, that the climate would prove deadly to Europeans, owing to the exceptional heat and other causes. Jacob was again charged to improvise a company of Artillerymen; he had a havildar and eleven Golundauze Sepoys, with a few gun Lascars to begin with, and he made up his detachment by selecting some men from the 5th Bombay Native Infantry, a regiment he pronounced to be the best in the Presidency, whose men were, in his opinion, perfect specimens of the Bombay Sepoys, as described by Sir John Malcolm: 'The true descendants of Seewajee's mountain rats, whom not all the pride and power of the armies of Hindustan could prevent from marching to the gates of Delhi.' Jacob adds on his own account: 'They were small and not at all good looking, but of an amazing energy and activity, full of zeal and courage, warmly attached to their officers and rejoiced at the prospect of meeting a formidable foe for the sake of the name of the regiment.'

Billamore crossed the desert to Shahpoor with comparative ease; thence he marched to Pooljee, believing it to be still occupied by Beja and his levies, but he reached it only to find its mud hovels in a blaze and that Beja had sought temporary seclusion in the hills. He soon found that to deal effectively with these robber tribes, who were all horsemen, some Cavalry were indispensable, and as the result of the representations he made at headquarters, the Sind Horse was brought upon the scene—the corps with which Jacob was to be inseparably associated.

The origin of this famous regiment, which was soon to be known far and wide as Jacob's Horse, came about as follows: Early in 1839,

when all North-Western India was in a ferment, Eldred Pottinger, then Political Resident in Sind, advised the formation of some squadrons of Irregulars for frontier service. The idea was adopted by the Bombay authorities, and the Poona Irregular Horse was in consequence formed, a detachment from which was sent to reinforce Billamore and to form the nucleus of a corps to be raised in Sind.

In a brief sketch like the present it is impossible to do more than to give the barest outline of Billamore's operations in the Murree and Boogtee Hills, where Beja and his followers had now taken refuge. The country traversed was quite unknown to Europeans, and proved to be of a most difficult and inhospitable character; but in spite of the resistance of the tribesmen and the natural obstacles, Deyra and Kahun, their two principal strongholds in the heart of the mountains, were reached and occupied. The success of the expedition was in a great measure undoubtedly due to Jacob's untiring energy and resourcefulness, and his characteristic self-reliance. With some extempore pioneers whom he pressed into the service, he rendered the mountain tracks passable for the guns, with the result that the tribes, finding their highest and most rugged hills proved no obstacle to the passage of the artillery, an arm they mortally dreaded, came in and surrendered. His work accomplished, Billamore was anxious to return by a shorter route, and Jacob, who had made a point of ascending the heights, surveying and taking rough sketches of the country, was confident it could be done. With the aid of an intelligent herdsman, he discovered a sheep track over the mountains (afterwards better known as the formidable Nuffoosk Pass), and with his Belooch pioneers succeeded in hewing a road, over which the guns with tremendous labour, owing to the steepness of the pass, were successfully dragged, and the expedition arrived safely at Pooljee, after an absence of three and a half months.

When the field force was disbanded Jacob returned to regimental duty at Hyderabad. It was at this time he met Outram, who was then Political Agent for Sind, with whom he struck up a warm and what proved to be a lifelong friendship. The Government being anxious to discover a practicable land route from Hyderabad to Naggur Parkur, on the Sind frontier, not caring to be entirely dependent on the sea communication between Bombay and Kurrachee, Outram selected Jacob to make the survey. Accompanied by only three tribesmen in the service of one of the Ameers, and trusting his life to their fidelity, Jacob made

the journey at the hottest season of the year, carefully mapping the route, noting the resources of the country and the disposition of the villagers. Above all, he specially regarded everything with a view to the transport of guns and the possibility of finding bullocks to replace broken-down teams, and the result of his survey showed that it was possible at any season to march troops of all arms direct between Gujarat and Sind. For this service he was highly commended by Outram and received the thanks of the Bombay Government.

In 1841 it was decided to augment the strength of the Sind Horse, and Outram in most flattering terms offered Jacob the command, which had fallen vacant, at the same time placing him in political charge of all the Cutchee frontier, then in a most disturbed condition. He took immediate steps to put down forays, and having organised an efficient service of spies, he was always warned in time and never taken off his guard. He always acted on the offensive, and the robber chiefs, baffled by his ubiquity, prescience and vigilance, soon began to lose heart. So successful was he in his operations that Outram, in an official letter on October 19, 1843, was able to record that 'for the first time within the memory of man, Cutchee and Upper Sind had been for a whole year entirely free from the irruptions of hill tribes, by which the villages were annually destroyed, lives and property sacrificed, and the whole country kept in a state of fear.' This Outram attributed entirely to Jacob's extraordinary vigilance and the strict discipline enforced by him. On November 27 he was ordered with his regiment to Sukkur to join the army assembling there under Sir Charles Napier. Two days later he reached it, and on December 3 the regiment was reviewed by Sir Charles, who expressed his satisfaction in the most flattering terms to its commandant.

The troubles with the Ameers of Sind that had been brewing for some time had now come to a head, and Napier's brilliant campaign which followed, resulting in the annexation of that country, gave Jacob fresh opportunities for distinguishing himself. Seeing that war was unavoidable, Napier determined to strike before the Ameers could all assemble and crush him by mere weight of numbers. On the morning of February 17, 1843, with a force numbering only 2200 men, of whom 700 were Cavalry, and only 800 Europeans, he attacked at Meeanee an army of more than 20,000 men, skilfully posted, and stronger in field artillery. For three hours the contest was stubbornly maintained,



and then Napier gave the Cavalry orders to force the enemy's right at all hazards. There has seldom been a more dashing feat of horsemanship. Reckless of the matchlock fire, the Sind Horse and 9th Bengal Cavalry charged through the guns, riding down the gunners, and while the Bengal Cavalry broke the hostile Infantry on the left, Jacob with his Sind troopers charged through the Ameers' camp, sabring to right and left, and spreading confusion along the lines of the enemy, when they saw these fierce horsemen in their rear. The day was won, and the Beloochs, beaten although not yet disheartened, sullenly withdrew from the scene of carnage. In his dispatch Napier recorded that Jacob had rendered 'the most active services long previous to and during the combat. He broke the enemy's camp, from which he drove a body of 3000 or 4000 Cavalry.'

The battle had been fought within sight of Hyderabad, and on the 19th Napier entered the capital; but his position was still critical, as the Ameer Shere Mahomed of Meerpoor, who had not arrived in time to take part in the battle, had now advanced to within ten miles of Hyderabad, with an army numbering some 35,000 men. Napier having received reinforcements from Sukkur, which brought his force up to 5000 men, with seventeen guns, moved out on the morning of the 24th and found the enemy strongly entrenched in a most skilfully selected and prepared position at Dubba, some eight miles to the north-west of the city. At nine the Artillery opened fire, and the Infantry advanced to the attack, which, however, for a time failed, the great strength of the Belooch position not having been at first realised. Meanwhile Jacob and Major Stack, commanding the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, who had been placed on the right to prevent any flanking attack from the enemy in that quarter, seeing the Beloochs in movement from their left, concluded that they were retiring before the cross-fire of our guns. Without hesitating a moment, they made what the general in his dispatch described as a brilliant charge upon the Ameer's left, crossing the nullahs, and driving the enemy before them in wild flight in a chase of several miles. Sir William Napier in his 'History of the Conquest of Sind,' who considers the charge a blunder which might have had disastrous consequences, thus describes the incident: 'The whole body of Cavalry was off at full speed, clearing the nullahs without a check, the riders' spurs deep in their horses' sides, their different war-cries pealing high and clear, their swords whirling

above their heads in gleaming circles; there was the fiery Jacob and the terrible Fitzgerald (Jacob's senior subaltern) careering alike in the same patch of error, while the splendid troopers of the 3rd Cavalry and the red turbans of Jacob's wild horsemen, speeding through smoke and dust, streamed like meteors behind them.' Meantime the Bengal Cavalry, far to the left, had turned the enemy's other flank, driving them back in confusion, while the Infantry, returning to the attack, carried Dubba at the point of the bayonet. Jacob, with his usual impetuosity, had pushed so far ahead that he caught sight of the elephant which was bearing Shere Mahomed away. He might have caught the Ameer and ended the war, had not Colonel Pattle, the second in command, deemed it prudent to stop the pursuit. A few days after the battle he received the gratifying announcement that he had been appointed honorary A.D.C. to the Governor-General, in recognition of his good services at Meeanee.

The Ameer fled to his capital, Meerpoor, but he made no stand there, and with his family and treasure sought safety at Omercote, a hundred miles from the fatal battlefield, from which he again fled into the desert to the northward, the fortress surrendering on April 4; but his movements still gave cause for anxiety, and to Jacob was assigned the duty of hunting him down. On June 14, with only eight hundred men of all arms, he came up with the Ameer at Shedadpoor, who had collected a force of some 8000 men, and completely defeated him, the enemy fleeing in all directions, leaving their guns and several standards in Jacob's hands; the Ameer himself, however, succeeding in making good his escape across the Indus into the hills. For his services Napier recommended Jacob for the brevet rank of major and the C.B., but neither the promotion nor honours came to him, the general orders by the Governor-General announcing that the honorary distinction for which he had been recommended could not at present be conferred on him on account of his want of rank. This was a great disappointment to him, and he felt it bitterly.

The victories of Meeanee and Dubba proved decisive, and Napier at once set to work to bring the conquered province into order, taking effectual means to prevent the disbanded Belooch troops from becoming hordes of banditti, and making the border tribes understand that raiding our frontiers or killing our people would be heavily punished. His administration was bitterly attacked, but that he showed himself as

capable an administrator as he was a commander there can be no doubt: the testimony of his successor, Sir Bartle Frere, is absolutely conclusive as to this. Under his energetic sway roads were made, streams and nullahs bridged, and irrigation canals brought into working order, while he also undertook extensive harbour works at Kurrachee and constructed quays on the Indus near Hyderabad and elsewhere. During this period Jacob's headquarters were at Hyderabad, where he built himself a commodious residence.

In 1844 the hill tribes of Cutchêe, under their old leader Beja Khan, began again to give trouble, and as the winter drew on Napier made preparations for another expedition against them. On January 13 he left Sukkur for Khangur—the future Jacobabad—having already sent Jacob on in charge of the advanced guard, who pushed on to Roza, nine miles to the west of the last-named place. Having refreshed his men, and ridden thirty-five miles further, Jacob learned, when within two miles of Shahpoor, that one of Beja's sons was holding the village with a strong force. In his report he states, 'I pushed on at a trot, and completely surrounded the village before the alarm was given or any one could escape. Knowing the place well, I at once galloped into an enclosure on one side of the village. The enemy now opened a heavy fire upon us from a high tower and the houses. I immediately picketed a troop and took the men into the village on foot, when all opposition ceased.' The report is modestly worded, but the General thought the affair worthy of a special order, in which he praised 'the prompt and dangerous attack for Cavalry of a village in the highest degree defensible and built for defence, and which was defended'; adding that 'Jacob and his men carried it with the rapidity of lightning, and while losing men did not injure one of the defenders, but captured them all. This is a very rare and a very glorious instance of perfect discipline as well as courage on the part of the Sind Horse, and in the mind of the Governor it stamps both the Sind Horse and its Commandant as first-rate soldiers—prompt, resolute, obedient and humane.' Another gallant exploit by a small detachment of the regiment drew forth further warm encomiums from the old General. 'Another laurel leaf,' he wrote in his order, 'has been added to the rich wreath of Jacob's Horse.' Jacob was now entrusted by Napier with the important duty of closing the passes leading to the plains, to cut off Beja's possible retreat, and so effectually was the blockade of the enemy's stronghold carried out that it brought the campaign

to a close, the hostile chiefs coming in to surrender, while Beja at last himself gave in his submission.

The Sind Horse returned to Hyderabad in April, and proposals which had already been made by Jacob for doubling the corps by raising a second regiment, which had the warm support of Sir Charles Napier, now at last took shape. Jacob claimed to command both regiments, a claim which the military authorities at first refused to admit, as being against all precedent, but to which they finally yielded—a proof of the high estimation in which he was already held. The order for raising the new regiment was issued, the Governor-General observing that ‘he had been induced in this single instance to depart from precedent, out of regard to Captain Jacob’s reputation and services.’

In 1847 Napier left India, being succeeded eventually in the Commissionership of Sind by Bartle Frere, and in January of that year a curt notice in the Regimental Records indicates the turning-point of Jacob’s career. The dashing leader of Light Horse was formally transferred to the sphere in which he was to make his mark as statesman, diplomatist, and administrator. ‘Under instructions from Colonel Forbes, commanding at Shikarpoor, and General Hunter, C.B., commanding in Upper Sind,’ runs the notice, ‘Captain Jacob has assumed command of the frontier.’ He was to establish his headquarters at Khangur, and the whole of the frontier from the Punjaub to Shahpoor in Cutchee was to be under his orders. It was a dreary waste of almost rainless desert, with scarcely a sign of vegetation, stretching over an area of some 4000 square miles, an atmosphere in the summer, which lasts for some seven months, like the blast from a furnace, and continually swept by dust storms and the burning and deadly simoon.

It was high time a strong man was sent to the frontier. Everywhere were desolation and dismay, there was no security for life or property, irrigation was neglected, the canals were choked, and consequently cultivation had almost ceased. The British garrisons shut up in mud forts, dotted along the frontier, looked on in impotent inaction. They did not attempt to forage or find food in the neighbourhood, all supplies were brought up from Sukkur and Shikarpoor, and the convoys were in constant peril. Things were at their worst when Jacob reached Khangur in January. A month before his

arrival, a body of 1500 raiders had swept down upon Sind; passing between the outposts, they came within fifteen miles of Shahpoor, which was garrisoned by a regiment of Bengal Cavalry, and made a clean sweep of all the cattle in those parts. The troops sent in pursuit found the raiders so strong that they did not venture to attack, and it was that scare and loss which caused the sudden decision of the authorities to send Jacob to the frontier. The very evening before he arrived the Boogtees had plundered a detachment of the Baggage Corps, and 'this,' he afterwards wrote, 'was their last successful exploit at pillaging in Sind.'

A more dismal spot than Khangur at the time of Jacob's arrival it is impossible to conceive; there was neither village nor bazaar, only a half-dozen of miserable huts, sheltering some twenty-four souls, and a mud fort where the Cavalry detachment was in the habit of shutting itself up every night. He promptly set to work to revolutionise the whole system; the mud forts in which the troops had been stationed were dismantled; henceforth there was to be no more passive defence, the offensive was always to be taken, each detachment being posted in the plain without defensive works of any kind. Patrols scoured the country in every direction on the look-out for the enemy, and these patrols crossed and met so often that support was certain to be at hand if wanted. Whenever a party of the Sind Horse came on any of the marauders, it always fell on them at once, charging any number, however superior, without the smallest hesitation. Against such sudden attacks the robber horsemen never attempted a stand; they always fled at once, frequently sustaining heavy loss in men, and never succeeding in obtaining any plunder. These proceedings, and particularly the tracks, daily renewed, of the Cavalry all over the desert and in all the watering-places near the hills, far beyond the British border, soon struck terror into the marauding tribes and prevented their ever feeling safe, and they ere long ceased making attempts on British territory. It was, however, hard and trying work: 'Our first year on the border was one of enormous bodily labour,' he wrote; 'with only a single regiment on the frontier, we had literally to lie down to rest with boots and sword on for many months together.'

All this time Jacob, who had now been made a Brevet-Major, was paying minute attention to the mounting and equipment of his men. The second regiment was recruited from the Deccan, for he had come

to the conclusion that Belooch and Pathan were 'untrustworthy and vicious,' and from this time his men were always drawn from the fighting races of Central and Southern India. The corps' reputation had been established, and it now mustered 1600 of the best horsemen in India; there were numerous applicants for every vacancy, and dismissal from the ranks was reckoned so severe a punishment that offences were almost unknown. Jacob only had the assistance of four European officers, two to each regiment of 800 men, and yet the discipline was so firm and the devotion of the men so unquestioned that it was said not a trooper in the corps knew any will but that of his Commandant. When it is remembered that the men had to provide themselves with everything, even with their own horses, that the pay was but 30 rupees a month, with no extra allowances except for a horse killed in action, that they had to arrange for the transport of their own baggage—no wheeled vehicles being allowed—it says much for Jacob and the high reputation of his crack corps that for long he was able to keep his men contented. But when the corps was shifted to the frontier, the trying service, coupled with the reaction after a brilliant campaign, proved wearing alike to men, clothing, and horseflesh. His native officers were veterans of the Mahratta wars, thoroughly trustworthy; many of the privates also were men of family with some means of their own, but they began to be dissatisfied. Jacob sympathised with them, and in a report to headquarters gave cogent reasons for an increase of pay. He does not hint that it was personal attachment to himself that kept them true to the colours, but he implies as much when he says that 'we may look in vain for a succession of such men at the present rate of pay. That we have hitherto succeeded so well is owing to the high character we have been so fortunate as to obtain . . . but there is a limit to this, and that limit I think the Sind Horse has attained.'

But raising the pay by 50 per cent., as he suggested, was a serious matter for the Treasury, and required anxious consideration. Meanwhile as an alternative, and as honours cost nothing, he asked that the designation of the corps might be changed to 'Silidar Light Cavalry'—'a distinction which I may say with honest pride and without presumption we have fairly earned.' This was granted.

In the summer of 1848 the troubles in the Punjaub came to a head, and Jacob was ordered to despatch 500 men, if he could spare them,

to join the Army of the Indus. He wished to proceed in command himself, but his services on the border were far too valuable for him to be spared, so the detachment proceeded under the command of Malcolm, his senior subaltern, and by their dash and gallantry during the campaign (especially at the battle of Gujerat, where, although only 250 strong, they completely routed and drove from the field 4000 of Dost Mahomed's picked horsemen) added fresh laurels to those already won by the regiment. In September 1850 he at last received the long-deferred honour of a C.B. for his services at Meeanee, and in April 1855 he was gazetted Lieut.-Colonel.

While keeping marauding down with a strong hand, Jacob devoted himself with untiring zeal to the administration of the extensive district under his charge. He disarmed every man in the country not a Government servant, and threw himself into the work of pacification by promoting prosperity. It was no light task to turn hereditary marauders into peaceful tillers of the soil, but he accomplished it with wonderful success. Writing in 1855 of the Jekranees, one of the most troublesome of the border tribes in the old days, he describes how after disarmament 'he induced 500 of them to set to work to clear the Noorwah Canal. They were very awkward at first, but were strong, energetic, cheerful and good-natured. They soon became used to the tools, and were then able to do a better day's work and earn more pay than the ordinary Sind labourers. . . . Soon afterwards they took to manual labour in their own fields with spirit, and even pride. From that time they were really reformed and conquered, and they were now the most hard-working, industrious, well-behaved, cheerful men in all Sind. . . . For three years past not a man of them has been accused of any crime, great or small, yet seven or eight years ago they were the terror of the country.' At the same time he was able to report: 'In the formerly desert border there are now always supplies for an army . . . with tanks and wells affording an unlimited supply of excellent fresh water. . . . Roads and bridges have been constructed by me all over the country, amounting altogether to 600 miles in length. Canals have been excavated which are bringing great part of the desert under cultivation. Peace, plenty, and security everywhere prevail in a district where formerly all was terror and disorder on the one hand, or a pitiless, silent desert on the other.' He might have added that Khangur-in-the-desert had become a name and a memory;

the village, which did not contain thirty souls when Jacob first bivouacked there, had passed away, and on its site had sprung up the city of Jacobabad, a flourishing town of some 14,000 inhabitants, and so named by the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, in honour of the man who had founded it.

In 1854 Jacob was entrusted with the task of negotiating a treaty with the Khan of Khelat, a duty which he carried through to the entire satisfaction of the Government of India. In 1856, after eight years of unremitting toil, his strong and beneficent rule on the frontier came to an end, as in April of that year, on the departure of Bartle Frere to England on sick furlough, he was appointed Acting-Commissioner of Sind, having a month previously been promoted to a Brevet-Colonelcy and nominated an A.D.C. to the Queen in recognition of his great services. He addressed himself to his new work with characteristic energy and activity, and was at once busily engaged in plans for the material development of the province. Encouraged by the results of irrigation round the old waterless Khangur region, his grand project now was, by the construction of a great canal along the boundary-lines between British and Khelat territory into the heart of the desert, to bring into cultivation a great part of the desert dividing Sind from habitable Cutchee; he was also anxious to see a railway built that should run from Kurrachee through the Bolan, and he proposed the permanent establishment of an outpost at Quetta, as he considered the best security for India was to obtain a strong frontier, and Quetta commanded all the direct routes from Candahar to the Punjaub and the passes leading into Sind. His views, however, did not meet with Lord Canning's approval, although twenty years after his death his suggestion was carried into effect and Quetta became an outpost of the Empire.

In the latter part of 1856 war was declared with Persia, and Outram was appointed to the command of the expeditionary force, Jacob being given the command of the Cavalry Division, of which the Sind Horse was to form part, with the rank of Brigadier-General. Sudden disturbances in Khelat, however, detained both him and his regiment, and it was not until the latter part of February that he landed at Bushire, on the very day that Outram was embarking on his expedition against Mohamerah, a strongly fortified town on the Euphrates. Three thousand men were to garrison Bushire, and, to his mortification, Jacob



found that he was to be left in command instead of proceeding to the front; Outram, however, softened the unwelcome order by appealing to his soldierly spirit and reminding him of the importance of securing the base. But the campaign ended abruptly; on March 26 Mohamerah was occupied, and a few days later news reached Outram that peace had been signed. A month later the Mutiny burst, and Lord Canning issued orders for both Outram and Jacob to return to India immediately. Outram left in June for India, but Jacob was detained, at the request of the British Minister in Persia, until Bushire was evacuated.

Four months later he landed at Bombay, where a sore disappointment awaited him. Outram had written to tell him that the Governor-General had approved of his appointment to command the Army of Central India then assembling, but on his arrival at Bombay he received a letter informing him that it had been found impossible to wait, and the command had consequently been given to Sir Hugh Rose. Jacob accordingly returned to his old duties at Jacobabad, but he found the work much increased, the long strain was telling upon him, and for the first time in his life he began to find his strength unequal to the task. During his absence the spirit of unrest had spread from the Punjaub to the Northern Mountaineers whom his strong hand had bridled for so many years, and in September the Boogtees broke out and raided the fields and pastures of the Murrees, carrying off a great amount of booty. It was obvious, as Nera wrote to Lord Elphinstone, that the old border spirit had by no means died out. Doubtless this recrudescence of the old troubles caused Jacob much additional anxiety, and dashed the hopes he had fondly cherished of leaving a legacy of peace to his successors. In 1858 he was authorised to raise two regiments of Infantry, to be called Jacob's Rifles, who were to be armed with a new pattern rifle he had invented. In March he wrote to a friend, 'The business I strive to get through daily would be sufficient to overwhelm fifty brains instead of one. I seldom get above three hours' sleep in the twenty-four, and the work will kill me; but I do not regret, for I have proved and established principles and built foundations on which others will be able to work, without being oppressed by the load of odium and universal opposition which has been heaped on me.'

At the end of November, a friend of his, Captain Pelly, found him in the desert, where he was surveying, suffering from sleeplessness

and general weakness. He consented to return to Jacobabad, but insisted on riding—a distance of twenty miles—though often bent double in the saddle. He was begged to have medical assistance, but he refused, declaring that all he needed was rest. The rest was soon to come. Shortly after midnight on December 6 he passed away, to the inexpressible grief of the officers of his staff, his old troopers of the Sind Horse, and the Belooch chiefs, who were standing round his bedside at the last. The next day he was laid in his grave, the bier being followed not only by the officers of the garrison and the Sind Horse whom he had so often led to victory, but by many of the Belooch mountaineers, who had learned to fear and love him, and a vast crowd, estimated at over ten thousand, of the inhabitants of the town which he had created, and of thriving cultivators from the adjacent country, which had been reclaimed for them from the waste by the beneficent genius of him who had now gone from among them. As his body was lowered into its final resting-place, the Beloochees comforted themselves with the fond belief that, as his body had been committed to their soil, so his spirit would remain to watch over them, and his name is still held in reverence among them as that of a being more than mortal.

Jacob was only forty-six at the time of his death, and was unmarried. He was a soldier of a rare type; a brilliant Cavalry leader and swordsman, a civil engineer of no mean order, an architect, the inventor of a greatly improved rifle, the originator of a military system, his achievements in the field were only part of his title to public gratitude. As an administrator he shone as brightly as he did as a soldier, while his influence was felt and his name held in respect in the countries bordering our North-Western frontier far beyond the marches of Sind. He was also an indefatigable writer, 'who,' in the words of one of his biographers, 'for good or evil left an indelible mark on the reorganisation of the Anglo-Indian Army, who in his uncompromising attacks on class interest and prejudices made more enemies than any man of his time, and who gave warnings which, had they been heeded, might have averted the Mutiny.' He died, a martyr to his devotion to duty. Few men cared less for fame, but few have done more for humanity or deserved better of their country.

*INSTRUCTION IN THE USE OF THE SWORD AND LANCE  
MOUNTED.*

BY SERGEANT L. HATTON, *20th Hussars.*

THE Cavalryman should be made to realise that he is provided with weapons solely for the purpose of killing, and all instruction should be carried out with the object of instilling him with that idea.

The method of using them and the best means of instructing in their use can be best understood by considering the various conditions under which the man will be called upon to meet an enemy.

Whether against Cavalry or Infantry, each man should ride at good speed with his weapon held firmly and pointed straight at the chest or stomach of his opponent in his immediate front, and with the fixed determination of killing him.

The guarding of his own body must be a secondary consideration; he must seek to kill at once, not save himself.

The Infantryman's defence is a bullet, and the Cavalryman's safety will be in the pace and vigour of his attack.

Charging is generally done collectively, but the individual may very often deliver it with success.

In charging, the rider's hand and arm are used simply for directing the point of his weapon on to his opponent, the impetus of the horse does the rest.

In the *mêlée* which may occur after a charge (but should not be looked upon as the necessary result of the charge! better that they should be taught to ride straight through their opponents, then rally to charge again or to meet a fresh attack) success *will* depend on the handiness of the horse and the skill of the rider as a horseman and swordsman.

In this case lack of space and the consequent want of speed will

deny to the rider the impetus of the horse, which in the charge drives the point home, and he is compelled to drive his weapon through his opponent by a vigorous straightening of his arm.

In the pursuit the same principle is applied, for though the pursuer is moving at speed the pace of the pursued is as fast as possible, and the requisite impetus is lost from the fact that the target is moving in the same direction as the pursuer.

From this it may be seen that the method of delivering the assault is dependent on the pace of the attacker and the direction in which the opponent is moving.

Every exercise in skill at arms should have a definite object in view, and should as nearly as possible resemble the conditions which will occur in the actual fight.

The practice of teaching men to point with sword and lance at rings, balls, heads, etc., should be discontinued, as it does not in any way resemble a living body.

When the impetus of the horse is sufficient to carry the sword through his opponent, the recruit should be taught to hold it and the sword in line position, with the edge up, and the arm locked; by this I mean that the elbow-joint is held firm by the back of the hand being directed uppermost, whereas if this and the edge of the sword is down, and the point of the sword strikes anything hard, the arm is merely forced backward and no harm done to the enemy. When the impetus is not sufficient to carry the sword through, then the engage, as spoken of later in dummy-thrusting, will be used.

In using the lance it is more or less the same as the sword, the engage with the pole under the arm, and the thumb inside the sling, will be used, and the point must be delivered from the engage, to the full extent of the arm, direct to the front in line with the shoulder, back of the hand to the left, pole outside the arm.

In regard to the dummies, rows of them or sacks stuffed with stable litter and suspended from a gallows-like erection should be freely made use of. The dummies should offer sufficient resistance so as to make it impossible to knock them over with the point of sword or lance—the patent spring dummies are perhaps the best for individual work—or to drive the point through them, unless the horse is travelling at speed, and unless the weapon is firmly held with the full weight of the rider and the momentum of the horse behind the point.

In this instruction delivering thrusts from the bent arm is not permitted.

Any instruction should be given at first individually and afterwards in squads or complete troops, and the conditions under which it is carried out depends on the number of dummies and suitable ground. When the men become proficient on level ground they should be practised over fences across rough and undulating country.

Proficiency should be judged by the vigour and accuracy with which the weapons are driven through the dummies at various paces. Targets should be fixed so that each man has a definite object to direct his point on. When attacking with speed the horses must not be allowed to get out of hand.

On the command, "Line will attack," the sword will be brought to the engage; on the command "Charge," the position will be changed to that of "sword in line."

In charging with the lance, it should be brought to the engage, on the command "Line will attack."

At the moment of impact with any body the grip must be tightened; when the body has been pierced, the rider in passing will turn his body on the hips, and in that way withdraw his weapon.

This instruction will be given in two forms:—

(a) Mounted combat, sword *v.* sword; sword *v.* lance.

(b) Dummy-thrusting.

To obtain any good results from *a* the horses must be systematically trained to the work. To attempt to train men to fight against each other on horses that get out of hand is useless and will spoil any good horse which may be opposed to them, and the exercises should be practised first of all at the slower paces.

The men should ride without spurs.

*Sword v. sword.*—When the horses are trained, the attack should be made with dash and vigour, the point preferably preceded by a feint. If his first attack failed, a good rider would turn his horse quickly, and manœuvre his mount to the best position favourable, and judgment on the part of the rider here goes a long way. Never from choice should an attack be delivered to the left, as no amount of training will make it as effective as a right front point.

There are other attacks which may be used, and which are too numerous to mention in this article.


In *Sword v. Lance*, the first principle is that the lancer takes the offensive by riding in a straight line at the swordsman, as he gallops past out of reach of the sword, and the point should be delivered to the right in front, the hand being previously held near the hip with the butt over the horse's croup. It is a mistake for the lancer to turn at once, as he would then run straight on to his opponent, who could parry and point effectively. From this we see that the lancer must go so far past his enemy as will enable him to open up a fresh attack as before mentioned. When using the lance always try and avoid close quarters.

To obtain good results from *b* all work should be done at a walk, until the horses face any ordinary dummy; also disappearing ones, which is the finest training perhaps which a man can receive at dummies—they should appear quickly at different places, and the rider must then ride them down.

All points are delivered from the engage in this practice except when actually galloping.

The disposal of dummies should be as varied as possible from day to day, and no stereotyped form, of course, is to be allowed.

The engage used in dummy-thrusting will be with the forearm and blade in one line, pointing in the direction of the adversary, edge of the blade to the right and the arm slightly bent at the elbow, which should be free from the body. There should be nothing stiff about this position, and the direction of the point will vary according to the position of the enemy.



*GREAT CAVALRY LEADERS.**LASALLE.*

BY BRIG.-GENERAL H. DE B. DE LISLE, C.B., D.S.O.

OF the many famous Cavalry leaders who assisted so materially towards the victories of Napoleon, the officer who possessed in a marked degree all the attributes which combine in the character of the ideal Cavalry commander was Lasalle. Of a distinguished appearance and with an imposing figure, he was always careful in dress, and was renowned for the splendour of his uniform and for his general turnout on all occasions. Antoine Charles Louis de Lasalle possessed a quick wit and a cultivated mind, and above all a kind sympathy with everyone which endeared him to all his friends. The story of his life, like many others of that day, is remarkable, and reads like a series of unchecked successful enterprises until the day of his death.

Born at Metz in 1755 of a noble family, he joined the 24th Cavalry Regiment at the age of sixteen, but shortly afterwards resigned his commission owing to the decree of the Republic that no one of the former nobility should serve in the Army. At the same time he enlisted in the ranks of the 23rd Cavalry Regiment and soon showed evidence of his adventurous spirit. In 1794, after attaining the rank of sergeant, at the head of a few chasseurs of his squadron he captured a battery, and was offered a commission in recognition of his bravery. This he refused on account of his desire to avoid recognition. The following year, however, political changes in the government of France made concealment no longer necessary, and at the age of twenty we find Lasalle gazetted as lieutenant of the 23rd Chasseurs. A few weeks later he was selected as aide-de-camp to General Kellermann, afterwards Field-Marshal the Duc de Valmy, and father of the Kellermann so famous at Marengo.

At this time General Kellermann was commanding the French Army in Italy, 50,000 strong, and there Lasalle learnt the art of war. On his arrival in Italy Lasalle found that General Kellermann had been

superseded, and Bonaparte was in command. Lasalle fully appreciated the character of his new Général, and later in life declared that Napoleon showed his highest generalship in the Italian War of 1796. 'There,' he says, 'Napoleon was a hero; now he is an Emperor. In Italy he had a small force badly armed, without food, boots, or money; no organisation, without any help, and under a Government in a state of anarchy. His appearance was insignificant, looked upon as a dreamer or as a boor, without a friend. He had to build up everything, and he did it. That is why he was so splendid in Italy.'

We soon read of Lasalle distinguishing himself, and his record of service bears the following entry:—

'On December 17, 1796, at Verona, Captain Lasalle at the head of eighteen men of the 1st Cavalry, charged 100 hussars of the enemy and defeated them. Being surrounded by four hussars he pounded all four, swam the river, and rejoined his troop.' After this affair Napoleon gave him command of a squadron.

In 1797 we read of Lasalle continuing his striking career. 'At Rivoli,' according to his record of service, 'he charged at the head of twenty-six Chasseurs against the battalion of Deutschmeister which had gained a footing on the plateau, and took the whole prisoners.' The intrepidity of this charge, according to Napoleon's 'Mémoires,' decided the victory. The enemy was thrown back into the ravine, and all who had advanced were captured—Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery. Some years after this action, at a dinner given in his honour, Napoleon said: 'It was Massena, Joubert, Lasalle, and myself who won the battle at Rivoli.'

In 1798 Lasalle accompanied Napoleon to Egypt and added fresh laurels to his fame. After the battle of the Pyramids, General Rampon captured the entrenched line of Embabeh, covering the Mameluke camp. 'They tried to escape by Giseh,' we read again in his records of service, 'but Lasalle with sixty hussars threw himself on them, drove them back into the camp, closed the road to Giseh, and forced them into the Nile, where most of them were drowned.'

Some weeks later he defeated the Mamelukes at Salahieh—a fight in which the Cavalry fought without Infantry support. Napoleon gives the following account of this action in his 'Mémoires': 'On September 10, at 2 P.M., the Cavalry, 350 strong, arrived near the Mosque of Salahieh. There Ibrahim Bey, with 1,200 Mamelukes and 500



Arabs, was drawn up showing a bold front. The French Infantry was still six miles off, but two Horse Artillery guns joined the Cavalry. The heat was suffocating and the Infantry had difficulty in following in the shifting sand. However, the guns came into action and the French Cavalry charged several times. It captured two camels carrying two small guns, and 150 others laden with articles of small value, which had been abandoned by Ibrahim Bey to hasten his march. In despair at seeing this fine convoy escape, Colonel Lasalle made another charge, in which he lost thirty men killed or wounded, but was unable to break through the enemy's rear guard composed of 600 Mamelukes.'

During this campaign in Egypt, Lasalle on many occasions added to his fame as a leader and to the fame of the regiments he commanded.

Many anecdotes are related about his life on his return to France, portraying him in various lights, but there can be no question as to the esteem held for him by the Emperor. On one occasion at Agen, when the prefect was giving an official ball, to which Lasalle and his officers had not been invited, the latter forced his way in with a party of his hussars and created a disturbance, throwing the supper out of the window. The prefect journeyed to Paris to lay his complaint before the Emperor. Lasalle at the same time reported the case from his point of view. The Colonel was placed under arrest for a month, but the Emperor informed the prefect his reason for not taking a more serious view of the case. 'It only requires,' he said, 'a signature to make a prefect, but more than twenty years to make a Lasalle.'

At one time Napoleon offered Lasalle the post of first equerry, but the latter refused, saying, 'Make me a general, because I can then fight for France, but I don't want to join your household.' When the order of the Legion of Honour was instituted in 1803, Lasalle was gazetted a member, and promoted to commander in 1804.

Before the campaign of 1806 against Prussia, the Cavalry was reorganised. Murat was placed in command of the Cavalry Reserve, which then corresponded to our Independent Cavalry, composed of eight divisions. The Light Cavalry was organised into two separate brigades under Milhaud and Lasalle, and was placed temporarily under Murat to reconnoitre in front of the Army. Lasalle's brigade was on the right, and was mentioned several times in the official despatches, and on one occasion, bearing the date October 19, 1806,

Napoleon administered to him a severe reprimand in Army orders: 'The Emperor testifies his displeasure to Major-General Klein and Brigadier-General Lasalle, and directs that this mark of his displeasure should appear in orders, for having allowed two columns of the enemy to escape which had been cut off. Both officers had the simplicity to believe what the hostile General Blucher conveyed to them with reference to the enemy. Since when has his Majesty sent his orders through hostile channels?'

The truth of this episode, officially recorded as above, appears to have been as follows: Lasalle, marching his brigade about 750 strong, was informed by his patrols that he had in front of him a column from 6,000 to 10,000 strong. He manœuvred with much skill and



withdrew without losing a man. When he heard of the Emperor's order he wanted to blow out his brains, but went to find Napoleon. The latter accepted his explanation, but as usual would make no alteration in orders. Lasalle swore to make the Prussians pay dearly for his annoyance. He pursued with redoubled energy, and after several days, during which he marched twenty-seven, thirty-three, and thirty-six miles, and pushed patrols in all directions, he arrived

The above portrait is reproduced by kind permission of Messrs. Berger-Levrault, Paris.

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at Oranienburg on October 25. He then ascertained with certainty that Prince von Hohenlohe with 18,000 men was marching from Magdeburg to Stettin and that the King of Prussia was at Custrin.

On October 26 he moved to Zehdenick, where his advanced guard came in touch with the Prussian rear guard consisting of fourteen squadrons. After some manœuvring to gain time for the arrival of Grouchy's Division of Dragoons, he launched all the Cavalry he had, about 300 men, in such a well-directed, irresistible charge that he threw the enemy into confusion and pursued for three miles. The Colonel, nearly all the officers, and 500 men of the regiment opposed to him were killed or captured. The pursuit lay through a defile, and only when Lasalle's horses and men were exhausted did he give way to Grouchy's Dragoons, who carried on the fight. Murat writes on this occasion to the Emperor: 'Your Cavalry has truly covered itself with glory. General Lasalle has indeed wiped out the day at Wiessensee (above). He fought for several hours after a march of sixteen miles.'

Lasalle, however, was by no means satisfied. The following day he reached the outskirts of Prenzlau as the Prussians arrived in the town by another route. Supported by a battery of Horse Artillery, Lasalle charged into the town and checked the Prussians until the arrival of Grouchy and Milhaud. Prince Hohenlohe was forced to surrender with seventeen battalions and nineteen squadrons. Lasalle's record of service bears the following note: 'Mentioned in Army orders as having materially assisted, throughout the campaign in Prussia, in the capture of several generals, the Prince von Hohenlohe, Prince Auguste of Prussia, Prince of Schwerin, 16,000 Infantry, six regiments of Cavalry, and sixty-four guns.'

The following day the Emperor wrote to Murat: 'Convey my satisfaction to the Dragoons and to the Light Cavalry of Milhaud and Lasalle.'

The very day this was written Lasalle achieved a still more remarkable feat. Arriving with his brigade before the fortress of Stettin, he was received by cannon from the walls. Collecting under cover, he sent two officers to demand surrender. The same night the capitulation was signed, under the impression that he was supported by the rest of the Army. In the morning, finding that the weak Cavalry Brigade was alone, the Prussians were on the point of offering resistance, but Lasalle, without losing a moment, charged and dispersed the troops. It was on this occasion that Napoleon wrote to Murat: 'If your hussars

are going to capture fortresses, I may as well melt down my siege guns and disband my engineers.'

As soon as he could hand over his prisoners Lasalle pushed on, marching twenty-five to thirty miles a day, and on November 6 took part in the fight at Lubeck, where the Cavalry enveloped Blucher's column and forced this general to surrender at Radtkau.

It is interesting to read the length of marches performed by this tireless leader. From October 1 to November 7 his average march was twenty-six miles. Though his men had been remounted more than once, of the 1,242 horses he had at the start, he could only mount 244 on November 15. Shortly afterwards the three Light Cavalry Brigades were formed into a Division under Lasalle, which soon became as renowned as all other units which this officer had commanded.

After the Peace of Tilsit the Emperor bestowed on Lasalle the grand cross of the Legion of Honour, and at the grand review in which Lasalle led by his Division of 5,400 horse, he was made a Count.

In 1808 we read of Lasalle escorting Napoleon into Spain, where he won fresh laurels, but being wanted by Napoleon on the Danube, we find him on May 20, 1809, crossing to the left bank with a new Light Cavalry Division to cover the remainder of the force.

During the costly battle of Essling, this Division, with those of Espagne and Nansouty, performed prodigies of valour, and saved Massena's force from destruction. In this battle Espagne was killed, and at Wagram on July 6 Lasalle, who was covering Massena's retirement, was shot when leading a charge carried out with his usual dash.

About Lasalle all his contemporaries are unanimous in the estimation in which he was held. Marmont, writing of the battle of Wagram, describes him as 'one of our most distinguished officers, who was endowed with a true soldier's instinct, and a man of remarkable energy.' General Foy, when specifying the leaders of those days capable of handling 'vast hurricanes of Cavalry,' mentions but four—Murat, Lasalle, Kellermann, and Montbrun. In the manuscripts of de Curedy praise is always given without exaggeration, and he writes: 'Lasalle, one of the bravest in the French Army, had sound judgment in the field and was prudent when necessary.'

To the men in the ranks he was ever a hero, loved by his officers, admired and respected by his superiors. He may well be described by French writers of his day as the ideal of a Cavalry leader.

*REGIMENTAL MEDALS.*

BY D. HASTINGS IRWIN.

LONG before it had become the custom for the Government to reward military service by distributing medals to the rank and file many regiments had instituted orders of merit and medals for individual rewards, such as shooting, sobriety, bravery, good conduct, &c. They were usually given and paid for by the officers, but the number given in each regiment was not very large, as they were not given to every soldier in the regiment, but only to those who were specially distinguished. Hence they are all rare, some being unique, and are much sought after by medal-collectors.

However, they were as a rule discontinued when the long-service and good-conduct medal was instituted by the Government in 1830; but the last issue of the 10th Hussars regimental medal was in 1860.

Below is a tabulated description of the medals issued by Cavalry regiments which I have met with during the many years that I have been interested in medals, but doubtless many others exist. As will be seen, there was no uniform design, and, from the fact that many were engraved instead of being struck from a die, one may reasonably infer that in those cases not more than one or two were issued. When only a few were wanted the expense of cutting a die was not warranted.

For convenience of reference, the notes are arranged in regimental instead of chronological sequence.

*1st Life Guards.*—A round silver medal, having on the obverse the badge of the regiment, and engraved on the reverse 'Waterloo; merit rewarded; Francis Dalton, 1817.'

*Royal Horse Guards.*—Two medals of different design are known to have been issued by the officers of this regiment. The first is octagonal, with the Star of the Order of the Garter in silver and enamel mounted on it. Between the points of the star are the words, 'Rl. Regt. Horse Guards,' and the date '1806' below. The reverse is engraved, 'A

reward for skill at arms: Corporal Major Simeon Hurst,' and two crossed swords. This medal is in the Payne Collection.

The other is oval, having on the obverse the Star of the Garter, and on the reverse 'R.H.G., Waterloo: A reward of merit; J. Varley, 1817.' Both medals are silver.

*1st Dragoon Guards.*—A silver-gilt and enamelled star of four points; in the centre on red enamel a crown, 'G.R.,' and 'I.D.G.,' surrounded by a ring of blue enamel, inscribed, 'A reward for military merit, 1817.' The name of the recipient, 'W. Clarkson,' is engraved on the reverse.

*4th Dragoon Guards.*—Two medals are known in connection with this regiment. The obverse of both bears the badge of the regiment; the reverse of one being inscribed, 'A reward of military merit, 1815; given to A. Kirwan by his comrades'; and the other, 'Presented to James Evans by the officers of the regiment: a reward of military merit, 1816.'

*5th Dragoon Guards.*—At one time it was no uncommon occurrence for Masonic Lodges to exist in regiments, and the following curious decoration is probably a relic of one of them. It consists of a pair of compasses resting on a quadrant. Between the legs of the compasses is a sun with nine rays, with a cock above it. The quadrant bears the following inscription on the front: 'Presented by the Brethren of Lodges 570 and 663 to their esteemed and much-respected Brother, Quartermaster J. H. Cochran, of the 5th Dragoon Guards, as a testimonial tribute of respect to one of the heroes of Llevena, Salamanca, Vittoria, and Toulouse,' and on the back, 'As well as every other field of glory throughout the Peninsular War—fields on which the character of this Irish hero was so honorably, so frequently, and conspicuously distinguished.' This peculiar decoration is of silver-gilt, and is  $5\frac{1}{2}$  inches long by 6 inches wide, and is fitted with a ring for suspension.

*6th Dragoon Guards.*—An oval silver engraved medal, inscribed 'For merit and soldierly conduct; James Scott, 1815.' It is suspended from a bar engraved 'Buenos Ayres, 1907.'

*1st Dragoons.*—An oval silver engraved medal, inscribed 'Major-General the Earl of Pembroke; obtained by Sergeant T. Fowler for skill at arms; Colchester, 17th November, 1804.'

A silver engraved medal one and three-quarter inches in diameter, with a chased flower border. The obverse bears the royal crest within a

crowned garter, with a wreath uniting branches of roses, shamrock, and thistles. The wreath bears the regimental motto, 'Spectamur Agendo.' In the exergue the Standard of the 105th French Infantry Regiment is shown. The reverse is inscribed, 'This badge of merit was awarded by Colonel Clifton, the Royal Regiment of Dragoons, to Sergeant Cook, at Cork, 17th November, 1827.'

*2nd Dragoons.*—A large oval silver engraved medal, inscribed '2nd Royal North British Dragoons; the gift of Lieutenant-Colonel John Haydock Bowman; 9th January, 1803. For merit.'

*3rd K.O. Light Dragoons.*—Two medals given by the officers of this regiment, now the 3rd Hussars, were recently sold in London. One was inscribed, 'The gift of Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Wade, 17th July, 1801,' and the other, 'Presented to Richard Brunton by the officers, 1816: Salamanca, Vittoria, Toulouse.'

*4th Light Dragoons.*—Of this regiment also two medals are known. The first has on the obverse a trophy of arms in high relief, and the inscription, 'IV. Lt. Drgns.' On the reverse the following inscription is engraved: 'The transferable prize for the best swordsman: presented by Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Dalbiac, 1808.' The other is inscribed, 'Reward of military merit. Presented to H. Allen by Major Jas. Hugonin, a token of regard and esteem, 1815.' This medal is fitted with a bar for suspension, engraved with the word, 'Peninsula.'

*5th Dragoons.*—This regiment having been disbanded in 1798, and being absent from the Army List until it was revived in 1858 as the 5th Lancers, not many relics of it exist. One medal, however, is known which is inscribed, 'Soldierly merit rewarded; J. McTaggart, 1792.'

*6th Dragoons.*—In the Day Collection there is a large silver engraved medal issued by this regiment. The obverse bears the Castle of Enniskillen inside a wreath of shamrock, with the inscription 'Inniskilling Dragoons' above, and the numeral 'VI.' below. The reverse is inscribed, 'A reward for twenty years' military merit; T. McC., 1814.' Another has on the obverse the badge of the regiment, with the following inscription on the reverse: 'Presented to James Fee by his brothers-in-arms; a token of their regard for his good qualities as a comrade and soldier; May, 1816.'

*7th Light Dragoons.*—Four medals are known in connection with this regiment. The first is a silver engraved medal one and three-quarter inches in diameter with a beaded border, and loop for suspension.

The obverse has in the centre the royal cypher 'G.R.' crowned, and surrounded by a garter. Above is inscribed '7th Regiment Light Dragoons,' and below 'Reward of merit.' On the reverse is the inscription, 'Presented to Sergeant Jas. Duncan by the officers of the regiment. For a worthy man and a soldier, 1804.'

A similar medal was inscribed 'The gift of the officers of the regiment to Sergeant P. White for merit with the sword, 17th July, 1808,' and another, as a 'Reward of merit, 1811; J. Jennings.' The illustration shows a silver-and-blue enamelled cross, with '7 L.D.' in the centre, and with the date 'MDCCCXVII.' on the upper arm, and 'Waterloo,' 'For military merit,' and 'Peninsula' on the other three. The reverse is not enamelled, and the specimen in the Payne Collection is inscribed 'J. Jeffs.'

*8th Light Dragoons.*—A regimental medal was 'Presented by Colonel Sir Robert Laurie in 1803,' but I am unfortunately unable to give details of it. A later one had on the obverse a harp and crown, with the inscription 'VIII. L.D.' above, and the regimental motto, 'Pristinae Virtutis Memores,' below. The reverse was inscribed, 'The King's Royal Irish Regiment, L.D. Reward of merit: W. S. Rickwood, 1819.'

In the Day Collection there is a gold engraved medal one and a half inches in diameter, having on the obverse a harp, lion and crown, with the word 'Laswaree' above, 'Hindustan' and the motto 'Pristinae Virtutis Memores' below. The reverse is inscribed, 'Presented by the non-commissioned officers and privates of Captain R. de Salis' troop, 8th Hussars, to Troop Sergeant-Major John Landers, on his leaving the regiment, as a mark of esteem for his exemplary conduct during the time he served in the above corps, 1838.'

*9th Lancers.*—Two medals were given to Sergeant-Major Godding of this regiment, and a third is known with the reverse inscribed 'Military merit rewarded by the officers of the regiment. Awarded to Thomas Hely, 1817.'

The obverses of the first two were illustrated in this Journal in July, 1910. The reverse of the larger one is inscribed, 'Presented to Regimental Sergeant-Major Thomas Godding by the officers of his regiment, as a token of esteem, and in testimony of his faithful and meritorious services for upwards of thirty-two years; March, 1837.' Around the outside: 'Present at the sieges of Buenos Ayres and



Flushing; at the battles of Arroyo-de-Molinos, Vittoria, St. Sebastian, Pyrenees, Orthès, and Toulouse.'

The reverse of the smaller one is inscribed, 'Edinburgh, 20th March, 1837. Presented to Regimental Sergeant-Major Thos. Godding by the non-commissioned officers of the regiment as a token of esteem, and in testimony of his gallant and meritorious services for upwards of thirty-two years.' Both these medals are in Lord Cheylesmore's Collection in the Royal United Service Institution.

*10th Hussars.*—The non-commissioned officers' medal of this regiment was instituted when they were quartered in Dublin in 1840, and its distribution was left in their hands. The obverse was illustrated in July, 1910. The reverse has in the centre a mounted Hussar, surrounded by a wreath of roses, shamrock, and thistles, and around it the following inscription is engraved: 'Presented to \_\_\_\_\_ by his brother non-commissioned officers, 10th Royal Hussars, as a mark of esteem,' with the date of presentation below. The medal is of silver, one and five-eighths inches in diameter, struck in high relief.

An earlier medal bestowed upon a soldier in the same regiment had in the centre of the obverse 'H,' with '10' above, and on either side 'G.R.' Over all was the Prince of Wales's crest and motto, the whole being surrounded by a laurel wreath. The reverse was inscribed 'For military merit: R.T., 1824.' The medal was silver one and seven-eighths inches in diameter, with a raised rim and loop for suspension.

*12th Lancers.*—Several medals are known in connection with this regiment, possibly the most interesting being that given by Pope Pius VI. to twelve officers of the regiment who were present at the attack on the Island of Corsica in 1794. The medals were struck in gold, and were one and a half inches in diameter. They are shown in obverse and reverse. As the date on the medal is 1791, it is obvious that it was not struck to commemorate the good conduct of the British officers in 1794, but to commemorate the restoration of the harbour of Civita Vecchia three years before. The next in chronological sequence is a large oval silver engraved medal, inscribed 'The gift of Lieutenant Colonel George Thomas Thomas to Sergeant White for skill with the sword; 18th June, 1804.' One dated 1817 has on the obverse the Prince of Wales's crest and motto between crossed lances, with '12 R.L.' and 'Waterloo' below. The reverse bears the following inscription: 'Presented to Samuel Chapman, a token of regard from his brothers-in-arms,

1817.' This medal is two inches in diameter, and has a reeded border and loop for suspension.

*13th Light Dragoons.*—In the Whittaker Collection there is an interesting medal given to a soldier in this regiment. It is in form a Maltese cross of silver, suspended from a silver bar. In the centre of the obverse is the royal crest, and on a scroll below 'For valour.' The reverse is inscribed 'No. 528. John R. Singleton, private, B Troop, 13th Light Dragoons.' When or for what act of gallantry this medal was rewarded there is nothing to show, unless the regimental records give some clue.

Another medal 'For military merit' was awarded to 'W. Minchin' in '1817,' but there is no description of it available.

*14th Light Dragoons.*—There is an interesting medal of this regiment in the Royal United Service Institution. The obverse was shown in the illustration in the July, 1910, number of this Journal; the reverse is inscribed 'Fortitudine: Blasco Sancho, 26 July, 1812; Peninsula.'

Another medal evidently used for more general distribution is known, bearing on the obverse '14 L.D.' within a laurel wreath and on the reverse the inscription, 'For soldierly merit'; it is one and three-quarter inches in diameter, and is suspended from a bar engraved 'Peninsula.' It is a struck silver medal, with the recipient's name engraved on the edge. Those known to the writer are engraved 'Sergeants H. Ivatts, Robert Waller, and Wm. Stuart, 1816.' The latter gives a clue as to the period when the medal was in use.

*15th Hussars.*—The earliest medal known in connection with this distinguished regiment is dated 1760, when it was known as 'Elliott's Light Horse.' The obverse is inscribed '15: Elliott's Light Horse,' and the reverse 'Emsdorff: 16th July, 1760; Trooper Ryland.'

On May 1, 1798, the Emperor Francis II. presented a gold medal and chain to eight officers of the 15th Light Dragoons for distinguished conduct at the battle of Villiers-en-Crouché, near Cambray, on April 24, 1794. The recipients were Major Wm. Aylett; Captains Edward Pocklington and Edward Ryan; Lieutenants Thomas Calcraft, William Keir, and Thomas Blount; Cornets Edward Butler and Robert Wilson.

The medal is two and three-eighths inches in diameter and weighs four and one-third ounces, and is suspended from a gold chain of the same weight. The obverse bears a laureated head of the Emperor, with

the legend 'Imp Caes. Franciscus II. P.F. Aug.,' and on the reverse 'Forti . Britanno . in . exercitu . Foed . ad Cameracum XXIV. Apr. MDCCXCIV.,' with two laurel branches in the exergue. Lord Cheylesmore has one of these rare medals in his collection. A medal was presented to Lieutenant Grant by Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine 'For gallantry' in 1799, but I have no details either of the design nor of the act for which it was given.

That an order of merit existed in the regiment is evident from the fact of an engraved silver medal, inscribed 'Vittoria, Orthès, Toulouse, Order of Merit, 15 H., C. Powell, from his brothers-in-arms,' having been recently sold in London. Another medal is known having the regimental device on the obverse, and with the reverse inscribed 'For military merit. Presented to Corporal James Dankins by the officers of the regiment, 1817.'

*16th Light Dragoons.*—A silver Maltese cross presented to Francis Lambert by Lieutenant-General Sir John Vandeleur for services in the Peninsular War was illustrated in this Journal in July, 1910. It is in the collection in the Royal United Service Institution belonging to Lord Cheylesmore. Two other medals of this regiment are known, one presented to D. Pratt in 1817 'by his comrades,' and the other inscribed 'Military merit rewarded; J. W. Jones, 16th Q. Lrs., 1819.'

*17th Light Dragoons.*—A small gold medal. The illustration in the July number, 1910, shows the obverse; the reverse is inscribed 'Presented as a token of regard to Troop Sergeant-Major P. Farley by the N.C. officers and privates of Captain Willett's troop, 17th Lancers.' This medal belongs to the period from 1843 to 1852. The earliest medal in connection with this regiment is dated 1790, and is inscribed 'First swordsman, 17th Light Dragoons; won by S. Bagot.' The medal most often met with is struck in silver, having on the obverse a skull and crossbones, and the motto 'Or Glory. 17th Light Dragoons.' On the reverse, within a wreath, 'India, Buenos Ayres, Monte Video, St. Domingo; a reward for military virtue.' The name of the recipient was engraved on the edge of the medal, and those known to me are inscribed 'J. Cockburn,' 'John Lorimer,' and 'Ed. Price' respectively.

I have also come across a small gold Maltese cross, one inch square, having in the centre a skull and crossbones in high relief, with diamonds in the eyes. On each arm of the cross is one word of the inscription 'In hoc signo vinces.' The reverse is engraved '17th' in the centre,

surrounded by a laurel wreath, with 'L' on one side and 'D' on the other, and below, 'San Domingo, 1796-7.' The obverse in enamelled scarlet; the reverse plain.

*19th Light Dragoons.*—The illustration shows the obverse of a silver cast and chased medal, inscribed on the reverse '19th Light Dragoons. Soldierly merit. Awarded to Pte. Henry Jones by Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Maxwell, 2nd October, 1801.' The medal is two inches long, by one and three-quarter inches wide.

*20th Light Dragoons.*—In the Day Collection there is an oval silver engraved medal two and three-eighth inches by one and a half inches, issued by this regiment. The obverse bears 'G.R., XX., Jamaica. L.D.,' surrounded by a wreath of pineapples. The reverse is inscribed 'Reward of merit from Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Gillespie, 20th June, 1800,' and the name of the recipient, 'Thomas Betts,' is engraved on the edge.

Another medal is known, engraved on the reverse 'Leipsic-Maida. The reward of military merit, 1816, W. Edwards.'

*21st Light Dragoons.*—In the centre of the obverse is engraved 'XXI.,' with a crown above and 'L.D.' below, surrounded by a laurel wreath, round which is wound a ribbon, inscribed 'Cut tack,' 'San Domingo,' 'Monte Video,' 'Africa.' The reverse is inscribed 'Presented to Mr. John Schroeder, veterinary surgeon, by Colonel Richard Pigot, as a token of regard, on the disbanding of the regiment, 1819.' The medal is two inches in diameter, and has a reeded border and loop for suspension. A medal was also given by Lieutenant-Colonel John Sullivan Wood in 1799 'For merit,' but I unfortunately have no details of it.

*22nd Light Dragoons.*—In the illustration issued in the July number of 1910 is shown the obverse of the regimental medal of this regiment. The reverse bears in the centre a rose, shamrock, and thistle, surmounted by a crown, and with 'Reward of merit and faithful service' below. I have also heard of a medal of this regiment inscribed 'Valour rewarded: Egypt, 1801,' awarded to William Taylor, but am unable to give further details.

*23rd Light Dragoons.*—The illustrations show the obverse and reverse of the fine medal given by this regiment. It was in use about 1816, as one of the specimens that I have seen has this date engraved

on the edge, after the recipient's name. It was given, no doubt amongst others, to J. Graham, J. Burke, J. Crouchley, and W. Jones.

*24th Light Dragoons.*—Two medals are known of this regiment, one 'For merit, the gift of Lieutenant-Colonel Bentinck, 1800,' and the other an oval silver engraved medal, having on the obverse an elephant and the word 'Hindostan.' The reverse is inscribed 'Reward of merit, William Andrews, 1817; Aleyghur, Delhi.'

*28th Light Dragoons.*—I have heard of two medals issued by this long-since disbanded regiment, one inscribed 'From Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. Charles William Stewart to Sergeant J. Cooper, for merit, 1798,' and the other 'To Charles Roots, 1816.'

This most rare series of medals cannot fail to be of interest to collectors generally, and to such regiments as very properly collect these relics of their earlier days.



## Regimental Medals.



12th Light Dragoons (*Obverse*).



12th Light Dragoons (*Reverse*).



19th Light Dragoons (*Obverse*).



23rd Light Dragoons (*Obverse*).



23rd Light Dragoons (*Reverse*).



Royal Horse Guards (*Obverse*).



7th Light Dragoons (*Obverse*).



Royal Horse Guards (*Reverse*).



THE LATE  
GENERAL SIR BAKER CREED RUSSELL, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.

1837-1911.



## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

*Revue de Cavalerie*, August-September.—As usual during the manœuvre season, this is a double number. The first paper contains reminiscences by General Baron Rébillot of the operations of the Army of the Rhine in 1870; he attributes the successive defeats of the French to the extraordinary passivity of their generals; that while German commanders of the most junior rank always marched to the guns, the French invariably waited for orders or actually refused to move. He quotes a speech of General de Castagny, one of Bazaine's divisional generals, who, in reply to the appeals of Frossard, merely remarked brutally, '*Le maître d'école est dans la mélasse, qu'il y reste.*' In a study of strategy which he calls 'from hypothesis to victory,' Colonel Cordonnier lays stress upon the importance of Cavalry forming a true idea of the questions which strategy requires this arm to elucidate. He illustrates his thesis by a detailed account of the events which followed upon the arrival of Napoleon at Vittoria on November 6, 1808, when he relieved King Joseph in command of the army in Spain, and specially deals with the movements of Bessières with the Second Corps and Lasalle's Cavalry. He traces what resulted from the false information transmitted by Lasalle, and, as he says, *là où un Lasalle n'a pas su découvrir le vrai, un autre aussi pourra se tromper*, and points out how often strategic calculations must inevitably be based upon error. 'L.N.C.' has a few words to say on the subject of the dismounted action of Cavalry; he is insistent on the need for Cavalry giving up the idea that they can or should aim at fighting a retarding action against Infantry. The rôle of Cavalry employing fire against Infantry is, he claims, to subject this arm to continual annoyance by constant petty attacks—usually from a distance and with the horses so well concealed as to cause the infantry to remain ignorant as to which arm is attacking them. It is, he contends, the *guns* which accompany cavalry and not the *rifles* which they themselves carry, which can really fight a retarding action against or stop Infantry. 'E.D.' writes, in the manner of de Brack, an essay on 'The Tactics of the Cavalry Fight,' which will well repay perusal. Captain d'Aubert concludes in this number his articles on '*La Cavalerie de demain.*' He sums up the requirements which he holds to be absolutely necessary: a special divisional Cavalry, by which we may assume that he means one which should fulfil this rôle and no other; for each army corps a Cavalry Brigade of two regiments available, if required, for attachment to Cavalry Divisions, or forming provisional divisions with other corps brigades—each army corps therefore must contain a commander who can assume the leadership of such a provisional division; each army to possess its own permanent



Cavalry Division; and finally, for certain special missions, the general in chief command must have at his disposal one or more Cavalry Corps from which he can either reinforce the army Cavalry or *vice versâ*. There is a description, hitherto unpublished, of the personal experiences of a Lieutenant Danel, of the 9th Hussars, during the retreat from Moscow; he was then only three-and-twenty, had made seven campaigns in Prussia, Poland, Spain, and Austria, and had charged at Friedland, Samosierra, and at Wagram. Colonel Sainte-Chapelle continues his account of General Moinier's operations in Morocco; the Count d'Ideville describes the work of the *Société du Cheval de guerre*; and Captain Valder has some suggestions as to the holding of reins.

October.—M. Lehautcourt describes in considerable detail the work of the German Cavalry in August, 1870, told off to find and locate the Châlons army; his paper is mainly based upon von Widdern's book *Verwendung und Führung der Kavallerie*; it is to be continued. This number also contains the first part of an account of three days *de manœuvres de cadres à la 6e division de Cavalerie*; this is illustrated by an excellent large-scale map. Colonel Cordonnier continues his strategical study commenced in the last number, and takes the operations of the Grand Army in 1906 crowned with the success of Jena; he shows us, however, how an army commanded by 'the god of war' served by a Murat, *voguant dans les hypothèses*, left on October 14 one corps doing nothing and Davout exposed to the risk of being overwhelmed by mere numbers. There is here a good statement in brief of the limitations of Berthier. There are two articles on this year's Cavalry manœuvres, accompanied by a good map; and Colonel Sainte-Chapelle brings his military history of Morocco down to the disembarkation at Tripoli of the Italian field force.

November.—This number opens with an article entitled, '*Ah! les braves gens*,' and contains a far too brief record of the distinguished services of the Chasseurs d'Afrique and of the Spahis, and when one reads the list, incomplete as it necessarily is, of their achievements, it is not easy to believe that the senior regiments were only raised as lately as 1831. The writer of this sketch remarks that at Balaklava the 1st Chasseurs d'Afrique *conquiert une fraternité d'armes avec le Cavalerie Anglaise, qui de nos jours n'est pas oubliée*, and he publishes also just the letter which one would have expected de Galliffet to have written on his final retirement from the Army to his old regiment, the 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique: 'It is to the regiment that I owe the best of my good fortune; I have not forgotten, I never shall forget.' There is a wonderful list of distinguished men who served in this Cavalry—Margueritte, MacMahon, Murat, Saint-Arnaud, Péliissier, Chanzy, Morris du Barail, Bosquet, and others; while among the names of those of the Chasseurs and Spahis who have been killed in action, there is one which is certainly British, that of Sous-Lieutenant Windham, killed at Safra on September 12, 1864. The *manœuvres de cadres* of the 6th Cavalry Division is continued, as is the account by Pierre Lehautcourt of the Wurtemberg Cavalry employed against the Châlons army. Colonel Cordonnier's strategical study—*de l'hypothèse à la victoire*—is full of interest and contains many valuable maxims, and he shows step by step that Jena was in

no way foreseen, that the *période des recherches* had not come to an end, and that many hypotheses had not yet been cleared up when the necessity for action was imposed upon the Emperor, when *il improvisa*. Commandant Mordacq complains that nothing has been decided to legitimise the position of cyclists with Cavalry, and urges that every Cavalry Division should have attached to it a group of cyclists not exceeding in strength 400 rifles. Then follows a very brief account of the operations this year of the 8th Cavalry Division of four regiments, and of a provisional division of six regiments of Cavalry. Jean d'Epée brings to notice a claim which commanders of Cavalry machine-gun detachments are said to be putting forward—that they should be supplied with a permanent mounted escort. He points out that machine-guns are attached to Cavalry to increase its fire-power, and that no body of Cavalry should be expected to manœuvre so as to support the machine-guns, which are themselves intended to support the Cavalry. To use Cavalry to support these guns will, he contends, end by immobilising the mounted arm altogether. In this number is published a very interesting letter filed in the national archives, and dated Neustadt, Dresden, July 22, 1813, wherein General Colbert, commanding a brigade in the Cavalry Division of Mouton, then Count de Lobau, recommends for promotion both Curély and de Brack, the first then chef d'escadrons and the other a captain and aide-de-camp to Colbert. It is surely a curious and a happy coincidence to find these two distinguished Light Cavalry leaders proposed for advancement in the same letter.

*Spectateur Militaire*, September 1.—In this number Dr. Gaston Bellat brings his review on 'Declaration of War and International Law' up to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, and blames the French Press for the view it then took of the action of the Japanese in attacking the Russian fleet outside Port Arthur. He holds that the first of the two despatches handed to Count Lamsdorff on February 6, 1904, must be considered as putting a close to a state of peace between the two countries and commencing a state of war. The following numbers contain some details of no small importance of the action of the Cavalry on either side at the battle of Coulmiers—especially on the French left; neither Cavalry appears to have risen to the height of its opportunities in the action, but the German horsemen seem to have rendered incomparably the better information. Interesting and not without significance in regard to territorial troops fighting against an invader is the account which the author gives of how regiments of Mobiles, some of them under fire for the first time and inclined to give way, were successfully rallied by appeals to local patriotism: '*Vive la Dordogne!*' and again, '*Eh bien! les Manceaux, est-ce que nous allons reculer?*' The October and November numbers contain further details of what was certainly a French victory, though an indecisive one. The reader must judge of the shortcomings of the French Cavalry rather by what is left unsaid than by what is definitely stated; but before condemning the limitations of this arm, one can form a better opinion of its state by reading an account in a recent number of the Austrian Cavalry Journal, referred to elsewhere, of the enormous difficulties attending the re-organisation of the French Cavalry after Sedan.

*Militär-Wochenblatt*.—In the number of October 10 there is a description of a new aim-controller which has been designed by the firm of Scheele, and which has now been issued to the German Army. It should be found of great use in teaching recruits of all arms the principles of aiming and pressing the trigger. The ordinary aim-correcter in use in our Army merely shows the instructor the alignment by the recruit of the fore and back sights with the target, but the Scheele apparatus permits the instructor *in addition* to observe the eye of the firer and also to notice the movements of a dialhand which is actuated by the pressing of the trigger. This dial can also be so placed that the firer can himself observe how the aim is affected by the steady pressure of his trigger finger.

Interesting are the details which have been collected by Lieutenant-Colonel Müller-Kranefeldt, and published under date of October 31, of what he calls the *Marchverluste*, or ordinary casualties (apart from wounds, etc., received in action), of the horses of the German Cavalry in the Franco-German campaign of 1870-71. For reasons of space the compiler of these statistics confines himself to an account of the wastage in horseflesh of the 4th Cavalry Division composed of six regiments, compared with that of the four Cavalry regiments forming the Divisional Cavalry of the 2nd, 9th, 10th, and 22nd Infantry Divisions. The horses appear to have all started on the campaign in good fettle; in none of the ten regiments dealt with do any appear to have entered upon the war with more than nine sick horses, but all were initially affected by the hardness of the roads in France, then by the wet weather, and finally by the snow and ice of the winter. On the other hand, horses which were too sick or too lame to follow with the baggage could be, and were frequently, left in charge of provincial *maires* or livery-stable keepers, who were bound under pain of punishment, to produce them when called upon or satisfactorily to account for them. There is a very great difference in the total numbers of horses which were shot as incurable or died of disease in the Cavalry Division and in the Divisional Cavalry—576 in the former (six regiments) and only 251 in the latter (four regiments); but the compiler of the return accounts for this in some measure by the extraordinary exertions of this Cavalry Division during the campaign on the Loire. As the war strength of a Cavalry regiment is 602, the loss in horses destroyed or died of disease practically amounted to one-sixth of the strength of the Division. There was a great difference in the numbers thus lost in different regiments of the same Brigade; in some cases it is found that the regiments armed with carbines had the largest number of horse casualties, owing to the fact that regiments thus armed did more advance guard and outpost work than others armed only with the *arme blanche*. All these regiments dropped sick horses at various places, the 4th Division to the number of 226, and the Divisional Cavalry regiments 101; but the 4th Division also left behind 310 in depôts formed at Nancy and Chartres. From the Ersatz squadrons the Division received upwards of 500 horses, from requisitioning 65, and from captures 183, while the remounts obtained in like manner by the Divisional Cavalry regiments were 110, 26, and 106. The compiler regrets that no tables seem to have been drawn up after the

war of 1870-71 showing the casualties, under all headings, of Cavalry horses, as was done after the wars of 1864 and 1866. But so far as can be seen from the return for 1866, the loss in horseflesh seems to have been heavy, considering the short period that campaign lasted and that the horses were serving in a climate and under conditions to which they were more or less accustomed; thus, including officers' chargers, something under 25,000 horses took the field, and of these some 3,250 seem to have formed the actual wastage.

In the number dated December 5, Major-General von Hertzberg, commanding the Guard Cavalry Division, has a paper on 'Cavalry Attacks'; he seems to fear that there is too great a tendency with Cavalry to attack dismounted, that the fire-fight is often overdone, and that it is sometimes undertaken because time is thus gained to consider the tactical situation. The writer believes that Cavalry officers are in some danger of dismounting when the mounted attack is perfectly feasible and indeed desirable, and holds that against Artillery especially the mounted attack will have even more chance of success in the future than in the past, owing to the frequent employment by Artillery of the covered position, which facilitates the Cavalry approach.

*Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, September.—Major Count Zedtwitz, of the General Staff, contributes an account of the great Austro-Hungarian Cavalry manœuvres in the district of Somogy, of the operations of which he was unusually qualified to judge from the fact that during the preliminary reconnaissance he was employed as summary-writer, while during the actual manœuvres he was alternately made use of as an umpire, as a summary-writer, and finally as a chief of the staff with different Cavalry bodies. He describes all that came under his purview, and offers various deductions. During the reconnaissance operations he finds that despite all the technical and other means for the transmission of information, the only ones which could be relied upon were the despatch-rider and the long-distance wireless. He values very highly the reconnaissance work of the aviators. He declares his opinion that Cavalry, unassisted by Artillery and Infantry, cannot without infinite trouble force the passage of a river presenting a serious obstacle. He lays great stress upon the difficulty of control and direction in a Cavalry body employed in reconnaissance. He complains, *mirabile dictu*, of the work of the umpires! Major-General Gradinger adds something to the remarks which have appeared in successive numbers of the *Revue de Cavalerie*, of the crying need for a Cavalry leader in the sense that General de Galliffet was one. Major von Junk, who was himself badly wounded in that action, describes again the charge of Bredow's Brigade on August 16, 1870, with special reference to the part taken therein by his own regiment. Then follows a short paper on the duties of Cavalry in Fortress Warfare, and this is succeeded by a review of the new 'Cavalry Training' of the Italian Army, a notice of which appears elsewhere in this number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL. Rittmeister Zimmer describes the arrangements of a jumping-school in Frankfort, accompanied by plans showing the different jumps here, those at the *Concours Hippique* in Paris, and at our

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International Horse Show at Olympia; the writer expresses his conviction that these competitions, or at any rate the practice for them, have a very real professional value, and has a preference for the French rather than the Italian school of horsemanship. Coupled with this paper is one by Freiherr von Esebeck, of the 9th Prussian Uhlans, detailing his experiences as one of the German representatives this year at Olympia, and complaining with some bitterness of the lack of interest displayed by Germans in the efforts of their representatives, and of the unsympathetic attitude taken up by their countrymen at the comparatively meagre success of the German competitors. This number contains a reply to an article appearing elsewhere on 'Shying Among Horses,' and the writer, a veterinary officer, states that tests carried out in his own regiment revealed the fact that only 13.5 per cent. of the horses possessed normal vision. This month's *feuilleton* is an account, compiled from hitherto unpublished papers, of the wonderful ride from Turkey to Strahlsund of Charles XII. of Sweden in 1714, with a table giving the itinerary of the route.

October.—Major-General Buxbaum, the German editor of the Austrian Cavalry Journal, has an article deploring the modern tendency which he has noticed of wrongfully employing Cavalry as dismounted troops in the battle. He welcomes the additional independence which the mounted arm has acquired by the provision of a long-ranging firearm; rejoices in the increased confidence with which the Cavalry can accept the performance of duties hitherto left to the slow-moving Infantry; and considers that the *rôle* of Cavalry, as Cavalry, will be enormously widened by the extra means of offence and defence now bestowed upon them. He deprecates, however, the disposition which he notices at manœuvres to employ the fighting power of Cavalry *rein infanteristisch*, by thrusting this arm dismounted into the Infantry fire-fight. He decrys this procedure as a misuse of Cavalry; it provides no real reinforcement for the Infantry firing line, since a Cavalry Division can only provide the same number of rifles or carbines as one battalion; and complains that if this modern tendency is to be of general application, the Cavalry, as a mounted arm, will be ruined without exercising any appreciable influence on the Infantry fight. In view of the report that it has now been decided that lectures at the Staff College on the Franco-German War shall no longer be confined to the study of the period ending with Sedan, those who wish to study the 'People's War' should read an article in this number entitled 'The Cavalry of the French Army in 1870-71.' The writer shows that while, when war broke out, the French Cavalry possessed 252 field squadrons, only 220 accompanied the armies marching to the eastern frontier, the remainder being for the most part in Algiers. Nearly all these squadrons were destroyed or captured at Metz and Sedan, only some 1,500 men escaping from the general *débâcle*, and regaining the interior of France along the Belgian frontier and by way of Mézières. The author describes the measures taken to raise a new Cavalry force upon the ruins of the old, and shows that while 100,000 remounts were collected these were wholly untrained, while even if they had been properly broken a large proportion of those to whom they were issued would still have been unable to ride them. The paper is quite a short but a very important one,

and brings out once more the truth of Napoleon's remark after 1812 that 'no arm is harder to improvise than Cavalry.' There is a short article on 'Machine Guns in the Duties of Reconnaissance and Security,' wherein the writer advocates pushing the guns as far forward as possible. 'R.S.' contributes a reply to a recent article by Count Zedtwitz on the subject of 'Divisional Cavalry,' which was published in the April number of the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, and of which mention was made in the CAVALRY JOURNAL for June of this year. The article by Count Zedtwitz, originally delivered as a lecture at the Officers' Club in Vienna, was a very temperate one, and contained no revolutionary proposals or keen criticisms; but 'R.S.' goes over much of the same ground, and in excuse for the shortcomings of the Divisional Cavalry points out certain faults of the higher leading and of the Divisional Cavalry itself. He finds that the Infantry officers under whom this Cavalry serves are very much to blame if it does not perform all that is expected of it, and suggests that Infantry officers should be attached for certain periods to Cavalry regiments to learn the possibilities and limitations of the sister arm. In like manner he proposes that Cavalry officers should learn from the Infantry something of their *Kampfesweise*. This number contains the second part of the review of the new Italian 'Cavalry Training.' Then follows an interesting and instructive account of the horse-breeding operations in Hungary; an idea of the vastness of these operations may be obtained from the statement that annually 140,000 mares are covered by Government stallions alone, and that there are probably at least 2,000 privately owned stallions in the country in addition!

November.—The management of this Journal has within the last few months adopted a novel feature in the discussion in brief of certain Cavalry questions, often put by different readers. One of those thus put forward in the number for November is 'whether the methods of intelligence-communication as used by Cavalry have or have not answered the purpose?' These are then discussed, and the writer comes to the conclusion that on the whole they have been satisfactory, while, where defective, this has usually been due to want of proper organisation. In this way is also the manner discussed of the disposal of the lance in the fire-fight, and the training of Cavalry under Frederick the Great. There is an account of the operations of the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry during the retreat on Olmütz in 1866—or rather of that portion of it accompanying the southernmost of the three columns into which Benedek's army was divided. This is by Baron von Dittfurth, who had to carry despatches from the column he accompanied to General Edelsheim, commanding the 1st Light Cavalry Division. The remainder of this number is largely taken up by accounts of long-distance rides; there are two, by the winner and by another competitor, of the ride from Ragusa to Sarajewo, describing not merely the incidents of the ride, but the methods of training adopted for horse and man. There is also an account of the long-distance ride for officers of the reserve from Buda-Pesth to Vienna early last October. Two short papers conclude the more purely professional part of this number; one under the head of 'French Opinions' is more or less a review of a book recently published by Charles Lavauzelle

and written by General Cremer, commanding the 2nd Infantry Division in Arras. It is called *A B C Tactique*, and is of interest as explaining the latest French ideas of offensive tactics, and also as showing the faith an Infantry commander has in the increased value of Cavalry co-operation. The remaining short article is by Colonel von Spohr on 'Shying in Horses'; it is a reply to a paper on the same subject by a veterinary officer, and the writer seems to incline to the belief that shying is not so much the result of defect of eyesight in the horse as of indifferent riding by the man.

'The German Army, its strength and its weakness,' by Hilaire Belloc, is published in two parts in the *London Magazine* for October and November, 1911. In these articles Mr. Belloc contends that the German army is not so superior to the armies of the other Continental Powers as English journalists usually imagine. He carefully examines the social and moral factors, but is unable to establish his point as to these so successfully as he does when dealing with the material factors. Here he points out that the Germans are inferior to the French in the matters of artillery, aerial reconnaissance, and fortifications. He suggests that the French forts might delay the German armies, whose policy is to gamble on initial successes, as long as Port Arthur delayed the Japanese. The articles are clearly and tersely written, but military readers will find little fresh in them; indeed, Mr. Belloc's intention is only to instruct English public opinion, which is unfortunately usually unable to appreciate military affairs.

'Notes on Shoeing for Horse-owners.' By Captain V. H. Scratchley (late 60th Rifles). (Printed by Horace Cox, Bream's Buildings, London, E.C. 3s. 6d.)

Every troop officer should read these notes, which are well put together, easily understood, and essentially practical. We also commend them as an acquisition for soldiers' libraries.

'The Revolutionary War of the United States.' By Francis Vinton Greene, Major-General, U.S.A. (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.)

This book is divided into two parts, the first deals with the Revolutionary War, and the second with the Military Policy of the United States. The first part narrates the events of the war from 1775 to 1783. It is very clearly and concisely written, and admirably illustrated by numerous accurate maps. It is the first of three volumes in which the author is undertaking to give the whole history of the military operations of the United States from Lexington to Pekin. There are many valuable lessons to be learned from a study of the strategy of these colonial campaigns, besides the historical interest which attaches to these struggles between the colonists and the Mother Country. The author writes in a very judicial and unbiassed manner, and presents the facts to his readers as accurately as they can be ascertained. His chapter on the military policy of the United States is especially interesting, and many of his arguments and deductions are equally applicable to the British military policy of to-day.

'The (Professed) Influence of Mr. Childers on British Cavalry.' By 'Vindex.' (Printed at the *Oban Times* Office.)

The author, who appears to be an experienced Infantry soldier, amusingly pulverises Mr. Childers and his arguments. In his preface he states: 'There are those who write and those who fight, and (mostly to their own confusion) good soldiers are forced to use the pen.' We regret that 'Vindex,' conceals his identity under a *nom de plume*, and that considerations of time and space do not permit us to offer the hospitality of the CAVALRY JOURNAL as an arena for a duel between 'Vindex' and Mr. Childers with the only steel weapon that Mr. Childers approves—the pen.

'From Pillar to Post,' by Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Lowther, C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O. (London: Edward Arnold & Co.), is an entertaining book full of good reading and anecdotes which will appeal to sportsmen. There are some racy chapters on the late South African War, where the author did good service, and descriptions of adventures in many parts of the world, including a sporting trip to East Africa.

'The Army Service Corps Quarterly' for October publishes an interesting account of the French Cavalry School at Saumur, illustrated by many photographs, by Lieutenant H. J. Solomon.

'Military History for Examinations.' Questions on Russo-Japanese War, August 23—November, 1904, with maps. By Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. E. Brunker.

For the modest sum of one shilling candidates can take advantage of Colonel Brunker's work, and ensure passing their promotion examinations. Messrs. Forster, Groom & Co., 13 Charing Cross, London, are the publishers.

'The Reminiscences of an Old 'Un,' by Frank W. Streatfield, C.M.G. (London: Everleigh Wood), is a most interesting book, well and breezily written. Abounding in sporting anecdotes of the lives of many celebrated soldiers and statesmen, it is pleasant and cheery reading and full of true soldierly qualities. Read it, and you will be glad if the author will give you some more of his reminiscences.

The 'Journal' of the U.S. Cavalry Association for November, 1911, contains two very interesting articles on American horses and their breeding. There is also an article on 'Machine Guns with Cavalry,' by Captain Leary, Eleventh Cavalry. The author discusses the question of pack *v.* wheeled transport, showing that those nations who have had the most recent war experience are in favour of pack transport. He relates what is being done in various European countries and in America. The article runs to nearly thirty pages, and is well worth reading. In narrating our share in the development of Cavalry machine guns, he says: 'Even the English are coming round to the view that machine guns with Cavalry must be able to follow that arm across country.' The word 'even' seems a little unkind.



## NOTES

## CAVALRY COLLISIONS IN WAR.

BY LIEUTENANT T. LISHMAN, A.V.C.

In view of the remarks made on page 31 of the Statistical and General Report of the Army Veterinary Service for 1909, regarding the probable result of a charge made by Cavalry, riding knee to knee, against another mounted unit riding in a similar manner, the following accidents are of interest, as they give support to the statement 'that the impact, head to head or head to shoulder, would mean the obliteration of the front rank of each side as completely as though they had ridden against a wall.'

Quite recently the writer of this note was called to a parade ground where some mounted sports were being held preparatory to an assault-at-arms, and shown two animals lying dead within two yards of each other and a third animal being led about with an attack of colic (?).

The two horses lying dead had accidentally been galloped into each other head to head, and just before the impact took place one of the horses raised its head, so that the full force of the collision was between this horse's mouth and the other's cranium. They both dropped as instantly as though they had been shot. The horse that had raised its head made an attempt to rise, which was no more than a movement, but the other animal did not even do this.

*Post-mortem* examination showed that one horse had been killed by its brain being penetrated by the upper incisors of the other, three of which were actually found broken off in the substance of the brain. The entrance had been made just above the brow band.

The other horse showed that three of its upper incisors had been broken off, and considerable hæmorrhage at the base of the skull was observed. The whole head was carefully boiled down, but no sign of a fracture was discoverable. The cervical vertabræ, similarly prepared, were also quite normal. The horse showing colic had been galloped into by another horse while it was standing still, and had been knocked over by the impact coming against its near side. This horse died two hours later, and *post-mortem* showed rupture of the stomach with its contents scattered through the peritoneal cavity.

The net result of these accidents goes to show that out of four horses colliding three were killed, and it enables one to form some idea as to what would be the result of Cavalry charging Cavalry. The case of ruptured stomach is the first one in the writer's experience that can be, beyond all doubt, directly attributed to external violence.—*Veterinary Record*.

## THE LATE GENERAL SIR BAKER CREED RUSSELL.

WE regret to announce the death of General Sir Baker Russell, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Colonel 13th Hussars, which took place on Saturday, November 25, at Folkestone.

Sir Baker Creed Russell was the son of the Hon. William Russell, formerly a major in the 73rd Regiment, and was born at Maitland, New South Wales, in 1837. He entered the Army in November, 1855, as a cornet in the Carabineers, the regiment which was at Meerut on the occasion of the first outbreak of the Mutiny. Baker Russell saw much service in the resulting campaign, being present at the action at Kurnaul, the battle of Gungaree, the capture of Bareilly, the relief of Shahjehanpore, the attack and capture of Fort Mitoulee, and the actions of Aligunge and Biswa. His later service was with the Agra Field Force and in the pursuit of Tantia Topee. He was mentioned in despatches and received a brevet majority.

In 1862 he was transferred as a regimental captain from the 7th Foot, on the list of which he had been for the past three years, to the 13th Hussars, with which he subsequently became most closely identified. In 1873-4 he was employed on special service with Wolseley's expedition to Kumasi. His particular achievement was the organisation of the natives forming 'Russell's Regiment,' which he commanded throughout the campaign taking part in the attack and capture of Adubiassia, the battle of Amoafu, the attack and capture of Becquah, the battle of Ordahsu, and the capture of Kumasi. For his services in the Ashanti War he received five mentions in despatches, a brevet-lieutenant-colonelcy, and the C.B.

From July, 1878, to March, 1879, he was Assistant Military Secretary to Sir Garnet Wolseley at Cyprus. In May, 1879, Baker Russell was again employed on special service in the field, this time in South Africa, where he served throughout the Zulu campaign, assisting in the operations against Sekukuni and leading the attack on the latter's kraal. Three more mentions in despatches followed, and he became in 1880 a K.C.M.G., and A.D.C. to the Queen. In September, 1880, he succeeded to the command of the 13th Hussars, which he brought to a wonderful pitch of smartness and efficiency. Although personally framed on a very large model, and scarcely the accepted type of a Hussar, he was a most dashing leader, and under him the 13th Hussars became perhaps the best Light Cavalry corps in the British Army. In 1882 he commanded the First Cavalry Brigade at the capture of Mahsameh, led the Cavalry charge at the action of Kassassin, was present at Tel-el-Kebir, and took part in the march to and occupation of Cairo. He was three times mentioned in despatches, and was promoted to K.C.B. In 1885 he became Inspecting Officer of Auxiliary Forces in Great Britain, an appointment which was followed by the command at Shorncliffe, and, in 1890, by that of the Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot. This was probably the happiest period in Baker Russell's professional career, and he certainly made the most of it. From 1890 to 1895 the Aldershot Cavalry Brigade led, indeed, an active life, under their indefatigable chief, and if, perhaps, comparatively little attention was paid to large questions of organisation and to uniformity of training, there was no lack of smartness and

dash. In 1895 the command of the North-Western District fell vacant, and Russell was appointed to it, rather to the surprise of some who thought he would prove an indifferent success in a district garrisoned almost entirely by Infantry. But at Chester he did very well indeed, taking a particular interest in the Volunteers, with whom his bluff and hearty manner made him an especial favourite.

In November, 1896, Sir Baker Russell succeeded to the Bengal Command, which he held as a lieutenant-general until October, 1898, when he came home to take over the Southern District at Portsmouth. Here he was closely associated with the despatch of the troops to South Africa, in which he took a very keen interest, personally supervising some of the more important embarkations. He retained the Portsmouth command until 1904, when he was placed on the retired list. He had previously, in 1894, been appointed to the colonelcy of his old regiment, the 13th Hussars, in whose welfare he always took a special interest.—*The Times*.

#### A TYPICAL CAVALRY LEADER.

An old 13th Hussar has contributed the following :—

‘Après les qualités nécessaires au commandant en chef, le talent de guerre le plus sublime est celui du général de cavalerie. Eussiez-vous un coup d’œil plus rapide et un éclat de détermination plus soudain que le coursier emporté au galop, ce n’est rien, si vous n’y joignez la vigueur de la jeunesse, de bons yeux, une voix retentissante, l’adresse d’un athlète et l’agilité d’un centaure. Avant tout, il faudra que le ciel vous ait départi avec prodigalité cette faculté précieuse qu’aucune ne remplace et dont il est avare qu’on ne le croit communément, la bravoure.’

Such is the definition of a Cavalry leader by General Foy in his ‘La Guerre de la Péninsule.’ It applied well in the case of General Sir Baker Russell, whose death has recently occurred.

Sir Baker Russell was the son of Captain Russell, of the 73rd Regiment, and afterwards of Ravensworth, Australia. His first entry on active service was at Kurnaul, between Meerut and Delhi, in the height of the Mutiny. As a cornet in the Carabineers he took part in a Cavalry charge in an attack on the mutineers. Three weeks later, when conveying stores at Cawnpore, the enemy appeared at Gungaree. The Cavalry were quickly mounted and sent out against them, but as they advanced the enemy opened a heavy fire, under which three senior officers of Russell’s squadron fell, and the command then devolved upon him. His bold and clever handling of the squadron at once brought him into prominence as a Cavalry leader, although he was at the time but a young cornet.

Two days later at Puttiallee the column was again assailed by the enemy with heavy artillery fire. Again a Cavalry charge was launched at them, and with entire success. The enemy were ridden down and pursued for several miles, their guns and baggage being captured.

‘To Lieutenant Baker Russell, who commanded the Dragoons, as well as to his companions in arms, my thanks are specially due for their gallantry in action and for the vigour of their pursuit.’ That was what the General Commanding, Sir Thomas Beaton, wrote in his report of the action.

Later on Baker Russell, anticipating his similar feat twenty-five years

afterwards, led a charge in the night in an action where General Penny was killed by the mutineers. This charge was again successful, a number of the enemy being cut down and a gun captured.

It was not in India alone that Baker Russell won his laurels. In 1873, when a major in the 13th Hussars, he went out to Ashanti on the west coast of Africa, in the expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley, and with Major Evelyn Wood and Captain William Butler, was given the duty of raising native levies. He commanded at the defence of Abrakrampa, which was attacked on November 5, and he held it for two days against the continued and determined assaults of the enemy, until a relief column arrived and put a successful conclusion to the incident.

It was in defence of this place that, in holding the native school-house, he stumbled over one of the wooden stools peculiar to the Ashantis, and finding it unusually heavy, he examined the interior of the central pillar and found it full of raw nuggets of gold. He fought in over half a dozen engagements in the bush, and always with success.

H. M. Stanley, the well-known war correspondent, described him as 'A resolute, hard-headed man, with vim and nerve in him, always with a sharp sword for an enemy and a soft tongue for a friend.' His favourite weapon in this campaign was a sword-bayonet, which in those days had a cutting edge and a saw back. It was invaluable either for cutting the way through the thick tangled undergrowth, or for meeting the enemy at close quarters, as is usual in bush fighting.

In 1895 it was my fortune to be sent to the same country with the same duties—raising native levies—and on this occasion Sir Baker travelled down to Liverpool to see me off, and on the deck of the transport he handed me the sword-bayonet which had carried him through his campaign, and, for the second time, it made its way to Kumasi through the Ashanti bush.

In 1879 Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed High Commissioner in Cyprus, and there he took with him Colonel Baker Russell as Assistant Military Secretary. Shortly afterwards he was ordered to South Africa for the Zulu War, taking Baker Russell with him. Although he arrived towards the end of the campaign, Colonel Russell had the important duty of pursuing the fugitive King Cetewayo. Pressed by two columns under General Clark and Baker Russell respectively, he was eventually forced to surrender. Baker Russell was then sent with a column to overcome Sekukuni, and he had with him a strong contingent of Swazis. The attack on Sekukuni's stronghold was a bold and difficult affair. Baker Russell himself led the charge on foot up the steep sides of the mountain, and as he topped the crest his orderly officer and his bugler were shot down beside him. He pressed on alone, and the enemy gave way before him. When I was among the Swazis some ten years later, they still remembered him as the 'White Chief with the white neck,' meaning the high white collar which he always wore.

R. S. S. B.-P.

Lieut.-General Sir R. S. S. Baden-Powell, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., has been appointed Colonel of the 13th Hussars, vice the late General Sir B. C. Russell, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.

### THE LATE MAJOR-GENERAL SIR STANLEY CLARKE.

WE regret to announce that Major-General Sir Stanley de Astel Calvert Clarke died on November 29 at his residence, the Ranger's Lodge, Hyde Park.

He was seventy-four years of age, having been born in 1837, the son of Colonel J. F. S. Clarke, at one time commanding the Scots Greys. Stanley Clarke was educated privately, and at eighteen became a cornet in the 13th Light Dragoons, in which regiment he served till 1871, when he obtained the rank of major and exchanged into the 4th Hussars. It must have been about this time that he made the acquaintance of the Prince of Wales (King Edward VII.), whose intimate friend he became, and whom he served as Equerry, and in positions of greater importance, till the end of his Majesty's life. Meantime he became colonel in 1883, and in the following year he joined the Nile Expedition, doing good service as commanding the Light Camel Regiment (Sudan Camel Corps) in the attempt to relieve Gordon.

In 1894 he retired from the Army with the rank of major-general. He remained, however, in the service of the Prince, after whose accession he became Chief Equerry, Clerk Marshal, and Paymaster of the Household, while on the accession of his present Majesty Sir Stanley Clarke was made Extra Equerry and Paymaster to the King. He received at different dates the G.C.V.O., the C.M.G., and the Cross of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour.

A mere list of appointments and titles gives but a poor idea of the services rendered by Sir Stanley Clarke. He was for many years in King Edward's close confidence, and was very often chosen to accompany him in those trips abroad which implied so much work for the Equeries and Secretaries. The succession of duties to be performed on such occasions is never-ending, and none ever performed them better than Sir Stanley Clarke. He was a hard worker and a man of great personal charm—always tactful, always cheerful, and always ready to oblige every one with whom he was brought in contact.—*The Times*.

We regret to announce the death, at the end of November last, of Lieutenant Charles Frederick Dugdale, 16th (The Queen's) Lancers, which was the result of an accident at the Tor di Quinto Riding School, Italy. While at the practice of jumping a high fence, his horse fell, and rolled heavily on the rider. He was picked up unconscious, and within the space of ten minutes died from terrible internal injuries.

Mr. Dugdale had previously taken a year's course at the Pinerolo Cavalry School, near Turin, where he acquitted himself extremely well, and was a general favourite with the Italian officers, and by whom he is deeply mourned.

Born in 1888, he obtained his commission in the 16th Lancers, September, 1907, and was promoted lieutenant, November, 1909.

## WHY NOT A SWORD-BAYONET FOR THE YEOMANRY?

By MAJOR H. G. WATKIN, 4th (Q.O.) Hussars.

BEFORE the South African war Yeomanry regiments were armed with the sword as well as the rifle, or rather carbine. In those days the Yeomanry were trained on the same lines as the regular Cavalry; but the time for training being necessarily very limited, and mounted work being much more to the liking of both officers and men than dismounted work, the carbine was very little used and dismounted service seldom or never resorted to.

Yeomanry officers can scarcely be blamed for this; even in regular Cavalry regiments the rifle was often a very secondary armament, only to be used as a last resource. The Yeomanry naturally looked to the regular Cavalry as their model and copied its methods.

Another very cogent reason for these tactics was the necessity of popularising this force amongst men who not only gave their services practically gratis to their country, but often sacrificed their own commercial interests in doing so.

Now the Yeomanry was, and still is, largely recruited from the ranks of the yeoman farmer, whose chief joy in life is being on the back of a horse, and who has a great objection to going on foot when a horse is handy. Can anyone blame him for preferring mounted drill to ploughing through the mud on foot in order to grovel in a wet and bramble-filled ditch; leaving his horse (his own property) to be kicked by its neighbour in the necessarily restricted cover to which the led horses have been sent; or having to run a mile or two after a thoroughly delighted loose horse, whose sole idea is to maintain as long as possible his newly acquired liberty?

After the South African war the authorities considered that the period of Yeomanry training was not long enough to teach a man the use both of a sword and a rifle, and decided that Yeomanry should only be armed with one weapon. They were to be asked to fight only in the British Isles, where country suitable for mounted combat is generally conspicuous by its absence, but where mounted riflemen can be very usefully employed. Moreover, the Boer war had given many people furiously to think that the *arme blanche* should be abolished even for the regular Cavalry. Another consideration which probably helped this decision was the nature of the enemy the Yeomanry was likely to meet. Whatever nation should have the audacity to send an invading force to this country would for many reasons have a large portion of its mobile troops mounted on bicycles rather than horses; such troops would be met better with the rifle than the sword.

Therefore, very properly the rifle was chosen as the arm best suited to the Yeomanry. The Yeomanry have loyally carried out the wishes of the authorities, and now devote their time to perfecting themselves in the use and tactics of the rifle.

There will be moments, however, when the yeoman on service, armed as he is at present, will find himself in peculiarly helpless positions into

which he must often necessarily be forced by circumstances or into which he will be driven by the use of the rifle, and from which the rifle cannot possibly extricate him.

For such moments should he not have some other weapon in order to defend himself in a difficulty, or to allow him to carry through the job he has on hand? Failing this, he will be apt to lose confidence in himself and his rifle, or lose that offensive spirit which it is so necessary to foster.

To emphasise the want of such a weapon, two services may be cited which would often fall to the lot of the Yeomanry in war. This force, until the main armies are joined in battle, will be in front and to the flanks of its own Army, reconnoitring in many directions. In a country so restricted as to view and movement, with so many small woods, twisting roads bounded by high hedges, numerous villages, &c., it will often happen that two hostile patrols will come into close contact, despite the most careful scouting.

Under such circumstances what can this yeoman do against an enemy armed with a sword, a bayonet, or even a stout cudgel? Shall he turn and bolt? Perish the thought! Shall he get off his horse and shoot? Certainly, if his enemy will kindly allow him time to do so. Shall he attempt to fire while still mounted? With a charging enemy, whether mounted or on bicycles, and the necessary excitement amongst men and horses, he is as likely to damage his horse or his companion's as the enemy. Or shall he make a bold dash through his enemy? The latter may be broken, but will soon see that the yeoman has no offensive weapon, and will in his turn pursue.

Our yeoman is now in a worse plight than if he had taken the first alternative; his enemy is between him and his own people and he is being chased in the direction of that enemy's main body. Whichever course he chooses must inevitably be an evil one.

Again a squadron or even a regiment, in the course of its reconnaissance, may have to attack some small post; or the brigade may be told off to prolong the Infantry attacking line, or make a turning movement with the object of attacking the enemy in flank. We will suppose that our yeoman has managed to arrive within about 200 yards of the enemy's position. Here a strong firing line has been built up, and fire superiority has been obtained; the enemy are beginning to dribble away from their trenches, but the majority of them are still there waiting the assault. The moment for the assault has come, that movement which history and our own regulations teach us is necessary to drive disciplined troops from their position.

The thoughts of our yeoman will now probably be somewhat as follows: 'I am prepared to rush across this intervening space and charge the enemy in his position; what shall I do when I get there? Shall I break my rifle over his head, or will he run away if I shout at him?' Perhaps this charge may have the desired effect once in a campaign, but next time an enemy with any sense finds himself attacked by Yeomanry he will lie hidden in the trenches, scarcely returning the fire, but keeping his men intact until the assault is made; then, springing up, he will bayonet his foe at his leisure.

Does it not seem necessary that the Yeomanry should have some weapon

to deal with such usual emergencies—a weapon that can be fixed to the end of a rifle and that can be used as a sword on occasions; in other words, a sword-bayonet? The possession of such a weapon will not tempt the Yeomanry to practise Cavalry mounted tactics or to pit themselves in the charge against regular Cavalry, but will help to retain and foster their offensive spirit by giving them confidence in the attack. Much training in its use will not be necessary; teach a man to draw and fix it, and he will find a use for it; it may not be of very deadly character when used mounted, but at any rate it will be a weapon.

Whether this sword-bayonet should be carried on the man or on the horse may be open to discussion; if carried on the horse it will not be at hand during dismounted service, so it seems that it should be carried on the man. No great ingenuity would be required to devise a suitable weapon and the means of carrying it; but something of the sort is most certainly needed. Yeomanry officers speak very feelingly on the subject.

The before mentioned audacious invasion is most likely to occur when the whole or the greater part of the Expeditionary Force is out of the Kingdom; in either case little or no regular Cavalry will be available. On the Yeomanry will fall the serious duties of guiding and guarding their Infantry at all times, and joining them in their battles. Can they successfully perform these duties as at present armed?

It is not necessary to arm them like the White Knight, against all emergencies, but they ought to have a fighting chance.

### THE CAVALRY SCHOOL, SAUGOR.

A SUBSTANTIAL increase in the equitation equipment and establishment of syces has increased efficiency all round, though a still further increase of syces for the Government horses is a much needed concession before a satisfactory solution to the grooming problem can be reached. The variety and quality of jumps has also been greatly improved.

A shady twelve-acre paddock has been made in which the raw remounts are turned loose in April until the arrival of students the following September. Students are required to take over their first-year horses at the paddock, and from the first day they become thoroughly acquainted with handling the really raw article. Opportunity for study has been increased by additions to the library. Perhaps the most useful introduction, however, is the water installation, with a pipe supply to every bathroom, which eliminates any further attempts at extortion or strikes by the bhistis.

The granting of detention allowance of Rs. 5 a day to officers sent out on schemes and tours has enormously increased the commandant's power of making this useful and very necessary part of the course thoroughly practical. It is felt that commanding officers have appreciated the starting of this institution, having given it their utmost support, and it is gratifying to know that students who attended the late course have already been selected as adjutants and woordie majors of their units. Not the least



important benefit of the school is the instruction afforded to Indian officers; and it is unfortunate that owing to their large numbers many years must elapse before each regiment can benefit by having a number of Indian officers who have graduated at Saugor.

To turn to the sporting side—always of interest to the Englishman. Three more polo grounds will shortly be available for play in addition to the old station one, while a fifth has been sufficiently advanced to make it a tolerable knock-about ground. The racecourse has been completely fenced in, and it is hoped that a chase, hurdle, and exercising track will all be in working order by November. The officers' mess has been re-decorated and re-roofed, the dining-room considerably lengthened, and it is now possible to dine fifty-six officers at one table, while twice that number can be accommodated without any discomfort or inconvenience. Several presentations of plate and trophies have helped to make the mess look more comfortable. A large kitchen range has been installed, which ought to satisfy those interested in the culinary art. Some mention of officers' quarters is called for. The accommodation is adequate and comfortable, and consists in many cases of two rooms with the necessary offices, all comfortably furnished by Government and comparing favourably with the usual bedroom accommodation of most clubs. A further increase in the stable accommodation would be greatly appreciated. The rent charged by Government, including furniture, is Rs. 15 a month, with the addition of a water cess of Rs. 1-8.

A new lecture theatre with a raised *daïs* suitable for concerts and entertainments has been constructed and the old one converted into five quarters for officers. The fencing-hall has been floored, a much needed alteration replacing an old and very uneven stone flagged surface. This hall will also provide a place for entertainment by the British non-commissioned officers.

A considerable number of trees have been planted on and around Cavalry School Hill, while many gardens are beginning to make an appearance, relieving the general bareness so noticeable last year. Last but not least an Indian officers' club has been started, the funds for which have been specially granted by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. Altogether the school seems to have a bright future before it.

*'The Pioneer.'*

#### PLEASE NOTE!

Owing to doubt having been expressed as to the extent to which officers may contribute articles to THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, in view of the recent amendment to paragraph 423 of the King's Regulations, it is notified for general information that THE CAVALRY JOURNAL is issued with the sanction of the Army Council. Officers are, consequently, encouraged to submit papers for publication, on the understanding that should their articles pre-judge questions under consideration by superior authority, or criticise existing orders or regulations, the Editor will make such emendations in the text as he may deem advisable.

## OUR YEOMANRY.

BY COLONEL SIR LANCELOT ROLLESTON, K.C.B., D.S.O.,  
*Commanding Notts and Derby Mounted Brigade.*

As I notice that 'Qui Sapit' in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL for October quotes in support of some of his criticisms the pages for which I was responsible in the preceding issue of the Journal, I perhaps may be allowed to repudiate the suggestion that those pages in any degree support his views.

'The ordinary Yeomanry officer,' he writes, 'is a business man, and he, I think justly, says I cannot give up the necessary amount of my time to learn the work of a Cavalry officer unless I am paid for it as much as I can earn by my business . . . it is natural to find that these business men cannot and will not give up the time that is absolutely necessary in order to learn the duties of a Cavalry officer—*vide* CAVALRY JOURNAL, pages 265 to 273.'

The words dealing with this subject in those pages are these:—'Before suggesting, as it is necessary to suggest, that more time than is at present given should be devoted to military work by the officers and men of the mounted brigades, it must be frankly admitted that they already do more than the bulk of the nation either acknowledges or deserves. There is no other class in the world which does so much hard and unpaid public work of all kinds as the country gentlemen, business men, and retired officers who furnish the bulk of the officers of the Territorial Force, many of whom, as well as the majority of the men under their command, depend for a living upon their own exertions in civilian callings; while their military work, far from being adequately rewarded, on the contrary too often makes demands upon their private funds. It is work performed only as a labour of love by men whose keenness outweighs the consideration of personal loss or gain, and whose love of soldiering is in many cases a hereditary instinct, handed down from forefathers who believed that the cultivation of the arts of war and the chase were the only occupations fit for a gentleman.'

Now whichever of these views is correct, it is at all events obvious that anyone who thinks that the latter of these extracts in any degree supports the former is capable of thinking anything! That 'the whole system of the training of the Yeomanry at present is faulty and uneconomical in the extreme,' that its methods of instruction in manœuvre result in playing at war rather than preparing for it, that owing to the prevailing sentiment that for Yeomanry order and cohesion are of little consequence, its drill is weaker still, is true enough; but, as stated in the pages to which 'Qui Sapit' refers, 'These are faults not of the men, but of the system,' and are neither to be cured by such criticism as his, nor do they justify the absurd misstatements as regards the officers and men of the force which distinguish his article.

In the course of it he makes against the units of the mounted brigades some twenty-three charges.

Ten of these are either out of date and have no longer any foundation, or never had any, except in such isolated instances as may be found in

all services wherever incompetence has remained undiscovered or has been condoned. Four of the faults named are either, as above, non-existent, or, where they do exist, are faults of a system for which neither the officers nor men are responsible.

Eight others are the inevitable result of the foolish expectation of getting a first-class article at a third-class price; and the last, the case of the Army Service Corps he quotes as being so absurdly equipped, is an instance of nothing but the failure of a county association to do its work.

To answer in detail the strictures in these six pages of monotonous detraction, desirable as it might be, would, I fear, exceed the space allowed me; but even a few instances of the contrast between these criticisms and the actual facts will be enough to gauge their value.

First comes the Royal Army Medical Corps. 'You cannot,' says 'Qui Sapit,' 'expect a ploughboy to be a good and efficient dresser, or an efficient hospital orderly. This comes from the fact that they have no knowledge and they have *no opportunity of gaining* the necessary knowledge . . . their best is necessarily very bad when compared with the man who learns his business in hospitals.'

In the Ambulance with which I am acquainted there are no ploughboys, and the 'opportunities of gaining knowledge' of which the men availed themselves during the last year, in addition to fifteen days' annual training, so far from being non-existent, consisted of an average attendance of twenty lectures and drills for every man, with attendance of 30 per cent. of the men at a full course of practical instruction in the wards of the County General Hospital in addition; while of the non-commissioned officers, one is in possession of the major certificate and two of the minor certificates of the Pharmaceutical Society, and one of the certificate of the Sanitary Institute, the whole of these N.C.O.s being also employed in sanitary or medical work the whole year round.

It is not surprising that, after so careful a training of highly intelligent men, the result flatly contradicts the above criticism, that the ambulance is efficient throughout, the horsemanship and the horsemastership sufficiently good, and that the hospital orderlies most favourably compare with certain recollections of orderlies on active service ten years ago, such as were so graphically chronicled in the adventures of 'Trooper 8008' by Sidney Peel.

His next strictures are on the Royal Horse Artillery, a branch of the Territorial Force which, by extraordinary efforts on the part of all ranks, by the expenditure of much time and trouble, and of considerable sums of money out of officers' private means in aid of public allowances, has made remarkable progress in a task so difficult as to have been by many good judges considered impossible. 'The kindest thing I can say,' says 'Qui Sapit,' 'of this branch is that, as it takes three years to make a Royal Horse Artillery driver or gunner anywhere near efficient, one cannot expect a Territorial Royal Horse Artillery battery to be efficient in eleven days. This is all the training these men get.'

He is mistaken. So far as the only battery with which I am acquainted is concerned, it has during the past year, in addition to its annual training

of fifteen days, every one of which was well employed, undergone the following as well :—

December, 1910. Rides in School daily at 6 A.M., 2 P.M., and 7 P.M., averaging about 30 lessons a day (six horses).

January, February, March, April, 1911. Rides in school daily at 6 A.M., 2 P.M. and 7 P.M., averaging about 40 lessons a day (eight horses).

Gun drill weekly, gunlaying and fuze-setting weekly.

Lectures weekly, followed by examination.

Easter Training (first training). Thursday night to Monday night. Battery of about 90 men taken to barracks at Leeds, taking over the complete horses and six guns of the R.H.A. battery for that period. Long mounted parades in the morning; dismounted parades in the afternoon.

May, 1911. As for January to April (ten horses), averaging from 40 to 50 rides a day. Other parades as above.

Whitsuntide Training (second training). Camp from Friday to Wednesday. Complete battery of four guns, without wagons, with mounted detachments under canvas.

June and July, 1911. As for May, but all rides and driving drill carried out in the open in a 54-acre field. Average about 40 rides a day. Battery gun drills and laying practice carried out in the open. Mounted parades for Battery Staff, including Sergeant-Major, B.C.'s orderly, rangefinders, lookout men, and horseholders. Whole mornings devoted to this.

July 30 to August 2, 1911 (third training). Complete 4-gun battery without wagons under canvas at Salisbury Plain for annual gun practice.

August to September 9, 1911. Riding and driving drills in Drill Field (24 horses), averaging 50 to 60 rides a day.

So much for the assertion that 'eleven days is all the training these men get'; and, lest it should be supposed that the above is an isolated case, it may be mentioned that the members of the battery referred to are by no means as sure as they would like to be that the neighbouring battery has not done more work still. Moreover, in spite of the high level of the model they have to follow, some indication that they are not so far below it as might be expected is afforded by the fact that, although only three of its men have so far transferred into the Regular Army, one of these three, trained in the battery from a civilian, won one of the four drivers' badges in the Regular Royal Horse Artillery battery to which he was transferred before he had been there six months.

With the matter regarding the Yeomanry concerning which 'Qui Sapit' is good enough to quote me I have already dealt, but there are one or two further points on which I may perhaps be allowed an observation.

As to getting a good class of men. 'This class of man,' he says, 'expects the officer to take off his hat to them and ask them to be good enough to join.' It is not often that this is the case, but what would he have to complain of if it were? Those who have neither the generosity adequately to pay, nor the courage to compel, must take off their hats and ask, and, in finding officers who will perform for it such service, this country's good fortune largely exceeds its deserts.

Then as to discipline when joined. 'The officers,' he says, 'cannot

speak as strongly as they wish, or in the manner that a Regular officer would, to the men under his command when they see things going wrong.' Cannot they indeed? I can imagine the smile with which many a yeoman I have known would read such words. For they display ignorance of what the highest kind of discipline can be, the discipline of personal influence, the only discipline effectual among irregulars, the best discipline in times of trial with any troops. It is common enough in the Yeomanry, but to an officer accustomed only to the rigid discipline appropriate to a Regular army, it is as the first unassisted efforts of a swimmer who has been accustomed to artificial aids.

Again, as to the relations between N.C.O.s and men. 'Can we,' says the critic, 'expect Farmer Jones to quickly obey the orders of Corporal Smith, when in ordinary life he can buy him out in five minutes?' Certainly we can, and do; and in any regiment worth its salt Farmer Jones is at pains to show, by an alacrity not exhibited in his private life, that it is *military* obedience, and military obedience only, that he displays.

Why, he again asks, should not Yeomanry arrange their own cooks and waiters regimentally, and feed their men on the prescribed shilling? Again he misses his mark, for many regiments do, and have done so for years, and that the practice is not universal is due to nothing but the absence, for which neither officers nor men are responsible, of a distinct order from higher authority that this is to be the rule.

Can anything, again, be more absurd than the lamentation as to the 'well-known fact' that the contractors pass on their horses from one corps to another! Of course they do! Why do not the Government buy for each regiment the necessary horses? Is it not to avoid the expense of outlay and upkeep? And is it reasonable to expect that what the nation cannot afford the contractor can?

The same fact is sometimes quoted as proof of a deficiency of horses. It is a proof of nothing of the kind. It is the inevitable result of the fact that we hire. If there were millions of horses to spare the contractor would still pass on their horses from corps to corps, for it is a commercial necessity of every contractor to ensure that he lets every horse as often as he can.

But space will be allowed me for no more remarks upon 'Qui Sapit's' five pages of criticism, and I pass to the point at which, after observing 'Now as regards rectifying these complaints,' he turns out to be able to make but five suggestions, only two of which are of practical value, and of which the fifth consists of the simple expedient of abolishing the whole of the mounted Territorial Force.

It seems obvious that if criticism is to be of any value, and is not to decline into mere peevish futility, different methods are demanded from these, that the faults described should be faults which still exist, and which can be cured, and that methods should be proposed which can cure them.

There are faults enough in these troops, as admitted earlier in this article, without our imagining more, and if it were made universal that all Army Service Corps units should be properly equipped, as some already are; that the Artillery should be supplied promptly with all technical equipment, their opportunities for practice largely increased, and funds provided to obviate

the present necessity of supplementary private expenditure by the officers, those branches would show an efficiency well repaying their cost.

The weakness in the Yeomanry before indicated could quickly be cured if the correct system of internal economy already practised by many regiments were made by order universal; a course of winter training in detached duties made obligatory, sufficient funds for this being already available; if the present system of learning nothing thoroughly were corrected by a separate training for the grounding of recruits in the two essentials of horsemanship and musketry; and if, instead of most of the annual training being spent in a series of sham fights in which nothing is done correctly, detached duties were learnt in the winter, and more attention in summer paid to drill.

The Force could then be relieved of the disadvantage of having no regular model to follow by being assimilated in training and equipment to the Regular Cavalry, as was the original intention announced by the Secretary of State when the Territorial Force was formed, and would suffer no longer from the diversity of practice which the absence of such a model entails.

'Qui Sapit' winds up his article by the statement that it is considered that one Cavalryman is equal to three yeomen, and adds that he 'regrets to say' that his choice would be given to the former.

I question the advantage of such comparisons, but have a lively recollection of an occasion when an estimate quite different to this was given by other impartial troops, who moreover at the time were vitally interested in the question; but putting that aside, considering that less than one-fifth of what the Cavalryman costs is spent upon the yeoman, what right would 'Qui Sapit' have to complain if it were so?

A man who, after giving four shillings for a cheap edition of what usually costs a sovereign, receives the worth of six-and-eightpence may 'regret' it if he likes, but he certainly receives more than he either pays for or deserves!

I venture to assert that to amend the Force on such lines as these is preferable to adopting 'Qui Sapit's' advice to end it; that criticism without adequate suggestion of amendment can serve no good end, and is comparable only to the inarticulate lamentations of the chorus in the old Greek plays, which, beyond expressing the general misery of the situation, achieved no result, and must, one thinks, have jarred most unpleasantly upon the nerves of the principal actors.

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BY A YEOMAN.

IN the last number of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL there is an article upon 'Our Yeomanry' by 'Qui Sapit' which is so extraordinarily inaccurate and misleading from my own experiences in the same, that I think some notice should be taken of it; and if you will permit me, I will deal with some of the misstatements.

Yeomanry officers nowadays have to go to Hythe and are attached to Cavalry units, and have to pass examinations for each step in rank, so

that to state that the annual training is the only means that they have of gaining information is on the face of it erroneous.

'Qui Sapit' states that they cannot speak to their own men as strongly as they wish. To anyone who knows anything about Yeomanry this is the most humorous thing that ever has been said about them. I heard an ex-regular officer gently reproving a brother yeoman recently for his picturesque rendering of his ideas to his men, and the former stated that no regulars would stand it. It was explained to him that yeomen are so keen to know their work that they look upon somewhat forcible language as part of the concentration necessarily involved owing to the shortness of the training.

He suggests that assembly and dispersal should take place on Sundays. He apparently is so hopelessly misinformed that he is not aware that this actually does now take place in many cases.

Your correspondent seems rather to jeer at the idea of business men taking commissions. Surely this is the best possible sign. A business man nowadays must be well educated and far-seeing, and must also be very tactful and quick to appreciate relative values in a position. Is not this the sort of man that is wanted? A man who succeeds by the sheer force of his brain in his own profession, and is accustomed to handle men of all kinds, is surely just the kind of man to be useful as a leader of yeomen if he is keen enough to devote sufficient time to learn the technique of the business.

The statement that officers seldom see their troops surely must imply that 'Qui Sapit' belongs to other times and a past order of things. Does he know that nearly all squadrons have a drill once every week from January to July, and most of them in addition have many mounted drills during the same period?

The remarks made about the permanent staff savour of the 'bad old times.' An Adjutant nowadays has to work really hard, and if half of what our detractor said were true his task would be impossible. In my own regiment the whole of the messing is done regimentally by our Quartermaster, and this is also the case in other regiments, so that 'Qui Sapit's' brainy idea seems to have been somewhat forestalled.

The Staff Sergeant-Majors are not losing their activity and energy, as suggested, but are mostly in their prime, and I have never heard of any non-com. who did not cheerfully comply with the direction of the staff, and no such feeling of superiority as is suggested has ever been seen in any Yeomanry corps that I wot of.

The fact is that most yeomen are really good sportsmen and play the game for all they are worth. The stale old jest about 'Follow me four at a time' I certainly heard over twenty years ago, and is about as much up-to-date as the rest of the information given by 'Qui Sapit.'

We want criticism in the Yeomanry—heaven knows we need it badly enough; but we do not want remarks that would have been applicable before the Boer War and now are entirely beside the mark. If 'Qui Sapit' used them in any other trade but that of a soldier he would find himself hopelessly in the cart.

Why have the War Office stopped regular officers from doing their last four years in the Yeomanry? This was the greatest idea from the Yeomanry point of view that ever was conceived, and now it is knocked on the head. Cannot something be done to resuscitate it?

We are all as keen as mustard to be efficient, and the numbers of regular officers one has come across have done all they could to assist us and help us on our way, and make the best of things by useful and constructive criticism. 'Qui Sapit' reminds me of nothing so much as the destructive demagogue of Hyde Park fame, and he is quite as dangerous to any spirit of patriotism that may be abroad.

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BY COLONEL G. C. RICARDO, *Late 14th Hussars and Berkshire Yeomanry.*

I HAVE read the article in the October number of this Journal, and am perfectly amazed at 'Qui Sapit.'

Either he has written the letter as a joke, or at all events with the desire to invite criticism, or I cannot believe that he has written it seriously.

He is, as the footnote at the bottom of the first page remarks, at least ten years behind the times.

I may be fairly entitled to add my share of criticism to those other writers who are sure to take up the cudgels, for I am, like 'Qui Sapit,' an old Cavalry officer, have been thirty-two years in the Yeomanry, have commanded my regiment for five years, and fought with the Imperial Yeomanry for eighteen months in South Africa.

I will endeavour to take the remarks of 'Qui Sapit' in detail.

His first grumble is that he went to Salisbury Plain and saw five Yeomanry Brigades without their Horse Artillery.

Probably that year the Artillery were ordered to go out at some other place or possibly there was not room for them at Salisbury; anyhow, if he had happened to go in 1910 he would have seen both the 1st and 2nd South Midland Mounted Brigades complete with both their Artillery, their A.M.C., and their A.S.C.

The latter in the case of the 2nd Brigade owns its own wagons, so that their vehicles, at any rate, could not have been collected from the rubbish heap of a great city, as 'Qui Sapit' so elegantly puts it.

In one thing, however, I agree with the writer, when he says that the A.S.C. do unnecessary work; their work in camp should be exactly the same as the regular A.S.C. performs daily, viz. it should carry the forage and rations of its different units from the stores to the lines. That is (or should be) their proper function, and they should be detailed to do this in 'orders.'

Whether the authorities will ever sanction Sunday work I do not know, but I used to have week-end camps at Churn for the purposes of shooting, and found it to answer very well, only of course the parsons of the neighbourhood were up in arms about it.

When the writer comes to the officers, and in a pitying sort of way says their heart is in the right place, he is talking of a subject he knows nothing about.

Every officer under the rank of major has to go to Hythe, or to the



School of Signalling, or else pass through a gymnasium or veterinary course; besides, each one is obliged to go to the Cavalry School before promotion, and pass the necessary examination. (A Cavalry officer is exempt.)

In each regiment of Yeomanry there is a good sprinkling of regulars, but I have found in the last ten years a most astonishing change in the knowledge the present officers possess, in comparison to what they used to have, so clearly the article I am quoting was intended to have been written many years ago.

The adjutant is now almost as hardly worked as if he was back in his old regiment; he does the whole of the winter training, he has the responsibility of getting out all the mobilisation papers and figures, he attends the orderly room daily (the C.O. has to certify in his monthly return that he does so). Every adjutant sees his commanding officer every week, and most of the other officers at least once a month, for all officers are ordered to attend as many lectures as they possibly can, and in my regiment they did. The berth is one which is naturally much sought after, but that is for one reason, that it is a permanent billet for at least four years.

There may be a slight appearance of truth in the remarks about the non-commissioned officers, for they are not made in a day, as any old adjutant will tell you.

But in the War I personally saw many gallant actions performed by the yeoman N.C.O.; I have seen him rally his men like a veteran (this happened in my own squadron): the man was as cool as if he was in the hunting field, and he was under a particularly hot fire. I also saw a sergeant in the 5th Regiment I.Y., I think it was, hold a hill against long odds as bravely as a veteran regular would have done.

As I am on the subject of the South African War, I can only say that 'Qui Sapit' was unlucky not to have been with us. We formed a part of those gallant men, the 3rd, 5th, and 10th Regiments of I.Y., who were with Lord Methuen for over a twelvemonth, and did the whole Cavalry work of his division, and until they left for home and were relieved by the new Yeomanry no disaster occurred; directly they left, Lord Methuen's column was rushed.

There is no such thing nowadays as 'Farmer Jones' and 'Corporal Smith.' Wherever the writer gets his ideas from I cannot imagine; all this *facetiae* that he mentions about 'Gentlemen, will you kindly follow me four at a time,' is as out of date as the dodo, or as probably 'Qui Sapit' is himself.

There is no doubt that all the Territorial Army wants more training, but I must stand up for the Yeomanry in particular, as it is always known that directly a new adjutant comes to take over, he is always greatly struck by the *personnel* of the regiment, having no doubt been told by men of the stamp of 'Qui Sapit' that he is going to instruct a rabble.

Yeomen as a rule perform every kind of fatigue work in camp themselves, with the exception perhaps of doing the latrines. No servants are allowed in the lines, and only a very few employed as waiters.

No man leaves camp without his pay, at least it must be a very slack regiment that allows this.

I hope 'Qui Sapit' will at some time go and stay with a good ordinary Yeomanry regiment; he appears up to now to have experienced bad ones.

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'DETTINGEN'  
'PENINSULA'  
'WATERLOO'  
'EGYPT, 1882'  
'TEL-EL-KEBIR'  
'SOUTH AFRICA'  
'RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY'  
'PAARDEBERG'

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THE 2nd LIFE GUARDS.

## FOREIGN.

*Austria.*—The Cavalry regiments are being gradually completed with machine-gun detachments, in the proportion of one detachment of four guns to each regiment. In the spring of 1911 detachments Nos. 10-13 were organised and attached to the 5th, 6th, and 12th Dragoons and to the 13th Hussars. In the autumn four more were created and attached to two Austrian and two Hungarian Regiments of the *Heeres-Kavallerie*. By the end of 1911 it was hoped to supply twenty-nine other regiments.

The Telegraph squad hitherto attached to each Cavalry regiment is for the future to consist of a section comprising two telephone groups and two operating visual signalling. The whole of the Cavalry is shortly to be armed with a folding bayonet, and Cavalry pioneers are to carry a greatly increased supply of explosives—the weight now carried is 32 k.g., and will be raised to 150.

The price to be in the future paid for remounts will be increased from 650 to 800 krone. It has been found impossible any longer to purchase matured horses at the lower price.

*France.*—The *Rappel* gives some significant and to some extent disquieting comparative statistics as to the fall in numbers of horses for military purposes available in 1899 and in 1911 in the district of Paris. In 1899 there were 91,261 such animals, while in 1911 there were only 75,463—a drop of close upon 16,000. There are now far fewer horses in the possession of the omnibus companies and the *Compagnie des petites voitures* than ever before.

For months past tests have been carried out with a steel lance which appears to give satisfaction, and its issue was to have commenced at the end of August last, but will not be completed until the spring of 1913. The idea of the bayonet for Cavalry—much favoured, it is said, by General Trémeau—seems for the present to have been abandoned, but there is a suggestion that Cavalry regiments, whose armament is carbine and lance, should be provided with a short sabre, capable of use either as bayonet or sword. It would be worn on the waistbelt; no decision has yet, however, been come to on this matter.


*Holland.*—Remount Depot at Milligen. In September, 1911, there were 1,000 horses (remounts) in the depot apart from the horses belonging to the train. Horses are bought at three, four, or five years, and are kept at the depot until five years old.

The stables are large roomy sheds arranged in pairs, each holding about thirty horses. The latter are allowed to run loose in the stable during part of the day. There is no artificial floor for the stables, the natural soil being found sufficiently good for drainage.

Each pair of stables opens on to a fair-sized paddock (or small kraal), which in turn opens on to the large exercising enclosure in the form of an oval, with a centre track containing a few jumps.

The horses are turned out daily, wet or fine, for several hours in the paddocks and exercising enclosure. The horses of the batch that was just going to be issued to the troops were in excellent condition.

A very ingenious method of tethering horses which are in the habit of breaking their halters was in use. It is shown in the diagram, and consists of a double light line, one end of which is attached to the manger; it




then passes through a ring on the headstall, one passing along each shoulder and flank. The two lines are joined together at the rear end, and the loop so formed is placed under the tail. When the animal throws up its head the strain comes on the tail, and this, in a very short time, effectively checks any tendency to breaking the halter by rearing, &c.

Another ingenious device was that in use for galloping the horses with a minimum of personnel to look after them. The enclosure was arranged as follows :—

The horses enter by the paddock gate, when they are met by a man with a long bamboo (12 ft.) and another with a long whip. These two men drive them to the right as shown by arrow at (1); the horses then naturally keep on the extreme outer edge of the enclosure until they come to (2), where the impetus of their gallop and the peculiar shape of the enclosure draws them across the enclosure to (3). Here they are again met by men with bamboo and long whip, who drive them to the right, round the other half of the enclosure. Near (2) their impetus carries them back to the starting-point, when the whole operation is repeated.

The dépôt is under the command of a major of hussars, who retains the post for the remainder of his service. In addition to one medical and one veterinary officer, there are ten non-commissioned officers of the permanent cadres; the remainder of the personnel consists of militiamen (conscripts).

The latter number between 130 and 140, and spend practically the whole of their service at the Remount Dépôt. On first joining they remain with their regiment (hussars) for fifteen days, during which period they are clothed and taught how to hold themselves and to salute, and that is all. They then go to the Remount Dépôt, where they remain for eighteen months, and are thoroughly trained in the handling and care of horses. After completing this first period of training, the men are not recalled for repetition courses like the rest of the Army. They receive slightly better pay than their fellow-conscripts in other branches. On mobilization they would be employed, first of all, in fetching horses from various parts of the country and in issuing them to the troops.



*Japan.*—From March 11 to 15, 1910, a forced march was carried out by a party of the 4th Cavalry Regiment.

*Organization of the Party.*

Officers . . . . .	3
Non-commissioned officers . . . . .	4
Superior soldiers . . . . .	9
Soldiers . . . . .	41
Male nurse (non-commissioned officer) . . . . .	1
Veterinary officer . . . . .	1
Farrier sergeant . . . . .	1
	—
Total . . . . .	60

*Average Weight carried on a Horse.*

	lb.
Average weight of a rider . . . . .	122
Average weight of a man's equipment . . . . .	34
Average weight of harness . . . . .	83
	—
Total . . . . .	239
Average weight of a horse . . . . .	814

*Distances Covered by the Party during Preliminary Practice.*

First day. 20 miles in 4 hrs. and 50 mins. in 'Ryakusō.'  
 Second day. 22 miles in 3 hrs. and 45 mins. in 'Jun-busō.'  
 Third day. 28 miles in 4 hrs. and 45 mins. in 'Jun-busō.'  
 Fourth day. 23½ miles in 4 hrs. and 20 mins. in 'Busō.'  
 Fifth day. 18 miles in 3 hrs. and 10 mins. in 'Busō.'

*Note.*—In 'Ryakuso,' carbines, swords, water-bottles, and three ammunition pouches are carried. In 'Jun-buso,' overcoats, mess-tins, portable tents, and two blankets are carried in addition to 'Ryakusō.'

In 'Buso,' spare pair of boots, regulation iron ration, forage, and reserve ammunition are carried in addition to 'Jun-Buso.'—M. A.

*The Ride.*

*First Day.*—Distance covered, 40 miles.

Route. From barracks to Gojō *via* Tondabayashi, Kimii Pass, and Hashimoto.

Time spent at halts . . . . .	1 hr. 45 mins.
Time spent in the saddle . . . . .	7 hrs. 53 mins.
Walk . . . . .	5 hrs. 38 mins.
Trot . . . . .	2 hrs. 15 mins.
Time spent in leading . . . . .	0 hrs. 52 mins.

Weather. Fine.

Nature of route. Generally level except at the Kimii Pass, where the inclination varied from 1/60 to 1/20.

Horses were watered at each halt.

Daily horse ration was as follows :—

	Noon.	6 p.m.	9 p.m.	5 a.m.	Total.
Oats . . .	1 pt.				1 pt.
Barley . . .		2 qts.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ qt.	1 qt.	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ qts.
Bran . . .		$\frac{1}{8}$ qt.	$\frac{1}{8}$ qt.	$\frac{1}{10}$ qt.	1 $\frac{1}{10}$ qt.
Vegetable . . .		.8 lb.	.8 lb.	.8 lb.	2.4 lb.
Hay . . .		3.2 lb.	3.2 lb.		6.4 lb.
Salt . . .		a little.	a little.	a little.	a little.

The above were prepared as a bran mash, the barley having been soaked in water for ten hours previously

*Second Day.*—Distance covered, 43 miles.

Route. From Gojō to Abo *viâ* Shimosaka Pass, Yagi, Sakurai, and Nabari.

Time spent at halts . . . . . 2 hrs. 10 mins.

Time spent in the saddle . . . . . 8 hrs. 35 mins.

Walk . . . . . 6 hrs. 5 mins.

Trot . . . . . 2 hrs. 30 mins.

Time spent in leading . . . . . 1 hr. 10 mins.

Weather. Snowing in the morning. Fine in the afternoon.

Road. Level for eleven miles; the remainder hilly, with inclinations varying from  $\frac{1}{70}$  to  $\frac{1}{60}$ . The surface was very muddy in consequence of the snow in the morning.

*Third Day.*—Distance covered, 41 miles.

Route. From Abo to Yamada *viâ* Aoyama Pass.

Time spent at halts . . . . . 2 hrs. 10 mins.

Time spent in the saddle . . . . . 7 hrs. 55 mins.

Walk . . . . . 5 hrs. 31 mins.

Trot . . . . . 2 hrs. 24 mins.

Time spent in leading . . . . . 0 hrs. 45 mins.

Weather. Snow-storm in the morning; fine in the afternoon.

Road. Level except at the Aoyama Pass, where the inclination varied from  $\frac{1}{60}$  to  $\frac{1}{30}$ . The ground was covered with snow to a depth of four inches.

*Fourth Day.*—Distance covered, 40 miles.

Route. From Yamada to Seki *viâ* Tsu and Mukumoto.

Time spent at halts . . . . . 2 hrs. 0 mins.

Time spent in the saddle . . . . . 7 hrs. 35 mins.

Walk . . . . . 4 hrs. 57 mins.

Trot . . . . . 2 hrs. 48 mins.

Time spent in leading . . . . . 0 hrs. 30 mins.

Weather. Fine.

Road. Level and metalled.

*Fifth Day.*—Distance covered, 86 miles.

Route. From Seki to barracks *via* the Suzuka Pass, Kusatsu, Kyoto, and Ibaraki.

Time spent at halts . . . . .	9 hrs. 12 mins.
Time spent in the saddle . . . . .	17 hrs. 31 mins.
Walk . . . . .	14 hrs. 39 mins.
Trot . . . . .	3 hrs. 52 mins.
Time spent leading . . . . .	4 hrs. 44 mins.

Weather. Fine and wet at intervals.

Road. Level except at the Suzuka Pass, where the inclination varied from  $1/12$  to  $1/8$  for about two miles.

*Table showing Loss of Weight in Men and Horses.*

	Before the ride.	On completion of the ride.	Loss of weight.
Average weight of men	123 lbs.	121 lbs.	2 lbs.
Ditto horses	814 "	759 "	55 "

*Note.*—Eighteen horses regained their original weight on the fifth day after the completion of the ride; twenty-four on the sixth day; seventeen on the seventh day; and one on the ninth day.

#### *Conclusions.*

Under favourable circumstances a party of selected men should be able to average about  $37\frac{1}{2}$  miles a day in the field as an ordinary march, and to perform a forced one of 75 miles.

Unless it should become necessary to come into action at the end of a march, the party should be able to average about 44 miles a day for about three successive days.

For increasing the rate of march, the most important point for consideration is how to reduce the time spent at the walk in proportion to that at the trot.

In the ride under consideration, the proportion was about two-thirds of the total time spent at the walk, and the remaining third at the trot. The actual figures were 36 hrs. 50 mins. at the walk, and 13 hrs. 49 mins. at the trot, in periods of twelve or thirteen minutes at the walk, and the succeeding seven or eight minutes at the trot. This gave a satisfactory result, the breathing of the horses never being other than easy. Horses should, however, on no account be made to move at the trot for as much as ten minutes successively. They must, of course, occasionally be led in order to vary the pace and keep them from tiring; to allow the men's seats to cool down, and to prevent their legs from becoming stiff. During a night march horses should be led for fifteen or twenty minutes after thirty or forty minutes' walking. Care must be taken, however, not to prolong the leading too much, since troopers unaccustomed to much marching are apt to tire soon, with the result that their powers of horsemanship deteriorate.

The first halt should be made at the end of about an hour for the purpose of adjusting the saddle. Short halts of from ten to twenty-five minutes, according to the strength of the party, should be made as often as

required. Those of longer duration for feeding will be from fifty minutes to one hour and twenty minutes, according to strength.

The best march formation for small units or scouts is file. The sequence of the sections should be changed at each halt so as to equalise the distribution of the fatigue.

Horses should be watered on every opportunity, but should not be allowed to drink much. In very cold weather, the water should be tepid.

Although, according to regulations, horses should not be fed on the line of march by day, a small quantity of barley (about one pint) should be given to them. So little as this would in no way interfere with digestion, even though given when actually on the march, but would on the contrary act as a stimulant to their powers of endurance.

Barley soaked in water for about ten hours before being given is a great help to digestion in horses tired by a long ride. Should it not be possible to arrange for this, the barley for the evening and morning feeds should be put to soak immediately on arrival at the end of a day's march.

(a) Horses' legs should be rubbed frequently with alcohol or some distilled spirit, the former being the most efficacious.

A small quantity of "sake" mixed with water was given twice to horses during the ride, and produced an appreciably good effect.

(b) The thirtieth year saddlery proved to be satisfactory. The saddles fitted well; the saddle-cloth lay flat; the girth maintained its proper length and pliability; and the blanket remained free from folds or tucks. If two blankets be used, the chance of sore back will be reduced to a minimum.

(c) In order to prevent fever in the feet, the following instructions should be strictly carried out:

1. Feet should be washed at each halt.
2. Hoofs should be oiled both morning and evening, and at each halt.
3. Horses should be kept on the softest part of the road.

(d) Forging being caused by a bad seat, troopers should be directed to change their positions on the horses' backs when necessary.

(e) Shoes of .354-inch thickness were used for the ride, and were found to be as thin as paper on its completion. In future, therefore, a thickness of .393-inch or over is to be recommended.

(f) Extra rations should be given to men when a long march is anticipated. Eggs are considered to be the best, as they take little time to eat, and are not productive of thirst as are cakes, &c. (*From notes supplied by the General Staff.*)

*Roumania.*—In this country a good deal has of late years been done for the improvement of horse-breeding. Up to the year 1908 the stallions were dispersed all over the country—some in the possession of the military authorities and some with the Department of Agriculture. Since that year all have been placed under the control of the last-named department, and the stallions have been collected into depôts, whereby different zones are served. The first zone formed was the Dobrudsha with a dépôt at Anadalkoi, while the second was the Upper Moldau with dépôt at Grasi. Each zone has from ten to fifteen serving stations. Every horse-breeder possessing



not less than ten mares is given the services of a Government sire. The whole is managed by the President of the Department of Agriculture, assisted by a standing committee of three military officers and three civilians.

*Spain.*—A German rifle manufacturing firm has offered to convert all the Mausers in use in the Spanish Army into automatic rifles. Two models have been proposed—one to take the present cartridge, the other a pointed bullet and a more powerful high-explosive powder.

The tentative efforts to form a local Cavalry at Melilla having proved satisfactory, the Spanish War Minister has decided to proceed with the creation of one squadron and four battalions of local troops, of which the officers will be Spaniards and the non-commissioned ranks Arabs or Berbers.

*Switzerland.*—From the 1st of April of this year the Swiss Cavalry will be organised in eight regiments of Dragoons each of three squadrons; there will be four Cavalry brigades each of two regiments, while to each brigade will be attached a mounted machine-gun detachment of eight guns. The divisional Cavalry will be formed, on a peace footing, of six sections of Guides, which in case of war each form the nucleus of two squadrons for each of the six Infantry divisions. The organisation of the Landwehr provides for twenty-four squadrons of Dragoons and four machine-gun detachments. While the establishment provides only five officers per squadron of the Cavalry brigades, there will be eight per squadron for the divisional Cavalry and seven per machine-gun detachment.

#### PROBLEM No. XI.


Non-commissioned officers of the mounted branches of the Regular, Territorial, and Colonial Forces, at home and abroad, are reminded that the last day on which solutions of the above can be received by the Editor is February 29, 1912.

The result will be announced in the April number.

#### SUBSCRIPTIONS.

Subscribers are reminded that Subscriptions for Volume VII., 1912, are now due, and should be forwarded to  
The Managing Editor,  
THE CAVALRY JOURNAL,  
Royal United Service Institution,  
Whitehall, S.W.

An Old Comrades' Association of the 13th Hussars has recently been formed. The address of the Secretary is 33 Tothill Street, Westminster, S.W., to whom all communications should be addressed.



**H.M. QUEEN VICTORIA'S CORONATION REVIEW,  
HYDE PARK, LONDON**

**9th July, 1838.**



## SPORTING NOTES

## POLO

## ALTERATION IN THE RULES

At a meeting of the Hurlingham Club Polo Committee it was decided to delete Rule 27 relating to off-side. This was generally anticipated as a result of the successful experiment made with the 'no off-side' game in this country during the past season, and the definite abandonment of off-side in polo will give satisfaction to the majority of British players, and also be appreciated by American players.

Rule 10 has been altered to read as follows :

'The duration of play in a match shall be seven periods of eight minutes, with intervals of three minutes after each period, no deduction being made for overtime.

'The first six periods of play shall terminate as soon as the ball goes out of play after the expiration of the prescribed time, or, on boarded grounds, when the ball strikes the boards.

'On play being resumed the ball shall be thrown in as laid down in Rule 16.

'The last period shall terminate, although the ball is still in play, at the first stroke of the final bell, wherever the ball may be.

'In case of a tie the last period shall be prolonged till the ball goes out of play or strikes the boards, and, if still a tie, after an interval of five minutes the ball shall be started from where it went out of play, and the game continued in periods of eight minutes, with the usual intervals, until one side obtain a goal, which shall determine the match.'

Rule 33 (which related to off-side when a player left the game in order to change a pony) has been deleted, and Rule 37 (ordering an extra minute to enable a penalty hit for a foul at the end of the game) becomes Rule 13. The bye-law relating to frost-nails is transferred to the polo rules, and becomes Rule 39, reading as follows : 'Frost nails and screws are not allowed.'

The conditions for the Champion Cup Tournament have also been revised as follows :

'1.—Open to any polo teams, but teams entering as a club or regiment may only play members of that club or regiment.

'2.—The entries, naming colours, to be made on or before 5 P.M. four clear days before the date fixed for the commencement of the competition.

'3.—The respective teams to be drawn, and the said draw to take place on the day the entries close.

'4.—Unless three teams contend the cup may be withheld.'

As regards the rules of measurement, it has been decided that polo ponies be registered for life at four years old after August 1.

The final of the Quetta Open Tournament, for which seven teams entered, was between the Staff College Junior and 23rd Cavalry. It was a great game, extra time being played, in which the Staff College won by six to five. After the second chukker the game was played three a side, as owing to Captain Ward (2nd Lancers) being injured through a foul, the Staff College captain availed himself of the rules and retired one of the opposing side.

The Poona Open Tournament final between the Central India Horse and Inniskilling Dragoons was won by the former by eight to one. The Inniskillings had won it the two previous years, but were handicapped by two of their best players being ill.

The great Polo Tournament for the King's Cup at Delhi has been the most sporting feature of the Durbar and excited the greatest interest. Fourteen teams entered, and many fine matches of the best polo were witnessed by thousands of spectators, graced by the presence of their Majesties the King and Queen.

In the first round:—

13th Hussars beat Golconda 6 to 4.

Bhopal beat 17th Cavalry 7 to 4.

Imperial Cadet Corps beat 9th Hodson's Horse 5 to 4.

Scouts beat 17th Lancers 8 to 7 (after extra time).

6th Inniskilling Dragoons beat Palapur 8 to 0.

1st King's Dragoon Guards beat 10th Hussars 8 to 4. This was a splendid game, the score after the fifth chukker being three all, and the winners became favourites for the cup.

In the second round:—

1st King's Dragoon Guards beat 13th Hussars 8 to 4.

Bhopal beat Imperial Cadet Corps 7 to 3.

Kisengarh walked over, as the Governor-General's team scratched.

Inniskilling Dragoons beat the Scouts 2 to 1.

In the semi-final:—

King's Dragoon Guards beat Bhopal 10 to 0.

Inniskilling Dragoons beat Kishengarh by one goal.

Kishengarh unluckily lost Moti Lal, their best player, through an injury in the third chukker.

In the final the Inniskilling Dragoons beat the King's Dragoon Guards by four goals to one.

The King's Dragoon Guards unfortunately had to play without the services of that fine player Captain Leslie Cheape, who had an attack of fever and was replaced by Mr. Hatfield. It was a fine, fast match in which all distinguished themselves, but especially Captain Ritson and Major Wickham.

Teams: Inniskilling Dragoons—Captain F. B. Nixon, Captain R. A. Ritson, Lieutenants H. Colmore and E. C. Bowen (back). King's Dragoon Guards—Captain Rasbotham, Lieutenants H. S. Hatfield, F. A. Wienholt, and Major H. F. Wickham (back).

Their Majesties, escorted by the 13th Hussars and 36th Jacob's Horse, were accompanied by Lord and Lady Hardinge and a large number of ruling chiefs, and received a tremendous ovation. After the match the Queen presented the cup to the winners, the members of both teams being presented to their Majesties.

The Secunderabad Junior Polo Tournament was won by the 33rd Light Cavalry, who in the final beat the 29th Lancers by 3 to 2.

The Meerut Autumn Tournament was a good one, with ten teams competing. In the final the King's Dragoon Guards beat 17th Lancers, 8 to 5 after a fine game.

Only three teams entered for the Southern India Infantry Tournament, which was easily won by last year's winners—the Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.

The Royal Dragoons' Cup Tournament at Lucknow resulted in a win for the 8th Hussars, who in the final beat the Scouts.

Teams: 8th Hussars—Captain Broadbent, Lieutenant Blacklock, Captain Blakiston Houston, Major Mort (back). Scouts—Lieutenant Hilliard, A.V.C., Lieutenant McCalmont (7th Hussars), Major-General Mahon, C.B., D.S.O. (commanding the Lucknow Division), and Captain Barrett, A.D.C. (15th Hussars).

The 8th Hussars received three goals handicap, but won without them by 5 to 4.

#### RACING

The Aldershot Autumn races witnessed good sport despite the inclement weather. On the first day the Past and Present Military Handicap Steeplechase (two miles) was won by Captain T. Godman on his horse Kennilworth, with Mr. F. Grenfel's Blue Hussar (owner) second, and Captain E. Christie Miller's Sir Percy (Captain Banbury) third. On the second day the Open Steeplechase was won by Captain S. C. Holland's Stormcock II.

At the Portsmouth races the Porchester Open Steeplechase (three miles) was won by Captain E. Christie Miller's Sprinkle Me, with Captain T. Godman's Kennilworth (owner) second. Kennilworth appeared in the race to be going the best, but a bad peck landing over a fence lost Captain Godman any chance of the race. Unfortunately at this meeting Captain Banbury had the misfortune to break his arm owing to the falling of his mount Sir Percy in the Purbrook Handicap Steeplechase. We wish him a speedy recovery.

The Amateur Riders' Handicap Steeplechase at the Gatwick Autumn Meeting was won by that good horse Kennilworth, his owner, Captain T. Godman, riding.

We deeply regret to record the death of Captain Bryan Lane, A.V.C., who died from injuries received while riding in the Calcutta Turf Club races at Meerut. Probably no officer was better known or more respected throughout Northern India. He was a magnificent horseman, fine polo player and boxer, and most popular with everyone. He was not thirty years of age, and the loss of such a good sportsman is much felt.

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## POINT-TO-POINT

Steeplechases for *bona fide* hunters, or so-called point-to-point from the old-fashioned custom of racing to a point and back, commenced with the Cavalry School meeting at Penton. The Light-Weight race (twelve stone) was won by Captain A. B. Pollock's Sunshine, Captain Bruce riding, with Colonel J. Vaughan, Commandant of the Cavalry School, second on V. H. S. Mr. J. Hardy's (Scots Greys) Grisney II. carried off the Chargers' Race, and the open race for a cup presented by Colonel J. Vaughan and officers, Cavalry School, was won by Mr. G. Black's good hunter, Meath.

The Delhi Durbar races secured splendid entries and were a great success. The All-comers' race was won by Mr. Curtis's Sir John.

The King-Emperor's cup for Imperial Service troops went to the Patiola Lancers, whose Black Douglas won easily.

Captain Kennard's The Ghost carried off the Queen-Empress's cup from a field of sixteen.

The Indian officers' race for the King-Emperor's cup was won by the 11th Lancers' Hirwana, and the Queen-Empress's cup for light-weights was taken by Mr. Nethersole's Harlequin in a field of seventeen. There were several falls, and Major-General Alderson was unfortunately kicked in the face by his pony, whilst Captain Jackson broke a collar-bone.

## BOXING

The Navy and Army Championships took place this year at the Connaught Drill Hall, Portsmouth, with a record entry of 311 competitors. It took four long days to get through the numerous bouts, which were decided under the rules of the newly-formed Royal Navy and Army Boxing Association. The popularity of the meeting was evidenced by the great crowd of spectators at all the gatherings, at least 5,000 being present on the last evening. Great praise is due to the hard-working hon. secretary, Lieutenant C. C. Walcot, Royal Navy, to whose great energy much of the success is due. The other officials were: Referees—Commander P. M. R. Royds, R.N., and Major M. C. Harrison, A.S.C. Judges—Major E. Wray, R.M.L.I., Lieutenant H. Farmby, R.N., Captain G. M. Lindsay, Rifle Brigade, and Captain R. B. Campbell, Gordon Highlanders. Timekeeper—Lieutenant F. C. G. St. Clair, R.N.

This year the officers' events were reduced by the elimination of the welter-weight and the light-heavy-weight. Owing to the venue being at Portsmouth, the Navy was more largely represented than the Army. The very fine manner in which every bout was disputed, the admirable behaviour of the crowds, the enthusiasm, and the best sporting spirit were features of the meeting and a direct facer to the carping criticism there has been on boxing lately. Everyone was glad to see Colonel Sir Malcom Fox, the pioneer of boxing in the Services, although not in the best of health, present at some of the gatherings.

Results: Officers' Feather-Weight Final Bout—Lieutenant G. Wildman Lushington (H.M.S. *Neptune*) beat Lieutenant J. A. Shuter (H.M.S. *Vincent*).

Officers' Light-Weight Final—Midshipman P. B. Lawder (H.M.S. *Bellerophon*) beat last year's winner, Assistant-Paymaster E. J. Leyshon (H.M.S. *Vincent*).

Officers' Middle-Weight Final—Lieutenant H. D. Bentinck (3rd Coldstream Guards) beat Midshipman L. H. Bailey (H.M.S. *Argyll*).

Officers' Heavy-Weight Final—Lieutenant A. Montray Read (1st Northampton Regiment) beat Captain G. W. Bentley (4th Middlesex Regiment). Unfortunately Captain W. S. D. Craven, of the Royal Field Artillery, who won this event in 1905 and 1906, was disqualified for knocking his opponent down after the gong had sounded the end of a round. It transpired that Captain Craven had never boxed to the gong before and had not heard it.

Men's Light Heavy-Weight—Private T. Harris (2nd Coldstream Guards) beat Stoker Priseman (H.M.S. *Hercules*).

Men's Heavy-Weight—Gunner Healey (R.G.A.) beat P.O. Kane (Physical Training School).

Men's Feather-Weight—Lance-Corporal T. Evans (Royal Scots) beat Driver Windebank (44th Co. A.S.C.).

Men's Light-Weights—Lance-Corporal T. Miller (1st Royal Lancashire Regiment) beat Driver Condon, R.A.

Men's Welter-Weight—Lance-Sergeant Baker (Royal West Kent Regiment), beat Private Jones (1st South Wales Borderers).

Men's Middle-Weight—Private W. Palmer (1st Leicestershire Regiment) beat Private McEnroy (Irish Guards). Private Palmer won this event last year.

At the finish Admiral Sir A. W. Moore, Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, presented the prizes, speaking in praise of the sport and warmly congratulating the men and the management.

The results of the Durbar Coronation Tournament at Delhi were as follows :—

Officers: Middle- and Heavy-Weights—Lieutenant Darby, R.A., beat Lieutenant Carter, R.A., and Captain Kirkwood (23rd Indian Cavalry), winning both events.

Feather-Weights—Lieutenant Selby beat Captain R. Williams, R.A.

N.C.O.s and Men: Catch-Weights—Sergeant Houston (Black Watch) beat Private Gates (Royal Fusiliers).

Middle-Weights—Rifleman Curzon (King's Royal Rifles) beat Sergeant Chivera (Essex Regiment).

Light-Weights—Corporal Shephard (Royal West Kent) beat Private Russell of the same corps.

Feather-Weights—Private Osborne (Welsh Fusiliers) beat Driver Chandler (Royal Horse Artillery).

Bantams—Drummer Fairman (Munster Fusiliers) beat Drummer Jennings (South Lancashire Regiment).

The finals were witnessed by over 8,000 spectators. The tournament was most successfully run by Captain Stansfield, of the Seaforth Highlanders, who was hon. secretary. At the conclusion Major-General Mahon distributed the prizes.



## FOOTBALL

## ASSOCIATION

The Cavalry Cup is now being contested.

In the first round:—

The 5th Lancers beat the 5th Dragoon Guards at Dublin by 2 goals to nil.

The 20th Hussars easily defeated the 19th Hussars at Fulham by 2 goals.

The 16th Lancers beat the 2nd Dragoon Guards by 4 goals to nil.

In the second round the 4th Hussars met the 5th Lancers, but the match resulted in a tie, as neither side could score.

## RUGBY

There was a most sensational finish to the match between Oxford and the Services played at Portsmouth before a crowd of 4,000 spectators. Up to ten minutes of the finish the hitherto victorious 'Varsity looked like winning comfortably. Then there was a complete change over. The Dark Blues' defence utterly broke down, and in dashing style the Services put on four tries and won by two goals and two tries to two goals (sixteen points to ten). This great game overflowed with the happiness and the grand sporting spirit of Rugby 'Play the game,' and the huge company present gave its applause ungrudgingly to all the heroes of the day. Lieutenant G. H. D'O. Lyon captained the United Services, and Mr. R. W. Poulton (Balliol) was captain for Oxford.

After a closely-contested game throughout, the Army beat London Scottish at Queen's Club by a solitary try.

Also on the same ground on the Wednesday before Christmas Day the Army defeated the Old Alleynians by eleven points to three. Owing to the recent rain the turf was very wet and the ball difficult to handle. Nevertheless, an interesting game was witnessed, which was notable for the fact that the Old Boys of Dulwich College, though the lighter pack, gave a good showing in the scrummages. In the three-quarters, however, they were not the equal of the Army line.

The Services were unexpectedly beaten by Richmond at Portsmouth by a goal and a try (eight points) to two tries (six points). The Services were unfortunate and played a man short throughout. Lieutenant Lyon, who is a rock of defence, failed to turn up owing to a misunderstanding, and Oakley had to retire with an injured back at half-time. Since 1906 Richmond had only once beaten the Services in eight games.

## ABROAD

Five teams entered for the Bombay Rugby Football Tournament. The final between the West Riding Regiment (the holders) and the Leicesters was a well-contested game. At half-time there was no score, but in the second period the West Ridings scored a goal and a penalty goal, thus winning by eight points to nil.

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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APRIL 1912

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## PRINCE EUGÈNE

By Sir GEORGE ARTHUR, BART., M.V.O., *late 2nd Life Guards.*

'Do you see those little girls?' said the wife of the Maréchal de Villeroi to Gaston d'Orléans, the uncle of Louis XIV. 'They are not rich now, but they will soon have fine châteaux, large incomes, splendid jewels, and perhaps great dignities.' The 'little girls' were the five nieces of Cardinal Mazarin, imported into France for political purposes by that astute Churchman; and Madame de Villeroi proved right, for all five made brilliant alliances. Olympe Mancini, the second of the sisters, who the most nearly resembled her uncle in character, married, in February 1657, Prince Eugène Maurice of Savoy. The bridegroom's father, Thomas Francis, son of Duke Charles Emmanuel I., and founder of the House of Savoy-Carignan, was a contemporary of our early Stuart Kings. A restless and unscrupulous soldier of fortune, Thomas Francis allied himself to the Blood Royal of France by marrying Marie, Comtesse de Soissons in her own right, who inherited her title from her father, Charles de Bourbon. Eugène Maurice was their younger son, and on his marriage with Olympe, and his taking up his abode at the Court of Versailles, her uncle the Cardinal caused his maternal title of Comte de Soissons to be revived in his favour. To distinguish her position as wife of a Prince of the Blood, Olympe was styled 'Madame la Comtesse.'

As a child she had been a favourite playmate of the boy King, but her aspirations to the Throne were never serious, like those of her

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younger sister Marie. Immediately after her marriage the Comtesse became the reigning favourite at Court, and in spite of her frequently outrageous conduct, the *liaison* with Louis XIV.—which the frequent absences of the Comte on military service did much to facilitate—lasted with varying degrees of fervour till 1665. The *Grand Monarque* then fell altogether under the more delicate charms of Louise de la Vallière, and sought to provide a new lover for Olympe in the person of his confidant and friend, the Marquis de Vardes. The King's defection was hotly resented by Olympe, who set afoot so scandalous a plot against the new beauty that Louis summarily dismissed the discarded mistress—with her husband—to Champagne, of which province Soissons himself was Governor.

The Comte died in 1673, and the Comtesse, who since her downfall had nursed her revenge, returned to Paris, where, in January 1680, she escaped being sent to the Bastille—on a false charge of complicity in a case of poisoning—only by a hasty flight to Brussels. Her five sons, left behind in their grandmother's care, came by degrees to realise that the French Court had no career to offer them, and took service elsewhere.

The youngest, Prince Eugène Francis,<sup>1</sup> who was born on October 18, 1663, had as a child been designated for the priesthood, and was known at Court as 'the little Abbé.' At the age of nineteen he asked Louis XIV. for a commission in the army. His petition being refused with a sneer, he instantly resolved to quit his native land, never to return except as an enemy. Eugène's lifelong hatred of France was due, among other causes, to the indignities offered to his mother. The mother lived to see her humiliation avenged by her son's sword, and her affection for him, which he nobly returned, was the happiest trait in her stormy life.

Following the example of an elder brother, Eugène, who from a boy trained himself physically and mentally for bearing arms, betook

<sup>1</sup> 'Pr. Eugène, though but of a middling stature, was very well shaped. His Visage was somewhat long; his Complexion brown, and becoming a Warrior; his Eyes black, lively and full of fire; his Mouth of moderate size and usually open; his nose well made but somewhat long; his Countenance meagre, and his Cheeks a little sunken. He had black Hair, which he wore till it began to grow grey. He took abundance of Snuff, and carried it loose in his pocket. Though his air was naturally grave and serious, he knew how to be merry on occasion, and that with great Freedom. When he was at the head of his Troops, there appeared a Grandeur and Majesty in his Person, which commanded Respect from every General as well as from the meanest Soldiers.'—Dilworth, *History of Prince Eugène* (eighteenth century).

himself to Vienna, where the Emperor Leopold received the gallant young exile with the utmost kindness, and gave him the honorary colonelcy of a regiment of Cavalry. Sent in 1683 to serve under Duke Charles of Lorraine against the Turks, who were threatening Vienna itself, Eugène received his baptism of fire at Petronell, where the enemy was pushed back. Throughout the fighting, which culminated in Lorraine's decisive victory before Vienna, Eugène was serving immediately under his cousin, the Margrave of Baden, an able soldier, and he had the inestimable advantage of observing closely such great generals as Sobieski and Lorraine.

Eugène, at the end of the year, was appointed to the command of a regiment of dragoons, and his skill, judgment, and courage were so conspicuous that, after the continuous fighting which marked the next two years, he was promoted major-general.

'This young man,' observed Prince Louis of Baden in a report to the Emperor, 'will with time occupy the place of those whom the world regards as the leaders of armies'—a good forecast of a career, which drew from Napoleon the opinion that Eugène's plans of campaign were nothing short of masterpieces.

Eugène's abilities were successfully tested in other fields than that of arms. In 1689 the Emperor deputed him to proceed to Turin and sound his cousin, Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, with a view to inducing him to join the coalition against France. Eugène proved himself as skilful in diplomacy as in war, and paved the way for negotiations which in the following year resulted in the Duke's active co-operation with the Austrian and Italian troops. Eugène, however, never put much faith in his rather shifty relative, and several times reported his suspicion of him to the Emperor long before the Duke's formal defection in 1696. The Duke was a skilful 'bluffer,' and at the conference held in Turin in 1695 he completely deceived the representative of England, Lord Galway, who wrote to the Embassy at Vienna that no one was more embittered against France than Victor Amadeus. At the very same moment Eugène was writing to inform the Emperor of the Duke's secret understanding with France, which took effect in the treaty signed the following year.

It was at this period that Louis XIV. resolved to fly at still higher game, actually endeavouring to bribe Eugène back to France with a secret threefold offer of a Marshal's *bâton*, the Governorship of Cham-

pagne, which his father had held, and a large pension. The ineptitude of making such overtures to such a man might indeed seem almost too great for belief. The offer was, of course, brushed contemptuously aside as preposterous, and resented as an insult. A French writer, nevertheless, naïvely remarks that it was matter for regret that Eugène did not abjure his aversion for Louis XIV., and restore his genius and his sword to his own country.

Meanwhile, Eugène's continuous work in the field had been of the highest order, alike in fortune and reverse. He established his reputation as a Cavalry leader at the Hill of Hassan in 1687, when his charge and pursuit at the head of the first Cavalry brigade turned a Turkish defeat—effected by Lorraine's infantry—into a complete rout. His reputation was so rapidly built up that at the age of twenty-six he was appointed to the command of a division, with the rank of Field-Marshal-Lieutenant.

The 1690 campaign on the Upper Rhine, in which Eugène served under the command of Max Emmanuel of Bavaria, marked an epoch in his life, as it was the first occasion on which he found himself fighting against France;<sup>2</sup> and in the siege and capture of Mainz he gave his enemy a foretaste of what they were going to receive at his hands. Eugène's growing fame is evident in his appointment in 1691 to the command in North Italy of an Imperial force—consisting of two regiments of Cavalry, two of Infantry, and one of Dragoons—which was sent to help Savoy against the French. His subsequent dash to relieve Carmagnola at the head of 2,000 mounted men added considerably to his reputation as a Cavalry leader.

But greater fame now attended him. Just before the Peace of Ryswick ended the war with France in 1697, the Emperor in 1696 conferred on Prince Eugène the supreme command of the Imperial Army operating against the Turks in Hungary, where the battle of Zenta gave him one of the great opportunities of his life. The battle was fought on September 11, 1696. Before daybreak the Prince had formed his army into twelve divisions—six of Cavalry and six of Infantry—with guns in the centre, and, on receipt of some scouting intelligence, sent out some light Cavalry to reconnoitre and get touch.

<sup>2</sup> In 1688 a decree of banishment from France had been issued against all Frenchmen who should continue to serve in foreign armies. 'The King will see me again,' was Eugène's grim reply when he heard of the royal order.

These did their work well, and also brought back as prisoner a Turkish officer who, under the pressing persuasion of half-a-dozen cavalry sabres brandished over his head, admitted that the Turkish army could be taken *en flagrant délit*. The Sultan, with a part of the Cavalry, had crossed the River Theiss, and the heavy Artillery, with the baggage, was just lumbering across a hastily constructed bridge, while the Infantry, with the remainder of the Cavalry and a few guns, remained on the near bank. Eugène galloped ahead with a small escort, and, having satisfied himself as to the captured Pasha's veracity, waited about three miles from the enemy's position for his force to come up. His order of battle was quickly arranged, and he placed himself in the centre ready to gallop wherever his presence might be needed.

If it be necessary to discount the statement—even though it be that of an eye-witness—that Eugène 'left to the Goddess Fortune no opportunity for the exercise of her influence against him,' military historians and experts seem agreed that the Prince's dispositions were as perfect as his action was successful in result. The slaughter of the Turks was terrific. By ten o'clock at night not a single Osmanli remained alive on the right bank of the Theiss. Early the next morning Eugène crossed the river and took possession of the Sultan's camp, where the booty left by that terror-stricken and fugitive potentate surpassed all expectation. Perhaps the most significant trophy was the great seal, which the Grand Vizier had always worn suspended round his neck, and which had never before fallen into hostile hands, even when—as at Salankament—a Grand Vizier had been slain. This great victory, the final crushing blow in the warfare which for 200 years had raged between Osmanli and Imperialists, was cheaply bought with only five hundred casualties. Eugène's dispatch to the Emperor after the great fight was a model of lucidity, simplicity, and modesty: 'I should be ungenerous and unjust should I not ascribe to all the commanding officers of your Majesty's army the honour of so complete a victory.' Meanwhile, Eugène, not content even with the success which had carried him at one bound to the zenith of his fame, heading a mobile force of 4000 Cavalry and 2500 picked Infantry, with twelve guns and two mortars, started on a raid into Turkish territory.

After the Peace of Carlowitz, which in 1698 followed the Turkish defeat, Eugène devoted his energies to building himself a palace known

as the Belvedere, on a site to the south-east of Vienna, which he had with shrewd foresight purchased a few years earlier, and which had already appreciated enormously in value. He also acquired an island in the Danube below Pesth, and displayed the keenest interest and a good deal of expert knowledge in the development of this and other properties. It was at this time, too, that he made the acquaintance of Peter the Great, who stayed in Vienna on his way from England to Russia, and who never tired of learning every detail of the Imperial army.

The war of the Spanish Succession was the next occasion for Eugène to draw his sword, and he was sent to Italy to oppose a distinguished soldier and old antagonist, Marshal Catinat, whom by his inventive ability he thoroughly out-manceuvred. His masterly march to the Mincio after the battle of Carpi, where he was wounded, showed his extraordinary driving power and ability to make full use of a success.

Catinat's successor, Marshal Villeroi, took up what he believed to be an impregnable position at the pass of Chiari, ten miles to the north-west of Verona. Eugène turned his enemy's position by a march which encountered almost insuperable physical and natural difficulties. He was compelled, indeed, to transport his guns—each drawn by fifteen pairs of oxen—across the mountains over roads only nine feet in width and improvised by the soldiers and peasants—a feat which stamped him as a commander of dogged pertinacity no less than of daring and resource. The latter qualities were admirably illustrated by the stratagem under which in February 1702 Eugène at the head of 200 men penetrated the town of Cremona and carried off Marshal Villeroi—a daring exploit which, however, had the unwelcome result that the incompetent Villeroi was succeeded by one of the greatest of French generals, the brilliant and skilful Louis, Marshal Vendôme. Yet, with admirable patience and unfailing resource, Eugène continued to maintain his position in Northern Italy against vastly superior numbers directed against him by so competent a commander. The campaign was terminated in August 1702 by the bloody but indecisive fight of Luzzara, when Eugène hurried back to Vienna, from which he had been absent for two years, to take up his new duties of President of the Council of War. An attempt, only partially successful, to quell a revolt in Hungary in

1703 was happily followed by the collapse of the revolt itself, and Eugène was thus left free to undertake the supremely important task that lay before him in Bavaria, where he was to join hands with the one great military commander of his time who is to be classed with Eugène himself.

June 1704 marks another epoch in Prince Eugène's career, for on the tenth of that month, at Mundelheim, he for the first time met the Duke of Marlborough. The student of Cavalry warfare will remember Eugène's very first remark after his greeting with the Duke—a spontaneous expression of admiration at the appearance of the British Cavalry, and of the excellent horsemastership of which it was the token. He had asked to see the English Horse, and on inspecting them expressed his surprise at their excellent condition after the long and trying march from the Meuse to the Danube. 'I have heard much,' he said, 'of the English Cavalry, and find it to be the best-appointed and finest that I have ever seen. The spirit which I see in the looks of your men is an earnest of victory.'

The two commanders fought side by side at Blenheim on August 13, when Eugène's loyalty to the British commander was put to a severe test. Their armies had previously been operating separately on opposite sides of the river. Eugène was threatened by an overwhelming French force, and at midnight on August 9 Marlborough sent 3000 Cavalry over the Danube to reinforce them at Kessel. Next day, on receiving a renewed request from Eugène for prompt assistance, Marlborough effected a junction with him. On the morning of the eleventh the Duke and the Prince, having reconnoitred the enemy's position at Blenheim, four miles away, decided to attack it next day. A characteristic incident in the great battle illustrates Eugène's unselfish loyalty to his colleague. Fighting on the right of the Allied line, with 12,400 Infantry and 5000 Cavalry opposed to 16,000 Infantry and 10,000 Cavalry of the enemy, Eugène at first succeeded in capturing several batteries with his Infantry. This attack he followed up with a charge of Cavalry, which was driven back by superior numbers, and the captured batteries were lost. At this moment the Prince received an urgent message from Marlborough asking for Cavalry reinforcements. Without a moment's hesitation Eugène dispatched his best squadrons at a gallop to the aid of his colleague, whose seniority he had cheerfully agreed to recognise.



With his few remaining mounted men he delivered two charges to occupy the enemy in his immediate front. When this handful of Cavalry was overwhelmed by superior numbers, Eugène rushed to the Prussian Infantry, and led them on foot in his famous attack on the Bavarian line.

Amidst the plaudits of their countrymen and allies, Marlborough and Eugène showed a self-restraining modesty, each attributing credit to the other and disclaiming it for himself. On the part borne by Marlborough in this, one of the most decisive battles in history, it is unnecessary to lay stress. The greatness of Eugène's share in bringing about the result might at first sight be less apparent. But as Malleson<sup>3</sup> has said, 'his dash across the Rhine to join the Allies' army, his perfect understanding with Marlborough, his forgetfulness of self on every occasion, had combined with his skill as a commander to render the efficient aid without which Blenheim could not have been fought.' The same writer has observed elsewhere that Eugène as a strategist was one of the precursors of Napoleon. His campaign in Lombardy, already referred to, in which, with a force smaller than either, he made head against two hostile armies, and finally defeated both, anticipated the campaign of 1796. If Marlborough was a splendid tactician, admirable to execute a plan, the inspiration for the campaign of Blenheim came from Eugène.

Eugène's co-operation with his English ally was cut short by an Imperial mission to Italy to assist the Duke of Savoy, who, during the Italian campaign of 1705, found a good deal more than his match in Vendôme. The presence of the Prince on the scene soon equalised the situation, and after a series of brilliant marches and counter-marches, the two forces came to deadly grips at Cassano on August 16, the most sanguinary struggle of the whole war. Eugène, whose rashness in exposing himself unduly was the only military error with which he was ever charged, was badly grazed on the neck by a musket ball. Indeed, the frequency with which he was wounded is in marked contrast to the almost startling immunity from casualty enjoyed by the no less heroic soldiers, Marlborough and Wellington. Eugène's wound checked his plans for that year. But in the following spring he succeeded by one of the most daring and skilful marches which marked his career in joining the Duke of Savoy, who was 200 miles

<sup>3</sup> *Prince Eugene of Savoy*, p. 113.

away, and in relieving Turin, which the French were besieging with 80,000 men. At the head of only 24,000 men, he passed the foe in the sight of Vendôme, crossed the Tanaro under the eyes of the Duke of Orléans, took Reggio and Carreggio, and effected his junction with the Piedmontese. Undaunted by his numerical inferiority, and encouraged by the well-known misunderstandings which existed between the French generals, Eugène hurled himself against the enemy's entrenched camp on September 7, 1706, and gained a victory—with, by-the-bye, another honourable wound—which decided the fate of Italy. The City of London had subscribed liberally to the funds necessary for this expedition, and Eugène wrote to the citizens that 'he flattered himself he had laid out their money to their entire satisfaction.' His recompense for this exploit was the Governorship of the Milanese, and Eugène's taste for pomp and circumstance, in their right place, was illustrated in the gorgeous ceremony which occurred on April 16, 1707, when he took over his rule. In the following winter he was nominated Lieutenant-General and Field-Marshal of the Empire. An abortive attempt against Toulon was followed by his mission to the different Courts of Germany to organise the campaign of the following year.

The early spring of 1708 found Eugène and Marlborough once more together, and their campaign for freeing the Spanish Netherlands opened in July with the victory of Oudenarde, to which the good feeling between the English and the ill-feeling between the French leaders materially contributed. The Duke of Burgundy, in his capacity of a Prince of the Blood, had assumed command, and his hopeless blundering provoked the remark from one of his own gentlemen, '*Je ne sais si vous avez le royaume du ciel; mais pour celui de la terre, le Prince Eugène et Marlborough s'y prennent mieux que vous.*' The subsequent fall of Lille showed Eugène, who on this occasion was severely wounded in the head, in the light of a most generous and courteous opponent. He paid the most eulogistic tribute to the defence of the French Governor Boufflers, and invited him to prepare the articles of capitulation himself, saying, 'I subscribe to everything beforehand, well persuaded that you will not insert anything unworthy of yourself or me.'

In 1709 Eugène met perhaps his most formidable foe in the person of Marshal Villars, and the victory of Malplaquet was only obtained at

a hideous expenditure of human life. It was followed by such exhaustion as to render the Allies temporarily unfit for any further fighting. The indefatigable Prince hastened back to Vienna, and sandwiched an important and highly successful diplomatic mission to the King of Prussia between his recent work and the rather colourless campaign of 1710.

In the spring of 1711 the death of the Emperor Joseph I. prompted Eugène to devote his energies to the pacific work of securing, in concert with the Empress, the Imperial Throne to the Archduke, who mounted it under the name of Charles VI. Hardly had this task been accomplished, when a new European situation arose owing to the British *entente* with France, which was the fruit either of the caprice of the English Sovereign or of the policy of the English Government, and which had as one of its consequences the total eclipse of Marlborough. The new Emperor desired Eugène to repair immediately to London, to use his best endeavours to re-attach England to the coalition, and at the same time to re-establish the prestige of the great English commander. Eugène's official reception on landing in London was, to put it mildly, inadequate. It is recorded that the persons deputed by the Ministers to meet him at Greenwich were an ex-stock-jobber and a quack doctor, and that it was hinted to him that if he wished to find favour at Court he should not champion the cause of Marlborough. This suggestion Eugène scornfully resented: 'It is inconsistent with my character to be wanting in respect to a friend in his adverse fortune, for whom I always expressed so much regard in the time of his prosperity.' Although Eugène was the 'lion' of English society, he made but little impression on the Queen and none on the Government. Anne objected to his new-fashioned wig as much as to his political proposal, and restricted her favours to the gift of a diamond-hilted sword. Eugène quickly saw that, from the point of view of international politics, his mission was foredoomed to failure. 'If,' he said to Harley, 'there were any question on the part of England of ceasing to insist upon the claim of the Emperor to the throne of Spain and the Indies, I have no longer any business in this country.' He remained in London for two months, and returned to the Hague convinced that, as regarded the Spanish claims, the Emperor had nothing to hope for from the English Ministry.

In 1712 Eugène met the Duke of Ormond—who had superseded Marlborough in the command of the English troops—at Tournai, and

the two commanders joined the Allied army on May 21. But the capture of Quesnoi was to be the work, as it was the design, of Eugène alone. His conduct at this critical moment, when harassed by the peevish objections of the Dutch deputies, and smarting under the defection of the English troops, proves that, if he did not possess Marlborough's serene temperament, he had his own naturally quick temper under perfect control, and that he could preserve his dignity as well as exhibit his courage in the most difficult and irritating circumstances.

The Dutch, under Lord Albemarle, were defeated at Denain, and Eugène, who was unable to get up in time to support him, was obliged to raise the siege of Landrecies and relinquish his pet plans of penetrating into Champagne. As if his cup of troubles were not full enough, the tongue of scandal began to wag, and his inability to assist Albemarle was attributed to the fact that he had placed his dépôts at Marchiennes in order to carry on an intrigue with a lady. The real reason for this failure lay in the meanness of the Dutch deputies, who refused to bring the stores further forward. On someone caustically alluding to the rapid movements of Alexander the Great, Prince Eugène remarked that the Macedonian 'would have moved less quickly had he been encumbered with Dutch deputies.'

Abandoned first by England, and then by Holland, the Emperor pluckily determined to prosecute the war alone. His idea was impossible of success, and after the capitulation of Landau and Freiburg, Eugène wisely urged his master in the direction of the peace which was concluded at Rastadt on March 6, 1714. Two years of political—and to Eugène not very congenial—work preceded another campaign, when the Emperor, having arranged with Venice for joint action against Turkey, appointed Eugène to command the forces in Hungary. Eugène's victory at Peterwardein over an army of more than twice the strength of his own was regarded by the Pope as a service to Christendom meriting the consecrated hat and sword which the Court of Rome used on rare occasions to send to those who had triumphed over the infidel, and which to this most devout Catholic Prince represented a reward of supreme value.

The Battle of Belgrade in the following year showed Eugène, now in the autumn of life, to be still at his best. Having sat down before the city for a month, he found himself with 40,000 men up against not only a garrison of 80,000 men, but an advancing relieving force of

200,000. Realising that his only chance lay in a masterstroke, Eugène led a grand general attack on August 16, 1717, which resulted in the defeat of the enemy with staggering loss, in the capitulation of the town a few days later, and in his being himself wounded for the thirteenth and last time. The great victory was marked by the presentation to him of a sword of the value of 80,000 florins, and its memory was perpetuated by the popular song, 'Prinz Eugen, der edle Ritter.' The Treaty of Passarowitz, concluded on July 21, 1718, destroyed Eugène's high hopes of reaching Constantinople, and of triumphantly dictating his own terms in the very heart of the Moslem dominion.

Eugène's splendid feats of arms abroad did not deter his enemies and calumniators at home from a partially successful attempt to poison the Emperor's mind against him. Chief among these were the Abbot Tedeschi, a Florentine, and the Imperial Chamberlain, Count von Nimptsch, both of them in the confidence of Eugène's jealous and vindictive cousin, Victor Amadeus of Savoy. But these worthies found their match in Eugène, who had received valuable proofs of their infamy from Nimptsch's valet, a devoted admirer of the great national hero. Having obtained possession of some most compromising papers, Eugène first took the kindly precaution of sending the valet to a place of safety, and then laid his evidence before his Imperial master. His demand for the condign punishment of his calumniators was enforced with the alternative of his resignation of all the offices he held under the Crown. Backed as it was by popular sentiment, such an ultimatum was irresistible. Both of the offenders were immediately and thoroughly disgraced. Nimptsch was punished by imprisonment, and Tedeschi by corporal correction.

During the years of peace which intervened between Passarowitz and the conflict of the Polish Succession in 1734 Eugène devoted himself to the care of his own properties, as well as to art and literature, his genuine taste for which he had been prevented by duties of a sterner kind from indulging. A student of literature, he had collected many rare and valuable books which, however, till now he had never found time to read. And he delighted in the society of cultured men, finding himself at home in the company of statesmen, of scholars, authors, and *virtuosi*. Among his intimate associates in his earlier days had been Leibnitz, while an intimate of later life was J. B. Rousseau, the poet, whose admiration for the great soldier found vent in laudatory odes.

The succession of Augustus II. to the throne of Poland in 1734 lent Austria a pretext for attacking France, but afforded Prince Eugène—who, in spite of the weight of seventy years, was appointed to command in the field—little opportunity for adding to his military laurels. While numerical inferiority rendered him powerless to prevent the capture of Philipsburg, his incomparable skill staved off an incursion of the enemy into Bavaria. But, painfully conscious of his own failing physical strength, he welcomed frankly the peace which was concluded on October 3, 1735. At Vienna during that winter he rested quietly, making but rare appearances at Court or in the world. On April 20, 1736, he was playing a game of picquet at the house of his most intimate friend, the Countess Batthyany, when he was seized with great pain and faintness. It was of a piece with Eugène's whole character that, in his anxiety not to distress his hostess, he insisted on finishing his game before retiring to his own house. He then refused to allow any fuss to be made, said that it would be ample time to call in the doctor in the morning, and declared that all he needed was sleep. When his servants came to his bedside in the morning they found that God had closed the eyes of the tired soldier in the Great Sleep.

Eugène's place in the military hierarchy of the world has been assigned to him by Napoleon, who pronounced him the peer of Turenne and Frederick the Great. A great French writer<sup>4</sup> declares that 'he belonged assuredly to the small number of generals who, in the seventeenth century, brought the art of war to its greatest perfection.' He has been adjudged by military experts to be equally gifted as a tactician and as a strategist. He possessed in a supreme degree the faculty of 'keeping his head' in circumstances of the utmost stress and peril, and in battle his personality was almost magical in the confidence and enthusiasm it inspired. He belonged to that category of commanders in the field who protest the impossibility of winning battles without losing lives, and he detested methods of 'languid warfare.' But he cared diligently and generously for the welfare and the comfort of his soldiers, by whom he was venerated and adored. Italian by origin and Frenchman by birth, no more true or single-hearted servant of the country of his adoption ever existed; and his Imperial master voiced the feelings of Austria when he exclaimed, on learning his great loss, 'The fortunes of the Empire have perished with Prince Eugène.'

<sup>4</sup> Latona, *Encyclopédie des Gens du Monde*.

### TRAINING POLO PONIES

By COLONEL J. VAUGHAN, D.S.O.

1. *State of Training at Time of Purchase.*—We can buy either (i.) raw ponies, (ii.) half-trained ponies, (iii.) trained ponies, or (iv.) racing ponies; but to turn any of the above into best class tournament ponies we must either train or re-train them on some reasoned method.

With (i.) lack of condition and muscle will make it advisable to start at the beginning and put them through the first three stages as detailed for remounts. The experts of the regimental riding establishment have usually put them through the first three stages, whilst I taught ponies the fourth stage—teaching them to work on a loose rein—myself. With polo ponies work at the trot may be curtailed, except for muscling purposes.

With (ii.) and (iii.) we must first ascertain what faults require to be eradicated, and then decide at what point to pick up their training.

With (iv.) the ponies are in the best of condition and muscle, so may be put into hard work from the commencement. The problem is merely one of altering the animal's balance—shifting the centre of gravity backwards—and then teaching him to stop, turn, and push. Racing ponies are generally quick starters, owing to their work on the course.

2. *Eradication of Faults.*—This is a difficult matter, and requires experience and great patience. I have known three months' hard work on foot necessary to teach a pony to raise his head and balance himself. After that, however, his progress was rapid, and he turned out a very good pony.

The most common faults are:—

- |                                  |                                     |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| (a) turning on the shoulders;    | (f) slow in jumping off;            |
| (b) stopping on the forehand;    | (g) poking the nose;                |
| (c) leaning on the rider's hand; | (h) funkng;                         |
| (d) pulling with head too high;  | (i) lack of pace;                   |
| (e) pulling over-bent;           | (j) favouring the off-fore leading. |

Of these, (a) and (b) can be cured quickest in the cross manege.

For (c) I have found it a good plan to use a broad snaffle and an Indian thorn bit. The pony has to learn that if he leans on the bit it is painful. I usually commence by lunging, with the lunging

reins on the snaffle rings and a running tackle through the bit rings, and a driving pad so adjusted that if the pony takes more than a very slight hold on the snaffle the bit comes into operation and pricks the bar of the mouth.

Simultaneously with this lunging the pony should be well flexed, dismounted and mounted, and if necessary can also have running reins or a dumb jockey placed on him in the stable.

Later he may be ridden with the snaffle and thorn bit, the snaffle reins in one hand, bit reins in the other. If he will not stop to the application of the legs and snaffle, apply the bit in no uncertain manner. Repeated sprints of about thirty yards, stopping and jumping off again, will undoubtedly lighten and quicken him.

(d) The common method is to use a standing martingale, but I much prefer side reins for training for the following reason: If a pony is to stop on his hocks and throw his centre of gravity back he must let his head go up. With a standing martingale his head is fixed and the animal cannot get his centre of gravity far enough back, and therefore stops too much on his shoulders. In bad cases put the side reins through the ring of the bit and not the snaffle.

(e) This is much more difficult to cure than the former case. The best methods that I know are to use a gag or an overhead or bearing rein. The latter should be so adjusted that the pony can get his poll in line with the withers when galloping, but no lower.

(f) The pony must be re-balanced and then given sprints with another pony for about fifty yards or less to a point and back again.

Ponies soon learn what the idea is and try to jump off quicker than their neighbours.

(g) Poking the nose out. This is a common fault, and not easily cured. Here again side reins are useful, but if they do not suffice a shell noseband may be tried with a standing martingale.

(h) 'A bold man makes a bold horse,' but the converse is even truer. Ponies must be taught to push systematically. It is a good plan to put them in the ranks with the young horses for a period. Then get another pony to try and ride them into a ditch or wall so that they have to push in self-defence—this at a walk. When they understand how to change their legs and use their weight give them five minutes' 'bumping' in a manege daily, being careful not to sicken them. When they bump well, speak to them, make much of them, knock off, and give some dainty.



They should be allowed to get the best of the 'bump,' and for this reason it is well to use a charger or troop horse, or some animal whose success in life does not depend on 'bumping,' and gradually give way to them as they push.

(i) Pace can be improved by sprints on the racecourse in snaffles; two furlongs twice a week will suffice. Ponies should not be put on the course till after they have completed their training, nor should they be allowed to 'carry on' after the finish. As soon as they have made their effort they should be collected and stopped on the hocks. Galloping up and down hill and jumping ditches will also give them more extension and lengthen their stride.

(j) This is a great nuisance when one wants to hit a back-hander on the offside, as the pony cannot get his quarters out of the way unless he changes his legs, nor can he ride off properly if on the wrong leg. Nine ponies out of ten prefer to gallop off-fore leading. A preponderance of work on the left rein in the school and in the open and insisting on their leading with the near fore on the straight will rectify this fault.

3. *Progressive Training.*—We must be certain that a pony is perfect in one stage of his training before we commence another. I place the order of training thus:—

- |               |                     |
|---------------|---------------------|
| (a) balance;  | (e) pushing;        |
| (b) mounting; | (f) stick and ball; |
| (c) stopping; | (g) slow games.     |
| (d) starting; |                     |

For (a) we cannot do better than follow the first three stages of the chargers' or troop horses' training.

(b) should be undertaken by the owner. Personally, I like a pony that I can ride entirely with my legs and balance, but some people like to be able to feel a pony's mouth. In any case, it is very difficult for another man to train a pony absolutely 'to your knuckle.' I strongly recommend everyone who wants really nice ponies to play on to undertake this part of their training themselves.

(c) I place 'stopping' next, as I think that it is the most important point in a pony's training. It is not difficult to teach if we can do it in a systematic way.

The cross manege is a great assistance. First teach your pony to do it at a walk correctly. I would lay down the detail thus:—

'To stop and turn on the near hock.'

Ride the pony into balance as near as possible along the right side

of the cross manege wall. When nearing the end apply the aids for the halt, and give the command 'Whoa.' Then apply the aids for turning to the left-about on the hocks; at the same time lightly tap the pony on the right shoulder to lighten the forehand with a cutting whip carried in the right hand. For stop and turn on the off hock substitute left for right in the above.

When the pony gives a good finished performance at the walk in the open, he can do the same thing at a canter in the manege and open, and finally repeat at the fastest pace. About five minutes at the conclusion of each lesson twice a day is sufficient cross-manege work.

(d) Starting. There is no difficulty in teaching ponies to start if they are well balanced. The method is explained in 2 (f) above.

(e) Pushing has already been referred to under 2 (h).

(f) The pony being balanced, mounted, and obedient to the aids, will now easily and quickly learn not to fear the stick and to follow the ball. He can be trained to the stick whilst at exercise by a syce or groom swinging a stick on his back, with both right and left hand. But on no account allow anyone but yourself to teach him to follow the ball. Do not indulge in long hits at the commencement. Begin with half-arm strokes and teach the pony to follow the ball in circles, first to the right with offside taps, and then to the left with small offside pulls under his neck. Lean well out of the saddle, and be careful never to hit him or job him in the mouth. When the pony is good at offside strokes—forward, cuts, and pulls—teach him the same on the near side. The next step is to ride him straight behind the ball, and give him the aids to allow you to hit it alternately near- and off-side, as you may determine. After this proceed with back-handers, being careful that he does not stop when you raise your stick; if he does, drive him forward as you hit. When you want him to stop apply the aids and make him stop correctly on his hocks, turn, and jump off quickly. If he does anything in a careless, slovenly manner make him do it over again correctly, quickly, and well balanced.

(g) Young pony chukkers should be arranged in regimental or club games. Hard hitting and fast galloping should be forbidden in such games, and attention given to the training of the ponies rather than to the game. For such games ponies should be taught to jump off quickly and stop quickly; they can be eased up after they have jumped off, and allowed to canter as you dribble the ball. Whenever alongside


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another pony they should be taught to change their legs (if necessary) and to put their weight against the other pony.

Slow games should be continued until ponies will go at any pace without pulling. They can then take their place in fast games.

4. *Tackle and Appliances*.—All polo players should have a variety of bits, but remember that more ponies play badly from being too severely, rather than too lightly, bitted. I will describe a few useful appliances mentioned in these notes.


The cross-manege consists of two lanes eight or nine feet wide crossing one another at right angles. In India they are most cheaply constructed of mud. There should be a door half-way along one of the wings—not at the end. The walls should be sufficiently high for a pony not to be able to see over them. At the base they should be



some nine inches wider than they are higher up. This will permit of the pony being ridden close to the side without the rider's leg touching the wall. The length should be sufficient to enable a pony to work at full speed on a loose rein. At the centre the lanes should be rather broader than at the ends, and the corners should be rounded off.

Circular maneges are invaluable for lungeing, leading in hand, and flexion. Where circular maneges are not available, an ordinary rectangular manege can be sub-divided into two or three small squares by screens or hurdles.

*Galvayne's Running Tackle* is a cheap and efficient mouthing tackle. It consists of a driving-pad with a terret or dee on it and a piece of sash-cord. The cord is fastened to the bellyband on the offside, run through the ring of the snaffle, back to the dee on the pad, through the dee, through the near ring of the snaffle, and made fast on the bellyband on the near side. Care must be taken that the pony's head is in the right place. This can be adjusted by fastening the cord higher or lower on the bellyband. It must be pulled sufficiently tight to make the pony flex from the poll, and sufficiently loose not to get him overbent. It is best to use a broad key-mouthing snaffle with it, a straight-barred wooden one for choice. This tackle is very useful in conjunction with long reins.



*Long Reins.*—It is important to see that these are of the right length to suit the manege in which the trainer works. If too long they get in the way of the trainer's legs, and may be a possible danger in the open.

*The Thorn Bit* is not generally known out of India. It is made like an ordinary bit, with a slight port. The mouth-piece has a series of projections along it, something like the grinders of a man's back teeth, but sharper, thus:—



As long as the pony does not pull the projections are inoperative, but the moment that the lever is pulled behind the perpendicular the projections prick the bars of his mouth. It is the best remedy that I know for old ponies that lean on the hand.

*Shell Nosebands* are made by stitching a number of cowrie shells perpendicularly inside an ordinary noseband. They are useful with a standing martingale to teach a pony not to poke his nose. After three or four days, if the hair is rubbed off and the skin threatened, they should be discontinued and replaced by an ordinary noseband for a day or two, when the shells can be resumed.

The best bit for training is the light Ward Union bit and bridoon, with martingale if necessary. I prefer a running martingale on the bit rein, because the function of the bridoon is to raise the head and of the bit to draw the nose in and make the animal flex and relax the jaw. If we put the martingale on the bridoon rein we are working against ourselves, unless we are working on a snaffle with four reins.

*Side Reins* are very useful in training. They teach the animal to have a light feeling, and the rider to have light hands, owing to the leverage. They enable one to draw the nose in, and are more elastic than standing martingales.

*Overhead Reins.*—A good overhead rein consists of a main strap, two rings, and four short straps and buckles. Two of these short straps affixed to a ring are fastened to the front dees of the saddle. The main strap passes from this ring over the poll, through a leather loop in the centre of the browband to the second ring about four inches below the browband. From this ring two straps are fastened to the bridoon rings. The main strap should have a buckle in the centre, so that the rider can adjust it without dismounting.

*THE INSTRUCTION OF THE RANK AND FILE  
ON BEARINGS AND TIME BY THE STARS.*

*BEING NOTES FROM A LECTURE DELIVERED DURING THE  
CAVALRY SCHOOL COURSE AT NETHERAVON*

By THE SOUTH AFRICAN SUB-EDITOR.

‘ Night was far spent and now in ocean deepe  
Orion flying fast from hissing snake  
His flaming head did hasten for to steepe.’

THUS the poet Spenser, on the setting in the Western Sea of Orion, the brilliant constellation that moved the inspired writers of Scripture, known to the Ancient Hebrews as Cesil and to the Arabs of to-day as Eljoza, the bride; the most easily recognised of all the fixed star groups, situated on the celestial equator, visible between its rising and setting from any spot on the globe, a useful starting-point for the identification of other fixed stars, and enabling us to determine the points of the compass without the use of instruments.

General Von Bernhardi has written, ‘ The Cavalry officer carries his map in his head ’; and by night this is unavoidable, as it would be impossible on service for him to constantly illuminate the map with an electric torch. Let him rather study the map beforehand, provided there is a useful one available, which is not always the case, and then proceed on his way, keeping his bearings by the stars or landmarks, and with every sense on the alert.

The Inspector-General of the Forces has made the observation that night operations will assume increased importance in the future. Under cover of darkness the movement of troops is not betrayed by dust and reported by aeroplanes, and you, as officers of experience, will endorse the opinion that each man in the ranks of the Cavalry should have his sense of direction so cultivated and developed that he



THE ZODIACAL LIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA.




Fig. I.

may be able to reconnoitre by night with as much confidence as by day.

A night march may have to be conducted without the light of the moon, or it may be advisable during the initial or final stages to profit by the moon's rays or those of a planet, or by the zodiacal light whose pearly glow is so noticeable in some latitudes, spread over the sky in pyramidal form, in the spring near the point where the sun has disappeared, and in the autumn before sunrise.

Lord Kitchener ensured that the night before the Battle of Omdurman there was a full moon, making the desert appear almost as bright as day.

No precautions should be neglected to ensure the success of night operations. We may advisedly ask ourselves in Shakespeare's words :

'Doth the moon shine that night we play our play? . . . A calendar, a calendar; look in the almanack!' or if none is available note that the moon rises about fifty minutes later each night, and make your calculations accordingly. But the planets Venus and Jupiter are young moons in themselves, and at favourable times give sufficient radiance to read a newspaper and cast a distinct shadow: The periods when they attain their greatest brilliancy may be found in the Nautical Almanac under the heading of 'Phenomena.' They are wanderers in the set pattern of the starry firmament, and of their capricious movements it is sufficient to say that Venus sticks so close to the sun, a mere matter of sixty-seven million miles, that she was known to the ancients as the morning star Lucifer and also as the evening star Vesper. Jupiter, however, unlike her, may be visible at any hour of the night. They are both more brilliant than Sirius (see Fig. 1), and when in their more obscure phases are distinguishable from the brightest stars by their steady lustre, as compared with the stars' twinkling, which in the case of Canopus (see Fig. 1) amounts almost to flashing when he is near the horizon.

*Fig. 1. Explanation.*—Orion stands with his head to the North midway between the two celestial poles round which the heavens appear to revolve once in every twenty-four hours. A line drawn through the centre of Orion's head, belt, and sword is true north and south, and if continued in each direction, will lead us to the Pole Star if we are in northern latitudes, and if we are in the Southern Hemisphere to the South Celestial Pole.



*For Northern Hemisphere* to compare the sky with this drawing :  
At about 7 P.M. on February 4 face southwards. You will observe Orion approaching a perpendicular position in the middle of the southern sky with the Pigeon below him near the horizon. The south circumpolar stars are below the horizon.

*For Southern Hemisphere* to compare the sky with this drawing :  
At about 8 P.M. on February 25 recline facing south with this drawing upright in your hand. Orion will be just past the zenith and overhead. The south stars will be in front of you. The north circumpolar stars are below the horizon and behind you.

#### TIME FOR NORTHERN HEMISPHERE.

Fig. 2 shows stars around the Northern Pole of the heavens (Pole Star), and the pointers of the Plough which direct us to the Pole Star.

Since all stars appear to rise in the east and set in the west, the




FIG. 3.—NORTHERN HEMISPHERE.

The Celestial Clock, showing position of the Pointers of the Plough for every hour during the night of February 4.

pointers revolve once round the Pole Star in the opposite direction to the hands of a clock once in twenty-four hours, or they swing through a quarter of a circle once in six hours; it is thus a simple matter after a little practice to judge what sector they will pass through in an hour or less.

Fig. 3. Assuming that all stars rise four minutes earlier each day, and that the pointers of the Plough are vertically above the Pole Star at midnight at the end of February, we may easily calculate the position of the pointers for any hour or day in the year.





Fig. 2. NORTHERN STARS - THE PLOUGH (rising) at 8 P.M. 4th February



## TIME FOR SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE.

Fig. 4 shows stars around the imaginary point called the Southern Pole of the heavens. The Cross is below the horizon to observers north of the Tropic of Cancer.

The analogy to a clock is very marked, as the Cross revolves around the Southern Pole in the direction of the hour hand of a watch once in twenty-four hours, or swings through a quarter of a circle once in six hours; it is thus a simple matter after a little practice to judge what sector it will pass through in an hour or less.




FIG. 5.—SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE.

The Celestial Clock, showing position of the Cross for every hour during the night of February 20.

Fig. 5. Assuming that all stars rise four minutes earlier each day, and that the Cross is vertically above the Southern Pole at midnight at the end of March, we may easily calculate the position of the Cross for any hour or day in the year.

## THE FALSE DAWN.

The illustration facing p. 177 is that of an illusive promise of daylight which was constantly observable in the small hours of the morning in autumn during the late war in South Africa.

## THE TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE

By LIEUT.-COLONEL H. CLIFTON BROWN, 12th (P.W.R.) Lancers.

'THOUGH our Cavalry was numerous, its work hardly came up to our expectations, but where it was properly commanded it did well enough. In my opinion, the main reform that is necessary in the Cavalry is to improve their training. Till it is educated to feel that it *should fight as obstinately as Infantry*, the money expended on our mounted arm is thrown away. If Infantry can still continue fighting after losing fifty per cent. of their strength, Cavalry should be able to do the same. In action we *nursed the Cavalry too much*; out of action we did *not take sufficient care of it*.'

So writes Kuropatkin of the Russian Cavalry after his experiences of the latest modern war. Perhaps it is not our rôle to fight as '*obstinately as Infantry*' in the attack or defence of a position; but it is certainly our duty to be equally persistent and determined, and to be prepared to 'lose fifty per cent. of our strength' in any battle without becoming disorganised. Are not we in the British Cavalry often too much inclined to impress on our troopers that scouting and reconnaissance are their most important duties, and to somewhat neglect their education in fighting tactics? Surely the fighting days of Cavalry are not over, and the first thing we must do is to train our Cavalry trooper to be a fighting man. He will be no good as a scout, signaller, pioneer, or in any other capacity, unless he has been educated to feel that his rôle on the battlefield is to fight as much and even more than any of the other arms.

When the Cavalryman is *mounted* it seems clear that his best way of fighting lies in the attack at full speed. If he halts or hesitates he loses the advantage that a horse gives him. On the other hand, when he is *dismounted* he is at a disadvantage with the Infantryman. He has his horse to look after as well as himself. Both want watering and feeding, and there is also the difficulty of finding cover. In the purely passive defence, as at Ladysmith, the best thing Cavalry can do is to become Infantry pure and simple, and put their full strength in the trenches. In the combination of *mounted and dismounted* action, whether advancing or retiring, their strength again lies in their mobility. While some gallop to seize tactical points, from

whence they can unexpectedly open fire on the enemy, the remainder attack with the *arme blanche*. In no case in attack or defence does the Cavalryman become superior to his enemy without using his horse and assuming the offensive. His true tactics in the fight therefore are to make use of his mobility to attack in every situation.

If it is necessary to cultivate the 'offensive spirit' in an Infantry soldier, it is doubly so in the trooper. In the hands of a resolute man the horse gives him the advantage in manœuvring, in retaining initiative, and liberty of action, and enables him to choose his own time and place for attack. In the hands of an irresolute man these very advantages become serious disadvantages, as he need not make up his mind to attack but can keep shooting safely from a distance. If we wish to avoid aspersions like Kuropatkin's, we must educate our troopers to resist the natural tendency for every mounted man, when he finds himself under fire, to canter away out of danger without any clear idea of what he is doing. He must be taught never to move off except with a definite object. If he cannot go straight for the enemy his objective must be to gain a position from whence he can. Where the Infantryman can get under cover, take time and make plans for the attack, the Cavalry soldier must act and chance the unknown. It is easy for a brave man to risk a situation and make up his mind when he knows what he is facing, but it is more difficult for him to hazard the uncertain, and when he is mounted it is easy to go round a bit further and find out more first.

In the days of Cromwell, Marlborough, and Frederick the Great, Cavalry was used as a fighting arm as much as the Infantry. Before the battle they were seldom far ahead, and in the fight these leaders usually made their first attack with the Cavalry and supported it with the Infantry. A hundred years later, however, the larger size of the armies engaged and the longer range of their guns and rifles necessitated bigger extensions, and consequently larger turning movements. Cavalry were naturally the arm used to outflank these long battle lines, while Infantry were massed with the guns for the attack on the decisive point. Napoleon used his Cavalry days ahead of his main columns for screening and reconnoitring purposes (*e.g.* the Ulm campaign), but he also took good care to have a large Cavalry force ready to use as a reserve in the fight, and owed most of his victories to their timely co-operation in the final stages of his Infantry attack. Later commanders have copied Napoleon in teaching their

Cavalry that their armies depend on them for information, that their duties are to keep touch with the enemy, and conceal the movements of their own columns. But they have not copied Napoleon in the use of their Cavalry on the battlefield. They have used them more independently, both before and during the battle, but not so much to co-operate in the final stages of the Infantry attack. Had Lees' Cavalry at Gettysberg been on the battlefield, their co-operation with Pickett in that last gallant assault of the Southerners would probably have ended the war. Gradually Cavalry have become to be looked on as of more importance than formerly before the fight, but of secondary importance on the battlefield itself.

But are we sure that this will be so in the future? Though Cavalry will no longer be put in the first line to attack, are they not invaluable in reserve to support quickly threatened points on a widely extended modern battlefield and to help in counter attack. Is it no longer possible for lines of extended horsemen to gallop through fire-swept zones? The rapidity with which Cavalry move still makes them a difficult target for the gunner and rifleman. Those of us who sat on our horses on the Reit River, waiting for the order to start to Kimberley, will remember how we watched the storm of shot and shell which the Boers were pouring down on one of our horse batteries. As we looked at the casualties on that kopje on our left, we did not expect to reach Kimberley without severe fighting and many casualties. We knew we had to gallop for about two miles between ridges lined with Boer riflemen; but the most sanguine of us hardly expected the result. After we had started hardly a man or horse was hit. Had we been Infantry it would have taken us hours instead of minutes, and our casualties would have been hundreds instead of ten.

In future wars it seems probable that wireless telegraphy, telephones, aeroplanes, and a well-organised intelligence will more and more take the place of strategical exploration by large bodies of Cavalry. On the other hand, it seems certain that owing to the enormous extension of the fighting front, Infantry, which are unable to get over the ground faster than two and a half miles an hour, cannot any longer fulfil the duties of a general army reserve, much less those of the reserve of a group of armies. Henceforward, these duties will belong to Cavalry. Surely the victor of the future is the commander who nurses his Cavalry during the initial stages of the battle, refuses to scatter them in various detachments, but keeps them

in reserve and sends them in to co-operate with the Infantry in the last stages of the fight. Napoleon's attack at Jena succeeded without the aid of his Cavalry, who were in reserve; in consequence, they were fresh and decisive in that tremendous pursuit. At Marengo, when the great blow was struck with every available man at the decisive point and the issue was still in doubt, Kellermann's squadrons charged the Austrian flank and settled it. At Austerlitz the Cavalry supported Soult's counter attack on the Pratzen by numerous charges against fresh Russian troops coming up in support, which decided the battle. When Napoleon was on the point of surrounding the Austrians at Ulm, he sent orders for the greater part of his Cavalry to move up to where he was, at the Abbey of Elchingen, from whence he intended to deliver the main attack next day; the Austrians, however, surrendered. At Eylau, Murat's Cavalry were thrown into the fight to stop the retirement of the Emperor's right wing, which they accomplished. At Friedland part of the Cavalry participated in Ney's unsuccessful attack on the Russians' left, but the bulk of them were massed under Lannes and Mortier on the centre and left, and used in the final stages of the fight. As long as Napoleon had fit and efficient Cavalry he used them to support his Infantry attack on the battlefield. Though he worked them hard beforehand, he nursed them in reserve until he wanted them, and then launched them at the critical moment in full strength. At the end of a long-drawn battle, when both sides are utterly exhausted, the Cavalry attack will always succeed. At these moments Cavalry is the only arm able to get about and reap the fruits of victory or restore confidence and breathing-time to the vanquished.

One cannot understand why Kuropatkin did not use his Cavalry masses at Lioyang or Mukden. Had he done so, surely these battles would have been Japanese disasters. His own criticisms really apply more to himself than to his Cavalry. At Mukden had he not split up his Cavalry (17,000 to 18,000 strong) into various detachments, but instead massed them at one or two central points on the battlefield, he could have sent 12,000 to 14,000 fresh horsemen to co-operate with Kaulbars in a determined counter attack on Nogi's exhausted columns.

On manœuvres it is very difficult for a regimental commander to nurse his men and horses and keep them fit for the fight. Many men and horses are told off as orderlies. Strategical patrols and advanced squadrons have to sacrifice their fighting strength to acquire information. Messages have to be sent back many miles by day and night.



Surely most of these jobs in Europe could be done quicker and better by motor-bicycles, and the horses saved in consequence. I believe six motor-bicycles would increase the efficiency and fighting strength of a squadron in the day of battle twenty to thirty per cent. Might it not also be better training for 'the arm' if Cavalry manoeuvres were slightly curtailed so that the horses should not get so worn out, and that more combined manoeuvres with Infantry were carried out? Could not 'mixed detachments' be more frequently practised and Cavalry more often exercised with Infantry in the fight itself?

In conclusion, the writer does not wish it to be inferred that he thinks reconnaissance is a thing of the past. Tactical reconnaissance before and during the battle will undoubtedly be of greater importance than ever. He wishes, however, to emphasise his convictions that the first duty of a Cavalry leader is to educate his men to fight. That the necessity of co-operation on the battlefield with Infantry has become of more importance than it has been since Napoleon's day. That the huge extent of modern battlefields and the wider extension of the armies engaged will disclose new opportunities for successes for the Cavalry arm. That Cavalry must usually be nursed, perhaps for days, till the final and critical stages of the battle, when they must be used without a thought of sparing them or of ever seeing them again until the enemy is annihilated. That the leader of the future (like Napoleon of the past) will be the general who understands his Cavalry and knows when and how to use them in masses in the fight.

For all this a mobile Cavalry is necessary, trained to fight persistently and determinedly: the troopers, full of confidence in their own fighting powers, which good horsemanship and a thorough belief in their weapons will give them: men like the Southern Cavalry at Cedarville, who alone and unsupported overthrew the whole Northern rearguard. These gallant Virginians, only two hundred and fifty strong, resolutely handled and charging at the right moment, galloped down a road with logs of timber on both sides, in pursuit of the Yankee troopers. When their leading section was knocked over by the Northerners' fire, they extended right and left, and thundered down on Infantry and guns in position, killed and wounded one hundred and fifty with sword and pistol, chased them for miles, and brought back six hundred prisoners and a complete section of Artillery. Their own losses were some twenty-six killed and wounded. Comment is needless. What has been done can be done again.

## *EARLY CAVALRY BARRACKS IN GREAT BRITAIN*

BY C. R. B. BARRETT.

A BRIEF account of the early Cavalry barracks in England and Scotland may perhaps not be without interest to the readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL. It is, however, to barracks for the Regular Cavalry alone that the writer proposes to limit his inquiries.

To all intents and purposes barracks for Cavalry were non-existent prior to the year 1792.

True, it is stated that Queen Anne built some at Kensington in 1702, or thereabouts.

Certainly barracks for Cavalry existed at Kensington in 1727, if the Parliamentary reports are to be credited; as in a return dated July 1, 1805, the fact is stated.

When it is remembered that Kensington Palace was a favourite royal residence, and that escort duty was far greater in those days than in these, the early existence of the Kensington Cavalry Barracks may well be credited.

Plans and drawings of early barracks are, however, very scarce. The earliest plan the writer has found is here given, and shows the arrangement of some barracks at Colchester. It is, however, most improbable that these were intended to be occupied by Cavalry, internal evidence pointing to their being used by Artillery and Infantry.


At Hampton Court the earliest barracks were in buildings adapted from an existing portion of Wolsey's old palace. It is not, however, known when or by whom Cavalry were first established there. Possibly the Hampton Court Barracks may go back as far as the reign of William III.

The old Hampton Court Barracks in 1796 would appear to have accommodated 160 men.

It was not until the year 1792-3 that the barrack establishment took shape. Prior to that date, whatever barracks existed were in the charge

of the Ordnance Department. The Master-General of Ordnance presided over a board who were all men of repute and also in many cases of Parliamentary experience. An engineer officer was also attached and in addition there were civil officials who were men effective as to their responsible duties.

In 1792-3, however, a most extraordinary condition of affairs arose. A military department was created, not only without Parliamentary sanction, but absolutely independent thereof. Over this, however, the Secretary at War held, or was supposed to hold, control. By a letter of service in June, 1792, a Barrackmaster-General's Office was



#### COLCHESTER.

Plan of Colchester Old and New Barracks; from 'Stowe, 484,' British Museum. This plan is reduced and comes from a manuscript Army List 'Return of His Majesty's Forces, June 2, 1762.' It is on a card which is inserted into the little volume, and dated.

instituted, the first Barrackmaster-General being a Colonel (afterwards General) Oliver De Lancey.

Armed with his certainly unconstitutional authority, Colonel De Lancey proceeded to acquire land, either by purchase or lease, upon which he immediately began to build barracks.

He had entered the army in 1766, had served in the 14th and 17th Light Dragoons, and was in 1792 the Deputy Adjutant-General. What his special qualifications for the post of Barrackmaster-General were is not apparent, as he had neither had experience in land, building, stores, or the handling of immense sums of money. That the accounts in consequence got into a most unsatisfactory state is not to be wondered at. But on this point we shall write hereafter.

By July 20, 1794, the only Cavalry barracks for Regular troops which were actually built and occupied were seven in number: Hounslow (270 men), Coventry (162), Manchester (324), Sheffield (162), Nottingham (162), Birmingham (162), and Norwich (216).

Eighteen more were in progress, namely, at Ipswich, Canterbury, Deal, Southampton, Wareham, Weymouth, Dorchester, Bridport, Exeter, Totnes, Modbury, Barnstaple, Trowbridge, Northampton, York, Edinburgh (Piershill), Perth, and Hamilton. These were each for one troop of fifty-four men, except Ipswich, Dorchester, Perth, and Hamilton (three troops each), Canterbury, and York (four troops each), and Edinburgh (six troops). Twenty-three more were ordered, but not yet

Upon the other side of the card is written the following explanation of the plan :—  
' Colchester Barracks were constructed for the following number of officers and men.'

Description					Field Officers	Captains, Subalterns, and Staff	Sergeant-Majors and Quartermasters	Non-Commissioned and Privates
Old Barracks.	Commanding Officer	{ EAST . . .			2			
		{ WEST . . .			2			
	Officers . . .	{ EAST . . .			3	21		
		{ WEST . . .			3	21		
	Letter A . . . . .					4	4	400
	" B . . . . .					4	4	400
	" C . . . . .					4	4	400
New Barracks.	" D . . . . .					4	4	400
	" E . . . . .					4	4	400
	" F . . . . .					4	4	400
	Letter A . . . . .				1	13		
	Officers { B . . . . .				2	34		
		{ C . . . . .			1	13		
	Letter A . . . . .					4		360
	" B . . . . .					4	4	1,080
	" C . . . . .					4	4	1,080
	" D . . . . .					4	4	360
	" E . . . . .					4	4	224
	" F . . . . .					4	7	336
Total . . . . .					14	130	47	5,840

The plan and explanation are both curious. Though probably not a Cavalry Barracks, the plan is quite worth insertion here, being so very early.

begun, at Wells, Taunton, Christchurch, Arundel, Eastbourne, Hastings, Hythe, Chelmsford, Saxmundham, Cromer, Lynn, Beverley, Dumfries, and Dunbar (one troop each); Bristol, Lincoln, and Bright-helmstone (Brighton) (three troops each); Winchester (four troops); Shrewsbury, Gloucester, and Leicester (size not yet determined); finally temporary barracks had been erected at Harlow Bush for 330 men, and at Windsor for 150.

We have not counted or mentioned the temporary barracks intended for Fencible Cavalry.

Here was certainly no lack of zeal, but of the discretion of the Barrackmaster-General there must be considerable doubt. The expenditure on this enormous amount of building came, when it was paid, out of what were termed the 'extraordinaries' of the Army, and as such did not come before the House of Commons until huge sums had been spent on account, and the credit of the Crown pledged to the various contractors employed in building. Suddenly in 1793 an independent member, without waiting for the vote of supply, submitted a resolution to the House against the building of barracks as unconstitutional. Fox



KENSINGTON (south view),

and Grey both supported the resolution—Fox on the ground that there was 'as much reason to be afraid of barracks now as in the year 1740. Was there, then, more cause for jealousy of a standing army, when we were menaced from abroad and dreaded the invasion of a pretender to the throne?' Yet when barrack-building had been proposed in the days of Walpole's last administration, 1721-1742, Pulteney, one of his supporters, and Pelham, who was in opposition, both spoke strongly against the scheme.

They had held it to be 'unconstitutional and inimical to the rights of the people.' They concluded that the mixing of soldiers and civilians (in billets or quarters as hitherto) was 'the best guarantee of security for the Constitution, as against the danger of standing armies.' In their contention according to their light they were correct.

They denied the truth of the statement that barrack-building was



acceptable to all the country. There were many places where barracks would be held not as a benefit but as a grievance. Depreciation of property, among other things, was cited. Publicans perhaps might be glad to be relieved, but that proved nothing, and even if all were of the same opinion, they ought not to be permitted to 'sell their permanent security for a temporary convenience.'

Pitt spoke strongly in favour of barrack-building. He argued that the circumstances of the country made barrack-building more necessary than formerly, and had been adopted as circumstances required. He was not to be deterred by any fear of innovation where the safety of the country was concerned. But it was not an innovation. The principle was so little new that in all places where troops were in general stationed 'barracks had been long since erected.' This must, however, refer to Infantry and Artillery barracks only.<sup>1</sup> He concluded by saying that troops were needed for good reasons in some manufacturing towns owing to the spirit manifested there: that it was better for troops to be in barracks than distributed among people where 'jealousy might rankle



KENSINGTON (north view).

into hatred and produce tumult and disorder.' Lastly, that having troops in barracks would operate against the 'seduction of the army by certain persons who considered the army as the chief obstruction to their designs.' He might also have added that there were grave risks attached to the collection of a small scattered force when called upon to turn out to repress civil disorder; but this point—and it was a strong one—escaped him. The resolution was negatived without a division.

Meanwhile, the spending of public money was proceeding in the most reckless manner. It was not until 1795 that General De Lancey presented the accounts for 1792-3, and to June 24, 1794, to the Secretary at War. The Secretary at War at once surcharged him with all the

<sup>1</sup> Barracks existed for Infantry in the Savoy early in the eighteenth century (*vide Commission Books*, W.O., 25).

money (£48,661) which had been spent on barracks in 1792, through the agency of the commanding officers of Cavalry.

By 1796 it was stated that £10,000,000 had been spent on barrack-building under the control of General De Lancey, but this was a most exaggerated estimate—a guess, in fact, since nobody actually knew how much money had been expended.

In April of that year General Smith moved in the Commons: 'To refer to a committee to examine into the expenditure of public money' on this head. Windham opposed the motion, stating that he had investigated the matter, and that he was assured that in the barrack-building there had been both economy and good management! Fox supported the motion. It was, he said, constitutionally wrong; money could not be raised without the consent of Parliament. This had been done. It was monstrous for money thus to be spent, and after the expense had been incurred to send in the bill without a warrant. If



WEYMOUTH (Stables).

such things were permissible the Constitution was 'a farce and a mockery.'

Fox also taunted Windham with having pledged the honour of the Barrackmaster-General, that in building barracks there had been both 'propriety and economy.' It was, he continued, not the most honourable 'method of accounting' to pledge a man's honour that all is right. 'I do not dispute the honour of the Barrackmaster-General, but where has all this money gone?'—thus Mr. Fox.

The Barrackmaster-General made a kind of explanation of his position when at length called upon so to do. But he took refuge in the fact that he was appointed by a Royal Warrant issued in 1793. He had been appointed Superintendent-General of Barracks and all pertaining thereto under the immediate direction of the War Office. He was at the time D.A.G., and retained that post also. His



original salary was £1 10s. per diem and actual out-of-pocket travelling expenses. The £10,000,000 was later shown to be an excessive estimate, £9,000,000 being the amount expended by November, 1804, when De Lancey resigned. He had drawn for his own use £135,128 13s. 8d. The salaries and extra pay of his officers in 1796 amounted to £9,524 17s. 2d.

As a 'Contingent Office Expense' amounting to £8,000 appeared a 'personal residence bought and furnished.' This house he lit and warmed at the public expense.

In eight years his travelling expenses amounted to £6,032, and there were no vouchers. His salary had gradually increased to £8 per day, and on retirement he received a pension of £6 per day.

It worked out that from 1796 to 1804 the establishment charges had increased from £27,999 16s. 6d. to £74,000, and barrackmasters were appointed at from 5s.

per diem in the case of barracks for one troop to 10s. per diem where two or more were housed. Also there were numerous barrackmasters appointed to barracks which were at the date of ap-



WEYMOUTH (Officers' Quarters).

pointment non-existent. Another little source of revenue which the happy holder of this most lucrative office possessed was this:—

Under 'contingencies' in the first account rendered (1795) and before any mention of 'disallowances' had been suggested, was a charge of £1 1s. per cent. to 'cover disallowances on all expenditure,' which amounted finally to £88,943. He certainly took a liberal view of the legitimate rights and privileges of his office.

Yet after all it was the old story: The army wanted money spent on it. As long as the Board of Ordnance controlled the barracks the money could not be spent, because it could not be obtained. Hence the power of the Commander-in-Chief was let in by setting the Board of Ordnance aside. No Board of Ordnance would have dared to have built over two hundred barracks for 17,000 Cavalry and 146,000 Infantry



in violation of the feeling so strongly expressed in Parliament against barrack-building; and, moreover, without the consent of Parliament. Another extraordinary feature of the case is that at the time the Secretary at War was not a Cabinet Minister.

As a way out of the hopeless muddle, all barrack affairs were transferred to the Treasury, 'as being more civil than military.' The Barrackmaster-General's Department was abolished, and the Principal Assistant Barrackmaster-General was dismissed. A Board of Commissioners, three in number, one being an officer of Engineers, was substituted, and a secretary was allowed.

The Board was abolished in 1817, and a Comptroller of the Barrack Department managed the business until 1822.

The barracks were then handed over to the Ordnance Department, and put under the Secretary at War until 1856.

But it was, of course, needful that a scapegoat should be found. In England somebody always has to be hanged on similar occasions. It is not surprising to read that one of the subordinates, a certain Alexander Davidson, was put upon his trial for misappropriation, taking false commissions, etc., etc., and was duly found guilty. We forget the sentence, which hardly matters.

The Royal Warrant dated from St. James's, May 1, 1793, is a very long document—too long to quote in its entirety.

But it is most interesting, as showing the origin of nearly all the barrack rules still existing as regards furniture, utensils, etc.

A few extracts may well be given here.

#### RULES FOR BARRACK ROOMS, MAY 1, 1793.

Rooms, staircases, galleries, bed, bedding, and utensils are ordered to be kept sweet and clean.

Non-commissioned officers and soldiers are forbidden to use their sheets for table linen, towels, etc. Neither are they to use their blankets for ironing; nor are they to use any utensil for any other purpose than that for which it was originally intended.

Coals are not to be wetted on the floors of boarded rooms. Early barracks, by the way, mostly had earthen floors.

No alterations were to be made in the barrack rooms, such as removing bedsteads or 'nailing posts to them or otherwise, whereby they


may be injured or loosened in their joints, or by fixing up shelves, racks, hooks, boards, or driving nails in the walls whereby the plastering may be destroyed.'

The Commanding Officer is to appoint a subaltern daily to inspect each room. The use of each room is to be painted on the door.

The Barrackmaster was to visit the rooms at seasonable hours, to report any alteration to the Superintendent-General, who in turn reported it to the Secretary at War.

A charming regulation this.

The eighth paragraph in this warrant states that on no pretence were women or children to 'inhabit or lie within' any barrack without previous notice being given by them in writing to the Superintendent-General, and were only to be allowed then if they neither caused inconvenience or crowding. But one or more married women were to be resident 'to promote cleanliness' as an 'occasional indulgence.' But if any mischief or damage arises from such indulgence the commanding officer is, on the report of the Superintendent-General, to displace such women.



Dogs are forbidden to be kept in any room in any barrack.

The allowances of coals and candles are set out with great minuteness.

The 'schedule of furniture and utensils' includes everything that would be needed for the use of the men, who had to cook their own food, it would appear, as each room has its quota of such things as 'iron pots, wooden lids, pothooks, trivets, wooden ladles, iron flesh forks, frying pans, gridirons, large bowls or platters, small bowls or porringers, etc., etc.'

In 1795 a few more things were added, such as 'a tin can for beer, a large earthen pan for meat, a tray for carrying coals, drinking horns, a wooden urinal, and a mop, and a round towel.'

An entry about beer is amusing. Efficient non-commissioned

officers and men actually in barracks are 'allowed to receive small beer, not exceeding the quantity they were entitled to from their landlords in quarters, viz., five pints each man per diem.'

**PIERSHILL.** The ground or 'stance' of the barrack was supposed to consist of between eight and nine acres (Scots); and was situated in the parish of South Leith, in the county of Edinburgh. It was purchased from the trustees of the late James Veitch, of Ellcock, for £1560 sterling, which, with interest to March 12, 1794, amounted to £1567 9s. 6d. The land was charged with a ground rent or feu duty, payable to the Earl of Moray, as Lord or Superior, of 11s. 1 $\frac{6}{12}$ d. There was also a 'quota' due towards the stipend of the Minister of Leith of £2 18s. 8 $\frac{10}{12}$ d., and another to the Minister of Lesswade of 7s. 6d., in all a total of £3 9s. 4 $\frac{4}{12}$ d.

An old Scots acre=6104.128 square yards. A small piece of ground was added in 1801, rather less than an acre, and was bought



NORWICH.

from a Mr. William Simpson for £100 sterling. These barracks are now to be rebuilt. Piershill Barracks were built to hold three field officers, four captains, four subalterns, six

quartermasters, three hundred and forty-four N.C.O.'s and men, three hundred and seventy-six horses, and thirty-six sick. The buildings were of stone and lime.

**GLASGOW.** Built in 1794. The site was a piece of ground of 16,055 square yards; the ground rent for a time being £37 per annum. Ultimately the land was enfranchised for £1,617 18s. 2d. Another lot of 4934 square yards, situated behind the original patch, was purchased in 1802 for £1,233 10s. In 1821 the buildings were of stone and lime. The accommodation is not stated.

**HAMILTON.** Built in 1794 on a piece of land 10 acres, 3 roods, 24 falls (Scots), and  $\frac{9}{10}$  of a fall (Scots measure). There was also a strip surrounding it of 1 rood and 8 $\frac{8}{10}$  falls, as an area or foundation of a road or passage and basis of the wall erected to enclose the barracks. The land was leased from the magistrates and councillors of Hamilton, with the consent of the Duke of Hamilton. The payment amounted to



£67 5s. 3d., as ground rent or feu duty at the rate of 9d. per fall, with an extra £67 5s. 3d. every thirteenth year from Martinmas, 1795, when the barracks were completed. The buildings were of stone and lime, and were designed to accommodate two field officers, three captains, nine subalterns, three quartermasters, one hundred and seventy-two N.C.O.'s and men, two hundred and two horses, and twenty-one sick.

DUNBAR. These barracks were originally designed to stand on a site of about ten acres, situated west of Belhaven. The land belonged partly to the town of Dunbar and partly to the Earl of Lauderdale. The inhabitants objected most strongly to their erection. The land was really worth about £8 per acre, and it was urged that half a mile away a more suitable site could be obtained for £5 per acre. The barracks were completed August 23, 1803. They were designed for



CROYDON.

two field officers, five captains, eleven subalterns, four quartermasters, three hundred and four N.C.O.'s and men, and three hundred and twenty horses.


HADDINGTON. These barracks were completed on August 23, 1803, and were built on three contiguous pieces of ground, purchased from Messrs. Dudgeon, Spears and Sawers. The barracks accommodated two field officers, five captains, eleven subalterns, four quartermasters, three hundred and four N.C.O.'s and men, and three hundred and twenty horses. The buildings were of stone and lime.

PERTH. The ground selected belonged to a Mr. Anderson. His valuer estimated its worth at £800 per acre. The Town of Perth had already granted the main site, and Anderson's patch was only one and a half acres, but joined the main ground. Eventually he received payment at the rate of five hundred guineas per Scottish acre. The barracks were built of soft freestone, and were opened in 1795. They accommodated two field officers, three captains, nine subalterns, three

quartermasters, one hundred and seventy-two N.C.O.'s and men, one hundred and eighty-eight horses, and twenty-one sick.

COLCHESTER. The site was a piece of ground 8 acres 1 rood and 21 poles, and was thus acquired : A payment of £63 in cash was made, and the ground was leased for twenty-one years, at a rental, tithe free, of £41 18s. The land belonged to the Master of Mary Magdalen's Hospital, in Colchester, and the poor of the said parish. The agreement mentions 'The said land on which the horse barracks have been lately built,' and is dated April 9, 1799. On July 1, 1805, Colchester Cavalry Barracks would accommodate three field officers, six captains, fourteen subalterns, five quartermasters, four hundred and fifty-two N.C.O.'s and men, and four hundred and fifty horses.

COVENTRY. These barracks date from 1792, when a building which had been erected long before and occupied as an inn was purchased for



CROYDON.

conversion. It had brick walls and a timber roof which was covered with slates. The name of the person employed to adapt the old inn was one John Williamson.

NORWICH. These barracks were built of brick and slate, and are much the same in general appearance as when first erected in 1793-4. From an old print we give one illustration, and the 'Queen's Bays Medal,' a quaint corroboration, shows evidently what the barracks were like when first planned and erected in 1793. The builder was a certain John Rooks.


The Weymouth Barracks, of which some portions still remain, stand on a piece of ground adjoining the Dorchester road, and about twenty minutes' sharp walk from what used to be the royal rooms on the sea-front in the days of George III. These barracks were begun in August, 1797, were ready for troops in August, 1798, and were finally finished in

September, 1798. In 1804-5-6, however, large additions were made to them. The total cost of the Weymouth Cavalry Barracks was £59,089 11s. The builder was Alexander Copland, who, perhaps, built more barracks than any man before or since.

Among other places, he did the work at Windsor and Eastbourne for £57,700 and £5,216 18s. 11d. respectively, in 1797-8 and 1800-2.

The Croydon Cavalry Barracks were built by Thomas Tomlins and finished in 1794. They cost £16,188 5s. 9½d. The illustrations here given date from 1825, and come from the Percival Collection.

Brighton Cavalry Barracks were built by Thomas Tomlins, at a cost of £49,574 9s. 8d. They were completed by June, 1795. Apparently in the case of these barracks there was what was then a considerable



#### CANTERBURY. ST. GREGORY'S CAVALRY BARRACKS.

1. Barracks for 288 men.
2. Cooking kitchen.
3. Stabling for 366 horses with 42 masters and 3 regimental store-rooms over them.
4. Blacksmith's forge and pent-house.
5. Cleaning-room.
6. Forage-room.
7. Lavatory.
8. Offices.
9. Dung-pit.
10. Pond.

luxury—for it is specially mentioned that they were 'built of brick, with wooden floors and a slated roof.'

Canterbury Cavalry Barracks were rather curiously developed. The first barrack was known as St. Gregory's. It, as the plan shows, adjoined some ground which was occupied by the Ordnance Department and which was known as the Ruttington Lane Stabling.

Next to this was a huge Infantry barrack, and next to that an Artillery barrack.


Then the new King's Cavalry Barracks were erected—and still stand.

The St. Gregory's Barracks were then disused.

The builder of the Canterbury Barracks was William Baldock, their cost amounted to £31,175 3s., in 1798, but the accounts of the final building in 1808 are not forthcoming. The two plans here given show how the buildings were arranged.

Barnstaple Cavalry Barracks were built by another very much employed builder—John Scobell. He also erected Modbury Barracks, among others. Modbury Barracks cost only £8,086 17s. 3d., and were finished in 1794.

The Hounslow Cavalry Barracks were built by no less than fourteen different builders. Apparently portions of the work were taken up by



#### CANTERBURY.

##### KING'S CAVALRY BARRACKS, 1808.

1. Officers' quarters for 2 field officers, 4 captains, 10 subalterns, staff and mess rooms; 2. stabling for 133 horses, and barracks for 2 quartermasters, 12 sergeants, 132 privates, over them, and store-rooms; 3. stabling for 133 horses, and barracks for 3 quartermasters, 2 sergeants, 128 privates, over them store-rooms; 4. cooking kitchen; 5. magazine; 6. riding school; 7. forage barn; 8. granary; 9. coal yard; 10. hospital stable for 24 horses; 11. blacksmith's forge; 12. armourer's, tailor's and saddler's shops; 13. shed for 40 carriages; 14. shed for 34 carriages, with blacksmith's and wheelwright's shops; 15. guard-house; 16. canteen; 17. granary; 18. forage barn, engine-house, carpenter's and bricklayer's shops; 19. washhouse; 20. hospital for 36 patients; 21. dung-pits.

tender. In a few cases this was done, but mostly the barracks were built by one man.

Manchester Cavalry Barracks were built by Charles McNevin, and were rebuilt for privates in 1829, and for officers in 1841; Nottingham by William Stretton; Birmingham by Charles Glover; Sheffield by Joseph Badger and Sons; and Deal by George Leith.

The barracks at Trowbridge were erected in 1794, and cost £8,989 13s. 4d., while those at Totnes, built in the same year, were rather cheaper—£8,110 13s. 8d.

The Windsor Barracks, built of brick, were not erected until 1800.



The new Hampton Court Barracks were put up in 1812.

The barracks in Hyde Park date from 1797, but have been rebuilt. Sheffield Cavalry Barracks were finished in 1794. They were built of brick and stone.

Northampton Cavalry Barracks date from 1797. They were built of stone, with timber roofs, covered with slates.

Those at Nottingham were of brick, with a timber roof and slates.

Those at Exeter date from 1794-5 and were brick-built and slate-roofed.

But even after all these barracks were built you frequently find that there was not sufficient accommodation therein.

Prior to 1795 regiments were invariably scattered by troops and half-troops.

However, by October in that year after return from sundry camps we find the Cavalry gradually settling down into barracks. The 1st Dragoon Guards had been at Romford, and it was proposed to put them into the new Romford Barracks.

The 2nd Dragoons had been quartered at Croydon, but were marched thence to Canterbury Barracks. The 11th Light Dragoons had been at Hounslow, but were marched to Croydon to occupy the new barracks there. At Croydon they shared the barracks with the 30th Light Dragoons, who marched thither from Bristol, and with the 32nd Light Dragoons, who had been camping at Lexden, near Colchester.

That Pitt was quite correct in his statement that barrack-building was no novelty, at any rate, that the proposal was not novel, the following paper which has at the last moment come to hand is worth reproduction :—

List of barracks intended to be built. March 3, 1760.

	Men.	Horses.	Amount.
Hythe . . . .	58	63	£6615
Arundel . . . .	58	63	£6615
Hastings . . . .	58	63	£6615
Windsor . . . .	58	63	£6615
Leicester . . . .	58	63	£6615

£33,075

But no barracks were erected at any of these spots till 1792-1804.



The writer regrets that more information and a greater number of details are not available, but the fact is that there has been such a wholesale destruction of old plans and maps in the past that it is only by good luck and perhaps, too, through diligent search that even this small amount of material here given has been collected.

Still, it is presumably of interest to Cavalry officers to know when and how they came to be quartered in barracks, why it had been so long opposed, and of the events which occurred when barracks were erected under the extraordinary circumstances here narrated.

The existing statutory powers for the acquisition of barrack sites at the time that the new office of Barrackmaster-general was created by Royal Warrant were somewhat remarkable. It may therefore be as well to mention them here in brief. It will be at once apparent how the newly-created official was intended to have an almost unchecked authority to carry out the scheme.

Hitherto they had been limited to war time only, in England and Scotland, and are to be found in 38 George III. cap. 27. At this date a French invasion was expected. These powers expired when the Peace of Amiens was signed. They were renewed when war broke out (43 George III. cap. 55) and continued in force until 1814.

By them any general officer could survey and mark out any piece of ground for public service, and could treat with the owner for possession during such time as the exigency of public service required. If the officer and the owner failed to agree a jury assessed the compensation, but this could not take place until the enemy had either actually landed or was endeavouring to do so. In fact, even then the land could not be taken from the owner unless its necessity was first certified for by the Lord Lieutenant of the county or two Deputy Lieutenants. Evidently then the land was only to be taken for temporary occupation. Hence the Barrackmaster-General could not plead that he had acquired sites legally. It was also found that in illegally acquiring sites he had had them conveyed to himself and his successors, which was manifestly absurd. Hence, after the investigation, an Act was passed (43 George III. cap. 63) declaring the Barrackmaster-General to be a quasi-corporation, and that all lands, etc., acquired were so acquired by the Barrackmaster-General for the time being, and held in trust for his Majesty, his heirs, and his successors.



THE ROYAL HORSE GUARDS.

1828.

(See p. 155).



THE FALSE DAWN.

## THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY.

BY PERCY CROSS STANDING.

### I. A SURVIVOR.—COLONEL JOHN S. MOSBY.<sup>1</sup>

THE octogenarian Colonel John S. Mosby is one of the rapidly-diminishing band of survivors among leading great fighters in the American Civil War. He was, in the judgment of numerous critics and authorities on the opposing side, the most formidable partisan leader of Cavalry in the service of the Confederate States in that fratricidal struggle. Colonel Mosby has been so good as to furnish the writer with certain facts concerning his participation in the defence of the Southern Confederacy which have not previously been published. He is himself a writer of grace and charm, having added to the immense literature of the Civil War a fascinating volume entitled, 'With Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign.' General J. E. B. Stuart was the brilliant and chivalrous commander of the mounted troops of the Confederate 'Army of Northern Virginia,' which met its Waterloo on the field of Gettysburg in 1863. It has been generally accepted that Gettysburg was lost on account of the absence of Stuart's Cavalry from the Confederate Army, engaged in an elaborate raid upon the enemy's lines of communication. Colonel Mosby, however, characterises this as 'the Gettysburg legend,' and forcibly adds: 'As I brought the information that induced General Stuart to ask permission to cross the Potomac in rear of the enemy, and was chosen to command the advance of his column, I think I have a right, as an actor in the great tragedy, to be heard.' Stonewall Jackson had been killed a few weeks previously, and Lee's defeat by Meade at Gettysburg was decisive of the fate of the Southern cause.

John S. Mosby first entered the Civil War as a private soldier, but even in that humble capacity his merits were recognised by the Confederate Generalissimo in an Order of the Day. Promotion speedily followed, and the sequel to one of his finest feats of daring, in conducting a raid far within the enemy's lines, was this communication from General Lee to Jefferson Davis, the Confederate President: 'Mr. President,—You will, I know, be gratified to learn by the enclosed despatch

<sup>1</sup> Based on facts communicated to the author by Colonel Mosby himself.

that the appointment conferred a few days since on Captain Mosby was not unworthily bestowed. The point where he struck the enemy is north of Fairfax Courthouse, near the Potomac, and far within the lines of the enemy. I wish I could receive his appointment as Major, or some official notification of it, that I might announce it to him.—R. E. Lee, General.' The 'enclosed despatch' was in these flattering terms: 'Captain,—Your telegram announcing your brilliant achievement near Chantilly was duly received and forwarded to General Lee. He exclaimed upon reading it: "Hurrah for Mosby! I wish I had a hundred like him." Heartily wishing you continued success, J. E. B. Stuart, Major-General Commanding.'

And what *was* the 'brilliant achievement' so brilliantly eulogised by Generals Lee and Stuart? I have thought it well to relate it in the veteran Mosby's own picturesque phraseology: 'It was on March 7, 1863, that I started from Aldie with twenty-nine men. It was pitch-dark before we got near the enemy's Cavalry pickets at Chantilly. Here a good point was won, for once inside the Union lines we would be mistaken for their own men. We passed along close by the camp-fires, but the sentinels took us for a scouting party of their own Cavalry. I had no reputation to lose by failure, but much to gain by success. I remembered, too, the motto that Ixion in Heaven wrote in Minerva's album—"Adventures are to the adventurous." There were a few guards about, but they did not suspect us until they saw a pistol pointed at them. Of course, they surrendered. Some even refused to believe we were Confederates after we told them who we were. Joe Nelson rode up to me with a prisoner who said he belonged to the guard at General Stoughton's Headquarters, and with a party of five or six men I immediately went there. An upper window was raised and a voice called out, "Who is there?" The answer was, "We have a despatch for General Stoughton." An officer (Lieut. Prentiss) came to the front door to get it. I caught hold of his shirt and whispered my name in his ear, and told him to lead me to the General's room. Resistance was useless, and he did so. A light was struck, and before us lay the sleeping General. He quickly raised up in bed and asked what this meant? I said, "General, get up—dress quick—you are a prisoner." "What!" exclaimed the indignant General. "My name is Mosby. Stuart's Cavalry are in possession of the place, and Jackson holds Centreville." "Is Fitzhugh Lee here?" "Yes."

"Then take me to him—we were classmates." "Very well, but dress quick." My motive in deceiving him as to the amount of our force was to deprive him of all hope of rescue. I turned over my prisoners to Stuart at Culpeper Court House. He was as much delighted by what I had done as I was, and published a General Order announcing it to the Cavalry, in which he said it was a feat "unparalleled in the war".

This incident evoked from President Lincoln one of the best of the numerous *mots* attributed to him. With General Stoughton had been captured a number of horses. When Mr. Lincoln heard the news he quaintly remarked, '*Well, there won't be any difficulty in making another General, but how am I to replace those horses?*'

Passing over the campaigns of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, we come to that of 1864, when the blood-drenched country was crying out for peace. Colonel Mosby and his dwindling band of guerilla horsemen ('My command never numbered more than two or three hundred men,' he says in a letter to the present writer) encountered the army of General Phil Sheridan, then operating in and direfully devastating the rich and beautiful Valley of the Shenandoah. As illustrating the drastic methods employed by anti-partisan operators in this war of retaliations and reprisals, I extract the following from General Grant's orders to Sheridan at Winchester, Va.: 'If you can possibly spare a division of Cavalry, send them through Loudoun County to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes, and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms. *In this way you will get rid of many of Mosby's men.* All male citizens under fifty can fitly be held as prisoners of war, not citizen prisoners. If not already soldiers, they will be made so directly the Rebel Army gets hold of them. Give the enemy no rest. Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste.'

It is matter of familiar history that the ill-starred Valley *did* remain a barren waste, but meanwhile the stories of Mosby's adventurous daring are too numerous for quotation. Once he narrowly missed capturing General Grant himself, and on another occasion he came so close to Washington during one of his incursions—actually within sight of the Capitol—that he cut off a lock of his hair and asked a passer-by to give it to Mr. Lincoln with his compliments (but 'the

exchange was never effected'). Wrote one of the Northern Generals: 'Mosby is the devil. There will be no peace till he is killed.' Eventually a price was set on his head, but he vigorously and successfully defended himself from the charge of having followed any but 'regular' methods of irregular warfare. And it is significant of General Lee's high opinion of him that after the capitulation of the Army of Northern Virginia—April, 1865—Colonel Mosby was placed in command of what remained of the Forces of the Confederacy until the final laying-down of arms, comporting himself with dignity and fortitude in what must have been a trying position. Many years afterwards, during Mr. Roosevelt's time as President, the veteran lived to hold office in the United States Department of Justice at Washington.

In his Memoirs, General Phil Sheridan speaks of Mosby's whirlwind operations in the Shenandoah Valley. He makes no complaint as to the Colonel's methods of conducting warlike operations, but, on the contrary, says, 'He was the most formidable partisan I met in the war'—and this although Sheridan had encountered both Forrest and the celebrated John H. Morgan. Thus commented President Grant after the sword had been finally sheathed: 'Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical fatigue. He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded successfully a detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command.'

In his admirable biography of Stonewall Jackson, the late Colonel Henderson has said concerning the work of Mosby and his coadjutors: 'These operations are brilliant examples of the great strategical value of a Cavalry which is perfectly independent of the foot-soldier, and which at the same time is in the highest degree mobile. Those who have never had to deal with the communications of an army may be unable to realise the effect that may be, and often is, produced by such a force; but no one with the least practical experience of the responsibilities which devolve upon a Commander-in-Chief will venture to abate one jot from the enormous strategical value assigned to it by American soldiers. The horseman of the American Civil War is the model of the efficient Cavalryman.'



## II. JOHN MORGAN AND HIS 'ROUGH RIDERS.'

THERE are lessons innumerable for the Cavalry officer of to-day in the meteoric career of General John H. Morgan, of the Confederate States service, who in the American Civil War performed feats of prodigious valour and romantic daring at the head of his corps of irregular horsemen known as 'Morgan's Rough Riders.' These troopers were undoubtedly the best-mounted in the Confederate service, every one of their splendid mounts being a thoroughbred Kentucky 'blue-grass' animal. And the men who bestrode them matched them, from Morgan's two 'brigadiers,' Colonel Basil Duke and Colonel Adam Johnson, to the humblest bugler in the command.

Morgan's first great feat of arms was performed in the summer of 1862. Entering the State of Kentucky at the head of nine hundred mounted men, he emerged at the close of this his first important 'raid' with no fewer than 2000, all of them well equipped and finely mounted. In the whole operation he did not lose more than a hundred men, while in prisoners alone he took nearly 1200. Nevertheless, after Morgan's return into Tennessee Kentucky reverted to the Federal power, and in June 1863, General Morgan was urgently 'sent for' by General Bragg, commanding-in-chief the Confederate 'Army of the West.'

Bragg was confronted in force by the Federal 'Army of the Cumberland,' under Rosecrans. He wanted Morgan to divert attention, and, incidentally, to inflict damage, by means of a fresh foray—but he did *not* want the intrepid Cavalryman to penetrate the enemy's lines farther than the city of Louisville, Kentucky. In fact, Bragg positively forbade a crossing of the Ohio River. Now this did not suit John Morgan at all. He told his second in command of his fixed determination to exceed orders by crossing the great river into Ohio, and on July 2 the raiders started off—a perfectly equipped array of 2460 horsemen, with two three-inch Parrott guns and two howitzers. They crossed the Cumberland River in fine style, brushing aside with heavy loss a determined attempt to dispute the ford. The enterprise had begun.

At dawn on July 3, 1863, the Rough Riders approached Columbia, stormed it in a wild charge, and made for the Green River. Meanwhile



the Federal authorities had been telegraphing all over the threatened States, and even as they marched in the night the raiders could hear the noise of the axes felling timber to obstruct their onward progress. It was now July 4 ('Independence Day'), and finding 400 Infantry under Colonel Moore blocking his way at Green River, Morgan sent in to demand his 'unconditional surrender.' The colonel had the bad taste not merely to decline to accede to this cool proposition, but to put up so good a fight when Morgan's men proceeded to rush his stockade that ninety of the assailants were placed *hors de combat* inside a quarter of an hour. So the Confederate leader, not relishing this at all, left the enemy where he was and crossed the stream lower down, his next objective being the thriving town of Lebanon. This place was garrisoned by the 20th Kentucky Regiment; but Morgan, hearing that this force was by way of being strengthened from outside, attacked at once and with the utmost fury. This time his men carried the place, but not before they had lost another fifty killed and wounded—making 140 casualties in two engagements. At Lebanon fell Morgan's brother Tom, a promising young lieutenant in the 2nd Kentucky. It will be perceived that Kentucky men were fighting on both sides, as, indeed, they did throughout this war.

On sped the valiant and dreaded raiders, twenty-one out of every twenty-four hours in the saddle. 'Tapping the telegraph,' i.e. taking down the telegraph wires in order to mislead the enemy by means of false messages, was a favourite diversion with Morgan. This he did with the utmost success until the Federal authorities became too wary for the ruse to be longer successful. Louisville was already in a panic, since, of course, it could not be known there that Morgan intended merely to threaten and not raid the city. 'So widespread was the effect of the raid of these 2000 Rough Riders that in the States of Ohio and Indiana 120,000 Militiamen took the field against them, in addition to three brigades of United States Cavalry.' On the morning of July 8, or less than six days from the start of his enterprise, Morgan reached the Ohio. He had done more than everything that duty and General Bragg had commanded, for three States were utterly demoralised and dumbfounded at the boldness of his wonderful initiative. Not that 'magnificent' was the word applied to it by the Federal foe, for Morgan had to burn in order to render his raid a real devastation, and his men had to plunder in order to exist.

His followers proceeded to cross the Ohio at Brandenburg, with the timely assistance of two steamboats which they 'commandeered.' Suddenly, and while yet a portion of the raiders were on the Kentucky shore and others on the Indiana bank of the mighty river, a hostile gunboat appeared in the offing and commenced to shell the crossing. This was a critical moment indeed; but again John Morgan rose to the occasion. By skilled and masterly use of his four small guns he beat off the gunboat, and the crossing proceeded. Next he made for



Indianapolis, the capital of Indiana; but he swerved aside so as to leave that city on his left. A running fight went on continuously now, for all the countryside was in an uproar. At a place called Corydon some sixteen of the raiders bit the dust in a very pretty skirmish. Most of their 'blue-grass' horses were long since done for, and every available animal that had any pace in him was 'borrowed' and ridden to death.

He might even have captured the fine city of Cincinnati, for not only was it absolutely within his grasp and defenceless, but he

could have utilised any number of ferry steamers on the Ohio. Moreover, it certainly was not because his men as well as his horses were now falling out from sheer fatigue that the bold 'rebel' did *not* occupy the city. It was because, incredible though it may sound, he cherished an even bolder ambition yet!—nothing else than to press right on through Ohio and Pennsylvania, and join hands with the Confederate Generalissimo, R. E. Lee. But what would have been an absolutely unique feat of arms was arrested by the sombre news that reached Morgan at Piketon. The fortress of Vicksburg had fallen, the great battle of Gettysburg had been lost, and Lee was in full retreat. Obviously the only thing to do now was, if possible, to get back across the Ohio with the wreck of his jaded force.

This task proved, however, beyond even his superhuman powers of endurance. There was only one point at which they could recross the Ohio, and this was not reached until the night of July 18. By that time it was held in force by the enemy, supported by several gunboats which shelled the crossing. It is extraordinary that, with his men starving and almost helpless to sit their horses, Morgan managed to hold out another week. At the ford 125 dead and 700 prisoners were left, and when at last John Morgan gave up his sword to Colonel Way—whose own surrender he had, with characteristic audacity, demanded, but Way was not to be 'bluffed'—he had only 364 men with him. In twenty-four days the raiders had (a) ridden 1000 miles through hostile country, (b) won several battles and skirmishes, (c) taken hundreds of prisoners, (d) destroyed *ten million* dollars' worth of Federal property.

Well may the late Colonel Henderson have remarked, in his splendid 'Life of Stonewall Jackson,' that 'the horseman of the Civil War is the model of the efficient Cavalryman.'

There was an unkind suggestion at the North to hang or shoot Morgan for alleged dereliction of the rules of civilised war. But he escaped from prison and got back to the Confederate lines—to be shot dead while heroically leading a Cavalry brigade at the battle of Knoxville, on September 4, 1864. He had the supreme gift of leadership and of winning the confidence and love of those who followed him, *plus* his superlative powers as an exponent of the Cavalry arm and its uses in irregular warfare.

*SOME RAMBLING REMARKS ON THE WAR  
IN MANCHURIA, 1904-1905.*

By J. B. J.

WHAT most impressed the onlooker at the theatre of war was probably the spirit and behaviour of the Japanese soldier, and the question naturally arose in his mind: How has such an excellent soldier been evolved, and whence comes this order and method so noticeable in the war? The reply is to be found in the fact that the Emperor of Japan has in the eyes of his subjects a position unique amongst sovereigns. He is not only monarch *de jure*, but he is the apotheosis of the Japanese nation, if such a term may be used. He is at once the object of their loyalty and patriotism. The Emperor, in fact, is Japan. To die for him is to die for the country. Republicans and Socialists in Japan on the outbreak of the war could be counted on the fingers of one's hands, though it is to be feared that is no longer the case to-day. This feeling has been innate in the Japanese mind from ancient times, and up to the war had, if anything, grown stronger since, over thirty years before, the Emperor had reassumed his temporal power. This growth during that thirty years must be ascribed principally to the educational system of the Government schools, in addition to the teaching a child receives from his parents. In the schools loyalty to the Emperor and patriotism are instilled into the child's mind; he is taught that obedience and respect are always due to his parents and teachers, and that it is by the favour of his Emperor that he exists at all. When the Emperor drives through the city of Tokio to attend any great function, the school children—boys and girls—are invariably paraded to line the road as he passes. The cult of the national flag is evident everywhere, but aggressive flag-wagging is non-existent. It is this loyal and patriotic spirit that has been the real power that has been behind the Emperor and his statesmen in creating the army of Japan. With an army

imbued with such a spirit as this, it is not a difficult matter to discover the foundation of its efficiency; but there is at least one other important reason why they managed to make such careful preparations, why they were so methodical, and why the machinery of transport and supply, &c., works so smoothly. Briefly, it all comes from 'playing up to one another.' And how is this faculty for playing up to one another evolved? The answer is no easy one, and is especially difficult to put into a few words.

Japan's order of society for centuries has been communalism; which implies that the greater importance of the community is recognised in contradistinction to the individual, who is practically of no account. For example, in days gone by the eldest son, if his father were dead, ruled the family, and his word was law. He might be a fool, and the second son a genius, but the latter had to submit, and unless his family or the community agreed, he could strike out no line for himself; in other words, he must sink his individuality. His duty was to the family and community first, and himself last. Outlawed from his community, a man could find no home elsewhere, so dependent was he on the social environment of his birthplace. Can we not comprehend how easily such a social order lends itself to the foundation and maintenance of an efficient and well-disciplined army? In spite of the antagonism between communalism and individualism, genius will out at times, and so Japan has in the past produced some undoubtedly great men, and will produce many more, for the old order is rapidly passing away. Every day, with gathering strength, the individualism of the Western nations is permeating the communalism of Japan. During the war the old saying that a council of war does not fight was abrogated. It is very doubtful whether any serious movement of troops amounting to a division or more was ever made without a consultation, and in the writer's experience it was not necessarily the general who had the casting vote. In a war such as this, which one may term 'A deliberate war,' *i.e.* a war of the slow and gradual approach and retirement of opposing forces, a weighing of pros and cons in council was a possible and advisable course, but it was a course primarily resulting from the nation's communalism.

Perhaps therefore the foregoing remarks will explain why neither a Napoleon nor a Wellington arose throughout the campaign. Had a great leader arisen it is probable greater results would have been

obtained in the course of the battle and in pursuit. In the methodical mind there is too often a lack of initiative, more especially when the unforeseen occurs. It was perhaps in pursuit that the lack of initiative in subordinate commanders was most apparent, for though they had their enemy on the run and dispirited in front of them, their energy was restrained by their failing to cast aside for the time their accustomed systematic and orderly procedure. That the transport and supplies must be brought up to the appointed places at the appointed times, that the telegraph and telephone must be ever ready for use even with the leading troops, was a fixed idea in the minds of the subordinate leaders. Is it surprising that the defeated Russians had time to pull themselves together and preserve an orderly retreat, even when one takes into account the numerically inferior Japanese Cavalry? The first pitched battle of the war—that of the Yalu—was a case in point; otherwise it is difficult to account for the inertia of the Japanese Cavalry on that day. They may be described as having been mere onlookers, while the Infantry were pressing the enemy over and beyond the hills of Hamaton.

A numerically inferior body of Cavalry will take refuge in future in rifle tactics, and be loth to submit to the arbitrament of the sword. The Japanese Cavalry exemplified this, notwithstanding their training, which encourages the employment of the *arme blanche* every whit as much as ours. This, combined with the Cossack's lack of energy, dash, and suitable training, resulted in the scarcity of the occasions on which sword met sword or lance. To the writer's knowledge there were only two occasions where a hand-to-hand fight took place between bodies of a squadron or more in strength. The first was when the First Japanese Brigade was reconnoitring Wafangkou from Pulantien, during General Oku's advance north to Liao Yang. The force on each side was two squadrons. A valley through the centre of which ran the railway to Port Arthur was the scene. The single line of rails lay on an embankment not more than six feet high, built up to avoid floods in the rainy season. It seems that it was the intention of the Japanese commander to gain this shelter and open fire, but this was anticipated by his adversaries, who, arriving at the railway first, swept over it and charged. The Japanese were caught. Some drew their swords, some fired their carbines on horseback; but the lances carried all before them, and they were driven off into the hills. It is an interesting fact

that many Russians, instead of using the point, grasped the lances with both hands and used them like quarterstaves in the *mêlée*, after the shock. The Russian lance is much longer than ours—a disadvantage in the *mêlée*—and their men did not carry a sword in addition, as our lancers do. The second hand-to-hand fight occurred during the battle of Mukden, far to the Russians' rear, when a raiding party of Japanese, composed of two weak squadrons, charged three sotnias and two guns, driving off the former and capturing the latter. A short account of this is to be found in the official reports.

The weakness of the Russian Cavalry, the majority Cossack, lay in their inferior training and lack of energy. It is difficult to acquiesce in the late General Négrier's deductions. Every failure of the Russians is used as a peg on which to hang an argument against the sword and lance, but we have seen this form of argument before. He described Mischenko's raid as organised and conducted with equal energy and ability, and ascribed his failure to lack of bayonets and howitzers. It is to be feared that the want of success was due to the absence of these qualities, rather than the absence of the material. The bulk of his troops were in reality a poor form of mounted Infantry, whose rifle tactics were indifferent, and who had been taught to place little reliance on the steel. To win the greatest success, and to be really worth while the expenditure in men and horses, a raid must fulfil one of two conditions. It must form part of or be in consort with larger operations, and there must be a reasonable chance that valuable information will be obtained by it. Credit may be given for the second condition, *i.e.* that there was a distinct opportunity of discovering the movements of the third army after the fall of Port Arthur, but little occurred elsewhere to prevent the Japanese concentrating their attention on the raiding force, nor did the expedition relieve pressure in the front of operations. What loss the raid inflicted was infinitesimal, when one considers the numbers of the force; and as regards its composition, why were there 1600 baggage animals? Evidently Mischenko had not studied the history of the Confederate Cavalry.

We get a more general idea as to how Cavalry raids should be conducted if we consider those employed by the Japanese prior to and during the battle of Mukden. Well-planned and executed, they had the effect of withdrawing considerable numbers of Russians from the battle, for by their boldness and activity these few Japanese

squadrons led the Russian General Staff to suppose that they were far more numerous than they were. It seems probable that for every Japanese Cavalryman engaged in these raids ten Russians were withdrawn from the line of battle.

It has been thrown in the teeth of the Japanese Cavalry that they habitually relied on bodies of Infantry to support them in reconnaissance. Generally speaking, there is truth in this, but it is often forgotten that, owing to their inferiority in numbers and the mountainous topography, such combination of arms was a necessity. Another marked result which the inferiority in numbers of the Japanese Cavalry had was that in cases where an army remained halted for any length of time it was the Russian Cavalry that dominated the situation outside a radius of ten miles to the front. Had they been enterprising they would undoubtedly have made their superiority even more felt. The halt of the First Japanese Army at Feng Huang Cheng is a case in point.

Again and again before, during, and after battles this paucity of Cavalry must have been sorely felt by the Japanese generals, although their generals of Infantry were loth to own it. At the Yalu they had sufficient, but failed altogether to make the most of them, particularly in pursuit, while during that battle one searches in vain for any symptom of the combined action of all arms on the field being understood. One is forced to ascribe the blame to exaggerated motives of economy, but at that period they had hardly drawn upon their reserve troops at all. At Liao Yang, in spite of the state of the ground on the western flank, which was saturated with rain, some good work could have been done on that side; but here their inferiority in numbers was very marked. At the Shaho the Cavalry took their share, and noticeable was the good work done by Prince Kannin's brigade on the Japanese right flank, where Renne-Kampft missed his opportunity of the war. Had he grasped it, he might have greatly affected the outcome of the battle. Truly, the situation lacked the man. At Mukden a larger force of Cavalry, acting with the Japanese Third Army, might have facilitated to an enormous extent the enveloping movement, although the two brigades did their best under the circumstances. Mukden was a great defeat, but the Russians never had sufficient Cavalry against them to keep them well on the run.

As for the Russian Cavalry, what the bulk of it was doing has never really transpired. Its inertia was most marked, noticeably



its failure to report for many hours the advance of the Japanese Third Army. As far as is known, Kuropatkin seems to have distributed his Cavalry everywhere (he had 18,000 under his command; Oyama had 8000), and put his largest body on the eastern flank, *i.e.* among the mountains, in lieu of keeping it on the plains about and west of the railway, where the ground was more favourable. A whole division of Don Cossacks and a regiment of Usuri Cossacks were sent off on February 28, *i.e.* in the middle of the battle, to pursue the Japanese raiding parties, whose numbers could not have exceeded 500 men. The following sentences appeared in a memorandum issued by General Kuropatkin on January 9, 1905, at Chanshamaton, to officers above the rank of captain. They threw a light on the requirements and deficiencies of his Cavalry, which had already been in the field for over ten months. Verily it is a truism to say that bravery is of no avail if training be absent in modern war: 'Army Corps Cavalry should be employed in fighting as part of the Army Corps, rather than as relay posts, or as personal escorts of commanders. Army Cavalry should receive certain definite orders in every battle, according to circumstances. Thus far, the enemy's seventy squadrons of Dragoons have suffered little loss. An important duty of Cavalry is to destroy that of the enemy. *We must be able to fight on horseback.*'

The attention of anti-sword and lance agitators is called to these words—words of the Generalissimo of the Russian Armies after ten months' campaigning. They wind up that part of the memorandum which refers to Cavalry, and in them lies the crux of the whole matter. Need we look further to discover the main reason for the failings of the Russian Cavalry in Manchuria? In them the spirit of the charge and the longing to close with the foe was not inculcated; rather was it hindered by the overweening attention that was paid to rifle tactics in time of peace. The cult of the rifle, necessary though it be, was overdone, at the expense of the steel. Let squadron leaders in the future, as in the past, remember and follow the signal that Nelson was wont to give his ships at the psychological moment in the battle—'Engage the enemy more closely'—and we will confidently meet any Cavalry whose be-all and end-all in training is rifle tactics.

## ***A CONCEPTION OF A GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST FRANCE.***

BY 'SCARLET LANCER.'

It is evident that a Franco-German war would within a few hours develop into a conflict which would affect and might embroil the greater part of Europe. Consideration of the main points of the strategic question should, therefore, be of interest even to the most junior ranks of our Army, and in this article I shall endeavour to bring out those points that may be expected to influence a German plan of campaign against France.

Surprise is such an important factor in strategy that a too-confident conclusion as to any plan of campaign must be guarded against. At the same time the features of the terrain and the systems of fortresses and railways cannot fail to give some clue as to proposed action.

A general view of the French frontiers should first be taken.

Commencing from the south are the Alps, bounding Italy and Switzerland.

The line of defence against Germany is drawn northwards from the foothills of the Alps (the Jura Mountains). It begins at the southern end with the gap of Belfort, which is effectively guarded by the fortress of the same name, one of the strongest in Europe. Northwards for fifty miles runs a difficult mountainous country (the Vosges), and where the country becomes less difficult stands the fortress of Epinal. The entire line from Epinal *via* Toul to Verdun, on the River Meuse, may be considered a continuous line of forts, with the exception of a gap of about thirty-five miles between Charmes and Nancy, which in this article hereafter will be alluded to as the Charmes gap.

About twenty miles north of Verdun is the Belgian frontier, so that north to Verdun the defences are inconsiderable. If Belgium is neutral and its territory not violated, works along its frontier are not required. Obviously the natural continuation of the French line of defence would be along the River Meuse into Belgian territory up to the heavy

Belgian fortifications of Namur and Liège, which defend the passages of the Meuse.

The French fortresses of Mézières and Givet on the Belgian frontier, fifty-five and seventy-five miles north of Verdun respectively, are comparatively strong, whilst those of Longwy and Montmédy are inconsiderable.

The system of German fortifications differs considerably from that of the French. Instead of lines of defence with small gaps, Germany contents herself with a few large entrenched camps with relatively large intervening spaces, viz., Coblenz, Metz, Mainz, Strasbourg. It is unnecessary to discuss these, beyond noting them as points of concentration, for there can be no doubt that the entire German plan of campaign will be wholly offensive, as in 1870. Germany's one aim will be to inflict a serious blow before Russia or other possible allies can give effective assistance to France, that is to say, within three weeks of the order to mobilise. Active hostilities will coincide with, if not precede, any formal declaration of war, and the first effort will be to force the gaps in the French line in such a manner as will admit of the greatest number of Army corps being strategically deployed.

The arrangements for detraining troops that have to be previously prepared in peace-time help each country to recognise the proposed points of concentration of the other. The French plans seem to be based on a concentration of their forces around Neufchâteau, behind their line of forts, and doubtless Germany will hope by gaining the initiative to create a situation that this concentration will not suit, and thus oblige the French to conform and devise a fresh plan to meet the new situation.

Granting that the German plan rests entirely on the assumption of a vigorous offensive, the question arises: What will be the objective? and again: Which of the available lines of advance will enable the greatest number of German corps to be deployed?

Von Moltke wrote of the last Franco-German war: 'The Chief of the General Staff had his eye fixed from the first upon the capture of the enemy's capital, the possession of which is of more importance in France than in other countries. It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid out for a prolonged period and carried out in every point.'

The concluding sentence seems only an indirect way of expressing

the accepted maxim that the first principle of strategy is the defeat of the enemy's Field Armies, whatever the ultimate objective may be.

The adverse conditions existing in the French Army in 1870 need not be discussed here. These conditions, the tactical mismanagement of the Battle of Wörth, the mistaken and hazardous strategy of Bazaine and MacMahon, which was more dictated by political than military considerations, and which led to the capitulations at Metz and Sedan, enabled the Germans to achieve in a few months the annihilation of the French Regular Field Armies, and rendered possible the advance to Paris. A proper organisation in the rich centre and South of France would have rendered a prolonged siege of the capital hazardous, and, even as it was, hastily raised and badly equipped levies under Chanzy, Bourbaki, and Gambetta gave the invaders some trouble. The difference in the prevailing conditions is obvious, and this digression has only been made to emphasise the facts that Germany's first aim must be the defeat of the French Armies, and that a victory on the direct road to Paris would not justify an advance on the capital until the enemy's forces on the southern flank, and based on the richer part of the country, had been adequately dealt with.

It will later be seen how important it is to Germany that any initial success should not only be complete, but gained with the utmost rapidity.

The number of roads required for the movement of the enormous armies of modern times, and the great space necessary for their strategical deployment, renders it possible to deduce more from a study of the terrain than was formerly the case. We shall, therefore, now examine the lines of advance across the frontier more in detail.

The gap of Belfort in the south hardly finds place in its narrow boundaries for the French fortress, and the mountainous country precludes a prompt turning movement by the north. This part of the line is more adapted for the offensive on the part of the French, and the fact that the Germans have recently fortified several places round Mulhausen points to their standing on the defensive on this flank. Turning Belfort by the south leads the invaders on the rich centres of Dijon and Lyons, but it entails violation of Swiss territory. Such a violation has grave drawbacks, for the Swiss Militia is an admirably organised Force, and for that action to happen with the consent of the Swiss means such a complete change in the existing international

relations as scarcely to come within the scope of reasonable discussion. Nevertheless, in war no possible move must be entirely disregarded. The German element in the Swiss population now, probably, exceeds the French, and German railway construction towards Switzerland should be watched with the closest interest.


Further north the difficulties of a direct attack through the Vosges Mountains are practically prohibitive. The country is extremely difficult, and roads suitable for the passage of large Forces are scarce. In short, the country between Belfort and Epinal is quite impracticable for large operations, and would favour a French attack on any debouching column.

We now come to the line of forts Epinal—Toul (sixty miles); and Toul—Verdun (sixty miles); with the Charmes gap in the first of these sections and the town of Nancy in front of the line, about fifteen miles east of Toul.

Against this section there are practically only five roads for the movement of large Forces, viz. one from Strasbourg to Lunéville, which divides into two branches leading on Charmes and Nancy; one through Château-Salins to Nancy and Toul; one from Metz *viâ* Mars-la-Tour to Verdun. One road from Metz *viâ* Jarny, and another from Thionville *viâ* Briey, which join and lead by Etain, to Verdun.

The idea that modern forts can be taken by *coup-de-main* may be dismissed in the light of the recent experience of Port Arthur with its incomplete defences, and the danger of advancing through so narrow a gap as that of Charmes until the flanking defences have been captured is obvious.

Colonel Boucher in a recent publication points out the difficulties in connection with a German advance on this line, and an interesting point arises as to whether Nancy is to be held at all costs or not. A pamphlet printed in 1906, entitled 'The Fortifications of Nancy,' describes clearly the different attempts to fortify the town, and alleges that by a secret clause, appended to the Treaty of Frankfort, the French had agreed to leave the place undefended. Whether this be true or no, the French, to anticipate any rapid German advance on this line, hold their 20th Corps ready to cover Nancy within an hour, and to check the head of the advance, whilst guns are mounted and the place fortified as part of the exterior defences of Toul, between the forts of Frouard and Pont St. Vincent.



The withdrawal of the French frontier after 1871 to its present line has this advantage, namely, that a German advance will be through a country entirely sympathetic to France and animated with a spirit equally hostile to Germany. Consequently news of any German movements would be transmitted with the least possible delay to the French authorities.

For the main frontal attack, then, this portion of the frontier, Epinal—Toul—Verdun, does not hold out any optimistic hopes of success. A Force once committed to an advance on these lines could not, in the event of a reverse, be extricated without the greatest difficulty. Strategical deployment would be confined, and large Forces expended on the opposing forts.

It is, therefore, considered that Germany must look for a wider and more open front, and that she will find by advancing on the line Verdun—Stenay—Mézières—Givet, which offers seventy-five miles of comparatively open country. This will entail her using the roads and railways south of the Meuse through Luxembourg and Belgium, and the entrenched camp of Metz will form a flank-guard to this advance. This is the opinion of Generals Ducarne, Cherfils, Maitrot, and others. An interesting leading article in *The Eye Witness* of September 7 argues against this view.

At Givet the River Meuse enters Belgian territory, and on it are the strong forts of Namur and Liège, which are geographically, but not politically, the true continuation of the French line of defence. When the French, under the direction of General Séré de Riviére, drew the line of their frontier forts up to Verdun, it was then believed that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium. The undefended frontier salient between Verdun and the South of Belgium was considered too narrow to admit of a German advance on a large scale, and, as at the Charmes gap, operations here would be to the advantage of the French. This was a reasonable assumption at the time, but conditions have altered with the growth of modern armies, and a plan of campaign must be formed in accordance with the military exigencies of the day.

We shall now examine the roads leading to this Verdun—Givet area.

North of the Metz roads already mentioned are the Trèves—Thionville—Stenay and the Trèves—Luxembourg—Longwy roads on Stenay and Vouziers. These might be employed for the southern or left wing of the advance.

Through the Ardennes there are five good roads into France for the advance of the right wing, exclusive of the more northern roads through Namur. They are, the St. Vith—Gouvy, and the Stavelot—Bastogne—Libramont roads, both on Carignan and Bouillon, the Viel Salm—La Roche—St. Hubert road on Sedan, the Marche Rochefort—Marche Ciney road on Dinant and Givet, the Diekirch—Arlon—Virton road on Montmédy.

From Trèves to Longwy is only thirty miles, and nowhere is the German frontier more than seventy miles from that of France.

A French General writes:—‘Seven German corps will leave their bases at St. Vith and Trèves. Two corps and one division of Cavalry will be sent as a flank guard towards Malmédy to neutralise the Belgian Army. The other five corps and a Cavalry division, 200,000 men, will attack the French frontier between Mézières and Stenay on about the sixteenth day.

‘On the fate of Liège being decided these 200,000 would be further reinforced.’

The Belgian railways would not be used for the initial rush across the frontier. Trains in advance within striking distance of an enemy are most vulnerable. It will be remembered that in 1870 Moltke had intended a concentration by rail behind the River Saar, but, finding the French within striking distance of that area, he ordered the detraining to be carried out on the Rhine. The same rules govern the use of railways in war at the present day. But once Germany will have gained a footing on the French frontier the railways up to that point will be used for reinforcements and supplies, &c. We shall now, therefore, note the railway system from Thionville to Aix-la-Chapelle, for from this, as has already been said, one can draw suppositions as to proposed action.

For the last eight years Germany has been systematically improving her frontier railway, doubling single lines across and along the projected front, and linking these lines up with the two bases, Cologne and Coblenz.

Anyone who has travelled from Aix-la-Chapelle *viâ* Montjoie, St. Vith, and Gouvy, could not fail to notice the exceptional siding accommodation apart from the running lines, nearly all of which are lit by electric light.

From Raaren to St. Vith there is detraining accommodation for

P



about 130,000 men. A Force of this size, soon to be followed by further reinforcements from their bases on the middle Rhine, could cross the Belgian frontier in one night. Thence their first objective would be Libramont.

A glance at the map clearly shows how Germany's frontier railways are closely linked up with their military centres.

There are several lines running parallel to a German advance across the Ardennes, which join the main Brussels—Metz line at Marche, Libramont, Arlon, and Luxembourg.

Exclusive of the Luxembourg lines, there were till lately ten lines crossing the Franco-Belgian frontier, and only two crossed the German-Belgian frontier. One of these was dominated by the guns in the fort of Liège.

Realising the importance of another direct line from Cologne, the Germans have commenced to construct a railway from Malmédy to Stavelot, which must by now be almost completed. The importance of this new line is considerable, for it relieves possible congestion on the line at St. Vith. Since the construction of this line the Belgians are understood to have placed more powerful guns in Liège to command this line and the road.<sup>1</sup>

If this is the case, the Germans are again determined to be equal with the Belgians in a peaceful and perfectly legitimate way. South of Aix-la-Chapelle is a small line from Raaren *via* Eupen to Herbesthal, which is now being transformed from an indifferent single line to a first-class double line.

This was at first considered part of the usual German policy of broadening their front of action. More importance is now attached to this undertaking, for it is thought that its true purpose may be to facilitate the seizure of the Baraque de Michel and Gileppe, which offers suitable ground from which the German Heavy Artillery could be brought into action against the guns of Liège and draw their fire from the direction of Stavelot—Malmédy.

So far we have seen that the front Verdun—Givet offers Germany the best chance of deploying a considerable Force, but even this space is confined as compared to the numbers that she would wish to use. This advance would be made on the southern or right bank of the Meuse. A considerable force would have to be told off to observe

<sup>1</sup> I believe these guns will not be ready for use till April of this year at the earliest.

Liège and Namur, for they constitute bridge-heads from which counter-attacks could be made against the German right flank.

To extend the front still further north, that is, by an advance on Maubeuge and Lille, entails moving by the northern or left bank of the Meuse, which is the most direct route for a German advance. Generals Ducarn and Maitrot point out the danger attending German operations between the three Belgian entrenched camps, and this was the consideration that influenced General Brialmont in his organisation of the defence of Belgium. Liège has twelve works with a perimeter of twenty miles, and Namur has nine works with a perimeter of twelve miles. Both places have been lately strengthened. At Antwerp there is a large reserve, but this is a purely defensive stronghold.

Belgium has about 110,000 men for her forts, leaving only about 80,000 for her Field Army. It is quite possible that this Force would be used only on the left bank of the Meuse, and Belgian action resolve itself into a passive defence against violation of their territory behind that river.

Attempts on the part of the Belgians to destroy railways and bridges south of the Meuse would probably be forestalled by the German Cavalry, and, in any case, would not greatly retard the German advance, for it has been seen that railways would not be used for the first dash across the frontier.

In all probability the bridges over the Amblève and the railway station at Trois-Ponts would be in the hands of the German Cavalry before any action was taken by the Belgians. Under the present Belgian arrangements there is no means, even if any intention, of checking a German advance across the Ardennes. Still, the Belgians may make a determined stand at Liège, and if reinforced by an allied Force, will make use of their bridge-heads at Namur and Liège and carry out a vigorous offensive movement against the German right flank.

I venture to predict that there will probably be a change of Government in Belgium next year, and when the Liberals are in office they intend to bring in a more extensive form of conscription. If in two or three years there is an Army of 400,000 to 500,000 men in Belgium, a German advance across the Ardennes would be under very different circumstances to that of to-day.

From what has been said of the present situation, the following conclusions may be drawn :—

(a) The amount of Army corps that can be brought into the first phase of a campaign is limited by the number of roads. Only the leading corps on each road is immediately available for action.

(b) Unless sufficient space for strategical deployment is found, the sacrifices and expenditure for the upkeep of the vast modern Army are thrown away.

(c) The political frontier of France, as now defended, offers neither sufficient lines of advance nor deployment space to permit of Germany using her large Forces to the greatest advantage.

(d) The violation of Swiss territory has the advantage of leading the invaders on the rich centre, but the drawbacks outweigh this advantage, unless it can be done with the full consent of the Swiss.

(e) As far north as Verdun the conditions do not seem favourable for the main German attack, and are possibly more favourable for a French offensive. Germany will have to adequately guard against the latter, and may make a subsidiary attack against the Charmes gap.

No large strategical deployment can be made without reckoning with modern fortresses, which is a matter of time.

(f) The front Verdun—Givet offers the most space, but even that is only for an Army of about seven corps. It entails moving through Luxembourg and Belgian territory and guarding against counter-attack from Namur and Liège on the right flank.

(g) The extension of this front northwards on Maubeuge and Lille entails dealing with the triangle of Belgian entrenched camps. Violation of Belgian territory should involve the hostility of the Powers that guarantee its neutrality.

The above conclusions all support the view that the main attack would be to strike at France in the neighbourhood of Mézières, and bring about a decisive battle, probably in the country between the Rivers Aisne and Marne.

It is necessary to state shortly the opposite view, so that the reader who has a knowledge of the country under discussion may draw his own conclusions. The opposing view is founded on the opinion that an advance through the Ardennes could not be sufficiently rapid to prevent its being adequately met. To quote from the number of *The Eye Witness* already referred to :—

‘ While an Army corps with its Field Artillery was attempting the

passage of the Ardennes there would be leisure three times over for an enemy, provided with the railway system of Belgium and industrial France, to concentrate on its flank in overwhelming numbers. Any attempt to bring a great number of men through that country by its few roads, with its violent gradients, its utter lack of subsistence and communications of all kinds, and to debouch them with success on the open country, would be a piece of folly.

'It is more probable that the determination to hold the line of the Meuse, which is now plainly apparent, will prevent war, or, if war is risked, will determine that attack into an offensive against the Meuse forts. That will be checked; and following upon that check a vigorous counter-offensive from behind them will follow.'

In conclusion, a rough estimate of numbers and a few remarks on the possible influence of neighbouring nations may properly be added.

The proportion of combatants, Germans to French, is about five to four. But in both cases on the mobilisation of their last reserves the actual numbers are in excess of what could possibly be employed in action.

Germany has twenty-three Army corps, about 900,000 men, that can be placed on a war footing in a very few days. These corps are supposed to be doubled in time of war, making about ninety-two divisions.

France has twenty Army corps, which are also supposed to be doubled in time of war, making about eighty divisions.

It is impossible to say to what extent the new corps mobilised would be employed in the first line, and at what intervals of time.

There is but little difference between the two countries in the rate of mobilisation.

Germany would certainly have to leave three or four corps on her Eastern frontier to cover the mobilisation of her reserve corps pending the arrival of the Austrian corps. In 1870 von Moltke told off three corps for this purpose, until he was certain of Russian neutrality. It is inconceivable that his successors would not take similar action under the present circumstances. France might have to leave a similar number on her Italian frontier, but, in the probable event of Italy remaining neutral, she could withdraw these, and then the strength of the two principal combatants become equalised.

*The Triple Alliance.*—The position of Italy in the Triple Alliance is one much discussed. Her relations with France as compared to those

with Austria would probably cause her to remain neutral in a dispute between Germany and France. Moreover, if she now becomes embroiled in a war with a superior Naval Power in the Mediterranean, her Expeditionary Force in Tripoli becomes a hostage to fortune.

Italy's Tripolitan enterprise has been a set-back to German diplomacy and German designs in the Mediterranean.

Austria does not directly threaten France, her importance lying in being a possible counterpoise against Russia. She has sixteen Army corps and a very similar organisation to that of Germany. She would certainly have to leave four corps on her Italian and Servian frontier and in occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She could mobilise eight corps on the Russian frontier by the fifth day, and four more by the eighth to tenth day. An advance of 200 miles is necessary, however, to strike any objective that would seriously damage Russia (Warsaw or Kieff), by which time the Russians could oppose in greater strength.

However, Austria's membership in the Alliance, and the slower mobilisation and concentration of the Russians enables Germany to entertain the idea that she can use practically her whole strength in an endeavour to obtain a decisive victory in France, and then with her excellent system of double lines which can each run forty military trains a day, rail back corps in time to meet a Russian advance, should it take place. The splendid efficiency of the German Staff and organisation renders such a plan attractive, but it has the weak point that the initial success should be followed up in full force to render it truly decisive, and it is doubtful whether the great duration and excessive strain of modern battles, as exemplified by the Russo-Japanese War, are sufficiently taken into account.

*The Triple Entente.*—Russia has recently withdrawn her line of mobilisation and concentration to that of Kovno, Grodno, Brest—Litovsk. She has done this owing to the danger of attempting to hold the salient of Poland when she can in no way mobilise as quickly as Germany and Austria.

The withdrawal retards the date at which she can attempt to enter the enemy's territories. This is, of course, a disadvantage to France, but it enables Russia to complete mobilisation and concentration in security. The former would probably be completed in seven to ten days, and the latter by the twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth day.

Russia has thirty-seven Army corps. A scheme of reorganisation is

now in progress for doubling these on mobilisation on the same lines as in the French Army. The organisation of these corps is too recent to say how soon they would be available.

If one deducts five Siberian corps, two Turkestan corps, and three Caucasian corps, there remain twenty-seven corps for employment in the West, of which one would probably be detained in Finland.

France, true to her traditions, will no doubt seek to act on the offensive, the creed of both Napoleonic and Moltke schools of war. It seems, however, unlikely that she can avoid the first great battle being fought on French soil, and perhaps it will be wise for her to accept this unpleasant fact, but make quite certain that it is fought under the best obtainable conditions. It has been shown how important an initial success is for Germany, and a loss of a few days before the decision of the first battle is clearly more adverse to Germany than to France.

There is an all-important factor that must affect every great war, and that is the spirit of the country and the faith of an Army in itself. No doubt the next war will find a united, patriotic, and determined Germany, and the German Army has often been described as the most perfect working machine of modern times. The administration and General Staff work are beyond reproach. The battle training differs in many important points from that of the French, and recent criticisms have aroused much interest.



*BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. R. CURETON, C.B., A.D.C.*

By COLONEL R. H. MACKENZIE, F.S.A. SCOT.

IN quoting Charles Robert Cureton as one of the rare instances of an officer rising from the ranks of the British Army to a position of anything like distinction, it is often overlooked that he was somewhat differently circumstanced to the ordinary worthy private soldier, in that he was not, as has been stated, of humble parentage, but a man of education and gentle birth, coming of a well-known Shropshire family. His father was the squire of Pradoc, near Oswestry, a property which after his death was sold to a brother of Lord Kenyon. Born at Hordley in that county in 1790, he commenced his soldiering at the age of sixteen as an ensign in the Shropshire Militia, a battalion which had been embodied and on permanent duty for some years. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the regiment in 1807. In those days a certain income from property was a necessary qualification for a commission in the Militia, and the officers of a good county regiment were generally country gentlemen of position and means. It was so in the Shropshire Militia, with the result that, fond of society, popular in his manners, and with impulses hospitable and generous to a fault, young Cureton became involved in financial difficulties. His creditors threatened him, and, dreading having to inform his relatives of the state of his affairs, he made his way to London, and took the King's shilling. He naturally chose a Cavalry regiment, for from the time he was able to stretch his legs across a pony he was, like Jackanapes, never happier than in the saddle. Indeed, it is said that little Cureton and his pony Madlegs suggested the story of Jackanapes and Rollo. Under the name of Robert Taylor, he enlisted in the 14th Light Dragoons, then serving in Portugal under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and henceforth his career was that of a soldier pure and simply. He clung resolutely to the great profession of arms, allowing no allurements to detach him from it, and living and dying with its






**BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. R. CURETON, C.B., A.D.C.**

—  
1790-1848.  
—

*In the uniform of the 16th Lancers, 1844.*





**RAMNUGGUR.**  
**THE CHARGE OF THE 14th LIGHT DRAGOONS.**

22nd November, 1848

harness on his back. He embarked for the Peninsula in 1809, and was posted to the troop of Captain (afterwards General) Sir Thomas Brotherton, and was soon in the thick of the fighting. According to the General, he enlisted in the name of Charles Roberts, but General Sir Lovell Lovell, who was cornet of the troop at the time, and knew him through life, gives his *nom de guerre* as Robert Taylor, and this is borne out by the Rev. Erskine Neale, who knew the family intimately. However, with the 14th he was present, mostly with the Light Division, in the majority of the actions and skirmishes in which that distinguished corps was engaged in the second phase of the Peninsula War in 1809-13, including the battle of Talavera, the retreat from Val-de-la-Mala to Almeida, the battle of Busaco, the affair of outposts at Coïmbra, and was wounded in crossing the Mondego, the action of Venta de Sierra, and the skirmishes at Pombal, Redinha, and Gallegos. He was wounded in the head and hand in Masséna's defeat at Fuentes D'Onor, and had his skull fractured by a sabre cut; was afterwards with the covering Army before Badajos, and in Wellington's great victory of Salamanca with its sequel the capture of Madrid. He was further engaged in the battles of Vittoria and the Pyrenees. During all this time his steady character, superior education, courage, and intelligence had not been overlooked by the officers of his troop, by whom his good services were brought to the notice of his commanding officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Neil Talbot and Sir Felton Harvey. He was by this time a sergeant, and in all duties requiring courage, intelligence, and observation was considered one of the best non-commissioned officers in a corps renowned for the excellence of its reconnaissance and outpost work. Happening one day to be detached on some important duty, he had the good fortune to be recognised by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who had known him at home, and, hearing of his superior reputation, put in a good word for him to Lord Wellington, to whom he was Military Secretary and A.D.C. Wellington made Cureton post-sergeant at headquarters, which led to the further recognition of his merits, and he was employed as mounted orderly to Lord Fitzroy Somerset until his youthful ambition was gratified by his appointment, on February 24, 1814, to an ensigncy in the Army. And so Sergeant Robert Taylor, of the 14th Light Dragoons, became Ensign Charles Robert Cureton, of his Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot. It is doubtful if he ever joined the 40th, as he is understood to have been retained

on some Staff duty at headquarters, and in that capacity to have participated in 1814 in Wellington's first battle on French soil—Orthes—also in the affair at Tarbes, and at Toulouse, the closing battle of the war. On the issue of the Peninsula medal in 1847 he was able to claim some ten clasps with his medal.

No Infantry corps, however distinguished, would have long satisfied the inclination of so essentially a Cavalry soldier as Cureton, so he effected a transfer on October 20, 1814, to the 20th Light Dragoons, old Peninsula comrades of the 14th, and a regiment upon which he seems to have set his mind. On March 17, 1816, he was promoted to a lieutenancy in the 20th, and assumed the adjutancy, the duties of which he performed with much exactness until the disbandment of the regiment at Cahir Barracks on December 16, 1818, when he was placed on half-pay. Within a month he was restored to full pay on being appointed on January 7, 1819, lieutenant and adjutant of the 16th Light Dragoons, another favourite regiment of his. India was the country destined to be the scene of his future triumphs. He held the adjutancy of the 16th until 1822, and three years later—on November 12, 1825—obtained his troop. In command of a squadron of the regiment, he accompanied the expedition in 1825-6, under Lord Combermere, the Stapleton Cotton of Peninsula and Waterloo fame, to Bhurtpore, the great Jât fortress which had been a standing menace to British rule ever since Lord Lake failed against it twenty years before. In the present instance, in spite of a stubborn defence and heavy British losses in the assault, the fortress was successfully invested, captured, and razed to the ground, the Cavalry performing excellent service in preventing the escape of the garrison and cutting down the fugitives. The India medal and clasp was awarded for the engagement in 1851, but Cureton never lived to receive it. Over £70,000 was, however, distributed at the time in prize money, of which his share amounted to £476. He seems to have been anything but favourably impressed with the principle upon which the private soldiers got but £4 each and the Commander-in-Chief £59,500! For the next twelve years the Army had comparative peace, and Cureton's life was spent in uneventful regimental duty at Cawnpore and Meerut, with his proverbial conscientious attention to the smallest details.

He was promoted to major on December 6, 1833, and in 1837 had the distinction of being selected to command the escort to the Com-

mander-in-Chief, General Sir Henry Fane, on the occasion of his visit to Runjit Singh, the Maharajah of the Punjab. The diary kept by Cureton during this period records from day to day his private impression of the scenes through which he passed, and is interesting, as showing his real concern for the welfare of the men and horses of the detachment, of which he was evidently very proud. The efficiency of the Horse Artillery and Cavalry in particular seems to have made a great impression on the old 'lion of the Punjab,' as did also Cureton's unmistakable military talents as a Cavalry officer. Runjit Singh presented him with a valuable sword, pearls, and other ornaments, and a beautiful dun horse which, with characteristic Eastern knavery, was carefully intercepted and a valueless animal substituted.

His next important service was in the ill-judged campaign in Afghanistan, under Lieutenant-General Sir John, afterwards Lord, Keane, in 1839-40, which had for its object the forcible imposition of an unpopular Sovereign on an unwilling people. He served chiefly as Assistant Adjutant-General of Cavalry, and was specially selected to command the advance column of the Army of the Indus in its arduous march into Afghanistan, across the Indus by the bridge of boats, over the plains of Beloochistan, through the Bolan Pass, to Candahar, and the country of the Ghilzies to Ghuznee. In the subsequent advance upon and occupation of Cabul, where the Shah Sujah was restored with great ceremony to the throne from which for so many years he had been an exile, he conducted the reconnaissance up to the vicinity of the city, marched nearly sixty miles on one occasion in twenty-four hours, and on the flight of Dost Mohammed effected the surrender of a number of his disbanded troops, and secured the whole of his Artillery and ammunition. Cureton's Cavalry did good service at the capture of the famous Fortress of Ghuznee, scouring the plains and intercepting the fugitives. For his distinguished services he was mentioned in despatches as 'an officer of great merit,' promoted to a brevet lieutenant-colonelcy, and awarded the medal for Ghuznee and the Third Class of the Order of the Dooranie Empire. With the escort to the Commander-in-Chief he returned to India by the Kyber in 1839, having in the meanwhile been promoted to a regimental lieutenant-colonelcy. The short but important Gwalior campaign of 1843 again saw him in the field, this time in command of a Cavalry brigade. He accompanied the force of the Commander-

in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, who, finding the Mahrattas in a strongly entrenched position at Maharajpore, attacked them on December 29, and, after a severe engagement, defeated them, assaulting their position at the point of the bayonet. The Cavalry again did good service, particularly in completing the discomfiture of the enemy till they broke and fled. Cureton's 'gallantry and exertion in command of his brigade' procured him mention in the Commander-in-Chief's despatch; he was created a C.B. and received the bronze star.

The conquest of the Punjab in 1845-46 next involved us in the most serious trouble that had threatened India for many a day, when the Sikhs, the superiors in every way of any Army we had yet encountered, burning to invade British India, provoked war by crossing the river Sutlej, the boundary between the two kingdoms. In command of the Cavalry, Cureton accompanied Sir Harry Smith in the earlier part of the campaign, and was with him in his march to the relief of Loodiana, when, in what is known as the battle of Buddiwal, on January 21, 1846, the Force, under a galling fire, had to run the gauntlet, covered by the Cavalry, of the front of the entire Sikh position. He was again in command of the Cavalry on January 28, when Sir Harry Smith encountered the Sikhs in open battle at Aliwal, where they held a strong position with their rear resting on the river Sutlej. The village was carried at the point of the bayonet, while the entrenchments were similarly attacked. Like a cat with a mouse Cureton watched his opportunity, and, as our Infantry swarmed over the entrenchments, let loose the 16th Lancers on the Sikh Infantry through an opening on the extreme right. Hurriedly throwing themselves in squares the Sikhs were caught by the Lancers before they were able to complete their formation, and ridden clean through. Reforming on the far side the 16th again rode through the Sikhs in splendid style, completing their demoralisation, doubling them up, spearing the gunners, and capturing over sixty pieces of ordnance, their camp, baggage, and stores of ammunition and grain. The victory, which was complete, was admittedly due in a great measure to Cureton's daring and timely employment of the Cavalry, and he was very highly praised in Sir Harry Smith's despatches:—'In Brigadier Cureton her Majesty has one of those officers rarely met with—the cool experience of the veteran soldier is combined with youthful activity. His knowledge of the outpost duty,

and the able manner in which he handled his Cavalry under the heaviest fire, rank him among the first Cavalry officers of the age.' In command of a brigade of Cavalry, Cureton also took part in Sir Hugh Gough's final defeat of the Sikhs at the hard-fought battle of Sobraon on February 10, 1846, being again mentioned in Sir Hugh Gough's despatches, and receiving the brevet rank of colonel, and medal with two clasps. His services were further recognised by his appointment on August 13 as adjutant-general in Bengal, in the duties of which he was employed until the Punjab, again in a blaze, recalled him to the field in 1848.

On Cureton life was now about to close, for Ramnuggur, the opening battle of the campaign, was his last. The circumstances of the action are well known and need not be detailed here. Essentially a Cavalry affair, it was brought about by a reconnaissance in force under the Commander-in-Chief on November 22, 1848, partly to explore the fords of the Chenab in the locality of Ramnuggur, but chiefly to entice the Sikhs across the river to be dealt with as at Sobraon. The Sikh outposts had been driven from the left bank of the river in the course of the operations, but our left flank being threatened by the Sikh Cavalry which had recrossed the river, they were ordered to be cleared off by the 14th Light Dragoons, under Colonel William Havelock, 'El chico blanco' of the Peninsula. In spite of Cureton's explicit orders not to charge across ground known to be almost impassable for Cavalry, and losing sight of his objective, the gallant Havelock dashed headlong across an arm of the river, under the banks of which numbers of Sikh Cavalry and Infantry were concealed. Cureton saw the danger, and exclaiming, 'My God! this isn't the way to use Cavalry,' rode off with a small escort to warn Havelock. But it was too late: the mischief had been done. Havelock was killed, and Cureton, struck by matchlock balls in the throat and forehead, fell dead on the field, in the presence of his old regiment, and to the grief of the whole Army. Among those who fell on that mournful day there was not a braver soldier or better man, or one for whom death had fewer terrors. He died as he wished, for although a man of strong religious convictions, he invariably avoided the prayer in the Litany for deliverance from sudden death. He was buried with every honour, the following General Order to the Army of the Punjab testifying to the universal affection in which he was

held :—‘ Aware of the general esteem and respect in which Brigadier-General Cureton was held by officers of all ranks who have enjoyed an opportunity of serving under his command, and been associated with him on duty, or in private life, the Commander-in-Chief invites all so disposed to be in attendance to pay the last honours to this excellent officer whose death no one in the Army can more deeply lament than Lord Gough himself.’ And so died Charles Robert Cureton, ‘ the first Cavalry soldier in India.’ Active in body and mind, brave to a degree, with the eyes of a hawk, determined, and prompt in action, he was undoubtedly one of the best Cavalry officers of his age, and none more modest in success. His private life was above reproach. His career has been quoted in proof of the advantage of service in the ranks, but in our opinion to no purpose. We can recall no instance of an officer in the British Army rising to real eminence from the ranks, and for reasons not far to seek. The requirements for a commissioned and a non-commissioned officer are not the same : they are on a different basis. The former should be a man of education, determination, self-reliance, resource, readiness to accept responsibility, independence, promptness in decision, and ability to act ; while success in the lower ranks seems to demand the opposite—subordination, routine, and a limitation of the horizon. Cureton succeeded in spite of his service in the ranks. Notwithstanding his education, natural aptitude for war, courage, and ability, he was but a colonel of less than three years’ seniority at his death in his fifty-ninth year. Had he joined the Army as an officer it is only fair to assume that he would have risen to greater eminence and with greater rapidity.



## THE FIGHTING VALUE OF MODERN CAVALRY

By C. VON HUTIER

(Translated from the *Militär Wochenblatt*)

CONTRIBUTED BY THE GENERAL STAFF

THE weapons of a Field Army are Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry. They must be so fashioned in peace time that they can perform the tasks required of them in war, and thus prove themselves serviceable weapons in the hands of the commander.

In great battles, when both sides are struggling for existence, each will endeavour to destroy the opposing Infantry, for it is on the Infantry that the destiny of the Army depends. The task of overpowering the Infantry falls naturally to the Infantry, which must assume the offensive to achieve its object. Great as is the power which modern firearms confer on their defensive, it is not sufficient by itself to crush the opposing Infantry; the Artillery and Cavalry must, therefore, support their own Infantry to the utmost of their ability; this is the highest duty of these two arms—in fact it is the guiding principle of their action in the attack. In the defence, the Infantry does not require their support to the same extent, for it is capable, by its own efforts, of keeping the attacking Infantry at arms length. The chief duty of the Artillery and Cavalry in the defence is, therefore, to restrict the offensive power of the enemy's Artillery and Cavalry as much as possible.

I will first ask you to look back to the days long gone by—when firearms had not yet begun to restrict the action of Cavalry, so that horsemen were in a position to win the highest honours. In those days, when firearms were still primitive, when ranges were short and aim uncertain; when loading was a tedious operation, and battlefields were veiled in smoke; when appliances for observing movements at a distance were few and imperfect; when campaigns were only carried on in the temperate seasons; when horses could be fed from the resources of the country in those days. Cavalry was indeed a marvellous weapon



of offence, capable of successfully engaging troops no matter of what arm—a weapon that could be used everywhere, even against the enemy's front. Masses of Cavalry could halt or manœuvre close in front of the hostile line, undisturbed by fire, and, when the right moment had come, hurl themselves on the enemy with their horses still comparatively fresh.

Owing to the small size of battlefields, and the primitive nature of firearms, only a few hundred yards had to be traversed at the highest speed during the charge, and the horses were therefore still fit for further enterprises. Again, the absence of good telescopes enabled Cavalry to appear unexpectedly and effect surprises. If two hostile bodies of Cavalry encountered each other, the weaker was bound to give way—assuming the conditions of ground and efficiency equal for both sides—as there were then no firearms to compensate for numerical inferiority.

The Cavalry of Frederick the Great was thus a powerful weapon of offence, although it entered the lists armed only with the *arme blanche*. Every Prussian Cavalry soldier was aware of his power, and this assurance formed an incentive to action. This striving for achievement, combined with energy and speed in manœuvre, were the characteristic features of the Cavalry of the period of the Great King. Since that day the offensive power and fighting value of Cavalry have materially diminished.

A bold Cavalry spirit has indeed descended to our present Cavalry, but now that the Infantry soldier can fire at least six times as many well-aimed shots as formerly, without any tedious adjustment of the sights ; now that the range of a rifle bullet runs into thousands of yards, and no smoke obscures the battlefield, the Cavalry will not find it so easy to get at the Infantry with the *arme blanche*.

The chance of success in attacking the enemy's fire positions is extremely small, while the employment of Cavalry against the front of the hostile firing line is practically impossible. The result is that the field of action for modern Cavalry now lies rather towards the flanks and rear of the enemy than in his front. But even here there is little opportunity for the use of the *arme blanche* ; for there are abundant means for discovering, observing, and frustrating the enterprises of hostile Cavalry. Surprise attacks are almost out of the question. They may sometimes succeed in small operations under exceptionally favourable conditions of ground and situation, but even so they will contribute little to the fate of the battle : the successes gained will be of a temporary nature. Large masses of Cavalry capable of seriously damaging portions of the enemy's forces can scarcely ever expect to approach the enemy

without giving warning ; all that such masses can do nowadays is to keep well out of range of the enemy's fire positions ; when on the move they must either make considerable detours, or else—if they have to cross the hostile fire zone—increase their pace in a way that must tell on their horses. If they attack, the charge has to be commenced many hundred yards from the objective ; and even when they are moving at their highest speed a hail of bullets will thin their ranks, for—as mentioned above—modern firearms allow of a rapid, well-aimed fire, and there is no smoke to obscure the battlefield. Finally, any Cavalry which succeeds in riding its exhausted horses into the enemy's ranks will fail to achieve anything, beside being rendered useless for subsequent enterprises.

It is only when the hostile Infantry is either weaker in numbers, or else absolutely demoralized, that Cavalry will still be able to reap successes with the *arme blanche*, i.e., by charging. In the former case it is an open question whether the losses which Cavalry will incur in attacking even a weak enemy are sufficient compensation for the success gained. A Cavalry soldier is a more expensive item than an infantryman, and even if the Infantry is completely annihilated the losses of the victorious Cavalry will always be higher than those of the enemy, provided that the latter, though weaker in numbers, is composed of good troops. The sacrifices entailed by charging Infantry—however inferior in numbers to the Cavalry—require, therefore, to be carefully weighed. Nevertheless, a Cavalry charge is always justifiable, no matter what sacrifices are entailed, provided that it affords the best means of attaining the object in view.

Now modern Cavalry should not be content with merely gathering the blood-stained laurels when the enemy's strength has been shaken by the Infantry and Artillery. The Cavalry must be able to pluck the laurels while they are still green ; in other words, it must be able to defeat the enemy unaided. But for this its present armament is inadequate. Neither the *arme blanche* nor the carbine is a fitting match for the Infantry weapons. In fact, the continued development of firearms has so greatly diminished the fighting value of Cavalry that it now requires the support of Artillery or machine guns for any enterprises which offer a real prospect of success.

Now this allotment of Artillery and machine guns to Cavalry usually takes place at the expense of the troops in the main front of the battle. This sacrifice is especially costly to the attacker, for every gun withdrawn

from the attack diminishes the possibility of breaking the resistance of the enemy's Infantry, since the entire strength of the attacker's Artillery will rarely be sufficient by itself to shake the whole front even of a numerically weaker opponent.

If one knew *for certain* that the batteries detached with the Cavalry would contribute to shaking the enemy, one would gladly spare them, or even a larger number of guns. Operations of this sort with Cavalry and Artillery are, however, usually directed against the enemy's flanks and rear; these outflanking manœuvres are doubtful enterprises, depending largely on the ground and the action of the enemy. Thus it happens that the guns allotted to the Cavalry are sacrificed for a remote chance, when they could have been made use of for a definite purpose on the field of battle. This does not apply to machine guns, which can be more easily spared by the attacker, because their fire cannot reach the enemy's reserves, while they are only of use against visible targets, and are bound to expose themselves to the direct fire of the enemy.

For the defender both weapons are of equal value. He requires his guns to weaken the attacker's Artillery—which is usually the stronger—so that the enemy may have as few guns as possible available at the end of the Artillery duel to shake his Infantry. The defender will not, therefore, willingly detach guns with his Cavalry; nor can he easily spare machine guns, which offer an excellent means of strengthening his flanks and the weak points in his front.

The experiment has already been made of attaching Infantry cyclists to Cavalry so as to increase its fighting strength. This plan was found to be impracticable because the cyclists could not follow the Cavalry everywhere. In the French manœuvres (1909) Infantry were even attached to the Cavalry, a striking proof how little reliance can be placed on Cavalry unassisted by any other arm. Heavily laden Infantry were thus expected at the end of a long day's march to assist the action of the less severely tried Cavalry.

In order to compensate for the diminution of fighting power which the Cavalry has suffered by the development of the Infantry rifle, the carbine has been greatly improved, and the new pattern is an efficient weapon. Still even with this weapon—which is excellent in itself—the fighting power of Cavalry cannot be considered satisfactory. For when acting on the offensive against Infantry—whose destruction is after all the principal object of the battle—the Cavalry can only expect to achieve

anything with the carbine when it can open fire by surprise. How seldom will such opportunities occur !

The carbine can only come into play against Artillery when the protection of this arm has been neglected. The latest pattern carbines are almost equal in capacity to the Infantry rifle. Given equal conditions of tactical and musketry training, Cavalry should, therefore, be able to fight Infantry almost on even terms. But this is not enough. Even if the carbine were equal to the rifle I would still consider it an unsuitable weapon for Cavalry.

In my opinion the Cavalry should have a weapon superior both to the Infantry rifle and the machine gun. Otherwise it will only become Mounted Infantry ; and modern Cavalry must be something more.

Such a Cavalry rifle would need in the first place to have a longer range than the Infantry rifle ; it would, of course, be heavier than the rifle, which weighs some eight pounds ; that would not matter, for even if the Cavalry rifle weighed two pounds more, it would still be lighter than the old needle rifle, which weighed eleven pounds. And yet that weapon used to be handled with ease, even when the soldier's movements were hampered by his knapsack. The Cavalry soldier would feel the extra weight less than the Infantry soldier, since the former is carried, together with his kit, by his horse ; and when he dismounts to fight he has only the weight of his rifle and ammunition ; otherwise he is unencumbered. Hence the Cavalry soldier goes into action fresher and with greater freedom of action than the Infantry soldier. Why, then, with all this in his favour, should he not make full use of a firearm weighing some ten pounds ?

If the Cavalry had a firearm superior to the Infantry rifle it would gain enormously in offensive power. Its fighting value would not be dependent on the Artillery, etc., attached to it. It could be used in any part of the battlefield, and would be able to shake the enemy's Infantry by its own unaided fire—an important consideration. Surely this is really the chief task for any arm ! All arms are only means to an end on the battlefield, but the field of action of the Artillery lies chiefly in the front of the main action, that of the Cavalry on the flanks and rear of the enemy ; and the Cavalry would be able to reach this field of action all the quicker if it did not have a train of Artillery and machine guns dragging behind it.

If the Cavalry had a long-range rifle it could shake the enemy's reserves by fire from a distance, without itself being exposed to the enemy's

fire ; or, if required, it could carry out a regular offensive attack, unaided, with a good prospect of success in the fire fight.


Again, in all cases where Cavalry finds itself compelled to avoid a decision, *e.g.*, when opposed to stronger bodies of Cavalry, when covering a retreat, etc., a long-range rifle would be of far more use than the present carbine. This would be the case even against Artillery. Cavalry would be a useful means for destroying machine guns, thanks to the long range of its rifle.

Finally, in winter, when snow, ice, and frozen soil restrict the action of Cavalry, and render it incapable of reaching its field of action, *i.e.*, the flanks and rear of the enemy ; when, with its present inadequate firearm, it can only be used on the defensive ; when the endurance of the horses is weakened by want of good food and stabling, Cavalry is—with its present armament—likely to become a drag on the offensive. No one is particularly anxious to have it. But if it were armed with a rifle superior to the Infantry weapon it would be welcomed as a valuable acquisition by everybody, even in winter.

I must not omit to mention that an increased offensive power would be of great assistance when reconnoitring.

With a long-range rifle Cavalry would regain the power of independent and energetic action.

The Cavalry spirit would not suffer by attaching greater importance to the firearm than to the *arme blanche*, and, as a matter of principle, it can make no difference with which arm the Cavalry achieves its triumphs. It is only the result that matters.\*



\* The views of the author will probably evoke much opposition ; nevertheless they may be of interest.—ED.

## CAMPING

By MAJOR EWING PATERSON, D.S.O., *Inniskilling Dragoons.*

IN all the years during which I have been a Cavalry officer I have always been struck with the chaos and muddle on the first day a regiment or brigade comes into camp, and put this chaos down to two reasons :—

1. No definite drill for laying down the lines is issued in our Cavalry drill books.
2. The horses are invariably placed, prior to the lines being put down, on ground which is not the actual ground they will stand on when in camp.

For several years I have practised my squadron in a very simple drill, and under all circumstances the laying of the camp is done in absolute silence, and in the minimum of time, without any confusion.

I guarantee from the time of marching the squadron on to their allotted ground to lay down my horse lines and be grooming in seven minutes; and will saddle up and be ready to move off in five minutes, by carrying out the following simple drill, which, after practised a few times, can be started by the sound of the whistle and no other word of any sort or kind given until the drill is finished.

Let us suppose, for sake of example, the regimental quartermaster has decided the squadrons should stand in column of troops, and the right end of each head line has been marked with small flags or swords.

The squadron is marching up in column of troops in double ranks; then give the following words of command :—

*'Form single rank,'* on which each front rank section opens up enough to allow their rear rank to form up on their respective lefts. Extend to five feet intervals from the right.

This gives you the frontage which ought to have been allowed in camp for your troops by the quartermaster.


On arriving on your allotted troop ground:—

*'Halt—eyes right—dress.'*—The right-hand man leaves room for the troop leader's horse to be tied on the right of the line, and the troop leaders take post mounted on the right of the line, and remain mounted until the lines are down. Each troop leader as each phase is finished holds up his hand above his head, and the leading troop leader, when he sees all are ready, waves his hand for the next phase to commence. This signal is at once repeated by each troop leader.

*'Dismount without advancing'*—odd numbers take over the even numbers' horses.

*'Even numbers, three paces forward—march—lay down your arms—take off your kits—stand to your horses.'*

Horse-Line Reel.



Off side, showing folded blanket (spare) containing: (a) troop cooking-pot; (b) 3 large line-pegs; (c) 3 short-shafted 4 lb. hammers.

*'Even numbers take over odd numbers' horses.'*

*'Odd numbers, three paces forward—march.'*

*'Odd numbers, lay down arms and take off kits.'*

*'Stand to your horses.'*

*'Lay down your head-lines,'* on which the right-hand section-leader knocks in the right-hand iron peg, No. 3 section-leader holds the head-line reel for unwinding, and No. 2 section-leader runs the line up to the right-hand peg, where it is fastened.

*'Odd numbers on the rope take the strain'*—always from right to left.



'*Fasten*'—on which No. 3 section-leaders fasten in the left-hand peg.

'*Tie up horses*'—when the horses are fastened to the head-line.


'*In rear of your horses*'—when all the men stand in the rear, with their heel pegs in their hands.

'*Right turn.*'

'*Cover*'—on which all heel pegs are brought to the recover and the men cover off.

'*Put in pegs*'—each man sticks his peg into the ground between his heels, and the hammers, one per section, are passed along each section, and the pegs driven home.

Horse-Line Reel.



Near side, showing rope and skerrit.

'*Shackle up*'—when the horses are shackled—length of shackle according to the horse's requirements.

'*Loosen girths.*'

'*Off saddle*'—when saddles are taken off and men hold them.

'*Three paces forward—march.*'

'*Eyes right—dress.*'

'*Lay down saddles.*'

'*Pick up arms.*'

'*Right turn—double march.*'

'*Pile arms.*'

The foregoing orders appear somewhat lengthy, but once the drill



is known no order is necessary, the work being carried on automatically, and in seven minutes you have a neatly laid camp, and neither horses nor men have moved off their own ground.

The taking up of the lines is more simple, as I always allow the heel pegs and shackles to be taken off when the men are packing their saddles, and before the squadron leader comes on parade.

The following orders are then given :—

*'Stand to your saddles.'*


*'Saddle up.'*

*'Put on your kit'*—when the men dress themselves.

*'To your arms—right turn—double march'*—when the men double to the arm rack, take their arms, and double back to their horses.

*'Untie horses.'*

*'Roll up head-line and pack on saddle.'*



The skerrit with rope uncoiled.

The great advantage of this drill is that no horse is saddled up a minute longer than necessary. One always sees, especially so with native Cavalry regiments, the horses standing with saddle and heavy kit on them half an hour, and some even an hour, before it is time to move off.

I have mentioned two articles in the foregoing which may need explanation :—


(a) The reel for head-line.

(b) The arm-rack.

and I attach herewith sketches of each.

The reel is very simple and costs a few shillings; in fact, I had one for each troop made in a small native village when on the line of march for Rs.4, or five shillings each.

In India we do not have the built-up rope as at home, but one long rope for each troop, and I found that the ropes were never rolled the




same length or with the same tightness, and therefore your pack was never the same; also in unrolling, the line, except by a miracle, always got twisted.

With this simple reel your pack is always the same; you can wind the rope in a few seconds, and the unwinding depends only on the time it takes a man to run from the left of your troop line to the right of it.

On the other side of the pack-saddle I carry the men's dicksie, and

in this dicksie I carry the section hammers and three long line-pegs rolled in a bit of blanket, and the daily ration for the men can also be carried in it.

The whole dicksie is rolled in the horse's blanket, and makes a neat, compact pack, which never comes off, nor does it shake or rattle.



Arm-rack, showing rifles racked and locked by chain and lock, lances and swords piled on board between rifles.

The Arm-Rack.—In India the greatest care must be taken against the stealing of arms, and with this arm-rack I think it is quite impossible to have any taken away without the whole camp being alarmed.

The rack costs about Rs.2, or 2s. 6d., and was also made by a local carpenter on the line of march.

You will notice the position of the lances—the locked chain running through the trigger-guards.

The advantages I claim for this small article are:—

- (1) Safety from theft.
- (2) Butts of the lances always on the ground.
- (3) Neatness.
- (4) Quickness in piling and unpling arms.
- (5) Small cost to purchase.

Always before going on a long march or manœuvres a great source of anxiety is the

'picketing peg,' and how to make the wretched things last the period, and how many spare ones will be necessary, etc., etc.


The wooden peg may last a few days at home—it certainly will not last a few days in India, where the ground, except in the rains, is usually as hard as a rock.

The iron peg is usually made so thin, to save weight, that it either



bends or breaks in half, and when you do happen to have rain it does not hold at all in cotton soil or soft soil of any kind. Last year, owing to an outbreak of anthrax in the squadron, and the horses being picketed out on cotton soil, the peg question was the worry of our lives.

I tried every sort of peg I could hear of, but with little or no success. One bad kicking horse was shackled with three or four pegs together, and yet they were pulled up, and it was only after several months I hit on the following idea for a peg, which held the kicker without once being pulled up, and which proved a tremendous success on a long five-hundred-mile march later in the year, when both hard ground was met with and very often ploughed cotton fields, where there was little or no hold; we carried only five per cent. of spare pegs, and we completed our march without the necessity of making more. My own farrier makes them at six annas each, out of one piece of metal, and no welding of heads must be allowed to make the real strong article. It is certainly slightly heavier than the ordinary peg, but surely it is worth it when it will hold your horse for ever, if necessary, in any ground.



I attach a sketch of the peg, which I have named 'The Paterson Peg,' and the principle of it and the reason for its shape is to bring the whole strain, not on the top of the peg, nor on the surface of the ground, but in the middle and in the strongest part of the peg, and on a point several inches below the surface of the ground. By getting this pressure on a point so low below the ground, you can imagine what

a tremendous strain it will stand, by a pull which is only slightly off being a pull parallel to the surface. Also owing to the width of the peg in the centre it makes a large enough hole at the surface of the ground to bury the knot and head of the rope when the peg is driven home.

In writing these few remarks on 'Camping drill,' 'Pack saddle,' and 'Picketing peg,' I do it because no definite method is laid down in our drill-books, and after many years' experience, I consider it was only by the mere chance of having had the misfortune of being obliged to camp on an impossible soil for many months during the rains, that I had the advantage of trying every sort of peg known to us soldiers, and I think that squadron leaders may like to try and see if the advantages I claim for the above are such as I found.



St. George.  
(April 23rd.)

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

*Revue de Cavalerie*, December, 1911.—The opening article in this number is one rather of local than of general interest, and criticises the provisional issue of Part II. of the Cavalry Training Manual, comparing it, to its disadvantage, with the latest German text-book. This is followed by something of the nature of an *avant-propos* of the new 'Manual of Equitation' now about to be issued in replacement of that which dates from 1853; it is by Lieutenant-Colonel Blacque-Belair, écuyer-en-chef at the Cavalry School. He states and elaborates the three principles which have guided those responsible for the production of the forthcoming manual; these are: (1) That if the horse is not *everything* in the Cavalry, on the other hand everything is of no account without the horse; (2) the more limited the period of Army service, the greater is the necessity for providing the soldier with an easy and well-broken mount; (3) instruction in equitation, whether addressed to man or horse, must, if it is to bear fruit, be methodically carried out and follow natural laws, for which both time and instructors are required. The French general who elects to write under the name of Pierre Lehautcourt continues his account of the operations of the German Cavalry and the Army of Chalons. In this instalment of his story the writer points out several instances where the German Cavalry, moving in front in too small parties, frequently suffered severely at the hands of the armed inhabitants, the German military authorities having apparently attached an undue importance to the moral effect producible by the mere presence of the Cavalry—as when thirty-four uhlans were expected to overawe the 10,600 civilian inhabitants of Epernay, when twenty miles from any support, and to force these to assist in destroying the railway line! On other occasions the Cavalry were sent out to effect demolitions, in regard to which they had received no instruction in peace-time, and accompanied by neither materials nor pioneers. Attention is further called to the curious disproportion in Cavalry possessed by the 3rd and 4th German Armies, the Cavalry with the former numbering only one-sixth, with the latter one-fourth of the effectives. This paper describes the events of August 19-26. Under the title 'N'exagérons rien,' 'F. T.' contributes the first part of what promises to be a very fair and exhaustive criticism of the German Cavalry, examining the actual tendencies of the high command, the spirit of the German Cavalry, and the action or methods of employment of this Cavalry in the most recent manœuvres. 'F. T.' dissects the opinions recently expressed by Captain Niemann and by Colonel Wenninger, and finds that there are in the German Cavalry two diametrically opposed schools of modern thought and teaching: the one breathing the very spirit of the offensive and inculcating the doctrine of the mounted combat upon all occasions against

the hostile Cavalry; the other demanding an extreme prudence of action against a Cavalry possibly numerically inferior, but supported by detachments of all arms. Then follows an account of the Cavalry manoeuvres carried out last September under General de Lastours: this is illustrated by two maps. In this number is concluded the series of articles, which has now been running for some time, entitled 'Trois journées de manoeuvres de cadres à la 6me division de Cavalerie.'

January, 1912.—General Durand, who for seven years commanded the 4th Cavalry Division, contributes 'Une doctrine sur le combat de Cavalerie'; he complains that none of the training manuals have laid down any such doctrine for guidance, and he therefore suggests one himself, which he first elaborates, and then summarises as follows:

*Courir à l'ennemi;*

*Prendre barre sur lui par une attaque d'amorce qui le fixe;*

*Conduire son gros vers l'un de ses flancs, et le lancer à l'attaque décisive.*

The papers on the German Cavalry and the Chalons Army are continued and concluded in this number; the author describes the work of the different reconnoitring parties sent out by the 5th, 6th, and 12th German Divisions, and in reviewing the whole of the operations now and previously recorded, he comes to the conclusion that the German material in men and horses was excellent, but that the manner of its employment was defective; that the generals, even of the Cavalry, knew little of the proper employment of Cavalry, whether acting alone or with the other arms; and that whatever information reached the German command was not communicated by the German Cavalry so much as by the French Press. From August 23 to August 25 a French and a German Army were marching towards each other, and only separated by a distance equal to a couple of marches, without the Germans having any suspicion of the proximity of the French. The French Cavalry remained in the immediate vicinity of the corps d'armée, or even in rear of them; the *exploration* of the German Cavalry was badly directed. The conclusion drawn is that when several armies are operating in combination, the direction of the Cavalry divisions should revert to the army commanders or to the commander of a group of armies. During these August days the individual reconnaissances are—many of them—well worth study, rather than the employment of large Cavalry bodies *en vue de l'exploration*. The article by Colonel Cordonnier, entitled 'De l'hypothèse à la victoire,' is concluded in this number; in this study the writer deals with the operations prepared for by Moltke in the second half of August 1870, and compares his methods with those of the First Napoleon in 1806. He shows that Moltke was content to base his procedure upon one hypothesis at a time, while of Napoleon he says: '*il les oriente (his generals) sur ses hypothèses . . . il entasse hypothèse sur hypothèse.*' In the second and last part of 'N'exagérons rien' 'F. T.' reviews the part played by the German Cavalry in the Army manoeuvres of 1907-10 inclusive, and comes to the conclusion that there have been few, if any, actions of large bodies *à l'arme blanche*; that as a general rule the combat has been a combination of the fire-fight and mounted charges, but with a marked predilection for the former, and that there is no trace of any attempt at producing a *tempest*

of horsemen. 'F. T.' claims also to detect a deterioration in the quality of the German remount, and produces a table of certain marches made by the German Cavalry divisions in the 1909 manœuvres. From this, and the column of 'remarks,' it appears that already on the morning of the second day's march, after a not especially long day under saddle, followed by rather a disturbed night, the horses of the Cavalry are noted as 'much fatigued.' The last two or three pages of this number are occupied by the transcript of a letter written either to Berthier or to Bessières by the Divisional General Bonardi de Saint-Sulpice, Colonel of the Dragoons of the Imperial Guard, in December 1812, and detailing the terrible losses in officers, men, and horses suffered by this corps during the Russian campaign; the general concludes by stating that the Dragoons of the Guard which marched into Moscow, numbering sixty-four officers and 890 of other ranks, at the moment of writing were composed only of a limited number of *chevaux éclopés et d'hommes à pied*. It is from documents such as these that we get a true idea of the casualties regiments suffered during the retreat from Russia.

February.—The first two papers in this issue are not of general interest: the one complains of the absence of any universal method of Cavalry employment, and of the difficulty of its effective practice, did such exist, owing to the want of proper manœuvring areas and the manner in which regiments are detached and their men and horses appropriated to the use of the other arms; the other article deals with the new regulations regarding the interior economy of corps. Captain d'Aubert continues with a paper on much the same lines, complaining, as we understand him, that the French Cavalry provisional regulations are too much taken up with matters of comparatively insignificant detail; his article is entitled 'Le guide au centre,' and he blames the regulation assigning two separate positions to the leader—*une place de déploiement et une place d'attaque*; he urges that for either purpose the leader must be in front, and asks of the authorities to give to the French Cavalry *une règlement 'd'attaque' et non 'd'exercices'*. There is a very short paper eulogising the new organisation of the High Command, by M. Millerand, as having no political character whatever, but as being purely and wholly military. Captain Romieux, in 'A Study of Equitation,' presses the value of polo as a school of horsemanship, and deprecates the practice of nothing beyond mounted combats, which occasionally become what he describes as *combats pour rire*. Finally, Captain Aulas has something to say in favour of an organisation which is no new one, and which he calls *ordre ternaire*—three squads in a troop, three troops in a squadron, three groups in a regiment, three brigades in a division. This was favoured by M. Messimy, and is likely to be, if it has not already been, adopted in the Turkish and Greek Armies.

'The Life of Lord Anson.' By Captain W. V. Anson, R.N. (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W.)

This is an intensely interesting book. The author shows clearly the political and social conditions of the period and the great character of the hero who laid down the foundations of the supremacy of our Navy.



*Internationale Revue.*—An article entitled 'The Present-Day Influence of Cavalry on the Battle,' by Captain Zürn, of the 4th Bavarian Chevaux-Légers, appeared in the July and August numbers of the Austrian *Cavalry Journal* of last year, and was also published in French in the December issue Supplément 153.

The writer begins his paper by reminding us once more that, despite the improvement in all modern weapons, the perfection at which methods of transport and of the transmission of intelligence has now arrived, the Cavalry arm has been affected least of any; that its chief weapon, the horse, remains very much as in the old heroic days, notwithstanding the improvement in the conditions of breeding; and that to-day Cavalry is organised much as heretofore and seeks still to exert its influence by the shock of masses and the use of the *arme blanche*. The mounted arm has now for some time past been engaged in a struggle for existence. The horse is gradually being pressed out of service by all the more purely mechanical means of communication which have come to the front; and even so purely military an operation as 'scouting' will doubtless in the future be largely performed by cycles on the earth and by aeroplanes above it, while telegraphs, 'wireless,' visual signalling, and telephones will still further reduce the work hitherto performed by mounted men. On the battle-field of the present day there is everywhere and on all sides a great void; concealment is sought by all, cover from fire and view; and how, asks the writer, shall objects so conspicuous as men and horses any longer venture to expose themselves in large bodies to the fire of modern weapons?

On all sides, even among the so-called experts, are men to be found who, while grudgingly admitting that Cavalry may still upon occasion be employed in the service of exploration and reconnaissance, deny that this arm can any longer exert an appreciable influence on the field of battle. It is this last contention which Captain Zürn sets himself to controvert. If, he says, in the Cavalry the chief weapon, the horse, has remained much as always, the same may be said of the other branches of the service, in which the Man, the soldier who is to extract the full value from the perfection in armament which has been supplied to him, remains ever unchangeably the same. Indeed, the writer is perhaps not far wrong when he urges that, while the chief weapon of the Cavalry soldier has greatly improved during recent years in breeding and quality, the man who is to actuate the scientific weapons of to-day is a more highly-strung, less-resisting animal than were his forefathers. The influence of Cavalry has grown rather than decreased with the progress of the *technique*. Modern weapons have done more to augment the independence and the *sureness* of this arm than has been the case with the Infantry, and even the more purely technical weapons have increased the value of the mounted arm, while the horse remains ever the same, even when the modern weapons of warfare fail in their full application.

The writer expresses his regret that the history of modern wars has not assisted to uphold the claim he puts forward for the continued importance of Cavalry before, during, and after the battle. In South Africa, as in Manchuria, excuses have always been forthcoming for the comparative

failure of the Cavalry there employed. None the less it is very significant that none of the nations which took part in these wars have reduced their Cavalry in numbers by reason of their experiences. Our Mounted Infantry the Bavarian Cavalryman dismisses as no more than 'un très petit incident,' while he reminds us that the Japanese have reorganised and augmented their Cavalry bodies since the conclusion of peace. Nowhere in the history of these campaigns do we find any proof that the employment of Cavalry is unsuited to the action of the battle-field. If distances have increased and the rate of fire has become more intense, horses can to-day gallop faster and further; increased mobility favours surprise; while accidents of ground offer opportunities for the combined action of sabre and carbine.

Cavalry can, of course, no longer of and by itself decide the issue of the battle—it is the secondary arm, where the Infantry is the primary arm; but Infantry will not be able to do without the help and support of Cavalry, which will contribute indirectly to the fate of the day by discovering and deranging the opponent's plans, by protecting and supporting the advance of its own Army, and by helping its commander to see his way clearly before him and to preserve his own liberty of action. At the same time a bold and enterprising Cavalry will always find an opportunity of intervention in the action and of playing its part in the actual determination of the ultimate issue.

Captain Zürn lays immense stress upon the increased moral effect of even the mere appearance of Cavalry upon an Infantry physically exhausted and mentally unnerved by the long-sustained fire-fight. He attaches little or no importance to the co-operation of dismounted Cavalry in the battle itself, pointing out how comparatively few in number are the firearms of which it can dispose. During the action the position for the large bodies of Cavalry—and only by such can decisive action be secured—is on the flanks of the Army, and from here will it be able to intervene with success in the action being waged by the other arms—at the outset of the battle, when distant and close reconnaissance has ceased, and reconnaissance during the fight has commenced, and when the exact position of the opponent's Cavalry has been made clear.

Again, towards the close of a protracted action, when the opposing Infantry are at close quarters, when the divisions hitherto held back in reserve have been thrust into the fight, the time should be at hand when the action of the Cavalry may turn the scale. But we are warned that *il faut des attaques réfléchies, un dévouement sagace, non des chevauchées désespérées.*

While the battle is in progress the long lines of guns, dependent upon the ammunition supply, are in real danger; the ammunition columns may be the prey of the Cavalry, or the guns themselves, at the moment when, during the concluding phases of the battle, they are preparing to change position.

But it is not only the Cavalry masses on the flanks which may influence the fate of the battle, but the smallest Cavalry body, even of the Divisional Cavalry, can profit by opportunity for assisting the action of its Infantry and thereby affect the general course of the engagement. Their opportunities,

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however, are less frequent and their intervention more difficult. The writer repeats more than once in the course of his article that, while Cavalry must always be *ready* to fight dismounted, its fire-action should, like its mounted attack, be of the nature of a surprise; and that Cavalry must not attempt to become mere Mounted Infantry by entering upon the fire-fight, either from the idea that it can thus appreciably influence the action, or that thus alone can it traverse the field of battle and zone of fire—*c'est la cavalerie à cheval qui reste l'important, même encore sur les champs de bataille modernes.*

But the writer especially invites attention to the effect which Cavalry may exert upon the result of a battle by hindering the combinations of troops, interrupting the ammunition supply, even for a brief period, and thus provoking a crisis which may be of the greatest importance in the forefront of the action. It may also help to deceive the opponent by occupying positions or villages, thus giving the appearance that these are strongly held by Infantry and so forcing a premature deployment.

Captain Zürn further discusses the action of Cavalry in the pursuit, differentiating between the pursuit of a routed enemy and one where the adversary is merely retiring *pour mieux sauter*. He insists that the Cavalry must, wherever possible, establish its superiority over the hostile squadrons, and that therefore the mounted attack must be sought—not merely for itself, but as a means to an end. He labours the point, as do so many Continental Cavalrymen, of the importance of the choice of the leader, of the need for recognising during peace the value of the mounted arm in war, of the necessity for maintaining at all times the proper proportion of Cavalry to the other arms, of the urgency of an increase in fire-power by artillery and machine-guns. Finally, he pleads that, while this arm should be organised, trained and manœuvred on modern lines, we must look to it that the word 'modern' *ne soit synonyme de pusillanimité devant le feu, et de mise hors de considération comme arme de combat.*

'Campaigns on the North-West Frontier.' By Captain H. L. Nevill, Royal Artillery. (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W.)

Within the space of 400 pages Captain Nevill gives the whole of the series of our numerous wars in the north-west frontier of India from the Black Mountain Expedition of 1852 to the Mohmand Expedition of 1908. All British officers should study this book, as any of them might find themselves engaged in a campaign in those regions at any date. Captain Nevill writes purely from an instructional and military point of view, and shows that the three maxims of frontier warfare are: 'Never refuse battle,' 'Never hesitate,' 'Keep the enemy on the ruh.'

His analysis of future conditions is open to controversy. He seems to overlook the fact that an enemy armed with modern rifles requires an organised ammunition supply and is induced to give up his formidable desire to get to close quarters in favour of indecisive sniping.

It is, however, an excellent and timely book which we recommend to our readers.

*Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, December 1911.—The article by Colonel von Unger on 'The Army Cavalry in the Manœuvres of 1911,' reviewed elsewhere, occupies the first place in this number. To this succeeds a paper on 'The Employment of Cavalry in Abnormally Enclosed Country,' accompanying which is a map representing what appears to be an imaginary piece of country, greatly cut up by rivers, streams, railways, &c., having many roads and tracks and small enclosures on all sides. The author takes a body of Cavalry and accompanies them through this country; he does not claim that his dispositions are perfect, but writes with a view of inviting discussion. He points out the increased initiative demanded in such country from the most subordinate commanders, and the need for more thorough training in crossing rivers, &c. In view of the extended use of wire, he urges that *every* Cavalryman should be supplied with a wire-cutter. Major von Ravelsberg relates his experiences during a march, followed by manœuvres, in 1900. His regiment left its garrison on July 20, and, halting every third day, reached its destination on August 12, having then covered about 390 miles. Within little more than a fortnight the squadron to which the writer belonged was detailed as Divisional Cavalry to an Infantry division on manœuvres; these lasted a month, and on return to quarters Major von Ravelsberg found that some of his horses had put on weight, all had preserved their condition, while there were no sore backs worth mentioning. He does not tell us where his horses mostly came from. Among the shorter papers in this number is a criticism of an article which recently appeared in *Streffleur's Magazine* on the necessity of relieving the Cavalry of some of its duties, and so enabling it to devote its energies to more purely Cavalry work. The writer draws up a comparative statement showing the number of squadrons per 100 battalions among six of the European Powers, which he works out as follows: England, excluding colonies, 100; Russia, seventy-two; Germany, seventy; Turkey, fifty-five; Austria-Hungary, fifty-two; and Italy, forty. The writer in *Streffleur's* suggests that the whole of the Austrian Cavalry should be formed into Cavalry divisions, the place of the Divisional Cavalry regiments being taken by Mounted Infantry, 325 mounted on horses and 150 on bicycles per Infantry division.

January 1912.—Occasionally the *redaktion* of this journal permits in its columns the discussion of questions of Cavalry interest, the solution being provided by the more experienced of its readers. In this number one of the questions debated is whether there is any innocuous and waterproof means of rendering grey horses less conspicuous in the field. The man who originally put the question appears to have been something of a humorist, his idea being to provide the means of transforming a grey Cavalry brigade into one of quite a different colour in the course of a single night, with a view of conveying bewilderment, alarm, and despondency to an enemy at dawn; the matter, however, is now discussed with all gravity by two veterinary officers. One of these offers two suggestions, the one for partial decoration—i.e. white stockings, blaze, &c., the other for effecting a complete transformation; for the former he recommends:

(a) A solution of *lapis infernalis*, which produces a rich brown colour, and which he guarantees to be tolerably 'fast.'

(b) A solution of tannin, which produces an iron-grey appearance.

For a complete transformation he suggests walnut-juice, which readily changes a white or grey horse into a chestnut, but the effect is unfortunately but a temporary one, and the animal is likely to revert—possibly at an inconvenient moment. The other professor is of opinion that wholesale colouring is not good for any animal, and that any decorative scheme should be carried out by degrees. The horse must be first carefully washed with soap and water with a little ammonia in it, and the colour laid on while the skin is still damp. He gives several recipes which from experience he has found tolerably efficacious, but it seems undeniable that the operation of painting a horse is a matter of considerable time, that even the best of the different dyes are not really of an enduring character, and that the *schimmel* will out. There is a long account, accompanied by sketches, of the Cavalry operations of last autumn in Northern Hungary; it is stated that the fact that the Cavalry are accustomed to seeing other arms as a rule only on a peace footing occasioned some inconvenience. For these manœuvres corps were brought up to something like war strength, and it is not to be wondered at that the Cavalry patrols often reported two companies where only one, at the increased strength, was actually represented. The country appears to have been unsuited to Cavalry, and surprises were not infrequent. There seems to have been no means of indicating at what Artillery was firing, and the decisions of the umpires appear in consequence to have been even more than usually unpopular. Major von Siegringen, of the General Staff, attempts something of the nature of a reply to a previous article in this journal, wherein the communication methods of the last manœuvres were to some extent found fault with, it being declared that all technical methods had proved generally unsatisfactory, and that the despatch-rider was, after all, the only really trustworthy agent. Major von Siegringen deprecates criticism of this kind, declares that each method of communication—wireless, telegraph, visual signalling, telephone, motor-cars, &c.—are each no more than a link in the chain, that each has its place and uses, and that failures here and there are only to be expected, until all ranks have learnt how to organise and co-ordinate all the different means of communication in the field. Rittmeister Niemann writes on 'The Air Fleet and the Cavalry in the Duty of Reconnaissance.' He says that in view of the future possibilities of the aeroplane as a scout, men are asking whether it would not be better to relieve the Army Cavalry altogether of the duties of reconnaissance, and form the Divisional Cavalry into a sort of large reservoir for despatch-riders. The observer in the aeroplane can travel so far, see so much, and return with reports so quickly, that theoretically he can effect more than the best-organised Cavalry reconnaissance. As yet, however, the aeroplane is not sufficiently reliable, being dependent upon so many climatic influences; and while it can observe only during daylight, it may be reasonably expected that as armies are increasingly supplied with aeroplanes, so will the means be multiplied with which to combat them. The aeroplane will always be the extended vision of the army commander, the Cavalry

his really reliable means of providing security and furnishing intelligence—the long arm with which he can both feel for his enemy and strike him. Hitherto the reconnoitring duties of the Cavalry have necessitated its dispersal; the aeroplane will enable the mounted arm to remain concentrated to use the intelligence gathered for it by its ally. The writer advocates the attachment to large Cavalry bodies of aerial groups, and combined practice by aeroplanes and Cavalry.

February.—Among the minor questions briefly discussed in this number is the alleged want of consideration for hostile fire shown by the Cavalry in field manœuvres. It is admitted that the difficulty of estimating the effect of fire upon a rapidly moving target such as Cavalry present is often ignored by the mounted men, and receives over-much consideration from the umpires. It is, however, considered undesirable that Cavalry should fail to go forward for fear of being fired upon or even for fear of being hit, but it is admitted that mounted men ought oftener to pay hostile fire the compliment of at once taking cover, moving out of range, or of at least setting themselves in movement. All this affords admirable practice for war, and on this account alone Cavalry should not be discouraged from advancing to positions where they are sure to draw fire. To another question—whether German Cavalry officers are in agreement with General von Bernhardt in his pessimistic views of the modern battle use of Cavalry, and in the inadvisability of organising permanent Cavalry divisions during peace—the editor replies that he does not altogether agree that General von Bernhardt's views are pessimistic. He considers that the well-known Cavalry writer means to imply that Cavalry cannot in the future be employed on the same lines as in the past; and that the influence of this arm on the decision of the battle will in the future be exerted by different methods. Agreement is also expressed in large measure with Bernhardt's opinion that permanent Cavalry divisions are not a necessity; the plea for such is made on the grounds that units would do better on service from having worked together during peace, and under the same leaders and staff, but it is pointed out that regiments cannot always be manœuvred together, and that constant changes in the *personnel* of leaders and staff are unavoidable. 'Cavalry in the War of the Future' is the title of a short paper by Lieutenant-General von Unger; the burden of this article is that the Cavalry is better than ever, but the author questions the oft-repeated statement that the Cavalry of Murat and Seydlitz were in the habit of charging and riding-down unbroken Infantry, while insisting that the men of to-day are more prone to an attack of 'nerves' and worse drilled than of old. The writer would appear to claim that while the mounted arm has improved, the Infantry has in a measure deteriorated, or at least stood still.

The Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association has a good, but somewhat lengthy, article among the Reprints and Translations. This is by Colonel Aubin, of the French Army, entitled 'The Evolution of the Ideas Concerning the Rôle and Employment of Cavalry.' We commend it to our readers.

*Militär-Wochenblatt*.—In the numbers dated February 8 and February 10 are papers by Lieutenant Count von Preysing, of the 7th Bavarian Chevaux Légers, explaining a system he has practised in his regiment for the training of Cavalry patrols in the crossing of rivers. He lays special stress upon the need for practice in running water, pointing out that many men who are good swimmers in a swimming-bath are apt to lose their heads when required to pass over a river with a fairly strong current. Swimming instruction and practice must be given until in every squadron of a regiment there are from twenty to thirty absolutely reliable and strong stream-swimmers. The writer further points out that patrols can rarely, if ever, be accompanied by technical means for crossing rivers, that in an enemy's country all boats will be removed, and that men must depend upon themselves for means of passage. The patrol-leader must, from cover, select very carefully a suitable place for entering the water, note the strength of the current, breadth, and probable landing-place; while his patrols, also covered from view, are stripping themselves and horses, and rolling their clothing, &c., in the horse-blanket, which is then stuffed into the water-proof corn-bag. These bags are then made into a raft, with the lances forming a framework, and are drawn over by a swimmer—one man can manage a raft made of ten or twelve bags. The saddles are placed astride a ladder or stout pole, and are drawn across in like manner. The men swim over with their horses. The writer recommends holding on to the mane and not the tail, and swimming on the down-stream side and not up-stream, as laid down in the German regulations. The carbines are carried across on the men's backs.

The issue of February 24 contains a paper on 'Bicycle Companies,' in which the writer endeavours to express the views of the different arms towards the creation of such detachments. In the Artillery they are regarded with indifference, the Infantry are greatly prejudiced in their favour, while in the Cavalry opinions differ very much. Some hold that it is very desirable that the Cavalry should be accorded such a support as could be afforded by such detachments, in view of the small number of rifles of which even a large body of Cavalry can dispose; others consider that wheelmen, being practically tied to the roads, would not be of much assistance to the Cavalry, that at times they might be a clog upon their movements, and again might not be forthcoming when their assistance and support were of the utmost importance. The writer is, however, in favour of the attachment of such troops to Cavalry, provided they are composed of men actually trained as Cavalry, and being Infantrymen only in regard to their higher musketry qualifications. He is, however, emphatic in insisting upon such detachments forming part and parcel of the Cavalry brigade, at the permanent disposal of the brigadier, and that they should *not* be drawn from Infantry battalions and merely temporarily lent to manœuvre or operate with Cavalry.

There has lately been some discussion in the pages of this Journal on the subject of casualties among Cavalry horses, and in a paper by Major-General Dreher in the *Militär-Wochenblatt* of March 5, he agrees that in future wars increased work will be thrown on the Cavalry, despite

the multiplication of the technical means of communication, and that horse casualties may be higher than ever. He quotes certain figures from the Russo-Japanese war, from which it appears that a total of 203,679 horses was made use of by the Russian Army, of which number rather more than half were employed in the transport and in other ways as draught animals. The total of sick horses was 120,488, or 59 per cent., while 23,068, or 11.33 per cent., were killed or missing. There are, unfortunately, no statistics to hand as to the percentage of sickness and death among the horses actually used in the front, but it is believed to be well over 59 per cent. The following are the detailed figures :

1. Wounds of back and withers . . . . .	25,230
2. Injuries or diseases of the legs . . . . .	16,145
3. Diseases of the hoofs . . . . .	9,000
4. Over-exertion . . . . .	4,642
5. Diseases of digestive organs . . . . .	19,405
6. Diseases of respiratory organs . . . . .	7,650
7. Wounded in action . . . . .	2,430
8. Killed in action . . . . .	3,701
9. Wounded and had to be shot . . . . .	1,159

From the above it will be seen that the casualties from action are hardly worth consideration as compared with those caused by hard work, indifferent food, and exposure, &c. The writer considers that much of the sickness experienced among horses on a campaign is preventible, and that just as in the last great war the percentage of actual sickness and the percentage of fatal cases among the soldiers were appreciably reduced from what we had come to imagine to be unavoidable, so in like manner should it be possible to diminish the number of casualties among horses by preventive measures practised during peace and insisted upon when war breaks out.

'Guerilla Leaders of the World.' By Mr. Percy Cross Standing. (Stanley Paul & Co., London.)

This new book deals with the personalities and work on the battlefield of a score or so of famous partisan leaders 'from Charette to De Wet.' During the period of about a hundred years covered by the author, he ranges from the irregular campaigns in La Vendée and the Tyrol to the raids of De Wet and Delarey in South Africa, from Von Schill and the 'Black Brunswickers' to Garibaldi, from Schamyl's struggles in the Caucasus to the great Cavalry heroes of the American Civil War, from Bolivar in South America to Tania Topee in the Indian Mutiny, from Abd-el-Kader in Northern Africa to Diaz and Juarez in Mexico, &c.

For his chapter dealing with the guerilla tactics of the notorious Osman Digna in the Soudan the author has received valuable aid, including a couple of rare illustrations, from the Sirdar, Lieut.-General Sir F. R. Wingate. The book is fully illustrated with plans, portraits, and pictures. We may add that Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., contributed a preface to a previous work by Mr. Cross Standing on a subject of military history.



'Das Maschinengewehr.' By Rittmeister H. Viktorin. (Vienna : Seidel und Sohn. 1911.)

Rittmeister Viktorin has had a considerable experience with Cavalry machine-gun detachments. In 1907 the Austro-Hungarian military authorities appear to have carried out something of a test between a detachment of four Maxim-guns carried on carts and one armed with the Schwarzlose machine-gun carried on pack-horses. The former detachment was during six months commanded by Rittmeister Viktorin; and when the Government finally decided upon the pack rather than the draught system of transport, Rittmeister Viktorin was again appointed to the command of one of the new detachments, which he held from 1908 until 1910. His experiences have already been recorded in the pages of the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, as have the records he has drawn up of the employment of machine-guns in Manchuria; and these are all now for the first time collected in this book, which is illustrated by many photographs, of which the chief intention seems to be to prove the extreme mobility of a detachment in which the guns



and ammunition are all carried on pack-horses. In the first part of this book the author starts out to show the part played by machine-guns in the Russo-Japanese War, to arrive at a decision as to which of the transport systems was the more practical, and to discover what was the expenditure of ammunition where machine-guns were employed. He shows that while the Japanese entered upon the war with no more than four detachments each of four guns, or a total of sixteen, they ended up with 320 of these weapons; the Russians began the campaign with only one machine-gun company, while on the conclusion of peace they had mobilised 400 machine-guns. The author describes in very considerable detail the systems in use and the manner of their employment both in attack and defence, and with Cavalry and Infantry; for this information Captain Viktorin seems to have ransacked all possible sources of information, and his notes are consequently very full and of real value.

In Part II. of his book he describes from his own experience, and from that of a brother officer, the employment of a machine-gun detachment in the manœuvres of 1908 in Western Hungary; there is a chapter on the training of a Cavalry machine-gun detachment, and another in which the relative advantages of pack and draught systems of transport of guns are exhaustively discussed. There can be no doubt which of the two systems Rittmeister Viktorin favours; he will not even admit that his

animals have ever suffered from saddle-galls, and states that there were no traces of sore backs among his horses in the five weeks of the manoeuvres of 1908, during which his detachment covered rather over 500 miles. Perhaps the most interesting chapter of this book is one in which is described a 'raid' by the Landwehr Cavalry Brigade in May 1909, in which Captain Viktorin and his detachment took part, and when the efforts demanded of men and horses appear to have been very great. The photographs, showing riding and leading over obstacles, prove the high state of mobile efficiency at which the author's different machine-gun detachments have arrived under his instruction and guidance.

'Die Heereskavallerie im deutschen Kaisermanöver 1911.' By Colonel von Unger, of the German General Staff.

The Imperial manoeuvres of last year were conducted on the general idea that 'two Red Armies have advanced in a south-easterly direction on September 7 from the line Bremervörde-Hamburg-Lübeck; a Blue Elbe Army is retiring before them on either bank of the river.' This book appears to be a republication of some papers which appeared in the Austrian *Cavalry Journal*, describing the operations of the Cavalry with each of the opposing bodies. Colonel von Unger gives the special ideas for Red and Blue and also the *ordres de bataille*; describes in considerable detail and comments upon the events of each day; and closes with some observations upon what he saw, and what is known to have transpired, during the three days that the purely Cavalry operations actually lasted. It must be regretted that from the initial positions allotted to the Army Cavalry on either side, neither was in any degree hindered in its reconnaissance by the other, and each was, further, able to devote itself to unfettered combination with the other arms in the tactics of the actual battle. Distant reconnaissance was also only possible for Red's Cavalry, and the forces seem from the first to have been in so close a proximity that the resulting reconnaissance operations assumed the character of a strong tactical reconnoitring patrol. The writer questions the wisdom of the arrangements whereby on the 13th two Red reconnoitring squadrons, whose original functions were then clearly at an end, were permitted to remain in the rear of the enemy, warring with baggage columns and rearward communications, and considers that they should have been called in betimes. Colonel von Unger is, however, of opinion that on the whole the reconnoitring bodies were excellently organised and worked, intelligence being valuable and transmitted in good time; but he admits at the same time that, owing to the distances being comparatively insignificant, the conditions were certainly unusually favourable. He is very outspoken, on the other hand, in regard to one occasion when *die Aufklärung völlig versagt*; this was on the 12th, when the left wing of the 2nd Corps fell back upon Strassburg. Here the Guard Cavalry Division was in ignorance at midnight that at midday the enemy had halted and formed front only a few kilometres to the west of Strassburg. He seems, further, to hint at a certain lack of initiative in the command of the Red Cavalry, and on occasion a failure to work in fullest accord with the other arms. Another point: the critic suggests that when once matters

have come to a tactical collision it is of infinitely greater importance that the troops already arrived at, or hastening to, the scene of action, should be informed of all that the General Officer Commanding the Army Cavalry knows of the situation in front, than that his information should be laboriously transmitted to the Army Command, probably far in the rear. Colonel von Unger has little if anything to say about the details of the reconnaissance work, of the collection and transmission of intelligence, but he declares that, from a general study of the whole operations, he has received the impression that both in the duties of reconnaissance and of the battle-field the German Cavalry is fully equal to all the demands which now and in the future may be made upon it.

Students who may wish to follow the movements of the Red and Blue Cavalries will find such labours materially lightened by the excellent large-scale maps which Colonel von Unger has provided.

'Geschichte der Reiter-Attacken.' By Carl Bleibtreu. (Berlin: Alfred Schall. 1911. Price M.5.)

This book purports to be a critical analysis of the principal Cavalry fights, commencing with those in which Cromwell was engaged and continued up to the present day. For Cromwell the author seems to have a very real admiration, as also for what he quite incorrectly describes as *Milizschwadrone*, and he claims for these that in power of manœuvre, in the *élan* of their attack, and in the energy of their pursuit, they are almost unsurpassed even in the present century. The writer falls, however, into a common-enough error—one, moreover, shared by many Englishmen, who adduce the success achieved by Cromwell's Ironsides in proof of what may be expected, in a short time and without much training, from British yeomen. It is forgotten, and Herr Bleibtreu seems unconscious of the fact, that Cromwell's Ironsides were not merely picked men, but that they were subjected to an iron discipline, while they received a very careful training. Further, they were not placed in the field as raw recruits; Cromwell began recruiting in January 1642, and it was not until May of the year following—the interval having been given up to training under a genius in war—that Cromwell had with them his first small success against the King's men. Then it is often overlooked that, while Cromwell defeated with them every Royalist general, including Rupert, there was hardly a Parliamentary leader of note, excluding Cromwell, whom Rupert had not overthrown—at least once. The author reminds us that Cromwell's tactics at Marston Moor were followed by Seydlitz at Zorndorf, and the whole record of the Cavalry actions of the Civil Wars in England shows very careful study.

There is naturally a very full account of the work of the Cavalry in the wars of the Great Frederick and in the campaigns of Revolutionary and Imperial France. English readers, however, will naturally turn to the records of the Peninsula and Waterloo campaigns, but the interest aroused for them by these will be tempered by a feeling of disappointment and possibly of irritation. These campaigns are treated of in as much detail as the scope of the work permits, but the relation of the operations of the

British forces is marred by a disposition to question, not merely the accuracy, but the *bona fides* of British historians, who are accused of misrepresentation and misstatement. The work done by Paget in the Corunna campaign is hardly accorded its due importance, and Herr Bleibtreu fails to appreciate the daring strategy of the commander whom he calls *der unvorsichtige Moore*. The reader will begin to wonder whether the British were ever present at the actions whose details Herr Bleibtreu reconstructs for him, and whether we did indeed expel the French from Portugal and Spain! It may be remarked *en passant* that the author is himself liable to err, as when he writes of the Polish Lancers as having at Albuhera cut down the *whole* of the 52nd—who were not, as it happens, present at the action! It is sincerely to be regretted that the book is disfigured by unworthy sneers at the accounts by British historians, and at the motives which, *pace* the author, have led them to say what is not. The book suffers in other ways: it has been badly planned and put together; for such a record an index is an absolute necessity, and none has been provided; again, the volume is not divided into periods, or campaigns, or *even chapters*, so that for purposes of research it is practically valueless.

'Vindex,' whose pamphlet on the (Professed) Influence of Mr. Childers on British Cavalry we reviewed last quarter, has since disclosed his identity. He is not, as we suspected, an Infantry officer, but an R.E. officer who has had considerable experience of Cavalry work. In the current number will be found a short article from his pen, illustrating the success of a simple ruse and the necessity of abstaining from fire fights when a quick decision is necessary. The pamphlet in question may be obtained from Hugh Rees & Co., 5 Regent Street, S.W.

'War Establishments (Part I.), Expeditionary Force,' issued with Army Orders, February 1912, contains a new scale of forage for units in the field which Cavalry officers will welcome. In addition to hay in countries where available, in lieu of the 10 lb. ration, a ration of 12 lb. oats for each horse and 15 lb. for heavy draught horses is authorised. This is a reform that will be much appreciated, and should add greatly to our efficiency in our next war.

'Fire Problems.' By Major-General T. D. Pilcher, C.B. (London: Hugh Rees, 5 Regent Street, S.W.)

This is a timely work, and comprises a series of field-firing competitions for forces of varying size, from two men to a brigade, carried out by the Sirhind Brigade in India. They are designed to bridge the gulf between target-shooting and tactics; their solution depends on common-sense and fire discipline. Regimental and squadron commanders should get this little work, and, if in England there is a difficulty in getting the use of ground for field-firing, similar exercises to be carried out on a range with a panorama target will suggest themselves.

## NOTES

## PROBLEM No. XI.—RESULT

THIRTY-TWO solutions were submitted for this problem, which appeared in the last October number, a large proportion of which came from N.C.O.s of the Yeomanry.

The solution of Sergeant L. Farror, 1st Field Troop, Royal Engineers, 1st Cavalry Brigade, Aldershot, which is given below, has been adjudged the best, and the prize of the 'Cavalry' watch has been forwarded to him.

## SOLUTION

*Defence of Axeter Bridge: Measures for Security and Defence*

On being left at Axeter the following points would be carried out at once :—

(1) Send out two examining posts of one N.C.O. and two men each (mounted) 2000 yards north of bridge and 1000 north of rifle-pits, and one 1000 yards south of points, 200 south of bridge, instructed to watch surrounding country and to give alarm in case of approach of bodies of inhabitants, and to stop any individuals from approaching nearer the bridge, any non-compliance with the order to halt being authority to shoot.

These posts would be relieved at intervals, and by sentries at rifle-pits, &c., at dark.

The troop would be told off in part under N.C.O.s or reliable men to the various posts, each party at night furnishing its sentry, working in conjunction with one another, those in command being given orders of procedure in case of attack.

(2) Make out plan of defence and set men to work.

(a) The river being low, indicating summer, the horses would be picketed on the east bank of river north of bridge out of sight of surrounding country and if possible under cover of rifle-fire from bridge. (Out-buildings at Lone Tree Farm are not selected owing to being too far from bridge and water.)

(b) Wagon ammunition, stores, and supplies would be packed on bridge.

(c) At points 200 yards south of bridge, east and west of road, rifle-pits for *four men each* would be dug at highest points to command surrounding country with a bullet-proof parapet all round; also small communication trench to allow of entering to and from bridge, particular attention being paid to assimilation.

(d) Lone Tree Farm living-house would be loopholed, both stories on all sides or windows barricaded.

(e) A half-circle of fire-trenches would be dug north of bridge extending from east to west bank, having a radius from bridge of 1000 yards, the trenches having an outward bullet-proof parapet and recessed, the bridge side being sloped so that the trenches would be useless to attackers in case of retirement to bridge.

(f) A barricade would be erected at each end of bridge in case of a retirement to same being necessary, the wood and nails from out-buildings of Lone Tree Farm and road metalling being used.

(g) The parapet of bridge would be notched.

If retirement to bridge became necessary the horses would have to be abandoned, as the bridge would be held at all costs.

The risks of taking horses on to the bridge by defenders, owing to stampeding, is too great, also parapet too low.

(h) Communication by pre-arranged signals would be made from rifle-pits and Lone Tree Farm to bridge by means of wire run from pits, &c., to bridge, empty ration-tins with pebbles in them being attached to wire to attract attention.

(i) The ford in river Drome is too far from bridge and garrison too small to allow of its being held.

(j) The telegraph lines would be left intact.

(k) Distances in 100 yards would be marked out from bridge, farm, and trenches to insure accurate rifle-fire.

#### *Disposition of Force for Attack*

The disposition of troop would be as follows by night and day :—

Four men at each point 200 yards south of bridge ;

Four men at Lone Tree Farm ;

Twelve men, fire-trenches, north of bridge ;

Five men at bridge to attend to horses, cooking, &c., and to act as reserve in case of necessity.

The day-patrols would be furnished by one man from each post south of bridge and three by trenches north of bridge.

By night each post furnish sentry, the trenches north of bridge furnishing sentries for river-bank east and west of bridge.

Men to sleep in trenches and farm.

In case of attack, each party will stand to posts. No post will be strengthened by weakening others unless it is absolutely certain that an attack cannot be made before such posts can be regarrisoned.

Should it become obvious that all or one of the posts south of bridge could not be held, the whole would withdraw to bridge.

The Committee desire to express their best thanks to Captain P. H. A. Anderson, 21st (E.I.) Lancers, for kindly setting the problem, and to the staff of the Cavalry School for acting as referees.

## THE LATE MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HENRY SCOBELL, K.C.V.O., C.B.

WE regret to announce the death, which took place at Cape Town on February 1, of Major-General Sir Henry Scobell, commanding the Cape of Good Hope District, who had been seriously ill with enteric fever.

The lamented death of Sir Henry Scobell at the comparatively early age of fifty-three will be deeply mourned by a wide circle of relatives and friends, and not less by the Army, which loses in him a fine leader of horse.

Left an orphan at an early age, Harry Scobell—as he was best known to his friends—was brought up with his brother and sisters at Aldermaston Court by his aunt, the late Mrs. Higford Burr, and was very early initiated into all the mysteries of fieldcraft by Squire Burr, a sportsman of the old school, whose knowledge of guns and rifles and of birds and beasts endeared him to many a lover of natural history, and in whose beautiful park wild animal life was seen at its best. After leaving Eton Scobell entered the Army through the Militia, and joined the Scots Greys, in which regiment his guardian, the late Colonel Sutherland, had fought at Balaclava. Harry Scobell soon singled himself out, and became a spoilt favourite of society. Tall and handsome in appearance, with charming manners, he had a beautiful seat on a horse and the lightest of hands. A very fair bat, fond of hunting, shooting, racing, and of riding between the flags, he quickly excelled in the accomplishments of the Cavalry officer of that day, and had his fair share both of the successes and the disasters of steeplechasing.

When quite a young man he was attracted by the possibilities of New Mexico, and became, with his brother, Mr. Calvert Scobell, the owner of an extensive ranche near Chihuahua. The venture turned out ill, and Scobell lost so much money in the enterprise that he was seriously hampered in the pursuit of his profession. But there was never a better example of the adage 'Money lost, little lost,' for Scobell knew how to bear up against all misfortunes of a material kind, and by living quietly for a while as adjutant of the Wiltshire Yeomanry was able to recover himself and to continue in the profession which he loved. Many stories are told of his pluck in the hunting field and between the flags. On one occasion, when the field was pounded by the closing of railway gates at a level crossing, Scobell jumped his horse over one gate on to the rails and out again over the other gate without turning a hair. He was a better man in the hunting field than on the racecourse, but he could ride a race with very fair judgment, while his nerve was never at fault. Nothing ever deterred Scobell if there was a day's hunting to be had or a race to be ridden, and whether his horse was good or bad was almost a matter of indifference to him so long as he could have the mount.

His chance as a soldier came in South Africa. Going out with his regiment as a major who had seen no service, he soon marked himself out by bold reconnaissance work, and at Abraham's Kraal on March 10, 1900, he pushed on to within four hundred yards of the Boer lines and brought

back valuable information to General French. Two days later Scobell did a brilliant piece of work at Brand Kop. Here the Boers were intrenched, and General French had decided to seize at all hazards a ridge near it occupied by the enemy. To Scobell and his squadron orders were given to rush the ridge. With sixty men Scobell swung out wide to the right, galloped to the eastern end, dismounted, and clambered up. There were five hundred Heidelbergers on the ridge, but they were seized with panic and fled. As they ran, they met several hundred men coming up to reinforce them, and as Scobell reached the top of the hill in failing light with thirty men he saw a crowd of Boers just below him arguing whether they should go on or back. A volley or two settled the question, and the key to Bloemfontein was won.

Less lucky later on, Scobell was involved in the disaster at Silikat's Nek, where 240 men under Colonel Roberts were overwhelmed by Delarey after suffering seventy casualties. In the confusion which followed the disaster Scobell managed to escape on foot, and a couple of months later surprised Barberton with sixty men, cut the railway, and secured the Landdrost of Vryheid with £10,000 in gold and notes. At the end of 1900 Scobell was in command of a small column in Cape Colony, and in February 1901 took an active share in the pursuit first of Kritzingen and Herzog, and then of Scheepers and Malan. In this campaign Scobell's untiring energy was rewarded on September 4 by a marked success. The rebel Lotter with 140 men, who had defied all attempts to close, had laagered at Bower's Hoek in the Bankberg. Scobell, under cover of a heavy storm, raided the laager at night with the 9th Lancers and some Colonial troops, and after a fierce fight, in which forty-six Boers fell, disposed of the whole commando. Later again Scobell and Monro had several bouts with Fouché, and killed or captured many of his men and horses.

Scobell, says *The Times History of the War*, 'was one of the ablest Cavalry leaders whom the war in the Colony had produced,' and this was the general opinion of the Army. Held in high esteem by General French, under whose orders he had almost continually served in the war, Scobell received rapid promotion, and became, first commander of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, then Major-General, and finally Inspector of Cavalry in 1907. This rapid advancement was on the whole unfortunate for him. He had neither leisure nor opportunity to fit himself by study for the higher leading of troops, and his good services in the war did not wholly make up for his want of education in the higher branches of his profession. In the Cavalry exercises of 1908 Scobell failed to reach the high standard expected of commanders by Sir John French. There was much excuse for him. The Cavalry Division had never been assembled before, and no one was accustomed to train and handle such a force. Scobell himself was ill, but concealed the fact with his customary pluck. Inexorable fate removed him from the arm which he loved, and consigned him, by a tragedy of irony, to die in command in the Colony in which his gallantry had been so conspicuous, but in which, however, he lived long enough to achieve a remarkable popularity in times of peace. Both as General Officer Commanding,



and on one occasion as Acting Governor of Cape Colony, he did much in the last few years to bring together the various discordant elements of South African society, and many English visitors will retain a delightful memory of his home at the Woolsack, the bungalow which Cecil Rhodes originally built for Mr. Kipling on the slopes of Table Mountain. He was created C.B. in 1904 and K.C.V.O. on the occasion of the Duke of Connaught's visit in 1910.

Greater generals than Scobell have no doubt commanded our Cavalry in the past, and men of more brilliant attainments, but the memory of Harry Scobell will always remain dear to those who knew him as he was, a thorough gentleman, a true friend, and the pattern of a dashing Cavalry officer.—*The Times*.

### AN OIL-CAKE FACTORY

By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

A VISIT to an oil-cake factory does not sound an interesting incident for a Cavalry man, but I found it of a more than normal interest to me.

The buildings were like those of any other great factory in their outside appearance. Near by was a bright village of red-roofed villa houses, with their gardens to them, looking homelike and comfortable. These are the workmen's dwellings. Within the factory were the great whirling engines—5,000 horse-power turbines, humming and making the floor to throb; the massive grinding and mixing machines; the hydraulic presses squeezing oil out of an apparently dry mess and kneading it into flat, hard cakes, and gangs of men handling them deftly and quickly as the machines delivered them. It was the men who attracted me, for they were all of them ex-soldiers, the large proportion being Cavalry men. That was where the interest came in.

The employers have found the value of the Army man as a smart and punctual worker, who can obey orders or take command as may be required.

Here at the head of a small squad of hurrying workers I found the former trumpet-major of my regiment. There a late sergeant of Dragoons was looking still every inch a Dragoon, though shovelling seed in the grain store. Here a smart and dandy foreman was pointed out to me as a former Hussar, while in the sack store a light-work billet had been found for a man who had been handicapped by a Boer bullet through the thigh.

A few words with these men showed me that they were all contented with their lot. Paid by piecework, a gang working well together could make from 45s. to 48s. a week apiece.

They were well cared for. Their nice-looking houses cost 7s. a week, and besides these there was the club with its splendid gymnasium, billiards, and baths.

The manager told me how, when strikes were the order of the day, the pickets came and called to the men to come out. Their reply was, 'If we come out it will be to chuck you in the river,' and the pickets

thought it safer to retire. These men, having got work which they could do, and pay that was good, and managers who were human, were not going to be the slaves of a few agitators and come out on strike for no reason beyond intimidation. They had some pluck of their own and some sense of fairness to those who were employing them, and they simply went on with their work quite unmoved by the strikes around them.

In acting thus they had shown that spirit which is common among soldiers. They do what they are paid to do in carrying out their routine duties, but their good spirit also prompts them to do more than they are paid for when some crisis demands it. The same spirit, in fact, moves them in their industrial work which governs them in the Service, where a man will risk his life to save a comrade, or to do his duty exactly the same, whether he is getting 1s. 4d. as a private or 4s. 6d. as a sergeant. It is not the money that influences, but it is that undefinable attribute—the British spirit.

Goods of British manufacture show influence of that same spirit all over the world. Other countries may produce the same article—the same in appearance and make—but all will acknowledge there is a bit of extra good work put into the British sample—the little bit that is not paid for, but which comes from the workman's inherent pride in his work.

But though the managers take none but ex-soldiers, it is not every ex-soldier that will suit them. In the first place, they will not take any man who has been over two years away from the colours, because he is apt to have slacked off and lost the discipline. They will not take a man who has not either a 'very good' or an 'exemplary' character on leaving.

The moral of this is that soldiers, while serving, should be warned by officers and N.C.O.s that if they like to do their work well while in the ranks it will make the whole difference in their lives afterwards. Good billets can be found for every man who leaves the Service with 'exemplary' or 'very good' character.

'Good' or 'fair' characters is no use to employers, and the soldier who can only show this at the end of his service has seen the best of his life. Nobody has any use for the ex-soldier who is shifty and who can turn his hand to nothing. Many an old soldier has come to me in rags and dirt cursing himself for having missed his chance, while in the Service, of putting by a few shillings a week instead of dropping them into the canteen till. It was the one chance of his life for making a little nest-egg which would have set him up in civil life in a very different plane. Let those who are still serving think of this before it is too late.

#### YEOMANRY COMMANDS

The undermentioned officers have been appointed to command the following mounted brigades respectively :—

Eastern.—Colonel H. W. Hodgson, C.V.O., late 15th Hussars.

London.—Colonel Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bart., D.S.O., late 19th Hussars.

S. Midland.—The Earl of Longford, K.P., M.V.O., late 2nd Life Guards.

Welsh Border.—Colonel E. A. Herbert, M.V.O., late Inniskilling Dragoons.

## YEOMANRY ARMAMENT

By MAJOR LORD ASHBURTON, *Hampshire Carabiniers*

The article by Major Watkin in the January number of the *CAVALRY JOURNAL* deals with a question that has for a long time agitated the minds of many Yeomanry officers—namely, the issue of a second weapon to the Yeomanry.

In the article referred to the writer describes in somewhat humorous language what would in all probability occur when a collision took place, as it would be bound to do on many occasions, between a Yeomanry patrol and one of the enemy's, and shows clearly the insidious position of a Yeomanry trooper under such circumstances—a position which a very large number of Yeomanry officers have fully recognised, hence the demand which exists among them for a second weapon. While entirely agreeing with Major Watkin's conclusion as to the necessity for a second weapon, the present writer reaches that conclusion by a different road, both as to the use the weapon is to be put to and as to what it should be.

The weapon Major Watkin suggests is a sword-bayonet—a compromise, and, like the vast majority of compromises, an unsatisfactory solution to the question. Apparently, all he is able to say for it is that 'it may not be of a very deadly character when used mounted, but at any rate it will be a weapon.' A weapon of which no more can be said than this degenerates into a mere instrument, and cannot in any way give the man armed with it confidence in himself, or foster the 'offensive spirit' that Major Watkin so rightly wishes to see impressed on the men.

Take the question dealt with by Major Watkin which amounts to hurling dismounted Yeomanry, in company with Infantry, at trenches. When one considers that, as he rightly says, 'little or no regular Cavalry will be available, on the Yeomanry will fall the serious duties of guiding and guarding their Infantry at all times and joining them in their battles,' one may think twice as to whether one can afford to employ them in this way. In the event of the trenches being carried and the enemy retiring, there would be a very seriously weakened Yeomanry regiment or brigade to follow them up, keep in touch with them, and do them what damage they could. In the event of a repulse and a retreat of their Infantry, the ability of the Yeomanry for rear-guard duties would be impaired, as it would be for their subsequent duty as the 'eyes and ears' of the Army. Infantry can put every man in the firing-line; Yeomanry cannot. What with scouts and patrols sent out, and the number threes with the horses, the number of rifles available is very much diminished as compared with the numerical strength of the regiment, and diminished to such an extent that it seems questionable whether what remains could make any appreciable difference, especially when that difference must be set against the diminution of a force absolutely necessary to an Army situated, as Major Watkin has described it, 'with little or no regular Cavalry available.' There will be plenty of other work for Yeomanry on the battlefield besides loosing them at entrenchments on the assumption that they know all an

Infantry man's work as well as their own. For these reasons the necessity of a sword-bayonet seems to the writer superfluous, and cannot be compared to the necessity for a weapon of a simple though 'deadly character' for use when mounted, for as at present armed a Yeomanry scout or patrol not only has not got the 'fighting chance' alluded to by Major Watkin when a collision such as he has described occurs, but has not the ghost of a chance. A sword-bayonet would not remedy this, and might in a few men inspire a false confidence, but not in many, for it would require a vast deal of faith to have much confidence in a weapon which starts by giving away several inches to any type of Cavalry sword. It must be remembered that the Yeomanry training is with the exception of shock tactics the same as that of regular Cavalry, and on detached duties the chances of sudden collision with the enemy are common to both. It is therefore difficult to follow the argument that maintains that the lesser trained man must be further handicapped by being left helpless when mounted.

To satisfactorily equip the Yeomanry with a weapon for use mounted, which is when they will need it most, cannot be done with any weapon which is a compromise, still less if the compromise can be referred to in the terms used by Major Watkin—terms which quite fairly describe the sword-bayonet in relation to the mounted soldier. It is surely not too much to ask that a 'fighting chance' should be given the Yeomanry by the issue of a thrusting sword, as its effectiveness would depend on its being used in one way, and in one way only; all the complicated cuts of the old type of weapon would disappear, thereby very considerably simplifying its use. Carried on the saddle, no man could then complain that he had not got the 'fighting chance' alluded to by Major Watkin. The writer is confident that the men would do all in their power to acquire some degree of proficiency in the use of a weapon which is certainly not unpopular with them, being well aware that its possession would go far to eliminate chances of their finding themselves in one of the various quandaries Major Watkin describes in the beginning of his article. As he says, 'Yeomanry officers speak very feelingly on the subject,' but of the many with whom the writer has spoken, none ever troubled about a second weapon for dismounted use, their desire being for one which would give their men the 'fighting chance' when carrying out the detached duties referred to above, fully realising that in war, when it is known that a certain force, though mounted, is unable to put up a semblance of a fight under that condition, there will be plenty of mounted men who will do their utmost to catch them on their horses, knowing well that there can be but one end to the 'rencontre,' and that entirely satisfactory to themselves.

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Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, C.B., Inspector of Cavalry, has been appointed Colonel of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers, vice the late Major-General Sir H. J. Scobell, K.C.V.O., C.B.

Major-General Allenby has also been appointed a member of the Council of the Royal United Service Institution.

## ERRATUM

The article on 'Training of a Remount' which appeared in the January number, was unfortunately attributed to Lieutenant S. J. Hardy (now Captain and Adjutant), Royal Scots Greys, whereas it should have been Lieutenant E. J. Hardy (now Captain), Royal Scots Greys.

The Managing Editor expresses his regret that this error should have occurred.

## REGIMENTAL MEDALS

With reference to the article on the above in the last number, a correspondent has kindly called our attention to the following :—

*7th Light Dragoons.*—There is no record of the names of either Sergeant James Duncan, Sergeant P. White, J. Jennings, or 'J. Jeffs' in the records of this regiment. The last name is a somewhat uncommon one, however, and it may be worth while to mention that there was a Thomas Jeffs, Cornet, March 7, 1816, and Lieutenant and Adjutant March 7, 1819. He retired on half pay June 14, 1827, being succeeded by Lieutenant Christopher Tower. He served at Waterloo, but not as a commissioned officer. Medal.

*13th Light Dragoons.*—There is no record of any man of the name of John R. Singleton in this regiment. The Service Troop, Depot Troop, and all other lists have been most carefully searched. Probably he enlisted under an assumed name, but as these medals, as far as the engraved portions were concerned, were issued in blank and the recipients had to have them engraved themselves, it is possible that John R. Singleton put his real name on the medal, adding his regimental number and troop for purposes of identification.

William Minchin was appointed Quartermaster of the 13th Light Dragoons September 10, 1812. He served with the regiment at Waterloo (medal). He was appointed to the 53rd Foot September 7, 1826. He died October 12, 1830, and was succeeded by William Fair.

C. R. B. B.

## SKIRMISH OF SULEIMAN-KHAN-KILA, AFGHANISTAN, 1880

By 'VINDEK'

While a subaltern in the Cavalry Brigade during Sir Donald Stewart's advance from Candahar to Cabul I had (on two days out of every three) to command a troop (sixty men) foraging in the afternoon, after we had completed our march in the morning. This was the only way the Cavalry subsisted, and the grain was hidden in the villages, buried in walls, graves, &c., often difficult to find. One day (April 17) the Brigade-Major (now General Sir George Bird) said to me, 'There is to be fighting to-day, and you are to have the troop' (19th Bengal Lancers). Fifty Infantry were attached to the troop, and 500 mules with 167 drivers, say one driver to each three saddled mules, pack saddles, and grain-bags, &c. Further, I was offered two guns R.H.A. if I wanted them : altogether a nice force for

a subaltern, as I then was. I refused the guns advisedly, from previous experience of foraging and skirmishing.

The villages, two or three of them, were five miles from camp, over rolling downs. When I sighted them at about three miles distant, I estimated the enemy in position as about two thousand armed villagers (such as attacked us as Ahmed Khel two days later).

I then tried a ruse or dodge. I tied my mules in threes, nose to tail, and mounted the drivers on the leading mules, forming a line three deep, of a front of, say, 170 files; and I directed these to follow me at a distance of half-a-mile, to simulate a reserve of Cavalry. Of course the hostile villagers had no field glasses. I did not stop the advance an instant, but had this done by some native sapper corporals who were with me.

At about one mile from the villages Lieutenant Gordon, 19th Bengal Lancers, joined me, getting up from a sick bed to help in the fight that was expected.

At 500 yards Gordon said, 'I think the Infantry should attack.' I replied, 'Let them attack at once, but with the bayonet only. No firing on any account, and I will charge in support at 300 yards with the troop.'

At 300 yards I merely let my horse go, saying nothing whatever, but the men and horses were strung up with the tension of a five miles advance at a walk, so they yelled and swung their lances round their heads, and the trumpeter sounded the charge of his own accord.

When we were all (Infantry and Cavalry) about 150 yards from the enemy, they broke and scattered over the rocky hills to the rear of their villages, and skirting the cultivated plain we had traversed, I got the best haul of grain during the whole march, and retired unmolested. Gordon heard a shot or two with the left picquet, but I heard none.

While we were loading the grain some of the enemy's Cavalry appeared, but Gordon chased them away.

This skirmish is only remarkable to me because firing of any sort would have spoilt the whole thing.

Firstly, it would have revealed that my reserve was a sham.

Secondly, it would have made a desultory fight that might have lasted indefinitely, and might have had any conclusion. It would certainly have delayed our loading up the grain.

Thirdly, even if we had inflicted fire loss on the enemy, it would have only served to irritate them, and possibly the loss of a chief, or such-like, would have made them keen for revenge and brought them all on us *when we retired*, as we knew we had to, and which is the really critical time with Orientals or mountaineers of any country.

Hence my maxim always has been, *never use fire* except when obliged to; and it has saved me from destruction on several occasions which I need not detail.

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The Middlesex Hussars (1st County of London Yeomanry) have now moved from their old quarters at Rutland Yard, Knightsbridge, to the Duke of York's Headquarters, Chelsea, S.W.

Among other mounted units already quartered there is King Edward's Horse (the King's Oversea Dominions Regiment).

## FOREIGN

*France.*—The Cavalry will take an important part in the manœuvres of this year. General Sordet, commander of the 4th Cavalry Division, will conduct the operations of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions and of a provisional division formed from two corps brigades. General de Lastours, commanding the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, will direct the manœuvres of the 3rd Cavalry Division and of a provisional division of three corps brigades. General Marion, member of the *Conseil supérieur de la guerre*, will be in command of the 2nd, 6th, and 8th Cavalry Divisions and two brigades of corps Cavalry. All these different operations will last for eight days, and they are so arranged that the brigades of corps Cavalry will all be free to take part also in the manœuvres in which their corps are engaged. In the Army manœuvres of the year the 1st and 7th Cavalry Divisions are to take part. These manœuvres will be directed by General Joffre, chef d'état major général, and Generals Galliéni and Marion will command the two forces. It will be seen from the above that this year eight existing Cavalry divisions, two provisional divisions, and two brigades of corps Cavalry will in all be exercised.

*Germany.*—So far as at present arranged, this year in Prussia a Cavalry division will be told off to the manœuvres of the 1st and 8th Army Corps at Arys and Elsenborn respectively. Cavalry Division A will be composed of the Leibhusaren Brigade and the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with a machine-gun detachment and a brigade of Horse Artillery; Division B will contain the 15th, 28th, and 30th Cavalry Brigades, and also a machine-gun detachment and a Horse Artillery brigade. Probably two Cavalry divisions will take part in the Army manœuvres, so that altogether no more than four Cavalry divisions will be exercised in Germany this year.

At the Hanover Riding School ninety-two Cavalry and forty-one Artillery subalterns are this year to go through the course, while at the Paderborn School in Westphalia forty Cavalry subalterns are to attend. Leave has been granted to an American, a Brazilian, and a Spanish officer to go through the course at Hanover, while a Roumanian officer attends at Paderborn.

*Italy.*—In the Cavalry and Horse Artillery men who re-engage for a third year's Army service are granted a bounty, the amount of which is fixed annually by Royal decree. For last year the amount was laid down at 500 *lire*, but it has been found to be insufficient to attract the required number of re-engagements, and consequently for the current year the bounty has been raised to 600 *lire*, and to 700 for such men as are employed in breaking young horses at the remount depôts.

*Russia.*—The last number of the *Russian Cavalry Journal* for 1911 contains a paper by Count Bragation wherein he draws certain lessons from an attack by Russian Cavalry on Japanese Infantry at the village of Zinzaipoa, described in the official history of the war in Manchuria lately published in Russia. The attack was made by several sotnias of the 4th Regiment of Ural Cossacks upon two companies of Japanese, who were

completely defeated and put to flight, having fifty-seven men wounded, 100 killed, and leaving thirty-nine prisoners in the hands of the Cossacks, who lost only one man killed and seven wounded; twelve horses were also wounded. From the history of this and other attacks by Cavalry in the same campaign, Count Bragation lays down that the horses must be thoroughly broken and made to stand fire perfectly; that the Cossacks must be provided with spurs, as otherwise they cannot properly control their mounts in the *mêlée*; that both ranks must be armed with the lance, for he holds that this is the only really reliable weapon, not only in the charge, but in the *mêlée*. (Many Japanese, he relates, fired at the Cossacks when lying on the ground, and although ridden over, remained uninjured, as they could not be reached with the sword.) The provision of wheeled carriage to accompany Cavalry in the field is to be deprecated, as such cramps the mobility of the mounted arm; the writer finds also that the Horse Artillery batteries are not sufficiently mobile, the gun being too heavy; the ammunition waggons, too, should not be heavier in draught than the guns. Finally, he insists upon a very high standard of professional ability and physical energy among Cavalry officers of all ranks, especially among the leaders.

## BALANCE, FLEXION, AND BITTING

By 'NEMO'

I have read with interest the article in your October number on 'Balance, Flexion, and Biting of Horses.' This article deals very ably with the theoretical part of the question, and I have thought that it might be of interest to your readers to hear something of the practical side from the bit-maker's point of view. At the outset I must say that I am astonished that 'Xenophon II.' does not make some allusion to Major Dwyer and his book on 'Seats and Saddles.' The views enunciated by 'Xenophon II.' are absolutely, so far as regards biting, word for word, and diagram for diagram, the same as those of Major Dwyer, and, so far as they affect the formation of the bit advocated for general use, the nett result is, in the opinion of the author, that the length of the upper end of the curb bit should measure, from the bearing point of the curb chain to the centre of the mouthpiece,  $1\frac{3}{4}$  in., and the length of the lower end  $3\frac{1}{2}$  in.—that is to say that the proportion between the upper and lower end should be as two is to one for an ordinary good-mouthed horse, and that the length of the lower cheek should be lengthened in order to make the bit more severe, and that it should be shortened to make it more easy—the upper end remaining the same for horses from 15.2 to 16.1.

Now, this is precisely the plan upon which most intelligent bit-makers have been working for many years. They have accepted Major Dwyer's measurements, so far as regards the cheeks, but they have found that his measurements as regards the width of the mouthpiece are absolutely impossible. Major Dwyer gives  $4\frac{1}{2}$  in. and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  in. as the correct measurement for most bits for horses 15.3 to 16.2. I have not the least hesitation



in saying that the correct measurement for solid bits for horses from 15.3 to 16.2 should be as nearly as possible 5 in. I have proved the correctness of this over and over again. I have made Dwyer bits, against my judgment, exactly to his measurements, and I have had them returned to me almost invariably:  $4\frac{1}{2}$  in. is too narrow even for a bit destined for an Arab pony;  $4\frac{1}{2}$  in. even is on the narrow side, and  $4\frac{3}{4}$  in. is better still. It always seems to me that these very accurate measurements of the comparative length of the upper and lower cheeks are all upset by the action of the movable mouthpiece. They are only applicable to the fixed mouthpiece, and, therefore, if a movable mouthpiece is deemed necessary I always advise that the part in which it moves should be as short as possible, and not, as one frequently sees it, an inch, or even more, in length. I have tried to ascertain when the movable mouthpiece came into fashion. I have talked to the oldest practical Loriner whom I have met, and he tells me that sixty years ago he used to make one movable bit to over fifty fixed bits; and in the present day I am certain that the relation has been completely reversed. The trade-name for a bit with a fixed mouthpiece is a 'solid' bit. It may astonish some of your readers to know that a solid bit is really made out of one piece of metal. The cheeks are not welded to the mouthpiece, but are forged out of the solid, and a very pretty piece of forging it is; and here I must utter a lament. The bit-forging trade is fast falling into decay, and in another generation I am afraid it will be numbered amongst the lost arts. There will be bits, of course, but they will not be hand-forged. Some will be stamped, and some will be cast. Apparently the work of forging is a little too hard for the present generation—one seldom hears of a lad being apprenticed to the trade. Cheap stamped bits and cheap cast bits of white metal are gradually forcing the best work out of the market, and twenty years hence I doubt if it will be possible to obtain a hand-forged bit from the best Wardlow steel. The Loriner will have joined the Armourer—his vocation will have gone. I wonder if 'Xenophon II.' has ever come across a treatise on biting by Don Juan Segundo, written early in the last century? He would find in it much interesting matter, and, strange to say, Segundo gives as the proper length of the upper cheek  $1\frac{1}{2}$  in., but the lower he advises being made three times as long for a good-mouthed horse. He goes into much detail, and adopts as his standard not the fixed solid mouthpiece, but one with a rotary movement in a quarter of a circle, which movement strikes me as being preferable to the ordinary sliding movement up and down; and, moreover, he advocates making the port 'exteriorily after the shape of the palate,' and 'interiorily after the shape of the tongue,' which also seems to me sound. This rotary movement is the same as one sees in a Banbury bit, and the secret of the success of both lies in the fact that the cheeks thereby act independently of each other, and the action of the curb chain is much more direct than is the case with ordinary shifting or solid bits. This mention of the Segundo bit reminds me that his was a favourite bit with the late Mr. Maunsell Richardson—he rode almost all his horses in it, and, with his wonderful hands, the results were marvellous, but they

were far different when his friends tried to emulate his example. It was a case of 'playing with edged tools.'

Another bit which has a history of its own is the Chifney. This also depends for its severity upon the direct action of the curb chain, and in order to secure this direct action it has a sort of double upper-end. To the outside upper-end the bridle-head is attached, to the inner upper-end the curb chain is fixed, so that by this means no pressure from the rein is communicated to the top of the horse's head—it is all transferred to the curb chain itself. This bit was invented by the elder Chifney, and I am sure it must have been to this bit that Chifney referred when he wrote :

'If the Jockey Club will be pleased to give me 200 guineas I will make them a bridle as I believe never was, and I believe never can be, excellent for their light-weights to hold their horses from running away.'

Alas for the vanity of inventors' hopes! We find poor Chifney dying in 1807 in the Fleet Prison, to which he had been consigned by Latchford, the bit-maker, for a debt of £350 for the manufacture of Chifney bits. No wonder they had no sale—they are the most severe bits which I have ever seen. Chifney, who wrote that 'a horse should be induced to ease himself an inch at a time as his situation would allow, and that this should be done as if you had a silken rein as fine as a hair, and that you were afraid of breaking it,' might use these bits with impunity, but not so the multitude upon whom bit-makers have to depend for their livelihood.

#### By 'ZUNGENFREIHEIT.'

In the interesting article on 'The Mechanical Laws of Balance, Flexion, and Biting,' by Xenophon II. in the last October number of the JOURNAL, no mention is made of *the size of the port* of the bit.

Surely this is one of the most important and difficult points to settle on when selecting a suitable bit for a horse? Many people do not appear to appreciate the fact that the port is simply made to give the tongue more or less freedom as desired.

Horses vary considerably both in the width of the tongue groove and also in the size and shape of the tongue—hence the trouble. I suggest that the reason so many horses nowadays get their tongues over the bit is that the port in these cases is not made large enough to give big and coarse tongues sufficient 'tongue freedom.' A horse in consequence plays about with his tongue till he eventually gets into the annoying trick of placing the latter over the mouth-piece. How often one sees a horse going particularly well in a heavy bit with the curb chain hanging so loosely as to be quite useless? Granted that this horse has a fairly good mouth, I maintain that owing to the heavy bit generally having a large port, this horse finds that he has plenty of tongue freedom, and so in consequence feels quite comfortable—probably going even better in this than in a 'nut-cracker' snaffle. I cannot help thinking that most people do not take sufficient trouble to ascertain the details of the tongue, and that if more attention was paid to this in the first place the correct selection of the bit would be made much quicker and easier.

LONDON'S GREAT QUADRIGA  
THE TRIUMPH OF A CAVALRY OFFICER

It has long been considered a reproach to the metropolis of the Empire that the three fine arches which beautify the entrances to Hyde Park and the top of Constitution Hill have never been completed, from the artistic point of view, by surmounting them with suitable groups of statuary such as are to be found on many of the triumphal and commemorative arches in continental capitals. It is a matter of congratulation, therefore, that this reproach has now been removed, as far as one of London's great arches is concerned, by the placing in position on the Constitution Hill arch of the imposing Quadriga, the work of Captain Adrian Jones, C.V.O., one of the first sculptors of the day, the informal inauguration of which by his Majesty the King took place on the afternoon of April 2.

Captain Adrian Jones, who was born on February 9, 1845, at Ludlow, in Shropshire, entered the Army Veterinary Service in January, 1867, joining the Royal Horse Artillery. He served with the 3rd Hussars during the Abyssinian campaign of 1868, being present at the battle of Arogee and the capture of Magdala, receiving the medal. On returning to England he rejoined the Horse Artillery, but in June, 1871, was appointed to the Queen's Bays, with which regiment he served for ten years, taking part in the Boer War of 1881. He was next employed on special duty in South Africa, and on his return to England rejoined the Horse Artillery; he was again detached on special duty to Egypt in 1884, taking part in the Nile Expedition under Lord Wolseley, receiving the medal with clasp and the bronze star, and on his return to England was next appointed to the 2nd Life Guards, with which regiment he continued to serve until he retired in 1891.

From his early days Captain Jones was always fond of painting; he took pains to cultivate his latent talent, and after joining the Service spent much of his spare time in learning the *technique* of the art, and when on active service sent home many sketches which were published in the *Illustrated London News* and the *Graphic*. His natural love for horses and sport gave him subjects for his pictures, and he made a speciality of portraits of race-horses and hunters, painting many winners of the Derby and Grand National, notably Persimmon, Diamond Jubilee, and Ambush II., and Captain W. Leetham's (5th Dragoon Guards) Roman Oak. He also made models of many of these horses, having in 1880 turned his attention to sculpture, and exhibited a model of one of his own hunters at the Royal Academy. Following on this he won, in open competition, the first prize offered by the Goldsmiths' Company in 1884 with his modelled group of a mounted huntsman and hounds.

Encouraged by his success, he modelled a sketch group entitled 'Triumph,' which was also exhibited at the Academy, this group being the original *motif* for the Quadriga which will add so much to the amenities

of Hyde Park Corner. 'Duncan's Horses,' 'Maternal Care,' the 'Rape of the Sabines,' 'Persimmon,' which now stands in front of the Stud House at Sandringham, all rather more than life-size groups, with many statuettes and small groups followed and were all exhibited at the Royal Academy.

The following public monuments have also been executed by Captain Jones :—

The monument of the Royal Marines who fell in the Boer War and during the Boxer Rising in China in 1900, which stands in St. James's Park opposite the Admiralty ;

The Equestrian statue of the late General Sir Redvers Buller at Exeter ;

The monument (an Equestrian statue) to the members of the South Australian Contingent who fell in the Boer War, erected at Adelaide, South Australia ;

The monument to the Carabiniers on Chelsea Embankment ;

The Equestrian statue of the late Duke of Cambridge in Whitehall.

His latest and most noteworthy work is the Quadriga, the subject of our illustration, the design for which grew out of the sketch model for 'Triumph,' already mentioned, which, as a small sale group, was exhibited in the Royal Academy in 1891, where it attracted considerable attention. The late King Edward, then Prince of Wales, and many influential people were specially interested in the work, which was much admired, and a hope was expressed that the group would be carried out on a large scale and placed in some prominent position in London.

The handsome arch standing at the top of Constitution Hill, which was designed by Decimus Burton, and was at one time surmounted by the Equestrian statue of the Great Duke, which was removed to Aldershot, when the arch was shifted back to its present position in 1883, was considered to afford the finest site in London, and Lord Michelham generously offered the group to the nation, to be carried out in bronze on a large scale and placed on the arch.

As a tribute to King Edward, Captain Jones now called the group 'Peace,' of which the winged figure, bearing in its right hand a crown of laurels and in its left an olive branch, is emblematic. The height of the figure is 14 ft., and it stands in a chariot driven by a boy charioteer, which the sculptor substituted for the triumphal car in the original design ; from the tip of the wing of the figure to the base of the group is 32 ft. The horses are twice life-size—thirty-two hands—and one of the great engineering feats, and one which required great anatomical knowledge, combined with what was possible in *any action*, was to be able to balance all the horses on their *hind* legs without any stay or support. The action of the horses is instinct with life, although in some quarters the criticism has been made that it is unnatural, but this is not the opinion of those best qualified to give an unbiassed opinion, and to any one who, like the writer of this notice, is acquainted with the horses in movement depicted on the wonderful marble friezes of the Parthenon at Athens such criticism seems decidedly fanciful and far-fetched.

It should be noted that Captain Jones's colossal work is not only the first Quadriga to be set up in London, but is, we believe, the only one at

present existing in this country. It is also the only Quadriga attempted as a composition ideal group, almost the only ideal group in England, certainly the only large one, and as a bit of living statuary it stands alone.

The term Quadriga is derived from the Latin *Quadrigæ*, the ancient four-horsed chariot, drawn by four horses abreast, which was chiefly used as the triumphal car of the emperors and victorious generals. The earliest example mentioned is that which was modelled in terra-cotta and raised on the pediment of Jupiter Capitolinus. In later times a Quadriga has formed the chief decorative feature which crowned triumphal arches, and there are numerous representations of them on coins.

The most celebrated Quadriga in the world is the famous one over the portico of St. Mark's Cathedral at Venice, the four bronze (gilt) horses of which, 5 ft. in height, are among the finest of ancient bronzes, the whole being the sole existing specimen of an ancient Quadriga. The horses are said to have once adorned the triumphal arch of Titus at Rome; the Emperor Constantine took them to Constantinople, whence the Doge Dandolo brought them to Venice in 1204. In 1797 they were sent by Napoleon to Paris, where they were set up on the Arc de Triomphe in the Place du Carrousel. After the occupation of Paris in 1815 by the Allies the horses were restored to Venice by the Emperor Francis Joseph. They were replaced on the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel by a Quadriga, the work of the French sculptor Bosio, representing the Triumph of the Restoration.

At Berlin is a celebrated Quadriga in copper, which surmounts the Brandenburger Thor; it represents Victory, and was executed by Schadow in 1794. Facing the Royal Schloss is the National Monument to the Emperor William I., an equestrian statue of the Kaiser led by the Genius of Peace; it is enclosed on three sides by a colonnade, ending in corner pavilions, each surmounted by a colossal bronze Quadriga. The work, which is by Begas, was completed in 1897.

It was intended to surmount the Arc de Triomphe at the top of the Champs-Élysées with a colossal Quadriga representing France destroying Error and Prejudice; and a model, the work of M. Falguières, was placed in position some years ago, but it has since been removed, and it is not known whether the group is to be completed.

H. G.

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#### TAIL-DOCKING

Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, when presiding at the meeting of the Ottawa Humane Society on March 31, with reference to the docking of horses' tails, said:

'I think the docking of horses' tails is a relic of barbarism. The dealers may not agree with me—the horses sell better when they are docked. I think it is a shame to deprive this dumb animal of the tail which God has given it.'



**"PEACE."**

London's Great Quadriga.

*Captain Adrian Jones, C.V.O.,  
Sculptor.*



INCIDENTS AT AN AUSTRALIAN STEEPLECHASE.

## SPORTING NOTES

### STEEPLECHASING IN AUSTRALIA

It is well known that racing in Australia is very popular and that every township possesses its own racecourse. The accompanying photographs depict some falls at a steeplechase meeting at the famous Flemington Course at Melbourne last June. The jumps are absolutely solid, some of them being very close together. The steeplechase jockey has a hard life and it is not common to find one who has retired. The tendency, however, is to make the fences smaller and less stiff, and the courses more like the English ones. There are very elaborate medical arrangements to deal with accidents, such as stretcher-bearers at each fence, and ambulances for man and horse. There is an operating-room and hospital, and also a convalescent home for jockeys, overlooking the course. In the falls shown in the illustrations there were no serious accidents.

### POLO

The annual Christmas Tournament for the Rhodes Cup and the Handicap Tournament for cups presented by the Governor-General took place at the end of December last on the Sachsenwald Polo Ground, Johannesburg. Eight teams entered for the Rhodes Cup, of which seven were military combinations. The ground was very hard and dusty. In the final the 12th Lancers 'A' team defeated the 12th Lancers 'B' team by seven goals to one.

'A' team: Lieut. Hornby, Captain Badger, Lieut. Charrington, and Captain Truman (back).

'B' team: Captain Fane, D.S.O., Captain Reynolds, Lieut. Leatham, and Major Bailey, D.S.O.

'B' team did not avail itself of a handicap.

The Handicap Tournament final lay between the 6th Dragoon Guards and 15th Hussars, the former winning by  $5\frac{1}{2}$  goals to 5 goals. This was a remarkable game, the 15th Hussars being five goals ahead at half-time, but thanks to the excellent play of Major Watson the Carabiniers won a fine game by half a goal.

6th Dragoon Guards: Captain Rasch, Major Kirby, Major Watson, D.S.O., and Lieut. Compton (back).

15th Hussars: Lieut. Arnott, Lieut. Osborne, Captain the Hon. D. Bingham, Captain the Hon. W. Nugent (back).

The Carabiniers were in receipt of a handicap of half a goal.

Lady Gladstone presented the cups to the winners, and Mr. Lionel Phillips, M.L.A., was 'at home' to polo members and their friends.

The final of the Calcutta Coronation Tournament was between the Scouts and the 10th Hussars, resulting in an easy win for the Scouts by 15 goals to 6. Teams:

The Scouts: The Maharajah of Kishengarh, Thabore Beni Singh, Captain F. W. Barrett (15th Hussars), and the Maharajah of Rutlam (back).



10th Hussars: Major the Hon. W. Cadogan, Lieut. C. E. Fielden, Lieut. Sir C. Brooke, and Lieut. R. C. Gordon Canning (back).

His Majesty the King arrived halfway through the match and presented the cup, congratulating the winners.

The team with which Lord Tweedmouth (Royal Horse Guards) has been touring in America played a match at San Diego, California, with the Passanda Polo for the All America Polo Cup, which England captured two years ago. A good game resulted in the English team being defeated by  $8\frac{1}{2}$  goals to 7, and America regaining the cup.

During the past winter many English players, including several soldiers, have been playing polo at the Côte d'Azur Polo Club at Cannes. The Cannes Permanent Challenge Cup was won by a Roehampton Club team, captained by Mr. C. D. Miller.

The final of the Junior Polo Championship played at Ghezireh, Cairo, was between 'A' team 21st Lancers and 1st Scots Guards, resulting in a win for the Lancers by 6 goals to 1. Teams:

21st Lancers: Captain Cecil, Lieuts. Learoyd, Hollings, and Howes (back).

1st Scots Guards: Lieut. Sir J. S. Dyer, Lieut. C. J. Balfour, Captain and Adj. M. Romer, and Lieut. Macindoe (back).

In the final of the Begum of Bhopal's Tournament, held at Jubbulpore, the Cavalry School beat the 2nd Lancers by 5 goals to 3.

The final of the Indian Inter-Regimental was played on March 8 at Meerut, and resulted in a win for the 10th Hussars, who beat the 17th Lancers by 6 goals to 5, after a splendid game.

This is the sixth consecutive year of victory for the Tenth, who are to be congratulated on breaking all records. The generally expressed opinion of leading polo players in England that Army polo in general, and Indian polo in particular, has attained a higher standard than ever previously known, enhances the value of their fine performances.

The Townshend Polo Tournament played for at Tempe, Orange Free State, South Africa, secured an entry of the following teams: The Carabiniers 'A' and 'B,' the 12th Lancers, 2nd M.I., 21st Brigade R.F.A., and a Tempe Club team. The aggregate points of a team were not to exceed fourteen.

In the final between the Carabiniers 'A' and 'B' teams, the latter won by 3 goals to 2, after playing extra time.

A Handicap Tournament, open to the competing teams which did not reach the final of the Townshend Cup, was won by the 12th Royal Lancers.

The final of the 9th (Secunderabad) Tournament produced a grand game between the 20th Deccan Horse and the 33rd Light Cavalry. Time was called with the score 3 goals all, but with widened goals and the game resumed, the 20th Deccan Horse scored the winning goal and again secured the cup.

The 15th Hussars' Challenge Cup at Lucknow produced some exciting games. The final between the Kings' Dragoon Guards and the Inniskillings resulted in a win for the latter by seven goals to five.

The Indian Polo Association Committee have recently readjusted their handicap list. 674 players have been handicapped. Two players have been given ten points, viz. Captain Leslie Cheape (King's Dragoon Guards) and Captain R. G. Ritson (Inniskilling Dragoons). Captain Barrett (15th Hussars), formerly at ten, has been reduced to nine. Others at nine are Captain F. St. J. Atkinson (9th Hodson's Horse), Moti Lali, Mr. W. E. Palmer (10th Hussars), and the Maharajah of Rutlam. There are eleven players at eight points, thirteen at seven points, fifty-five players at six points, sixty-eight players at five points, ninety-four at four points, 143 at three points, while 283 are assessed at two points or one point.

### RACING

The Grand National was run on March 29 at Aintree in lovely weather and perfect going. Owing to the coal strike the attendance was smaller than usual, and all regretted that it prevented his Majesty the King being present, especially as the race preceding the National was won by his Majesty's b.c. Dorando by a head, amidst a great scene of enthusiasm.

A grand field of twenty-four fine chasers started for the National, and after a beautiful race Sir C. G. Assheton-Smith's Jerry M. (E. Piggott) won easily by six lengths from Mr. Ismay's Bloodstone (F. Lyall), with Lord Derby's Axle Pin (I. Anthony) third. Only seven of the twenty-four completed the course, and the seventh after two falls. Jerry M. carried the top weight of 12 st. 7 lb., and is the finest stamp of chaser we have ever seen. It was a magnificent performance, and the horse received a tremendous reception. Jerry M. will rank as one of the greatest steeplechase horses, if not the greatest, ever known. The race was not a very fast one, but, in contrast to last year, the riders rode with great judgment and with lengthened stirrups.

The Grand Military at Sandown Park this year kept up its reputation as a great sporting meeting, and was patronised by a huge aristocratic crowd. Unfortunately the weather broke down badly on both days, and the proceedings were otherwise marred by a mishap to Major 'Lucy' Lockett, of the 11th Hussars, who had the misfortune to break his thigh owing to the falling of his horse in the Maiden Steeplechase. The Sandown executive, always so good and generous to soldiers, were on this occasion found wanting, as there was a most unnecessary delay in getting a doctor, so Major Lockett had a very rough time of it lying in the pouring rain, which he bore most pluckily. We are glad to hear that Major Lockett is doing well, and wish him a complete recovery.

The race for the Gold Cup was the best we have ever witnessed for that event, and quite sufficient refutation to some scribes who had harped on the decadence of military steeplechasing. Both Mr. Wyndham, who won on his own horse Another Delight, and Captain the Hon. R. Bruce, who was beaten by a head, rode magnificent races. In the Past and Present Steeple-

chase Captain V. Beatty rode a fine race on Captain Denny's Rustic Queen. The Maiden Hunters' Steeplechase was most sporting; eight horses started, all ridden by their owners. Major Lockett's Cree Rue was favourite and going well, when it fell for the first time in its career, and caused his unfortunate accident, leaving Captain Tomkinson to win on his May Day II. There was a good race for the Grand Military Handicap Steeplechase on the second day won by Captain Banbury on Captain Christie Miller's Sir Percy by three-parts of a length from Captain G. Paynter on his own horse Jack Symons. Captain Paynter made a good race of it, but Sir Percy, well-handled, was the better horse at the weights. Details :—

## FIRST DAY

The SELLING STEEPLECHASE of 92 sovs.; weight for age, with allowances; winner to be sold for 50 sovs. Two miles.

Capt. L. S. Denny's b g BAELDI,  
by Gallinule—Ballyohara, aged,  
12st 3lb .....Mr. A. Fitzgerald 1  
Mr. C. T. Lawrence's ch g WOODS-  
DOWN, aged, 11st 7lb .....Owner 2  
Mr. S. E. Armitage's Venio, aged,  
11st 12lb ...Mr. G. Phipps Hornby 0  
Mr. A. S. Hoare's Leghorn, 6 yrs,  
11st 7lb ..... Owner 0

Mr. W. E. Lyons's Charlie O'Ryan,  
aged, 11st 12lb (car. 11st 13lb)  
Owner 0  
Capt. C. Noel Newton's Milfoil,  
aged, 12st 3lb..... Owner 0  
Capt. G. Paynter's Nimrod VI.,  
aged, 12st 3lb .....Owner 0

The GRAND MILITARY GOLD CUP of 395 sovs.; 11st 7lb each. with penalties and allowances. Three miles.

Mr. E. H. Wyndham's br g  
ANOTHER DELIGHT, by General  
Symons—Annie's Delight, aged,  
12st 7lb..... Owner 1  
Mr. G. D'Arcy Edwardes's br m  
EBONETTE, 5 yrs, 11st  
Capt. Hon. R. Bruce 2  
Capt. A. C. de Wiart's br g  
QUINTON, aged, 11st 7lb. (car.  
12st 1lb) Capt. R. C. de Crespigny 3

Capt. E. Christie-Miller's Sprinkle  
Me, aged, 13st.....Capt. Banbury 0  
Capt. G. Paynter's Chapelizod,  
6 yrs, 11st 7lb (car. 11st 13lb)  
Owner 0  
Mr. Colwyn Phillips's Tempo Bello,  
aged, 11st 7lb..... Owner 0  
Mr. Claud Sykes's Wand, aged,  
11st 7lb ..... Owner 0  
Mr. D. P. Wormald's Little Pitcher,  
5 yrs, 11st ... Capt. C. N. Newton 0

The PAST AND PRESENT HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 127 sovs. Two miles and a half.

Capt. L. S. Denny's br m RUSTIC  
QUEEN, by Bergomaster—Forest  
Queen, aged, 10st 4lb  
Capt. V. Beatty 1  
Mr. G. Sheppard's b m FLAXEN,  
aged, 11st 3lb ...Capt. Springfield 2  
Sir Peter Walker's b g LONG  
WATER, 5 yrs, 10st 12lb  
Capt. the Hon. R. Bruce 3  
Capt. G. Paynter's Jim May, aged,  
12st 3lb (inc. 7lb. ex.)..... Owner 0

Capt. T. G. Gibson's Tullow Lass,  
aged, 10st 7lb ..... Owner 0  
Capt. S. C. Holland's Simple Ned,  
6 yrs, 9st 10lb (car. 10st)  
Mr. G. Phipps Hornby 0  
Mr. G. B. Atkinson's Glen Heston,  
6 yrs, 9st 9lb (car. 9st 13lb)  
Owner 0  
Mr. W. Macneill's Foolhardy, aged,  
9st 9lb (car. 9st 11lb) ..... Owner 0

The MAIDEN HUNTERS' STEEPLECHASE of 68 sovs.; 12st each, with allowances.  
Two miles and a half.

Capt. H. A. Tomkinson's ch m MAY DAY II., by The Dale— Marchioness, by Bold Marshal, aged, 11st 9lb ..... Owner 1	Mr. G. R. Elliott's Faugh a Ballagh, aged, 11st 4lb ..... Owner o
Mr. W. E. Lyon's ch m ROYAL WELSH, aged, 11st 9lb (car. 11st 11lb) ..... Owner 2	Mr. A. S. Hoare's Lutterworth, aged, 11st 4lb ..... Owner o
Mr. D. C. M. Beech's ch g GOLDEN VANITY, 6 yrs, 11st 4lb (car. 11st 5lb) ..... Owner 3	Mr. K. Lloyd's Stephanie's Prince, aged, 11st 9lb ..... Owner o
	Major W. J. Lockett's Cree Rue, aged, 11st 9lb (car. 11st 11lb) Owner o
	Mr. H. McMaster's Molinam, 6 yrs, 11st 9lb (car. 11st 12lb) ... Owner o

## SECOND DAY

The UNITED SERVICE SELLING HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 137 sovs.; winner  
to be sold for 50 sovs. Two miles.

Capt. S. C. Holland's b g STORM- cock II., by Missel Thrush— Philippize, 6 yrs, 12st 2lb Mr. Phipps Hornby 1	Capt. C. Noel Newton's Milfoil, aged, 12st 4lb ... Capt. Tomkinson o
Mr. P. S. Cadman's ch g BOROUGH, aged, 10st 7lb (car. 10st 11lb) Owner 2	Mr. W. E. Lyon's Charlie O'Ryan, aged, 11st 8lb (car. 11st 10lb) Owner o
Capt. G. Paynter's ch g NIMROD VI., aged, 11st 10lb (car. 12st) ... Owner 3	Capt. L. S. Denny's Moynalty, aged, 11st 10lb ..... Capt. Springfield o

The GRAND MILITARY HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 226 sovs. Two miles and a half.

Capt. E. Christie Miller's b g SIR PERCY, by Pride—Belle Demoiselle, 6 yrs, 11st 6lb ..... Capt. Banbury 1	Col. Wilson's b f LYSANDER, 6 yrs, 11st 1lb ..... Capt. Tomkinson 3
Capt. G. Paynter's bl g JACK SYMONS, aged, 12st ..... Owner 2	Capt. C. Noel Newton's Flax Field, aged, 11st 6lb ..... Owner o
	Mr. F. Grenfell's Schwarmer, aged, 11st ..... Mr. Phipps Hornby o

The TALLY-HO STEEPLECHASE of 70 sovs. Three miles.

Capt. Foljambe's b g ENOCH, by Workington—Thistlegrave, aged, 12st 2lb ..... Owner 1	Mr. P. S. Banning's Brooke, aged, 11st 4lb ..... Owner o
Capt. C. Noel Newton's b g DOWNPATRICK, aged, 13st 7lb Owner 2	Mr. R. McGillicuddy's Frontinac, 5 yrs, 11st 9lb ..... Owner o
Mr. G. R. Elliott's FAUGH A BALLAGH, aged, 11st 9lb Mr. Phipps Hornby 3	Mr. E. H. Wyndham's Mouthmill, 5 yrs, 11st 9lb ..... Owner o

A MAIDEN STEEPLECHASE of 87 sovs.; weight for age. Two miles and a half.

Capt. G. A. Sandforth's b m SCILLOT, by Bushey Park—Nano, 6 yrs, 11st 11lb ..... Owner 1	Capt. R. C. de Crespigny's br m RIVIERA, 6 yrs, 11st 12lb Mr. T. Walwyn 2
	Mr. E. H. Wyndham's Ethel's Boy, 6 yrs, 11st 7lb ... Capt. Springfield o

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Previous to the Military Meeting the Newbury Club gave a United Services Meeting, as last year, at which some capital sport was witnessed. On the first day the Services Selling Handicap Steeplechase was won by Captain S. L. Denny's Baeldi (Mr. A. Fitzgerald riding), with Major J. D. Edward's Banoge (Mr. Phipps Hornby) second. There were nine runners for the United Services Cup, a two and a half mile steeplechase of 417 sovs. This was carried off by Mr. A. Fitzgerald with his own horse Couvrefeu II., on which he rode a capital race, Mr. Silver's Cannock Lad, with Mr. MacNeil up, being second. The Military Maiden Steeplechase was won by Colonel F. Murray Baillie's Ilston (Mr. J. B. Foster). On the second day at Newbury the United Services Hurdle Handicap was won by Sir P. Walker's Lord Ninian, Captain the Hon. R. Bruce riding, by a neck from Lord Gerard's Bronzewing III. (Mr. P. Whitaker up).

The Army and Navy Handicap Steeplechase was captured by Mr. Stacey's The Lurcher (Mr. H. A. Brown), and the United Services Hunters' Cup was won by Captain Banbury on his own horse Noble Roy, with Mr. W. MacNeil, also on his own horse Foolhardy, second.

At the Ludlow Races that good and hardworking sportsman Captain Paynter won the Oakley Steeplechase Plate on his own horse Miss May. It was a most popular win, as Captain Paynter has not hitherto had the best of luck this season. Again, at the Retford Races Captain Paynter rode two of his horses to victory, and was second in a third steeplechase, although he was scarcely able to walk, suffering from a leg badly crushed in a fall he had received racing the previous day. His victories were immensely popular.

Another fine hard-riding soldier is Captain C. Noel Newton, who can take his own among the best of amateur or professional riders, but who has not been favoured with the best of mounts this season.

The National Hunt held their Jubilee Meeting over the splendid Cheltenham course. A field of thirty-one started for the National Hunt Steeplechase of four miles, but the race was spoilt by seven horses coming to grief at the first fence, our own representative, Brushwood, being knocked over in the scrimmage here, and then completing the course. In the end Mr. E. Platt's The Rejected IV., well ridden by Mr. G. F. Cotton, won easily, with Mr. D. Faber's Postman second, and Captain G. Paynter's The Scarlet Secret (owner) third, after a fall. Only one of the falls was serious, viz. that of Mr. P. Roberts (twice a winner of this race), who was taken away unconscious from severe concussion, but we are glad to say that the latest reports are favourable to his recovery. On the second day the Foxhunters' Challenge Cup of 537 sovs. produced one of the finest steeplechases ever witnessed. Seventeen started, and there was only one fall over the four-mile course. The last fence was charged by five horses, any one of which might have won, and almost on the post that fine rider Mr. H. Ussher lifted in Captain H. C. Higgins' (late Inniskilling Dragoons) Merry Land a winner by a length from Captain Part's Frigate (Captain H. Tomkinson), a head in front of Captain F. Forester's New Aidan (Major Hughes Onslow), a head from Captain G. Paynter's Chepelizod (owner).

The veteran Major Hughes Onslow, late 10th Hussars, rode a splendid race, and Captain G. Paynter was unlucky not to win, as his horse made a blunder at the last fence. The National Hunt Handicap Steeplechase of £1,000 was won by Major H. M. Cliff's Great Scot, with Captain H. C. Higgins' Abaleur second.

The Irish Army Point-to-Point Races were brought off at Ellistown, Co. Kildare. There was a great gathering of military and hunting folk. Some cold sleet showers fell, and the Wicklow mountains were covered with snow, but the weather on the whole was propitious. Brigadier-General H. de la P. Gough acted as starter, and Brigadier-General R. C. A. Bewicke-Copley, C.B., as judge. The course was laid over four miles of fair but difficult hunting country. Results :

Heavy Weight Race (14 st.) for a cup presented by General the Right Hon. Sir Neville G. Lyttleton, G.C.B., commanding the Forces. Won by Major C. Dalton's (R.A.M.C.) Thowlpin (owner) by three lengths from Mr. H. O. Wiley's (6th Dragoon Guards) Dreadnought, Mr. Robinson's (5th Lancers) Gallop On third. Twelve ran.

Light Weight Race (12 st.), cup presented by the Lord Lieutenant. Mr. R. Wyndham-Quin's (12th Lancers) first, Mr. J. P. G. Worledge's (R.E.) Cyclops second, Mr. E. Ramsden's (5th Lancers) Curiosity third. Won by ten lengths, a length between second and third. Twenty-four ran.

Royal Artillery Race, run in two classes, 14 st. and 12 st. 7 lb. Fourteen ran. The Light Weights was won by Mr. A. T. Price's (49th Bde. R.F.A.) Black Hermit (owner), and the Heavy Weights by Major A. B. Forman's (24th Bde. R.F.A.) Biscuits.

Farmers' Race, about 2½ miles. Fourteen runners. Mr. E. Brophy's Emigrant (Mr. J. C. Kelly).

On the same day as the Irish Military Races the Army and Navy in England held their meeting in conjunction with the Pytchley Point-to-Point Races at Hopping Hill, Northants. The course was about 3½ miles over a stiff grass country. There were many falls, but no one was seriously injured, and a great day's sport resulted. A large and distinguished company were present.

For the Grand Military Light Weights (12 st.) twenty-four started and twelve finished. Captain Wallace Wright's (the Queen's) Sterling Lady, ridden by Captain Grice, was the winner, with Captain G. Paynter's (Scots Guards) Ardrie (Mr. J. Ainsworth) second, and Mr. A. E. Summer's (13th Hussars) Sporting Times (owner) third.

For the Grand Military Welter Weights (13 st. 7 lb.) nineteen started and nine finished. Captain the Hon. G. Monckton-Arundell's (1st Life Guards) Chantry (owner) was first, Mr. G. R. Elliott's (3rd Dragoon Guards) Brownie (owner) second, and Major Wormald's (12th Lancers) Sister Anne (owner) third.

The Royal Navy Hunt Challenge Cup (Heavy Weights) was won by Lieut. C. D. Alexander's Corlegan (owner), and the Light Weights by Midshipman Hughes Onslow's Pip (owner). The latter rode a good race,

and is a worthy son of that well-known rider Major Hughes Onslow, late 10th Hussars.

The Royal Horse Guards ran their Point-to-Point Race over a course near Beaby, in the Quorn country. Lieut. the Hon. C. Philipps won, Lieut. M. J. Wemyss being second.

The 1st and 2nd Life Guards held their meeting near Towcester with the Grafton Hunt. The 2nd Life Guards' Light Weight Race was won by Mr. Wallace's Lawrence Gate, and the Heavy Weight Race by Captain Ashton's Ebony. The 1st Life Guards' Regimental Race was won by Captain the Hon. G. Monckton-Arundell's Chantrey in a field of fifteen runners.

The Mounted Infantry School at Longmoor held their first Point-to-Point Races of the season at Farringdon over  $3\frac{1}{4}$  miles of hunting country. The Inter-Station Race, Bordon *v.* Longmoor, was won by the latter with fifteen points to fifty. Twenty ran, and Lieut. J. S. M. Matheson's (Cameron Highlanders) Remnant II. came in first. The Inter-Battalion Cup, owners up, was won by a short head by Lieut. R. H. Bond's (King's Royal Rifle Corps) Fanatic from Lieut. C. F. Blacker's (Connaught Rangers) Jim. Thirty-six ran.

The Regimental Point-to-Point Race between the Cheshire Yeomanry and the Derbyshire Yeomanry took place at Eccleston, near Chester. After a fast race Captain H. A. Tomkinson (Adjutant Chester Yeomanry) was first, with Lieut. de Knoop (Cheshire) second, and Captain Wailes-Fairbairn (Derbyshire) third. The winning heavy weights were two Cheshires (Lieut. Kingscote and Lieut. C. W. Tomkinson). Victory was awarded to Cheshire, with 113 to Derbyshire's 82.

The Royal Artillery Meeting took place near Hawthorn Hill in very heavy going. Results :

Welter Race : Mr. B. F. Rhodes' Florence. Fourteen ran.

Light Weight Race : Captain Speller's Bristles. Nineteen ran.

Open Race : Mr. E. J. L. Speed's (2nd Life Guards) Stockings.

Chargers' Race : Mr. G. C. Neville's Hoppit. Eleven ran.

The Royal Scots Greys' Challenge Cup was run for at the Bedale Hunt Point-to-Point Meeting, and was won by Major Seymour's Frialing (owner), with Major Swetenham's Rober (owner) a length away second. It was a sporting race of twenty-one runners.

The Members' Race at the meeting was won by Captain M. Graham's Weathercock II. (owner).

The 3rd Dragoon Guards and the Bedfordshire Yeomanry ran their races with the Oakley Hunt at Stagsden, Bedfordshire. Results :

3rd Dragoon Guards' Subalterns' Race : Mr. N. K. Worthington's Sheila.

3rd Dragoon Guards' Regimental Race : Mr. G. R. Elliott's Brownie.

Bedfordshire Yeomanry Race : Major Green's Lady James.

The 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards held their races at Penton, near Andover. Owing to the heavy rain the going was treacherous, but fortunately there were no serious accidents. Results :

Subalterns' Cup : Mr. J. W. Aylmer's The Little 'Un (owner).

Regimental Race : Captain Oldrey's Tim (owner).

Welter Race : Major C. R. Gaunt's Turcoman (owner).

The 1st Cavalry Brigade Point-to-Point took place near Reading in miserable weather. Results :

11th Hussars' Light Weight Race : Captain Sutton's Despair (owner). Eight ran.

11th Hussars' Heavy Weight Race : Mr. Lowther's Tertius (owner). Three ran.

Queen's Bays' Welter Race : Major Ing's Gamecock (owner). Six ran.

19th Hussars' Light Weight Race : Mr. Bowden Smith's Juliet (owner). Six ran.

19th Hussars' Heavy Weight Race : Mr. Summer's Broncho (Mr. Bigge). Seven ran.

11th Hussars' Subalterns' Cup : Mr. Ainsworth's Woodcock (owner). Six ran.

Queen's Bays' Light Weight Race : Mr. Walker's Tommy (owner). Thirteen ran.

19th Hussars Subalterns' Race : Mr. Summer's Sporting Times (owner). Nine ran.

#### ABROAD

The Delhi Durbar Indian Officers' Race for the King-Emperor's Cup was won in a canter by twenty lengths by the 27th Light Cavalry's b. aus. g. Agamemnon, ridden by Ressaidar Mul Singh, of the same regiment.

In our last issue, owing to a cable error, we announced that this race was won by the 11th Lancers' Hirwana. We regret the error.

At the Ghezireh Meeting at Cairo Mr. B. A. B. Schreiber's Barnabale, with Major Tudor in the saddle, won the Polo Scurry Handicap from a big field, and Mr. D. Methven's Bedawi took the Members' Handicap.

In the Bombay Inter-Regimental Point-to-Point Race for teams of four from any regiment stationed at Bombay, Santa Cruz, or Deolali, thirty-six competitors faced the starter. At the finish Mr. Max Rummel (1st team Bombay Light Horse) was first, Mr. Kube Smith, of the same team, second, Mr. Barney (1st Royal Warwick Regt.) third, and Mr. Knight Bruce (also of Warwicks) fourth. These were followed by the 26th Light Cavalry team, who finished in a body and thus won on points, with the 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment second and the 104th Wellesley's Rifles third.

At the Jubbulpore Point-to-Point Races the Indian Army Race was won by Jamadar Sunder Singh (32nd Lancers). Twelve ran.

The British Army Race was won by Driver Fear (80th Battery R.F.A.). Sixteen ran.

Horse Race : Mr. Todd's (P.W.D.) Curse of Cromwell.



The 60th Rifles held their races at Highworth in the V.W.H. country. The race confined to Officers Past and Present, for which the King presented a cup, was secured by Captain Watson's Torboy. The Regimental Light Weight, for a cup presented by Brig.-General the Hon. E. I. Montague-Stuart-Wortley, was won by Lieut. Moore's Loughborough; and the Heavy Weight, for a cup given by Major Ulric Thynne, by Lieut. C. Gough. Lieut. H. Porter had the bad luck to break his collar-bone, but pluckily remounted and finished second.

The Grenadier and Coldstream Guards' Races were run near Bicester. There were twenty-six entries for the Grenadiers' Race, in which Lieut. L. Ames was first and second with Talbot II. and Blucher. The large entry of fifty-three was secured for the Coldstream Guards' Regimental Cup, and it was won by Lieut. J. V. Alexander's Rome.

## IRISH COMMAND BRONZE MEDAL MILITARY TOURNAMENT, 1912

### MOUNTED EVENTS

#### RESULTS

#### FIRST DAY—APRIL 2

##### Sword v. Sword

1. S.S.M.R.R. Colman, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.
2. Sergt. Aldridge, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.
3. Sergt. Miskimmen, 5th Royal Irish Lancers.

##### Jumping (N.C.O.s and Men)

1. 'A' Team, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.
2. 'A' Team, 4th (Q.O.) Hussars.
3. 'B' Team, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.

##### Sword v. Lance

1. S.S.M.R.R. Colman, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.
2. Sergt. McLaughlin, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.
3. Sergt. Mason, 4th (Q.O.) Hussars.

##### Tent Pegging (N.C.O.s and Men)

1. Driver Keys, 42nd Battery R.F.A.
2. S.S.M.R.R. Kibler, 5th Royal Irish Lancers.
3. Sergt. Mason, 4th (Q.O.) Hussars.

#### SECOND DAY—APRIL 3

##### Tent Pegging (Officers)

1. Lieut.-Colonel G. K. Ansell, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.
2. Major C. L. Graham, 4th (Q.O.) Hussars.
3. Lieut. A. J. R. Kennedy, 42nd Battery R.F.A.

##### Riding and Jumping (Officers)

1. Lieut. The Hon. H. C. Alexander, 5th Royal Irish Lancers.
2. Major W. Q. Winwood, D.S.O., 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.
3. Captain M. Crawshaw, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.

##### Dummy Thrusting (N.C.O.s and Men)

1. S.S.M.R.R. Kibler, 5th Royal Irish Lancers.
2. Sergt. Aldridge, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.

## RUGBY FOOTBALL

His Majesty the King and the Prince of Wales were present at the Rugby football match between the Navy and Army at Queen's Club. They were received by Lord Desborough, the Earl of Clarendon, Vice-Admiral Sir J. Jellicoe, and Lord Roberts. Rain fell throughout the match, but it was one of the finest exhibitions of Rugby football seen this year. From start to finish it was a real good game. The Navy established a commanding lead in the first quarter of an hour of eight points, and thereafter stuck to it, finally winning by sixteen points to eight (two goals and two tries to a goal and a try). The Navy players, captained by N. A. Woodehouse, the English international, and the Army players, captained by W. S. D. Craven, of Blackheath fame, were presented to his Majesty. This is the first time a British King has been present at a football match, although as Prince of Wales King George has previously shown his interest in the game.

## THE TOURNAMENT

The Royal Naval and Military Tournament is to be held at Olympia from May 23 to June 8. A new departure is to be made in the jumping competition for officers, the Committee having decided to offer a £100 prize in addition to the Challenge Cup, value fifty guineas, which is held for one year only. There is also a second prize of £50, and three premiums of £10 each. The rules of the mounted combat have been revised.

## HORSE SHOW—OLYMPIA

The International Horse Show at Olympia is to take place June 17 to 29. The prize-money amounts to £13,500—£10,000 in cash, and the balance represented by the value of the different Challenge Cups. There is the King George V. Gold Cup for the best individual jumper by an officer of any nation, which was won last year by Captain Dimitrir d'Exe; the King Edward VII. Gold Cup for the best jumping amongst teams of Army officers of all nations, won last year by France; and the Duke of Connaught's Cup for jumping by British officers.

There will also be an international military display; each team must comprise not less than six nor more than ten riders; fifteen minutes allowed each team in the ring; each team to select and execute its movements; the chief may or may not be a member of the team at his discretion. Points: (a) General character, viz. type of horses, manners, equipment, bearing of riders, &c., 40 per cent.; (b) the way in which various movements are executed (position of horses and riders), 30 per cent.; (c) difficulty of performances and skill shown in executing, 30 per cent. The only paces recognised will be walk, trot, and canter (excluding artificial paces).

THE OLYMPIC GAMES  
STOCKHOLM—SWEDEN

(From information supplied by the Honorary Secretary,  
*British Olympic Association*)

## RIDING

A NOVEL feature in the Olympic Games which are to be held at Stockholm this summer will be a series of Riding Competitions, some of which are to be restricted to officers on the active list, while others are open to officers and civilians alike. These competitions will take place from July 13 to 17 inclusive.

The Military Competition, which is a combined team and individual competition, comprises five events in which every competitor must take part, viz. :—

1. Long Distance Ride of 55 kilometres on the road, which includes during the latter part a
2. Cross-country Ride of 5 kilometres.
3. Individual Riding over steeplechase course of 3,500 metres, with ten obstacles.
4. Prize Jumping Competition with fifteen jumps.
5. Prize Riding Competition.

The Open Competitions are Prize Jumping and Prize Riding, the former being an individual and team competition, whilst the latter is an individual only.

The great interest felt is shown by the number and value of the challenge trophies presented. These are : The Challenge Cups by H.I.M. the Emperor of Germany for the Military Competition, by H.I.M. the Emperor of Austria for the Prize Riding Competition, by H.M. the King of Italy for the Team Competition in Prize Riding, by Count Geza Andrassy for the Individual Competition in Prize Jumping, and by the Swedish Cavalry for the highest total of points obtained by any country in all riding competitions.

It is already certain that the Argentine Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States will be officially represented, and it is expected that officers will also compete from Austria, Belgium, Hungary, and Italy. In all there are likely to be not less than one hundred competitors.

The representation of the United Kingdom in the Military Competitions will be undertaken by the Army Council, which has decided to send as the official representatives of the British Army in the United Kingdom a team of four officers selected by the Inspector of Cavalry, and under the charge of a senior officer.

This is the first occasion on which the British Army has been officially

represented at Olympic Games, and it marks an important step in the development of British interest at these great international gatherings.

For the purpose of selecting this team a course of jumps on the Swedish model has been laid out at the Cavalry School, Netheravon.

For the Open Competitions, the British Olympic Council has nominated a sub-committee, consisting of the following: Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, C.B., Inspector of Cavalry (chairman), the Rt. Hon. Lord Desborough of Taplow, K.C.V.O., Major the Rt. Hon. Lord Decies, D.S.O., Colonel P. A. Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C., Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Noel Birch, R.H.A., Major F. Egerton Green (manager of the Hurlingham Club), M. G. Lloyd Baker, Esq., Theodore A. Cook, Esq., and R. G. Heaton, Esq.

This Committee will select the British representatives in these competitions, which are strictly confined to 'gentlemen riders.' The definition of a gentleman rider adopted by the Committee is as follows: 'Anyone who has not ridden for hire, or derived his livelihood from trading in horses, will be considered a gentleman rider.'

All competitors will be allowed free transport during their stay in Sweden for horses entered, free stabling, forage, and veterinary attendance in Stockholm, and free board and lodging for one groom.

Full regulations, including diagrams of evolutions, obstacles, etc., can be obtained from the Hon. Secretary, British Olympic Association, 108 Victoria Street, S.W., and applications for inclusion in the team should be received at this address not later than May 10.

#### THE MODERN PENTATHLON

\*This competition, which comprises the five undermentioned events, is to be held from July 7 to 11 inclusive, and is designed to encourage all-round excellence in sport.

1. Pistol-shooting at 25 metres at a vanishing figure 1.7 metres high.
2. Swimming 300 metres (free style).
3. Fencing, épée.
4. Riding over a course of about 5,000 metres, with obstacles.
5. Cross-country race of about 4,000 metres.

Each competitor must take part in every event, and the relative order will be determined by points corresponding to the place numbers in the five events.

It is unlikely that any competitor will be a first-class performer in all these events, but anyone who is in the first class in any three, and fairly proficient in the other two, should not hesitate to enter; and there can hardly fail to be among British Cavalry officers many who come up to this standard.

The full programme and regulations for these competitions are to be obtained from the Hon. Secretary, British Olympic Association, 108 Victoria Street, S.W., to whom intending competitors should send in their names not later than May 1.

## RACQUETS

## MILITARY CHAMPIONSHIPS

These were played for as usual at Princes Club, Knightsbridge. Eight teams entered for the Doubles. In the semi-finals the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry (represented by Captain Luther and Mr. King) defeated 'L' Batt. R.H.A. (represented by Mr. White and Mr. Robinson), and the 2nd King's Royal Rifles (Captain Harker and Mr. Denison) defeated the 1st Rifle Brigade (Captain Ovey and Mr. Williams).

In the final Captain Luther and Mr. King beat Captain Harker and Mr. Denison by 4 games to 1 (68 aces to 47).

Captain Luther and Mr. King then played the holders, the Army Service Corps (represented by Major Puckle and Captain Berger) for the championship, and won by 4 games to 2 (80 aces to 56). The 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry thus secured the championship. Major Puckle and Captain Berger were not in their form of 1910 and 1911, or they would probably have retained the title.

Nineteen players entered for the Singles Championship, and after many well-contested games the final lay between Mr. Muir (15th Sikhs) and Captain A. Berger (Army Service Corps). A grand match resulted in the victory of Mr. Muir by 3 games to 1 (57 aces to 41).

The play-off for the championship between Mr. Muir and Captain A. C. G. Luther (King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry) (the holder) was most exciting. Leading by two games and 13 to 8 in the third, Captain Luther looked like easily retaining the title; but then Mr. Muir wore him down, and finally won by 3 games to 2 (76 aces to 70). The match had lasted 62 minutes. Mr. Muir has previously shown capital form in India, and we congratulate him and the 15th Sikhs on his taking the championship.

## ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL

## THE CAVALRY CUP

Throughout the winter months this competition has been well contested, many keen and interesting matches having been witnessed.

In the semi-finals the 18th Hussars defeated the 5th Lancers by four goals to nothing, and the 3rd Dragoon Guards defeated the 9th Lancers by two goals to one. The final was therefore between the 3rd Dragoon Guards and the 18th Hussars.

This match was played on Wednesday, April 10, at Craven Cottage, Fulham, on a sunny afternoon and before a large number of spectators.

The result was a victory for the 3rd Dragoon Guards by three goals to nothing, the regiment thus retaining the trophy which it won last year.

Throughout the game was most vigorous. Unfortunately there was a series of mishaps to the players, and for a certain period of the game each team was playing only nine men, whilst it was noticed that several of those who remained on the field were also handicapped by minor injuries.







*Stapleton Cotton.*

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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JULY 1912

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STAPLETON COTTON,  
VISCOUNT COMBERMERE, FIELD-MARSHAL.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL N. M. SMYTH, V.C., *Carabiniers*.

STAPLETON COTTON, the second son of Sir Robert Salusbury Cotton, Bart., M.P. for Cheshire, was born in Denbighshire, November 14, 1773.

When ten years old Stapleton was sent to Westminster School where he had as school-fellows Jack Byng, later Field-Marshal Lord Strafford, and the poet Southey.

In 1790 Sir Robert obtained a second-lieutenancy without purchase for his son in the 23rd, or Royal Welsh, Fusiliers, and on February 28, 1793, he was appointed captain by purchase in the 6th Dragoon Guards ("Carabiniers"), which corps he accompanied to Flanders in September of that year, being placed in command of one of two light troops which were specially formed of light men on small horses, and instructed in the services of Light Dragoons. Having been present during the siege of Landrecies and at the affairs of Prémont and Cateau, Captain Cotton was promoted to a majority in the 59th Regiment, and a few days later to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 25th Light Dragoons, which regiment he received orders to join in England. He left the officers' mess early one morning in May to journey to the coast, being accompanied by Lieutenant Crosbie, afterwards Sir John Gustavus Crosbie, who had just sold out of the Carabiniers.



They had proceeded about a mile from camp when the sound of shots, succeeded by heavy firing, announced an attack. The two young men galloped back to the lines and placed themselves at the head of their former troops and were thus present at the battle of Willems.

The allied Generals had been surprised, but the British Cavalry, numbering sixteen squadrons with two Austrian squadrons, were in the saddle at the first alarm, and in a few minutes met the enemy, who had advanced from Lille and Menin in the night, and stemmed his progress. After three hours' fighting the regiment sustained a loss of over thirty men and ninety horses. Some of the horses whose owners had been killed, fell into the ranks and manœuvred with precision till picked up by men whose horses had been shot. Lord Combermere often alluded to the extraordinary sagacity of these animals which seemed animated by human motives.

A strong force of unbroken French Cavalry now moved from the direction of Lille and formed a long line parallel to the British Cavalry. The French Carabiniers were on the right, and light regiments on their left. Our Carabiniers, having seen some of the French Carabiniers before, knew them at once, by their large bearskin caps and cuirasses, and called on the Commanding Officer, Major Sir Thomas Chapman, to lead them to the charge. Sir William Erskine, the senior British General Officer, happened to come up at this moment. Sir Thomas rode up to him, lowering the point of his sword, and saying, 'General, my boys are most anxious to charge their namesakes.' Sir William answered, 'I fear you are not equal to do so; they are more than four to one of your men. However, if you are able, go on.' 'Thank you, General; I have a light troop of the 5th Dragoon Guards with me,' replied the Commanding Officer, and turning to the regiment: 'Now my boys, mind the signals for movement, and when I raise my sword to the St. George \* shout as loud as you are able, and into them as quick and as close together as possible, and we'll have a glorious day yet.' 'But the enemy,' to quote Cotton's words, 'did not wait to receive us, for the whole line wheeled in some way (perhaps by threes) to the left, and the Hussars got clear off, while we came in contact with the Carabiniers, nearly four squadrons of whom we unhorsed in a few moments, leaving many dead on the field. The other squadron got

\* The St. George or 'head defend' signified a horizontal position of the sword overhead.

off after the Hussars. We, however, followed the fugitives close to Lille, when an eighteen-gun battery opened a smart fire with grape upon us. Having re-assembled, we observed the Infantry that had given us so much trouble in the morning passing between two plantations.

'The Oxford Blues were ordered to charge them, but Sir William Erskine, finding that their heavy horses sank to the knees in the tillage ground owing to the continuous rain that had fallen in the morning, permitted us to take their place.


'Sir Thomas Chapman said, "General, our light Irish horses will do the work." "Ay, and the men too," added Sir William. We charged and killed about eight hundred, and as many more laid down their arms. Having sent the captured guns, thirteen in number, with the prisoners to headquarters, the several regiments marched to their former ground. The Carabiniers were encamped again about three o'clock p.m.'

Cotton soon after left the Carabiniers, thus missing the actions of May 17 and 22, the march to Holland, and the cantonment in Bremen.

On joining the 25th Light Dragoons, then called Gwynn's Hussars, quartered at Margate and Ramsgate, Colonel Cotton fell in love with a fascinating Jewess, but had the good sense to recognise that this was one of the occasions on which the motto 'no retreat' cannot be literally adhered to, and, having obtained leave of absence, he fled from the danger.

He was well calculated to attract the attention of the fair sex, for in addition to agreeable manners and lively, intelligent conversation, he was an indefatigable sportsman. Of middle height, slightly, but strongly, built, a swarthy complexion, dark hair, thick eyebrows and bright hazel eyes gave him somewhat of a foreign appearance. The head was small and well-proportioned, the nostrils open, and the nose aquiline; while a massive Saxon chin indicated the firmness of character which was one of his principal characteristics.

In 1796 the 25th Light Dragoons were ordered to India, and on reaching the Cape the troops were disembarked, as the French and Dutch fleets were expected to rendezvous at Saldanha Bay. The 18th, 25th, 27th, and 28th Light Dragoons, partly mounted on Boer horses, and a force of Artillery and Infantry, accompanied by local transport, which was cheerfully furnished on the demand of the Burgher Senate,



SIEGE OF SERINGAPATAM, 1799.

marched to Saldanha Bay, and after a brush with the enemy, the next day had the satisfaction of seeing the Dutch fleet of nine sail strike their colours to the British Squadron under Admiral Sir George Keith Elphinstone.

As soon as the safety of Cape Colony was assured the 25th Light Dragoons proceeded to Madras, and in 1799 took part in the decisive operations against Tippu Sultan in Mysore.

General Harris led his troops over the frontier, and on March 27 attacked Tippu's army in position at Malavali.

A brisk cannonade was succeeded by a charge of 15,000 Mysore Cavalry, formed in a wedge shape, against General Baird's British Infantry brigade, who allowed the thundering mass to approach within fifteen yards of them, and then opened a destructive fire which brought the foremost ranks to the ground and beat off the attack.

The Mysorean Infantry were scattered by a bayonet charge, and Tippu's army retired, after an hour's combat, with the loss of 1,000 men left on the field, which was subsequently brought up to 4,000 by desertions.

Tippu threw a garrison of 8,000 men into Seringapatam which he made his headquarters, leaving the remaining Infantry with the Cavalry on the north bank of the Kaveri.

During the siege Tippu, instead of inspiring his followers with resolution by his personal example, had more than once shown that he despaired of the result, and had constant recourse to astrologers and priests.

On the night preceding the assault a curious circumstance occurred, the moon rose in a crescent with a planet close to one of its horns, giving it the appearance of a Turkish scimitar, of which the star formed the hilt. The phenomenon appeared to forebode evil to the British arms, but fortunately there were no augurs among the besiegers, or it might have been interpreted as unfavourable to the proposed attack, and had that been deferred twenty-four hours we should have been compelled to raise the siege, for on the very night succeeding the assault the river came down in a sudden freshet, and remained impassable until the termination of the monsoon season.

Already provisions had become very scarce in the British camp. Indeed, to such straits were they reduced that it was related of one Cavalry officer of high rank that having been warned that an egg which

he was about to discuss had a chicken in it, instead of checking his hungry jaws in the infanticidal act, he immediately swallowed the savoury mouthful with the exclamation, 'I wish it was a goose.'

On May 4 the island fortress was stormed at one o'clock in the afternoon. The column, consisting of 2,494 Europeans and 1,882 natives, dashed into the river and waded for the breach, the summit of which the forlorn hope had gained in six minutes. The Union Jack floated above the smoking battlements, and as the din of conflict rolled slowly but surely eastwards, it became apparent that the vast stronghold had fallen.

Tippu, thrice wounded, lay in a heap of dead or wounded fugitives blocking a gateway. An English soldier attempted to seize his jewelled sword belt, and the Sultan, making a cut at him with his sword, was instantly shot dead. The French contingent surrendered at discretion.

Ten days before the storm, the English soldiers who had been taken prisoners in different actions before the siege had been put to death by having nails driven into their skulls; but, although cognisant of this and other atrocities, the British soldiers behaved with their usual merciful tolerance, and the carnage, though considerable, was much less than might have been expected.

Shortly after the fall of Seringapatam, Colonel Cotton became heir to the baronetcy by the death of his elder brother, and his father procured for him an exchange to the 16th Light Dragoons. In 1808 he proceeded to the Peninsula as Major-General, and until the arrival of Lieut.-General Payne he commanded all the Cavalry in the campaign in Portugal.

On July 28-29, 1809, was fought the Battle of Talavera. During the progress of the general attack by the French on the afternoon of the second day, Sir Arthur Wellesley saw the Guards make their rash attack upon Victor's repulsed battalions and speedily ordered down the 48th Regiment from the hill, while, at the same time, he directed the Light Cavalry brigade, under General Cotton, to move up to their support. Cotton had already taken the initiative, for he recognised that this was the crisis of the battle. A close and well-directed volley from the 48th arrested the progress of the victorious Sebastiani, and under cover of it the Guards rallied. The French then turned upon the 48th, but that regiment firmly stood its ground, and the Guards

advanced with cheers to its support. The French column staggered, and Cotton, launching his Cavalry, forced them to retire; on which the enemy's entire forces, foiled at all points, gathered together their columns and withdrew. The defensive character of the battle had necessitated the dissemination of the British Cavalry in three brigades.

For his services on this day Cotton was the recipient of an unanimous vote of thanks by the House of Commons.

At this time he was but thirty-five years of age, and resembled Murat in personal enterprise and fearlessness; like that *beau sabreur* also, he paid scrupulous attention to his 'turn out,' and on the most perilous occasions was attired in the smartest uniform and magnificently mounted. This characteristic obtained for him, in the army in Spain, the name of the *Lion d'or*, and it was said that he was worth £500 dead or alive.

The Iron Duke was often heard to remark that when he gave an order to Sir Stapleton Cotton he felt sure it would be obeyed, not only with zeal, but with discretion.

In 1810 Sir Stapleton was appointed Commander of the Cavalry of the Allies, during the retreat from Almeida to Torres Vedras, and had constant charge of the outposts.

There were periods in the war in which the condition of the Cavalry horses left much to be desired, owing to the scarcity of forage. 'Long forage' was always hard to find; often the only herbage gathered consisted of the tops and sprouts of young gorse from the hill tops. In spite of these difficulties the British Cavalry, though less numerous, were acknowledged to be better mounted than the enemy.

A French officer taken prisoner during Wellington's retreat on Torres Vedras is reported to have said: 'When we break you we can't catch you; but when you break us not a single man escapes.'

General de Brack wrote: 'If the English Cavalry knew war it would, on the day of battle, be perhaps the most terrible in Europe. Their luxury in horses and equipment is in harmony with the courage and handsome appearance of the soldiers. Rarely separated from Infantry they rely more on spies than on scouting. The men are more brave than instructed, they begin charges too far off; the horses, little schooled, have a vigorous and abandoned charge. They may easily be outflanked.' Wellington himself held similar opinions concerning the want of order of the British Cavalry in the Peninsula, and expressed

himself to the effect that, though one of our squadrons could beat two French squadrons, as the numbers increased and order became more necessary he was unwilling to risk the English Cavalry without a great superiority of numbers.

July 22, 1812, the day of the battle of Salamanca, was the most memorable in the annals of our Cavalry in the Peninsula. The night before was remarkable for uncommon darkness and a storm, the frequent precursor of a battle, broke with violence as the troops moved into their positions and bivouacked in the wet. A vivid flash of lightning killed some men and so frightened the Cavalry horses that the greater part of those of the 5th Dragoon Guards broke loose and stampeded, wounding some thirty men; some of the escaped horses were mistaken in the darkness for patrols of the enemy, and the greater number were not caught until next morning.

During the course of the battle, about 2 p.m. in the afternoon, Wellington observed Thomière's division with the enemy's Light Cavalry and 50 guns marching to seize the height near Miranda with the object of cutting off the Allied army from Ciudad Rodrigo. A strong body of Cavalry was brought with expedition from the left wing to the right, and dispositions for the occupation of the British position having been made, and to assail the enemy's centre, Pakenham's 3rd Division ('the fighting division'), accompanied by two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons and General D'Urban's Portuguese Cavalry, marched forward to cut off Thomière's line of march, being followed on the left rear by Cotton with Bull's troop of Horse Artillery, Le Marchant's Heavy Cavalry, Anson's Light and Alten's German Cavalry brigades.

The 3rd Division had pushed the French over a slight eminence, the slope of which was steeper on the side of the enemy than on that of the British, when Cotton rode up the hill to reconnoitre. He saw his opportunity of attacking Thomière's troops, and at once brought up the Cavalry division in three lines; the charge was sounded; Le Marchant's Heavy Dragoons, sweeping over the crest line at full speed, overthrew and trampled down 1,200 French Infantry.

Many of the foe cast away their arms and running blindly between the British squadrons, piteously demanded quarter. Le Marchant and many officers had fallen. Victory, however, appeared yet to waver; an irregular stream of fire opened on the victorious horse and emptied a

hundred saddles; but Lord Edward Somerset, at the head of a squadron, broke through the assailants, and the second line, in another minute, had pierced with terrible slaughter a fresh column of Infantry and captured five guns. Lord Wellington who, as usual, was present at the decisive point, rode up to Sir Stapleton and, fired with unusual enthusiasm, exclaimed, 'Cotton, I never saw anything more beautiful in my life! The day is yours.' D'Urban's brigade of Portuguese Cavalry relieved Le Marchant's Dragoons; Anson's Light Brigade led the renewed advance; and Alten's Germans formed the reserve. Onward swept the victorious Cavalry, directing their advance upon Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, where nearly 2,000 of the enemy laid down their arms. On emerging into the open ground, Anson found, about sunset, a strong body of Artillery and Infantry drawn up in position to dispute his advance and coming under a heavy fire, he was obliged to retire a short distance. The French then withdrew, and Anson's brigade continued the pursuit to within a short distance of the Tormes, having been in one continual gallop from half-past four in the afternoon till sunset.

Lord Wellington then desired Sir Stapleton to take a portion of the Cavalry and patrol along the river in the direction of Alba. He did so and after placing posts of observation at different points on the banks, was returning, when he was fired upon by two Portuguese sentries, who in the darkness of night mistook his party for a body of the enemy. General Cotton and his orderly each received a bullet in the left arm, shattering one of the bones. Though badly hurt he rode on to the village of Calvariza de Bajo, where he was carried from his horse into a pillaged hovel and placed in a pig trough, the most comfortable place that could be found. The surgeon of the 14th Light Dragoons advised immediate amputation, but the General refused to consent to it until the opinion of the Principal Medical Officer, Dr. McGregor, had been obtained. Next morning Dr. McGregor visited him, and to his patient's intense relief declared that the arm might be saved, which it was, though to the end of his life it remained partially disabled.

The trophies of the victory were eleven guns, two eagles, six standards, and 7,000 prisoners, but the enemy are computed to have ultimately lost from all causes 22,800 men and twenty-four guns.

After Salamanca Sir Stapleton received the Order of the Bath; the




Order of the Tower and Sword from the King of Portugal; an additional crest, consisting of a mounted Dragoon, with the word 'Salamanca' beneath; and the thanks of both Houses of Parliament.

During the retreat from Burgos in 1812, Cotton was continually on horseback from dawn till nightfall, and never changed his clothes once. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining regular meals, he contrived an ingenious plan by which he occasionally took a hot meal. He procured a metal box with a partition running down the centre. On one side was a piece of meat, and by the other side a hot iron. This box was slung over his orderly's shoulder at the beginning of the day's march, and, the cooking going on as they rode along, Sir Stapleton was able to enjoy a warm dinner at the first convenient halt.

At the end of the Peninsula War, Sir Stapleton was raised to the Peerage by the style of Baron Combermere, on May 17, 1814. He had been in independent charge of two successful and important operations—namely, Llerena and Castrejon—had covered two retreats, had done good service at Talavera, led the Cavalry to their decisive charge at Salamanca, and was present at the battles of the Pyrenees, Orthes and Toulouse.

In 1817 he was appointed Governor of Barbados. In 1825 the directors of the East India Company sought the Duke of Wellington's opinion as to what officer should be the next Commander-in-Chief in India. An expedition against Bhurtpore was no unlikely event. This fortress, situated 110 miles S.S.W. of Delhi, had defied all the efforts of Lord Lake in 1805, and, after fourteen weeks of effort, and a loss of 3,100 men, he had abandoned the siege. Hence doubts were raised all over India as to the invincibility of the British Raj. It was important, therefore, that, if hostilities broke out, there should be no second failure. The Iron Duke replied to the directors: 'You can't do better than have Lord Combermere. He's the man to take Bhurtpore.' In February he was appointed, and within a year Bhurtpore was invested by the army under his lordship. After less than two months' siege, preparations were made for the assault, which was delivered on January 18, 1826. Three mines were exploded, a dense cloud of dust and smoke arose, streaked with bodies, limbs, stones, timbers and masses of earth, some of the débris falling into our trenches killed or wounded two brigadiers and many officers and men who were standing at Lord Combermere's side; a thick veil of darkness shrouded the scene,

and as it cleared away the Grenadiers of the 14th and 29th Regiments were seen rushing impetuously up the steep faces of the breaches opposed by a scorching fire of grape and musketry. As soon as the leading sections had passed, the Commander-in-Chief himself ascended the breach. From the debris around protruded the half-buried limbs and bodies of those of the garrison who had been engulfed in the explosion. A fierce struggle of bayonet against tulwar ensued, but was quickly decided in favour of the stormers. Fighting their way foot by foot Major Everard's column approached the Jungeenah gate, and was joined by Colonel Delamain's column from the right breach. Here



was a steep and narrow gorge, sixty feet deep, the only descent to which was by a narrow flight of steps. The two columns arrived on its opposite sides, driving their respective foes before them. On its very edge the Bhurtporeans fought in desperation until they were bayoneted or pushed into the chasm. The bodies fell like hail from above. The cotton-padded clothing of some had caught fire from the point blank discharge of musketry, and in about ten minutes 200 lay wedged at the bottom of this awful abyss, a shattered, groaning and burning mass of humanity, from which repeated explosions were heard as the ammunition pouches caught fire. Lord Combermere and his staff found many tortured wretches still alive and a noble effort was made to rescue them.

He then proceeded to the Citadel, and having captured it, the King's colour of the 37th Native Infantry was hoisted, at the sight of which a universal shout of triumph burst from the victors.

The usurper Doorjun Sal, however, had cut his way out of the Kombheer gate, and, keeping close under the city walls for some distance, had entered a thick jungle, where he was joined by some more of his horsemen, and whence, like a hunted tiger, he tried in vain to find an avenue of escape, for every outlet was watched by our Cavalry. At length, about half-past two, Brigadier Sleigh, being encumbered by upwards of 6,000 prisoners, Doorjun Sal sent forward his Cavalry to create a diversion, while he made a dash for liberty with a small body of followers. The 6th Light Cavalry gave chase, the usurper was captured, and each of the horsemen who accompanied him was found to have his horse weighted by from 1,200 to 2,000 gold mohurs, sewn up in the lining of the saddle. Thus fell that celebrated Indian fortress, deemed to be impregnable, which had successfully sustained four desperate assaults by British armies.

The loss of the garrison was put down at 13,000 killed and wounded, 7,000 prisoners, and 135 pieces of ordnance, while treasure realising £480,000 fell into our hands. The Citadel, called the Stronghold of Victory, said to have been built upon the bodies of Lake's soldiers, and all the battlements were demolished.

Lord Combermere was raised to the rank of Viscount. Bhurtpore was his last battlefield. In 1829 he was appointed Colonel of the 1st Life Guards; in 1852, Constable of the Tower; in 1855, Field-Marshal; and he died in his ninety-second year.



## THE YEOMANRY AND ITS ARMAMENT

By MAJOR T. E. L. HILL-WHITSON, *14th (King's) Hussars.*

It is hoped in this article to arrive at some definite conclusions as to the rôle of Yeomanry, and to satisfy ourselves as to the adequacy of the present armament for its proper performance.

It is pretended that by this method alone can we solve the difficulty of deciding whether Yeomanry will be best armed with a rifle only, or with a bayonet or sword in addition; little progress can be made in the solution of this problem by vague arguments as to the ability of the Yeoman to use the sword or bayonet, or as to whether there is time available to instruct him in their use, or as to whether it would be better to devote the time taken in such instruction to other subjects more productive of efficiency; we must face the fact boldly: Is this force armed in such a manner as will enable it to carry out its rôle with a prospect of success?

If it is, well and good; if not, then measures should, it is urged, be taken to make it so, or else evolve some other force to supplant it.

One of the arguments used by those who favour the present armament—the rifle only—is that the leading and action of Yeomanry is made thereby much more simple, and permits all instruction in arms to be centralised on one object—efficiency in fire-action.

It is the intention of the writer to show up the unsoundness of such reasoning and the inaccuracy of the conclusion arrived at.

The Yeomanry at present consist of fifty-six regiments, forty-two of which form fourteen mounted brigades, the remaining fourteen being allotted to the fourteen Infantry Territorial divisions.

Brevity being always a desideratum, it is only proposed to deal with the part played by a mounted brigade in warfare carried on in the United Kingdom, which, it is believed, is the contingency which

the Yeomanry was designed to meet. If we admit that another arm is essential to the proper execution of its rôle in this comparatively close country, it will apply in even greater force to action in more open *terrain*.

It is supposed that the action of a mounted brigade composed of Territorial troops will approximate to that of one whose units are all Regular ones.

In an article on the mounted troops forming the Expeditionary Force, which appeared in the *Times* of February 16 from the able pen of its military correspondent, it was stated that these Regular mounted brigades, containing as they do a proportion of mounted Infantry varying from one-third to two-thirds of their total strength, were evidently designed for a rôle into which defensive tactics would largely enter; and it was also pointed out (and all must agree) that such a rôle is wholly opposed to all modern ideas of the employment of mounted troops, for the best method of defence is offence. If this argument holds good with regard to a force which contains one-third to two-thirds of Cavalry who can attack when mounted, how much more does it apply to a force which is powerless the moment it becomes necessary to mount and advance?

In the following discussion of the rôle of a mounted brigade in reconnaissance, in attack on foot, and in night operations, an attempt will be made to show how difficult the handling of the brigade becomes for want of some weapon in addition to the rifle; also how hard it is to assume the offensive against well-led Cavalry, and, *per contra*, how easily we may have a defensive rôle forced upon us.

Dealing with reconnaissance first, it has been argued that in this country, on account of high-hedged and tortuous roads, troops armed with lances or swords will have no advantage over those whose sole weapon is a rifle; and one brilliant writer has gone as far as to proclaim that victory will crown those troops which are first off their horses and deliver an accurate and rapid fire at their opponents in the act of dismounting. It is suggested that all these arguments are unsound.

In close country a *rencontre* between opposing reconnoitring patrols must be frequent, and, on account of the frequent turns in roads, etc., must be more sudden than in open country, which provides an extensive field of view.

Again, will foreign Cavalry dismount the moment they observe our scouts? The German Field Service Regulations lay down the following rule: 'Even patrols will lose no opportunity in attacking the enemy's patrols whenever met'; and no one can doubt that this could be effected by a charge mounted. Most other foreign Cavalries are imbued with the same spirit.

Is it fair to place our patrols in such a position? They must first dismount, hand over horse, raise safety-catch, and perhaps examine sights; then open fire. This cannot be done in less than from eighteen to twenty seconds, on an average, and we must remember a .303 bullet will often fail to stop the horse, even if it hits it in a vital place.

There is another alternative for our half-armed patrols—retire. But this we cannot do; if we do we are at variance with every teaching of military history, and the force that would adopt such a method or makes it a practice were better disbanded.

The attack on foot must now be considered, firstly, against opposing Cavalry, and then against Infantry.

It will be granted, it is presumed, that to win we must attack, and also that the best defence is 'attack.'

The attack is therefore forced on us as the rôle which we should adopt.

How can this attack be carried out against a similar number of Cavalry, with Horse Artillery, machine guns, etc.

To be brief, we cannot attack them mounted, for we have no weapon to do so. They can and will attack us the moment the country is favourable and opportunity offers.

To safeguard ourselves when mounted from these attacks we must cover ourselves with patrols and detachments in all directions; we must avoid all open or rolling country; in woods alone will we be safe from attack mounted. Our Royal Horse Artillery can only change its position at great risk to itself, because when mounted the escort will be as powerless as the force which it is its duty to protect.

And, finally, when the opposing firing lines are almost *aux prises* no advantage is conferred on that one which has a rifle and no bayonet. It is recognised that a successful decision will be sought by our men by co-operation of machine gun and the Horse Artillery. By seizing positions which enable flanking fire to be brought; by the mutual fire-support of all units, so rendering movement possible;



by using the mobility of our reserves to open fire from new directions and covering positions.

But all these methods entail movement; and all mounted movement will be dangerous under the beard of an active Cavalry.

Colonel Henderson, in the 'Science of War,' mentions the case of an officer in command of a Mounted Infantry force refusing to act against a similar number of Cavalry without an escort of the latter arm. Again, the same authority says: 'A sword must be carried by every mounted man as a means of protection against a sudden charge, and the rifleman is useless without a bayonet.'

And in the attack against Infantry we may try hardiness by the determination to 'get there,' by co-operation of all arms, by fire discipline and accuracy, and by using our mobility to the utmost establish a strong fire position, and even gain fire superiority; but will this avail anything if at the psychological moment there is nothing in our hands to put the seal on victory? The advance to and establishment of a final fire position is costly, and if the lives of the men lost do not purchase something more and beyond such establishment, it were better to forego the attack altogether; and who can disagree? For no good troops will leave their hold on the ground simply because they temporarily lose fire superiority; they will wait for something more.

The bayonet is a weapon bestowing *morale* on those armed with it. There were, it is believed, fifteen bayonet charges at Wörth, but no bayonet encounters.

Now, night operations claim our attention. Our Field Service Regulations, Section 138, lay down that till daylight the bayonet alone is to be used. As this is not carried by the Yeoman, participation in this form of attack is denied him.

Village fighting also gives much scope for bayonet work; it is a form of fighting which must be frequent in this country, and especially so in winter. Our mounted units will, as in all the above cases, be severely handicapped by the inadequacy of their equipment.

At the risk of becoming tedious, another incident common in every war may be discussed—the gallop for a position or some place of tactical importance.

Take, for example, a hill equidistant from two forces who desire it, one force Cavalry, the other Yeomanry. Who will win? The

former, who will arrive potential for immediate attack at the same moment as our riflemen, or the latter who require some fifteen seconds' grace to dismount, hand over horses, extend, open fire, etc.

Much can be done in a quarter of a minute by good Cavalry well led against riflemen getting off horses restless with the gallop.

And to this quarter of a minute must be added another quarter in which the effect of our riflemen's fire has the necessary effect. Thus, as a rule, unless we are from a quarter to half a minute nearer the position covered than our opponents, we would do well to forgo it. This argument applies to bodies of all sizes, and again restricts their action, for, as a rule, they must abandon the capture of such points when in the near vicinity of mounted troops, and this is the negation of the offensive spirit.

It is the duty of some of us to spread the doctrine enunciated by the General Staff and communicated to us at various training centres, colleges, schools of instruction, etc. One of these doctrines or principles, and not the least of them, is that one sometimes called the 'offensive spirit' or the spirit of the attack, that spirit which Clausewitz ('generally recognised as the real philosopher on war') describes as a plant or exuberant growth testifying to a rich and fertile soil.

The task of reconciling the above excellent principle with the rôle forced on a mounted brigade armed as they are has not been an easy one.

The difficulty is therefore one which should be overcome as soon as possible. In short, for want of an arm which we can use when mounted, patrolling, reconnaissance, and despatch-riding become increasingly difficult, and 50 per cent. more dangerous. Night, fog, mist, and very close country add to the risks run.

Movements of a mounted brigade in open country within striking distance of Cavalry become more difficult to arrange, for many detachments must be made, and often favourable points surrendered to the enemy in preference to the risk of being 'caught' whilst getting off one's horse.

We are thus often forced to select close country when action against hostile Cavalry is contemplated, and sometimes this action will be antagonistic to our proper rôle, *i.e.* screening, etc.

The mounted brigade and its units, it has been shown, are all armed for the attack or defence of villages. Night attacks are



forbidden us in many cases for want of a bayonet, and on the same account we cannot press home an attack against good Infantry, and have not an advantage over good dismounted Cavalry.

In a word, we cannot enter into the hurly-burly of war, but must wait outside, watching others, better armed, doing the butchering work. Defence alone seems the rôle we can be successful in, and, as a rule, the passive kind.

Such a rôle is one which cannot be recommended as sound either in principle or practice. Moral, which we are informed is to the physical as three is to one, will be absent, or become increasingly scarce by such a rôle.

It may justly be urged that the Yeomanry are handicapped in any conflict with Cavalry for want of an arm which can be used on horseback or in 'the serried phalanx tight' on foot, but when by such an inadequate armament the benefit of 200 to 300 per cent. in their efficiency also is surrendered, moral must suffer. The need for reconsideration of the whole question of what weapons were required becomes a burning one.

Foreign Powers are not doubtful as to the requirements of mounted troops. All are armed with the sword and rifle or carbine; their non-commissioned officers are armed with the automatic pistol—a great improvement on the revolver, with which corresponding ranks in our Service are armed.

In Germany the front ranks of all Cavalry carry the lance, and it is proposed to add the bayonet in addition to the lance, sword, and rifle.

Russia has undertaken a complete metamorphosis with her Cavalry. The old pre-1904 ideas, 'get off and shoot,' and sundry other false doctrines, heresies, and schisms, have given place to those which obtain in all virile Cavalries. Uhlans and Hussars again figure in the Army Lists, and the cult of the mounted rifleman has taken its place in the limbo of theories which have failed in practice.

How, then, can our Yeomanry be armed so that they can carry out the rôle usually assigned to mounted troops? If with a sword only, they will still be handicapped when engaged in the bloody work on foot; if with a bayonet only, they are still powerless whenever mounted against Cavalry, Artillery, Infantry, Engineers, or even unarmed mobs.

The issue of both arms, it is argued, is unnecessary, would lead

to too much time being taken up with their instruction, and would add to the weight, already sufficient, carried on the horse.

There is something to be said for the above contention, but luckily we have a compromise between the two, viz. a sword-bayonet.

This should always be worn on the man, and never carried on the saddle. It should be sufficiently long so as to give its wielder some chance against an adversary armed with a sword or lance, but not so long as to make its employment at the end of a rifle difficult.

Opponents of this arm and protagonists of the present armament (or want of it) will urge that time will be given up to sword exercise or bayonet exercise which could be much more profitably spent, or, again, that Yeomen cannot be taught how to use a sword or a bayonet.

To deal with the first argument adequately it will be sufficient to remind its adherents that the Yeomanry is officered and also staffed by men who are in no wise ignorant of the rôle which Yeomanry will be called upon to play in war, and who have devoted some time in attempting to evolve a satisfactory solution as to its handling. They are just as concerned as others in directing the training of the units under their command and care, so that all things unnecessary to efficiency and which savour of eye-wash are omitted. But let those champions of the 'rifle only' inform us how a mounted brigade is to meet satisfactorily an equal force of troops armed for attack, and therefore defence, mounted, and for attack and defence on foot; and we will give them every hearing, especially when they appeal to history to back them in their theories. Sword or bayonet exercise will not figure unduly in the annual training, but encouragement in non-training periods would be given for men to make themselves efficient in both; and from experience it can be stated that encouragement would be much appreciated by all Yeomen.

As to the impossibility of teaching Yeomen to use a sword or bayonet—a favourite argument of the anti-*arme blanche* school—it will be sufficient to add that if the argument is persisted in it must lead to the conclusion that the Infantry soldier also cannot be taught to use a bayonet, and should be forthwith deprived of it.

Many possibly will differ from the conclusions arrived at in the above article. If those who desire the present state of armament to be perpetuated will only show clearly how Yeomanry can perform its rôle without sword, sword-bayonet, or bayonet, much will have been achieved.

*RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS*

By COLONEL J. VAUGHAN, D.S.O.

THE conduct of 'Reconnoitring Detachments' or 'Contact Squadrons,' the distances to which they can be sent and from which they can transmit information, depend on a variety of circumstances. The country, its character, the position of obstacles which may be used to an advantage or disadvantage, the condition and morale of the enemy's troops, the attitude of the inhabitants, the facility or otherwise of obtaining forage, the condition of our horses, even the state of the weather, are all factors which have to be carefully considered.

A reconnoitring squadron may be sent any distance from the first rise beyond our outposts to four days' march of 30 miles or more each, anything between 1 mile and 150 miles, according to the factors of the particular problem that we have to solve. It will, however, be exceptional in European war to find a zone of country requiring exploration of anything like the latter size, so for practical purposes we may confine ourselves to considering the action of reconnoitring squadrons over any distance from 1 mile to 60 miles.

In spite of the fact that every problem in reconnaissance has to be solved on its merits and with due regard to the military situation, there are certain definite theories on which the conduct of all reconnoitring detachments is based. These principles are :—

1. Moving by successive bounds from position to position. Such positions may be important tactically, for gaining information, or for both reasons.
2. Constant protection of the detachments whether on the move or halted.
3. Sending forward patrols on definite reconnoitring missions as occasion demands, giving them instructions—and opportunity—for rejoining when their mission is completed.

4. Maintaining touch with the enemy once it has been gained.
5. Providing for the transmission of information obtained.
6. Security at night, concealment and changing position after dark.
7. Living on the country.
8. Moving concealed whenever possible.

To deal with these seriaticim :—

1. *Bounds.* Requires careful study of the map and a knowledge of the enemy's normal tactics and dispositions for security. For instance, if a patrol is sent to see if a certain place is occupied by the enemy in force, it will not expect to reach that place direct without first meeting his outposts or patrols. A few moments' study of the map and quiet consideration will reveal where these are likely to be met should the enemy be in the neighbourhood, and arrangements can then be made to approach them unseen or from an unexpected direction.

If we can succeed in capturing one vedette, post, or picket, it is our first necessary step in procuring the information required. Our next step will be to penetrate the enemy's advanced troops and attain a point whence we can observe his main bivouacs or columns.

Meanwhile our squadron must be as secure as possible in a good tactical position which provides alternative routes of retreat. Then our patrols can act boldly and with confidence that if they are in danger of being intercepted they can fall back on the squadron which is 'holding the door open' for them to retire on, and which will also guarantee the transmission of the information they must have had to run risks for and will probably have had to fight for.

2. *Protection.* It would hardly seem necessary to emphasise this were it not that carelessness by all ranks and arms about protection is so often observed at manoeuvres and field-days that General Langlois' criticism that 'the British Army knows nothing of the service of security' seems justified.

As a rule, whilst on the move it will probably suffice to have a couple of good scouts well in advance of the squadron and a couple on each flank; they will, of course, also move by bounds, passing rapidly over low or open ground and making short halts for observa-

tion near the crests of hills or other spots affording a good view to the front and a well-defined and sufficient protected area to the rear. Similarly, at the halt, we should be covered by small standing patrols, and all dead ground, coverts or buildings, whence the enemy might conceivably surprise us should be searched.

These principles apply for all reconnoitring detachments, from a division to a patrol. They are the natural principles which impel small boys to fag smaller boys to keep 'cave' for them whilst they rob an orchard or otherwise run risks if detected.

3. *Patrols to Reconnoitre.* Whilst the squadron is in movement it will not infallibly be necessary to have any other patrols out than those of security, but as soon as the squadron halts it must be necessary to send patrols to reconnoitre not only for news of the enemy, but to pave the way for the next bound.

Such patrols can either rejoin where their squadron is halted or during the next bound that it makes; or, again, the patrol may be told to await orders at a certain point, should that be clear of the enemy, in case the squadron leader at the time of despatching the patrol is uncertain of the next move of the squadron.

To send out patrols 'in the air' on vague missions unsupported is not advocated. It is true that such patrols may often discover much, but there is no method of transmitting their information with certainty and celerity unless they know approximately the position of the squadron or relay posts to which the information should be sent. Nor can a leader of a contact squadron foresee his position beyond the objective point of his next bound, for his future movements must be subject to information, positive or negative, acquired during or at the conclusion of this bound. It is not fear of losing patrols that induces this view; if no patrols or parts of patrols are lost, it is probable that the reconnaissance has not been carried out in a sufficiently bold and determined manner. If valuable information has been acquired and transmitted the loss of a patrol is a small matter, and the patrol leader and his men who have been wounded or killed have done much more for their country than those who return whole and sound without information the procuring of which involves risk and danger.

But to risk patrols with only an indifferent chance of getting their

information back is another matter, and patrols should therefore only be sent long distances without support when we have not the means of working more methodically, or when we are operating in a country where the inhabitants are friendly.

4. *Maintaining Touch.* If we have kept our squadron and patrols well concealed it should be possible to maintain touch with the enemy's advanced troops and from their movements to observe, or at any rate infer, the movements of his masses. But should the enemy detect our presence, as will be more usual, he may detach troops to endeavour to surround, or at all events drive off, the reconnoitring squadron. In such cases we must retire, probably in an oblique direction and by an alternative route to that by which we advanced.

We may thus be compelled temporarily to relinquish our posts of observation, and when the enemy's detachment ceases his pursuit he may give us the slip owing to nightfall, distance, limitation of view due to thick atmosphere or close country, or other causes. In this case we must go through the process of regaining touch in the same way as we originally gained it. But our task will be easier, as we shall have the place where the enemy was last seen or reported as a sure find on which to direct our first effort.

To use a sporting simile, we shall be hunting a drag instead of drawing a covert for a fox.

5. *Transmission of Information.* This question requires careful study. The best method will be to employ mounted orderlies for short stages when in touch with the enemy, cyclists out of the immediate presence of the enemy, and motor-cyclists for the longer stages nearer our own troops.

6. *Security at Night.* This will depend on our whereabouts being unknown. Horses and men require food and rest. Our best plan will be to mark down a good position for the night, but not to move to it till after nightfall, and then not to move direct to it. A fold in the ground or a wood some distance from roads or villages will serve our purpose.

Any place from which egress is difficult should be avoided. An obstacle on the enemy's side will limit his possible lines of advance and so enable us to watch them with the minimum number of men.

7. *Living on the Country.* Horses should be watered about 9 A.M.,

midday, and in the evening, and this should be taken into consideration in arranging the 'bounds' of the squadron. Every opportunity should be taken of filling nosebags when passing farms and villages, so as always to have one feed in hand. Also during periodic halts for observation an eye should be kept open for a stack of hay or some good grazing.

It is best to pay cash for everything taken and to give the inhabitants to understand that your force is much stronger than it really is. As long as forethought for and care of the horses does not militate against the success of the mission, no trouble to give the horses a chance of keeping fit can be too great.

The men require less thought, as supplies for them can nearly always be obtained and carried in haversacks. No supplies excepting hay should be eaten on the spot where they are obtained, and even hay may be carried a short distance to the night resting-place, if such action is not likely to lead the enemy to discover the squadron.

8. *Concealment.* From what has previously been said the desirability of moving as concealed as possible is obvious.

When the question of concealment *versus* lesser distance arises, the squadron commander will have to use his judgment as to which has the less disadvantage.

This will depend on the military situation, time available, and other factors.



## ***THE ENLISTED CLASSES OF THE INDIAN CAVALRY\****

By CAPTAIN R. W. W. GRIMSHAW, 34th (P.A.V.O.) Poona Horse

IN these days when equitation, tactics, manœuvre, and drill necessarily absorb a vast deal of available time, there is a tendency to relegate to the background such a subject as forms the heading of this paper, and yet the writer ventures to maintain that a little more interest devoted to it would amply repay all, not only by enabling officers to better keep in touch with the recruiting problems of their own units, but also to help them to more fully appreciate such changes in constitution of units as from time to time take place in the Indian Army. Further, in time of war, officers will probably be called on to command troops composed of classes quite different from those of their own units, and therefore some general knowledge of all the classes which go to form the *personnel* of our Indian Cavalry may not be out of place. A short historical retrospect of the peopling of India is necessary to obviate unnecessary repetition further on.

Early Indian history is very much a matter of conjecture; every year one or other of the numerous investigating bodies bring to light something new which goes to swell our very slender knowledge, the recent Buddhist discoveries in the Punjab being one of many examples. We do know, however, with some degree of exactitude that in the earliest ages India was inhabited by many tribes belonging to two great races known as Kols and Dravids. The former occupied Northern and Central India, whilst the latter, who were the most numerous, were scattered all over the continent. Some authorities maintain that the Kols, like the Aryans and Scythians, entered India from the north-west, but there is no reliable evidence to support this supposition, and whether there is or not, the Kols have so intermingled with the races that succeeded them that they can now only be traced in a few tribes which inhabit the hill tracts of Rajputana, Western Bengal, Chota Nagpur, Orissa, and the Central Provinces, the most important ones

\* Lecture delivered at the Cavalry School, Saugor. Authorities consulted:—Elphinstone, Malcolm, Marsden, Bonajee, Tod, official handbooks and gazetteers.



being the Bhils and Santals. As to the Dravids, their origin is also wrapt in mystery, some maintaining they came from the north, whilst others that they are of South Indian origin. They differed from the Kols in that they cut down the forests, were active cultivators, and generally possessed of more civilising instincts than the Kols. They formed themselves into distinct kingdoms, were great traders, and adepts as carpenters, weavers, and smiths. As successive invasions entered India, however, they were slowly pushed into the more southern part of the peninsula, where large numbers of them, some fifty odd millions, are found to-day very little changed in appearance. The Tamil and Telugu are the most important representatives of the Dravids.

There are still some, what one might term, old Dravidian tribes left in other parts of India, who, unlike their more southern cousins, seem to have stood stationary in the march of advancing civilisation. They are to be found in the most inaccessible hilly tracts of the northern Deccan, and the most important communities are the Gonds and the Khandhs.

There are no Gonds, Bhils, Khandhs, Santals, Tamils or Telugus enlisted in the Indian Cavalry; officially there may be a few scattered about here and there. They have only been alluded to because even the shortest historical retrospect would be incomplete without reference to them.

The first great incursion from outside India of which there is left any evidence whatsoever is that known as the Turanian or Mogul. These people entered India from the north-east long before we have any written records, and we only know of their invasion by the marks they have left on the inhabitants of North-Eastern India. The first historical landmark is the invasion of India by that portion of the Aryan race which went east about 2000 B.C. The Aryans could not write, but their bards handed on from generation to generation certain hymns called Vedas. Later on, when the art of writing was mastered, these bardic records were written down, and from them we are able to learn something about these early invaders. The Aryans continued to pour into India for some 500 years, and were then followed by Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Huns, Arabs, Afghans, Turks, Moguls, and, lastly, the British.

The Aryans not only brought the entire country as far south as the

Vindhya Hills under their sway, but, uniting to a large extent with the existing inhabitants, founded the bulk of that gigantic and heterogeneous community we call Hindu, the spiritual, if not the temporal, power of their priests extending eventually to Cape Comorin.

The above-mentioned Hindu community was roughly divided into four great subdivisions. Soldiers and their rajahs, called Kshatriyas; Brahmins, or priests; Sudras, or common people; and Chandalas, or slaves.

From a very remote period, to the Kshatriyas subdivision, can be traced thirty-six royal families, and the descendants of the latter style themselves Rajputs or sons of princes.

These four subdivisions still exist to this day. In early times, however, they were rather imperfectly defined, but with the advance of Brahminism with its reactionary caste prejudices, the cleavage between classes became very pronounced. To-day these distinctions are again receding, and many advanced Hindu thinkers are endeavouring to still further break down 'caste intolerance.'

The above order prevailed for many hundreds of years till the Mahometan invasion. When the followers of the Prophet first arrived in India they found four great Hindu kingdoms in existence. Firstly, Delhi, under the Tuars and Chohans; secondly, Canouj, under the Rahtores; thirdly, Mewar, under the Ghelotes; and, fourthly, Anhulwarra, under the Chauras and Solankis. The approximate geographical boundaries of the above were: *Delhi*—the Punjab and Scindh; *Canouj*—all that country stretching east along the Ganges valley; *Mewar*—the country at present embraced by that portion of the Rajputan Agency east of the Aravulli hills, Malwa, and the Central India Agency; and *Anhulwarra*—Rajputana west of the Aravullis, Gujerat, and Baroda. These are very rough indeed, but give an approximate idea of these four great kingdoms. The direct result of the Mussulman invasion is the present-day sixty odd millions professing the faith of Islam. Large numbers of these are direct descendants of the invading hosts, but a very high percentage spring from converts who were either forced into accepting the new faith, or voluntarily adopted it to escape the toils of their dominating intolerant Hindu co-religionists of higher social standing.

The Indian regular Cavalry consists of 39 complete regiments—that is, there is no 24th Regiment and the Guides make the

39th. In addition there are 2 more squadrons, 1 from the 42nd Deolis and 1 from the 43rd Erinpura Regiment—in all 157 squadrons. The Aden troop is excluded. Of these 157 squadrons 39½ are Sikh, 21½ Punjabi Mahometan, 17 Jat, 16½ Pathan, 16 Hindustani Mussulman, 9 Rajput, 8 Dogras, 7½ Rajput Mussulman, 6 Deccani and Madras Mussulman, 6 Derajat Mussulman, 4 Multani Pathans, 3 Punjab Rajputs, 2 Khaimkhani, 1 Mahratta, 1 Hindustani Hindu, and 1 Mixed of the Guides.

Previous to the mutiny of 1857 regiments had no very hard and fast rules as to caste constitution. That great upheaval brought about the present-day class squadrons and half squadrons, it being assumed that in the event of future trouble each class would balance the other, or, in other words, give one another away. There are to-day only four regiments officially recognised as one class—the 1st, 14th, 15th, and 17th—the remainder are made up of Hindus and Mussulmans in varying proportions, the main idea being, as already stated, to balance the two great religions, the one against the other. This equipoise is rarely actually attained in any one unit, but there are, in fact, 78½ Hindu and Sikh squadrons balancing 78½ Mussulman. The most striking point in connection with the above is the enormous preponderance of Sikh squadrons—one quarter of the whole—and this probably accounts for the general sense of apprehension amongst Indian army officers when it was rumoured that the Sikhs were showing symptoms of unrest some two or three years ago. Another point which generally escapes observation is that if a line be drawn from Karachi to Calcutta only seven squadrons are enlisted south of that line. When discussing the question of the reliefs the writer became aware that quite a large number of well-informed officers were under the impression that many more squadrons were enlisted in Southern India than is actually the case; as a matter of fact, the centre of gravity of recruiting falls a little south of Lahore.

It is now proposed to deal with each class in turn. In the compass of an article like this it is impossible to enter into details. It is merely intended to give a rough general idea of the origin of each class and their various idiosyncrasies.

#### SIKHS

The Sikhs are not a race, but a religious sect. Sikhism was founded in the Punjab by one, Baba Nanak, in the fourteenth century. Many

Hindu tribes and races of the Punjab embraced the persuasion, amongst which predominated the Jats, and hence the name Jat Sikh. For many years after its inception there was nothing militant about Sikhism. This latter trait was given to it by Govind, known as the tenth and last Guru. At the time of his appearance Sikhism was at a very low ebb, due to the brutal persecutions of the Mussulman rulers. Govind, fired by the spirit of revenge, conceived the project of throwing off the Mahometan yoke by creating what might be termed a warrior sect. In order to consummate his plans he began by preaching that war was the first duty of a true Sikh, especially if directed against a Mussulman.

To give more weight to his militant preaching he introduced certain customs by which he hoped to keep alive the fighting instinct, and on those who accepted these customs he conferred the title of Khalsa, which means the elect. To gain this title he re-instituted the rite called the Pahul, which for some years had fallen into desuetude. This rite consisted in drinking in the presence of at least five of the faithful a certain mixture stirred by a dagger accompanied by vows of constancy and courage. Having joined the Khalsa the word Singh (meaning a lion) was added to the name. Govind made heroic efforts to stifle all caste prejudice, and admitted every grade to his Khalsa fold. He was by no means a socialist, and readily admitted that a man's natural ability must be recognised by distinctions withheld from those of more mediocre attainments, but, as far as it lay in his power, he steadfastly set his face against distinction by right of birth or caste. Under Govind's leadership the Khalsa Sikhs rapidly rose to great power, and became a veritable thorn in the flesh to the Government of the Mogul Emperor Aurungzebe, who ultimately found it expedient to come to terms with these troublesome zealots, and Govind eventually accepted a high command in the State of Hyderabad, Deccan. He was murdered at a place called Nandair on the Godavery, and to this day there is quite a large community of Sikhs round those parts, and the place is frequently visited by Khalsa pilgrims. On Govind's death the feud between the Sikhs and Mussulmans grew more bitter, but as the authority of the latter was rapidly waning, the Sikhs continued to grow more powerful, till, under the leadership of Runjeet Singh, they completely dominated the Punjab. In 1845, when in the zenith of their power, they came into collision with the British, which

brought about the first and second Sikh wars, ending with the desperate and sanguinary battles of Chillianwallah and Gujerat, and final subjection of the Sikhs to our sway, and the deportation of their Maharajah Duleep Singh.

The term Sikh as used nowadays practically alludes only to that portion of the Sikh community which embraced the tenets of Govind, and are known as Khalsa Sikhs, but there are many thousands who never take the Pahul prescribed by Govind, and they are termed Nanakpanthis. The latter merely follow the teachings of Baba Nanak, whose doctrine, in so far as it affected Hinduism, may be looked upon in much the same light as the Reformation was to the Church of Rome, in that it was an honest endeavour to rid Hinduism of its more grosser practices. Sikhism is still essentially Hindu in conception, differing chiefly over such matters as birth, marriage, and death ceremonies, the prohibition of idol worship, and omission of the sacred thread worn by all orthodox Hindus.

One not infrequently sees it stated that a man is not born a Sikh, and has, so to speak, to be baptised. This is not strictly correct, as the offspring of Sikh parents is still a Sikh, but he is not a Khalsa Sikh or warrior until he has taken the Pahul. This usually takes place on attaining puberty or earlier if desired by the parents. It has, however, become the custom for families who propose sending their sons into the army to postpone this taking of the Pahul until the lads are enlisted.

As mentioned in the early part of this paper, one of the great classes of the Punjab which embraced the new faith at its outset were the Jats, who were essentially agricultural peasants. It is this class that is most sought after by the army, especially the Cavalry. The next largest division one comes to is the Khatri or merchant class, of which large numbers enlist in the mounted branch. The supposed to be respective characteristics of these two divisions may briefly be summed up in the terms, grit and brains. Needless to say, one frequently comes across brainy and gritty Jats as well as brainy and gritty Khatri, and judging by the Sikhs met with at the Cavalry school, and one meets a good many, it is a case of six of one and half-a-dozen of the other.

The Khatri, it may be mentioned, claims descent from the Kshatriyas, already alluded to, but this is more than doubtful. The

Khatri is a fine manly soldierly person, and as all Sikh Gurus were Khatri, they are held in high esteem by Sikhs in general, but are not so popular in military circles as the Jat. Other classes are Lobanas (pedlars), Torkhans (carpenters), Mazbi (sweepers), and Sainis (gardeners). These are found in the Pioneer units; very few come to the Cavalry. Two other interesting sects are Akalis, or Nihangs, and Udasis. The former are pronounced Khalsa Sikhs of the fanatical order, and correspond to the Ghazi. It is said that Govind specially created this sect as a set-off to the Ghazi. There are very few of them now left. Udasis correspond to the Hindu Jogi and Mussulman fakir, and wander from one place to another.

That portion of the Punjab chiefly occupied by the Sikhs lies east and west of the Sutlej, those coming from the west being known as Manja Sikh, those from the east as Malwa. Another important geographical group are the Doaba Sikhs, from the country lying between the Beas and the Ravi Rivers.

The chief recruiting centres are Amritsar, Jullunder, and Ludiana. There is very little difference in the appearance of Sikhs from these three tracts, but the Manja Sikh is supposed to be broader in the jaw than the Malwa, whilst the Doaba comes between the two.

This can be seen on referring to the illustrations, but more often than not this physical trait will be found anything but a reliable guide.

And now a few characteristics of the Khalsa or warrior Sikh. His distinguishing marks are his strict adherence to the five Kakas of Govind—namely :

(1) He never cuts his hair.

He wears

(2) The Kachh, or short drawers. (3) The Kara, or steel bangle.

(4) The Khanda, or knife. (5) The Kanga, or comb.

In addition he does not use tobacco, but has no objection (rather the reverse) to liquor or opium, and loves the flesh of the pig, but, like all Hindus, will not touch beef. He generally apparels himself in white. He has no objection to handling agricultural implements, and can marry a Hindu woman, the latter having to perform certain rites. It is hardly necessary to enter into his many sterling qualities as a fighting man.

The warrior Sikh can be classed amongst the finest specimens of

the human race in Asia, or, indeed, the world. His shortcomings, from a Cavalry point of view—and every class has some—are possibly a too great regard for mammon, and a tendency to run to flesh at an early age.

Their written language is known as Gurmukhi.

There are only 10 regiments out of 39 which do not enlist any Sikhs at all—viz. 1st, 5th, 8th, 14th, 15th, 17th, 26th, 27th, 28th, and 34th, all the remainder have Sikhs in varying proportions.


### JATS

Since the Sikhs are largely indebted to the Jats for all that is best in the Khalsa fold it is intended to deal with Jats in the same article as that on Sikhs.

There is a considerable divergence of opinion on the ethnology of these people. Some maintain they are descendants of the Scythians who appeared in India after the Moguls, others that they are nothing more than descendants of the Sudra class of the Aryan Hindu community, and are therefore closely allied to the Rajputs. This is a fairly reasonable assumption, as Jats and Rajputs have many points in common, and are, in fact, remarkably similar in build, appearance, habits, and manners. In their customs they differ rather widely, but not to such an extent as to attribute their origin to a completely different source. Such differences are easily accounted for if they are descendants of the Sudra community of the Aryans. A Jat, for example, lives by handling agricultural implements, and is a toiler in the fields. A Rajput looks upon such with contempt. Again, Jat women attend their men folk in the fields, and assist them in many ways a Rajput one will not. Again, a Jat practises widow re-marriage which socially condemns to an inferior position in the Hindu world. These customs, however, are in no way incompatible with an Aryan origin. Another point showing their close similarity is that as a Jat rises in the world he sooner or later claims to be a Rajput, and accepts Rajput customs as far as he can do so. Not so very different from what one sees in the old country. This point will be returned to in another number when dealing with Rajputs.

The Jats of the Punjab are of exactly the same origin as the Jats of other parts of India. Those of Central India gained a rather meretricious fame by their obstinate defence of Bhurtpur, a little north

of Gwalior, when Lake, after three unsuccessful assaults, had to abandon the siege. The Jats are a widely scattered community all over the northern portion of India. They have little or no history, and



all that is known of them is that in early times they consisted of many tribes, each under its own chief. They never founded any really well-known kingdoms or dynasties, and as a community have played an insignificant part in war, religion, or politics. Bhurtpore, already

Y



alluded to, is the only Jat State of importance, and its chief is looked upon as the titular head of all Jats hailing from Central India, Rajputana, and the United Provinces.

The great characteristic of the Jat is his individual independence. His ideas are the reverse of syndicalism. He is honest, industrious, and manly, possessing, as a general rule, an excellent physique. They have a good deal of the soldierly instinct about them created by their inter-clan wars of days gone by. From a Cavalry point of view, when carefully selected they make most useful troopers, if somewhat lethargic. They are often credited with dulness of intellect, but from the writer's experience of them at the Cavalry school, as well as at musketry, signalling, transport, and mounted Infantry classes, he has not found them more so than other classes. The Jat is not a brilliant linguist, and that, coupled with the average Englishman's unhappy shortcomings in that respect, is probably responsible for the reputed dulness.

He has always fought well when called upon to do so, although he lacks that *élan* which his brother who accepted Sikhism possesses.

The total Jat population is about six million. The Jats enlisted in the Cavalry come chiefly from the districts of Delhi, Gurgaon, Rohtok, and Hissar, in the Punjab, and from Bhurtpore in Rajputana.

They speak no particular language of their own, using the dialect of the particular district they come from.


The following units enlist Jats:—2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th (a class regiment of Jats), 16th, 20th, 29th, 31st, and 33rd, having 1 squadron each except the 29th, which has two.

(To be continued.)


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#### NOTES ON ILLUSTRATIONS.

1. Ludhiana Sikh Recruit in ordinary village costume.
2. Malwa Sikh from Patiala in civilian gala apparel.
3. Jat Recruit in ordinary village costume before enlistment.
4. Typical Jat Trooper.
5. Typical Doaba Sikh Sowar (Trooper).
6. Manja Sikh—Indian Officer
7. Jat Trooper in mufti, after entering the Army.
8. Jat—Indian Officer.








*'C. B. A.'*

*THE CAVALRY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION.*

THIS Association has been recently formed with the special object of providing office accommodation, secretarial and executive administration for those Cavalry regiments whose benefit societies may wish to join the Association. Such regiments joining the Association will be entirely free to carry out under their own Committee the mode of management and method of working their own Society or Association. The Committee of the Cavalry Benefit Association consists of one member elected from each regiment joining the Association, and should such representative be unable to attend any meeting of the Committee, the said regiment may delegate a substitute with full voting power. The Chairman is elected by the Committee and holds office for two years. The appointment of a secretary and the administrative staff rests with the Committee of the Cavalry Benefit Association with full powers to adopt such measures as may best fulfil the objects of the Association.

A regiment joining this Association pays an entrance fee of £10 as a contribution towards the office furniture and fittings, and yearly an equal share of the Association's annual expenses, which are estimated to not exceed £300. The following Regimental Benefit Associations have joined the Cavalry Benefit Association : 4th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, 11th Hussars, 12th Lancers, 13th Hussars, 18th Hussars.

For further particulars application should be made to the Secretary, Cavalry Benefit Association, 33 Tothill Street, Westminster, S.W.



*THE EXTINCT CAVALRY REGIMENTS  
OF THE BRITISH ARMY*

Compiled from an article contributed to the 'Journal of the Royal United Service Institution' on 'The Extinct Regiments of the British Army,' by A. E. Sewell, Esq., 1887.

THE English Army practically dates from the Restoration in 1680, and it appears that every regiment raised by Charles II. is represented in direct descent in our army of to-day; at the time of the King's death in 1685 the strength of the force stood at about 10,000 men.

James II., however, increased this number largely, and of the fourteen corps of Cavalry embodied during the first year of his reign, six come within the scope of the article as extinct regiments. They include the 5th, 8th, and 10th Horse, the first being disbanded in 1690, the others in 1692. Beyond the fact that the 5th, commanded by General Werden, served in Ireland previous to its reduction, and that the others were commanded by Lord Scarsdale and Lord Dover (who subsequently threw in his fortune with the Roman Catholic cause), little is to be discovered of their history. Their equipment was the same as the contemporary regiments of Cuirassiers, the strength of which, however, varied so far as to be nine troops in the (then) 2nd Horse, while it was only four troops in the (then) 3rd.

A regiment of Dragoons, raised by Colonel Richard Hamilton, proceeded to Ireland in the year 1685. It subsequently formed part of King James's Irish Army, and was presumably from the first never on the English establishment. Subsequently to 1691 it was for many years in the service of Louis XIV. of France. To James II.'s reign also belongs a regiment of horse, raised by his warrant, under Lord Brandon, in September 1688, two months only before his abdication; the regiment seems to have been disbanded a few months later. It is probable that Colonel Slingsby's Horse, also disbanded in 1688, was raised the same time as Brandon's.

The revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which nearly synchronised with King William's accession to the throne, brought a large number



of French refugees into England, from among whom five regiments were promptly raised, two of which were Cavalry. Of these one was the Duke of Schomberg's Regiment of Horse, formed in July 1689, composed of eight troops, which he took over with him to Ireland in August as part of his division of 10,000 men. He commanded it in person at the battle of the Boyne on July 1, 1690, where he was killed, being succeeded by Henri de Ruvigny, afterwards Earl of Galway. The regiment served with much distinction during the rest of the campaign; returning to England in the early part of 1692, it sailed in July for Flanders, where in the same month it was engaged against the French at Landen, where it was led by the King in person. In 1698, peace having been concluded with France, a motion was brought forward in Parliament for the reduction of the French regiments, and negatived. At this time 'Galway's,' as it had now become, consisted of nine troops; it was disbanded, however, in the following year. The other regiment referred to was one of Dragoons, raised by Colonel Miremont; it served in Ireland, and then in Flanders, and, like 'Galway's,' was disbanded in 1699, its strength at the time being 698 of all ranks in eight troops.

The 5th Dragoons (Irish Grenadiers) came into existence in 1689, only a few weeks later than the Huguenot regiments. It was raised, with the existing 6th (Inniskilling Dragoons), in the neighbourhood of Londonderry and Enniskillen, for the defence of Derry, its first commander being Brigadier Wynns. After serving through the Irish campaign, the regiment, consisting of six troops, embarked in 1694 for Flanders, where it took part in the concluding campaign, under William III., against the French, returning to England in 1698 at the declaration of peace. In 1702, war having again broken out with France, the regiment was sent to join the army under Marlborough in Germany, being present both at Schellenberg and Blenheim (August 2, 1704), distinguishing itself so much at the latter battle that three troops were added to its strength. Two years later, at Ramillies, it, in common with the existing Scots Greys, earned the distinction of becoming a Grenadier Corps. At the conclusion of peace in 1713 the regiment returned to Ireland, and does not appear to have seen any further active service. Into the unfortunate circumstances under which it fell into disgrace during the suppression of the Irish Rebellion in 1797 we need not enter; the regiment was ordered to England and

disbanded at Chatham on April 10, 1799. In 1858 the existing regiment was raised, as the 5th Royal Irish (Light) Dragoons (Lancers), and allowed to assume the battle honours of its predecessor.

Delamere's, Drogheda's, Lisburne's, Lovelace's, Kingston's, and Roscommon's Dragoons, raised for King William's service in Ireland, all ceased to exist as regiments when the troubles in that country were quieted. Wolsey's Dragoons on the Irish establishment were, like the Huguenot regiments, also disbanded in 1699.

The year 1693 saw the formation of the first troop of Horse Grenadier Guards, the second troop dating from 1702; these ranked immediately after the Life Guards of Horse, between them and the Oxford Blues, and were part of the Body Guard. They survived until May 1788, and their list of colonels includes some of the most noted soldiers of the day. On their disbandment, to quote a contemporary magazine, 'Not one of the rank and file enlisted in inferior corps. They received with their discharge the money they gave on entering, viz. 100 guineas, with some small deduction.' It is further noted that the officers were to receive full pay during their lives; and that on May 26th the Blues took the place of the Horse Grenadiers in guard-mounting at Whitehall.

Lord Windsor's Horse was raised February 1, 1693; it was apparently numbered 1st Horse on the Irish establishment, and was not disbanded until 1712. Lucas's Horse, on the Irish establishment, raised December 1, 1709, was disbanded in 1713.

During the reign of George I. several regiments of Dragoons were raised to oppose the invasion of 1715, which included the existing light Cavalry regiments, numbered 9th to 14th, and Molesworth's, Stairs's, and Churchill's, all three of which fought at Preston, and must have been disbanded shortly afterwards.

To meet the emergency arising from the Jacobite insurrection of 1745, the following regiments of horse were raised by the noblemen whose names they bore, viz. the Duke of Kingston's, the Duke of Montagu's, the Duke of Bolton's, the Duke of Ancaster's, the Marquis of Granby's, the Earl of Berkeley's, Viscount Falmouth's, and Viscount Harcourt's, with the Derby Blues. They were all disbanded the following year, but the Duke of Kingston's was practically re-embodied on the spot, as the Duke of Cumberland had so highly approved of its conduct at the battle of Culloden that he obtained

permission to embody as many of the men as would re-enlist in his own regiment of Light Dragoons. All the men except eight enlisted in the new regiment, which consisted of six troops, the Duke of Cumberland being appointed colonel. It was sent to Flanders and distinguished itself highly at the battle of Val in 1747, but the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle having put an end to the war, it returned to England and was disbanded at Nottingham in 1749.

Five regiments of Light Dragoons were incorporated in 1759, viz. the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th; of these, the 15th and 16th are the existing 15th (King's Hussars) and the existing 16th (Queen's Lancers), while the 17th, raised by Lord Aberdour in Scotland, was disbanded in 1763, the number being then taken by the 18th, now the existing 17th Lancers; while the 19th in turn became the 18th.

This last regiment (the 18th Light Dragoons) was raised in Ireland by the Earl of Drogheda, who commanded it as lieutenant-colonel until 1762, when his command was raised to a colonelcy, and it was known for some time as 'Drogheda's Light Horse.' The regiment was not employed on foreign service until 1795, when it was ordered to Jamaica, but landed at St. Domingo, where the headquarters remained during their stay in the West Indies. Its strength on embarkation was 463 noncommissioned officers and men. It was employed against the Caribs, and was brought home again in 1797. In 1799 two squadrons were employed in Holland, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, but returned to England at the end of the year. In December 1807 it was constituted a Hussar regiment, the uniform being light blue with silver lace, busby-bags blue, and plumes white, springing from smaller red ones, the dolmans being furred with grey. In July 1808 the regiment sailed for Portugal, and joined Sir John Moore's army, being present at Benevente, and forming part of the rearguard during the retreat on Corunna. In 1813 the regiment embarked for Lisbon, and was attached to Sir Stapleton Cotton's Cavalry division; it was engaged at Vittoria, Morales, at Orthes, and other battles, including the final one before Toulouse. It marched homeward through France, and embarked at Calais in July 1814. Six of its troops served through the campaign of 1815, and mustered 396 of all ranks at Waterloo; they formed part of the Army of Occupation, and after the entry into Paris were quartered in the North of France. Brought home in 1818, the regiment was sent to Ireland, and disbanded in September 1821 at



Newbridge. The exiting regiment was raised in 1858, and shortly after its embodiment was permitted to assume the battle honours of its predecessor.

A 20th Regiment of Light Dragoons was incorporated in Ireland in 1760 by Sir James Caldwell, who was appointed its captain-commandant; it was disbanded in 1763 at the conclusion of peace.

The Marquis of Granby and Lord Robert Sutton raised a regiment of Dragoons, numbered 21st, in 1760, which was styled the Royal Foresters. The equipment and discipline of the corps, which, however, never left England, was excellent, but it was disbanded at the peace in 1763, its strength at the time being twenty-three officers and 381 non-commissioned officers and men. Another regiment of Dragoons, raised for service at the Havannah, was also disbanded in 1763.

Four regiments of Light Dragoons were embodied in 1779, and all disbanded in 1783. These were the 19th, commanded by Major-General Russell Manners, who had formerly served in the Royal Foresters; the 20th, commanded by Major-General R. P. Philipson, which was formed of the light troops that had for a time been attached to several regiments of Dragoon Guards; the 21st, raised and commanded by Major-General John Douglas; and the 22nd, raised and commanded by Lord Sheffield, which was known as the 'Sussex.'

The 23rd Light Dragoons, better known as the 19th, had a longer history. The regiment was embodied in 1781 by Colonel Sir John Burgoyne for service in India. It was formed of drafts from seven regiments of Light Dragoons—the existing 14th, 15th, and 16th, and the 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd mentioned above. It sailed for India in February 1782, and on arrival was quartered at Madras; but it was not until May 1784 that a wing of the 23rd joined the army in camp at Arcot. In 1788 the regiment was again in Madras, as the 19th Light Dragoons, which number had been assigned to it after the disbandment of the previous 19th, already referred to, and it was as the 19th that the corps was distinguished throughout its brilliant and arduous service in the East. It fought at Assaye, Vellore, Seringapatam, and Conaghal. In March 1803 it was at Hurryhur, and from there marched to occupy Poona. On November 29 it took part in the battle of Argaum, and was also present at the siege and storming of Gawilghur. Shortly after this, fresh horses having been purchased, Major-General Wellesley mentions that the 19th Dragoons 'are looking better than I have ever

seen them.' In February 1804, after a fine march, the regiment was present at the action of Muncaisir, and in December is again mentioned in Wellesley's despatches as looking 'remarkably well.' It was not relieved in India until 1808. The regiment next served in Canada during the war 1812-14, in defence of the frontier, returning home at the conclusion of peace. In 1817 it was constituted a corps of Lancers, and was disbanded in Ireland in 1821. As battle honours the regiment was granted the *Elephant*, *Assaye*, *Mysore*, and *Niagara*. The existing 19th Hussars was originally raised by the East India Company on the outbreak of the mutiny of the Bengal Army, as the Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry, and received its present number on the transfer of its services to the Crown in 1861. In 1874 the regiment was permitted to assume the honours granted to the old 19th.

A regiment of Dragoons was raised, probably in America in 1782, whose chief was Sir Banastre Tarleton, the commander of the British Cavalry during the War of Independence. The date of its disbandment is not recorded.

The Queen's American Rangers, although formed earlier, was not known by a distinctive name until 1782. The corps was originally raised about the commencement of the war, and the command given to J. G. Simcoe in 1777, after the battle of Brandywine, who was gazetted major-commandant. It was a mixed regiment, and at the time of its disbandment in 1783 consisted of three troops of Cavalry and eleven companies of Light Infantry. Sir Henry Clinton praised it highly. 'Its history under Simcoe's command,' he wrote, 'was a series of gallant, skilful, and successful enterprises without a single reverse.'

The 20th, or Jamaica Regiment of Light Dragoons, was raised for service in the West Indies in 1787 by Lieut.-Colonel H. F. Gardner. After service in Jamaica, the 20th were employed on detachment duty both in Malta and Sicily. It was ordered to the Cape with Sir David Baird's force in 1805, but disembarked in Saldanha Bay and did not share in the march upon Cape Town. A detachment of five dismounted troops was sent to South America, and were present at the assault of Monte Video on February 3, 1807. The regiment was also represented the same year in Egypt, and fought both at the capture of Alexandria and before Rosetta. The English force was withdrawn in September, and a detachment of the 20th, 300 strong, joined Sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal in July 1808, and served with distinction at

Vimiera, where, to quote the historian of that war, 'All the Cavalry with the army was a squadron of the 20th Light Dragoons, under Colonel Taylor.' After the success of General Anstruther's attack on the right flank of the French, this squadron was thrown forward in pursuit. Taylor with his few horsemen rode furiously among the confused and retreating troops, and scattered them with great execution. Unfortunately the ground was ill-adapted for Cavalry, and this small body, led away by the ardour of pursuit, became entangled in difficulties; hemmed in and charged by a very superior force under General Margazon their gallant leader was killed and the greater part of his squadron destroyed, though not before it had produced an effect upon the enemy greater than could have been expected from twice their number. The regiment also saw service on the south coast of France, at Genoa, in Sicily, and in Spain, and acquired the honour of bearing the word *Peninsula*, in addition to *Vimiera*, on its guidons and appointments. The regiment was disbanded in Ireland in 1818.

The existing 20th Hussars was raised by the East India Company on the outbreak of the Mutiny as the 2nd Bengal European Light Cavalry, and received its present number when transferred to the service of the Crown in 1861. Later the regiment was permitted to assume the battle honours of the old 20th.

The 21st Light Dragoons was raised in 1794 by Lieut.-Colonel T. R. Beaumont, and sent to the West Indies the following year, where it was disembarked at San Domingo, and employed against the natives who had taken up arms and enrolled themselves under the flag of the French Republic. The climate played havoc with the regiment, and in 1798 it mustered only 120 rank and file, of whom ninety-six were returned fit for duty; it was then brought home. In 1806 the regiment sailed for the Cape, two troops being sent to South America, rejoining headquarters in 1807, after the fall of Monte Video. In 1816 a small detachment was sent to St. Helena to do duty when Bonaparte was removed there. The regiment was disbanded at Chatham in May 1820 after two years' service in India.

The 22nd, 23rd, and 24th regiments of Light Dragoons were raised in 1794 by Viscount Fielding, Colonel William Fullarton, and Colonel William Loftus respectively. The 23rd took the number which had been vacant since the renumbering of the old 23rd as the 19th. None

of these regiments served abroad, and they were disbanded in 1802 on the conclusion of the peace of Amiens.

The 25th Light Dragoons were raised in March 1794 by Major-General Gwyn, served in India, and were renumbered 22nd in 1802. The regiment bore the honour *Seringapatam* for its share in the siege of 1799, and was present in the following year, both at Malavelly on March 27 and at Conaghul, September 10. For its services at the capture of the Fortress of Badanwy the 25th was publicly thanked by General Monro. The 22nd was employed in Java in 1811, and then returning to India, was present at Maheidpore in 1817. It returned home the next year, and was disbanded in 1820. The uniform was blue, with white facings and gold lace.

The 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th regiments of Light Dragoons were raised in 1795, and all saw service in the field.

The 26th, better known by its second number as the 23rd, served in the West Indies and in Egypt. It was renumbered in 1803, and, as the 23rd, served with distinction in the Peninsula, and suffered so severely at Talavera in 1809 that it was brought home to recruit. It was in General Anson's Light Cavalry Brigade, which, in conjunction with General Fane's Heavy Brigade, attacked the two French squares defended by a ditch flanked by Artillery. In this desperate charge, which was undertaken to check the French advance against the heights held by Lord Hill, the 23rd was nearly annihilated. It was later employed in Flanders, and was present at Waterloo. In 1816 it was constituted a Lancer regiment. The uniform was blue, with crimson facings and gold lace. Its battle honours were the *Sphinx*, with *Egypt*, *Peninsula*, *Talavera*, and *Waterloo*. The regiment was disbanded in England in 1817, having been commanded in succession by General Russell Manners, 1795; General Floyd —; W. Cartwright, 1804; Sir W. Payne, 1807; H. Fane, 1814; and Sir George Anson.

The 28th Light Dragoons was raised by Major-General Robert Lawrie, and served at the Cape. The regiment was styled 'The Duke of York's Own,' and was disbanded in Ireland in 1802.

The histories of the 27th and 29th, known later as the 24th and 25th, are closely connected. Both were raised in 1795, and both distinguished themselves by their service in India, where they often fought side by side. The 27th was raised by Major-General Blathwayte; he was succeeded in 1801 by Lord Dorchester, and Lord Dorchester in

the following year by Colonel Loftus of the recently disbanded 24th Light Dragoons. In August 1803 the regiment was in the Doab, and present at the siege of Alighur; later on in the year it was at Delhi, and at the battle of Laswarree on November 1. On the 17th of the same month the Cavalry Brigade, which included also the 29th and the existing 8th Hussars, surprised Holkar's Cavalry at Furruckabad, with a trifling loss on the English side, and then rejoined the Infantry of the army, which had fought the battle of Deeg on the 13th at Muttra. The brigade was present before Deeg from December 13 to 24. The 27th and 29th had each a light field-piece attached to the regiment—presumably worked by a party told off and instructed for the purpose, as in the case of the 19th Light Dragoons—that were found very effective and frequently employed, among other occasions, in a skirmish with the enemy's Cavalry outside Bhurtpore, January 21, 1805. On February 9 in the same year the Cavalry Brigade was despatched after Shir Khan into the Doab, and after following him over a large district, came up with him on March 2 at Affzulghur, in which action the 27th lost fifteen killed and thirty-one wounded. The brigade then returned to Bhurtpore. Its next service was to pursue and engage Holkar's Cavalry at a spot some distance south-west of Bhurtpore, which was effected with a slight loss. The 27th and 29th then went together into camp at Secundra. On October 28 they marched as a part of Lake's army to Delhi, thence to Ludhiana, and returned by Jullunder to Delhi in the following February. The *Elephant* and *Hindustan* were granted as honours to the regiment for its services. It was recalled from India and disbanded in 1819. The uniform was blue, facings light grey, lace gold.

The 29th prefaced its career in Hindostan by service in the West Indies. This regiment was raised by the second Lord Heathfield and sent abroad at once. It served in some minor operations in San Domingo, and returned home in 1797. It was then sent to India and was present at Alighur, and, after the engagement, was detached to Shobabad and Agra in pursuit of the Mahratta Cavalry. The regiment was present at the battle of Laswarree, where it suffered somewhat severely. Its services at Furruckabad, Muttra, and before Deeg were those of the rest of the brigade mentioned above. It was present at the battle of Affzulghur, and in October, as the 25th Light Dragoons as the regiment had now become, it marched with Lake to Delhi. In

1810 it took part in the capture of the Isle of France (Mauritius). The honours awarded were the *Elephant*, *Laswarree*, and *Hindostan*. The regiment was disbanded at Chatham in 1816. The successive colonels were Lord Heathfield, 1795; R. Vyse, 1797; R. A. Welford, 1804; C. W. Lord Stewart, 1813.

The 30th Light Dragoons, Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. C. Carden; the 31st, Lieut.-Colonel W. C. St. Leger; the 32nd, Lieut.-Colonel H. J. Blake; and the 33rd, Lieut.-Colonel Blackwood, were all raised in 1794, and disbanded in 1796 without seeing any service abroad. A sword belonging to an officer of the 30th Light Dragoons is in the museum of the Royal United Service Institution.

A number of foreign corps were in English pay during our war with France. Among these were the York Hussars, which were raised in September 1794, under Lieut.-Colonel Irwin. Eighteen of the officers were foreigners of mixed nationality. Colonel Wilford succeeded to the command in 1796, and shortly afterwards seems to have taken the regiment abroad, as in 1798 it was in the West Indies. In 1800 its strength was increased from eight to ten troops; it was disbanded in 1802.

In 1810 the Duke of Brunswick-Oels's corps came into the English list. It consisted of six troops of Cavalry and twelve companies of Infantry. The Cavalry was disbanded in 1817, at the same time as the King's German Legion, in which were included two regiments of Dragoons and three of Light Dragoons.

The author of the article from which the above extracts are taken admits that the list of extinct regiments is imperfect and deficient in detail, which is inevitable, for the subject is a wide one and capable of almost indefinite expansion. It can only claim to be a *catalogue raisonné*, and catalogues are disappointing in their inefficient preciseness, but it may have conveyed an idea of the warlike vigour of English feeling when encouraged by authority, and of the extent of the work capable of being achieved when that authority cared to employ the material at its command.

*AN OLD CAVALRY TRAINING MANUAL.*

APPARENTLY the first training manual for the use of the British Cavalry was published in 1795. The volume, which consisted of nearly four hundred pages, was called 'Regulations for the Cavalry,' and was issued 'so that one uniform and general System of Discipline may be formed and established throughout His Majesty's whole army.' Though the book in itself has no value at the present day as a guide to Cavalry instruction, it has a certain interest on account of the light it throws on the ideas and customs of the Cavalry of more than a century ago.

The first part of the book deals with the duties of officers and non-commissioned officers, the dress of all ranks, instructions about returns, and other matters of interior economy; the second part with 'Riding School,' 'Horse Drill,' 'Foot Drills,' 'Review Exercise,' and 'Manœuvres.'

Owing to want of space it is impossible to quote the whole of the Preface, which contains many sound remarks on the question of discipline, but the following sentences will show the spirit in which it is written: 'Impartial justice, with an uniformity of conduct which never swerves from its object, are the only solid foundations of discipline; and at the same time that an officer exacts a blind obedience from the soldier, he has it in his power to convince him that he is his friend and protector. But never let him think that he is more respected as he is the more relax; for the reverse is the case; and the officer who is ignorant of or neglects his duty, incurs the secret censure instead of the approbation of those under his command.'

From the instructions to 'officers in general' it does not appear that in the matter of wearing uniform the officers of to-day are any worse off than were their predecessors, for the following was the rule:

'Officers in quarters of the regiment are to appear at all times dressed in their regimentals, according to the duty they are on, in conformity to the orders on that subject; nor are they to wear coloured cloaths, excepting when going away from the regiment, or in the pursuit of country diversions. In common rides about their Quarters they must always appear in uniform.' Later on, under the heading 'Dress,' it is laid down that 'Nothing is so unmilitary as seeing them (officers) walking about in plain cloaths, and it is therefore absolutely forbid by His Majesty's orders.'

The regulations were again rather hard on the officer when they state: 'Nothing is so absurd as an officer not being able to account to the C.O. for every man and horse in his troop, without referring to the Quarter Master—therefore they must absolutely not do it.' The old troop spoken of was, of course, larger than that of the present organisation, and the Quartermaster was the 'chief N.C.O. of the troop.'

It has become the custom to regard drinking and swearing as prominent characteristics of the soldiers of Wellington's time; it comes as a surprise, therefore, to find that a hundred and twenty years ago the latter habit was regarded with disfavour by the authorities. With reference to the drill instructors, the adjutant is told that 'though they must be alert and sharp at the drills, he (the adjutant) must absolutely prevent their swearing, or using any improper language.' The instructions on the subject are still more emphatic in the case of the private soldier. 'The Dragoons must behave to each other with decency and propriety; and if anyone makes use of improper language to another, the troop should take it up immediately. Nor is any Dragoon to give way to that abominable blackguard practice of swearing.'

If this order were still in force and strictly carried out, there would without doubt be a considerable amount of 'taking it up,' whatever that rather indefinite term may mean.

Another feature of the rules for privates is the emphasis laid on the good treatment of the horse: 'A Dragoon ought to have a real regard for his horse, and as care will be taken that a man's horse is never changed from him, and that he is properly fed, there can be no possible shadow of an excuse for his not paying him the utmost attention; it depends very much on this attention whether a horse looks well, is clean-heeled, and fit for service.' The idea, if not the identical words, might well be included in our next training manual.



Little mention is made of the band, but the trumpeters receive some attention. It was their duty to carry out the corporal punishments as well as to sound the calls; but whether efficiency in the former duty was regarded as of more importance than skill in the latter the book does not relate. Some importance, however, must have been attached to trumpet work, for the manual lays down that 'it is absolutely necessary that they (the trumpeters) should be sober people; for if they are the least in liquor, it is discovered in a moment by their sounding, and they never know when they may be called upon to sound the alarm.'

There are several other small points of interest in connection with the duties of the various ranks. The regimental sergeant-major had 'the advantage of taking letters from the post, for each of which he receives a penny from the officers, and a halfpenny for regimental letters; but he is not allowed to make any charge of this sort to privates.' The rough-riders receive ten shillings and sixpence from every officer who learns to ride, 'and from every officer who has a horse broke at the riding-school.'

Space, however, does not admit of more being said on this subject.

From the sample states it appears that the average height of the men was about five feet nine, and of the horses about fifteen hands two inches. In a sample return of men dead, discharged, &c., the reason given for discharge in three cases out of the seven mentioned is 'Wore out,' so evidently this complaint was as common then as now.

In 'instructions respecting the remount' the height is laid down at 'from fifteen hands and one inch to fifteen hands and three inches,' and the age four or five off, if possible. 'No horse must be taken which is not very close and compact in his make, very broad across the loins, close coupled, round barrelled, and well carcassed, wide between the rider's thighs, deep at the girth and shoulder, and full, though not heavy, chested, with short-jointed, clean, bony legs, and full furnished with strong thighs; the shoulder must lay well back; the forehand rise so as to give the horse freedom, and the head must be so set on as to admit of his getting his nose in. To this must be added action; and good, sound, full feet, with open heels. No horse must be taken with flat feet, or any lameness or visible defect. No heavy, fleshy-legged, lumbering horse must be taken on any account.'


In equitation the book is rather modest. 'It would be quite superfluous to enter into a detail of the Riding School, as all that could be

said would only be a repetition of what may be found in Lord Pembroke's book entitled "Method of Breaking Horses, etc." Therefore this useful work must be considered as the Riding School Regulations of the Regiment. But Lord Pembroke, when he so justly recommends the breaking of horses in snaffles, and the not using the bitt too soon, must not be mistaken for recommending also the use of the snaffle in the ranks. No man can ride properly in the ranks on anything but the bitt, and that, too, a bitt of very considerable power. Lord Pembroke's is certainly a good shaped bitt, but it is hardly powerful enough for any Dragoons, and especially the heavy.'

After a few pages of instructions for drill and reviews the book concludes with the following sentences: 'This system of formation and manœuvre is meant to *prepare* a regiment for acting in the field, either separately or in line. It will be followed by a code of field regulations for the duty in camp, and observations upon Cavalry when opposed to the enemy in every situation that can be foreseen, either in line or in smaller bodies. Also by a treatise on the field service, commonly called the *petite guerre*. These will complete the instruction of the Cavalry officer—but he must first lay a solid foundation, before he proceeds to the superstructure.'

The writer has been unable to discover that any of the 'complete instruction' to which reference is made was issued within ten years following the publication of the book.

Was it the war which prevented the author completing his task, or was it the magnitude of the task that deterred him?



*THE STRATEGICAL ACTION OF CAVALRY*<sup>1</sup>

By BRIG.-GENERAL H. DE B. DE LISLE, C.B., D.S.O.

THE employment of Cavalry in war may conveniently be divided into the strategical and tactical action of this arm.

The strategical action embraces those services prior to the meeting of the two main armies, when the Cavalry, with or without support, acts independently under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief on a special mission. This mission may be reconnaissance, or the acquisition of information about the enemy or the country in that particular zone of operations; or its mission may be to hamper the enemy during concentration; raids against his lines of supply; or the Cavalry may be used to mystify and deceive the enemy as to the probable plans of its own forces.

Of these various strategical missions, that of reconnaissance is undoubtedly the most important.

Frederick the Great is reported to have said: 'If we could be acquainted beforehand with the enemy's plans, we would always be able to defeat him, even with an inferior force.'

Reconnaissance, or the means of acquiring information, is performed by Cavalry in two distinct ways: by stealth and by force.

Reconnaissance by stealth may be carried out by scouts or patrols who avoid meeting the enemy, but approach secretly and report his movements. These small parties are usually supported by formed bodies which collect and transmit all information, and are called reconnaissance or contact squadrons or troops.

Reconnaissance by force becomes necessary when such squadrons are not strong enough to go forward against any opposition which may be met.

Although reconnaissance by small bodies, if used expertly, may

<sup>1</sup> Lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution and published by permission of the Council.

achieve excellent results, these will seldom be able to acquire the more important information, as the hostile army will certainly protect itself from such inquisitive parties by a screen of detachments which can only be torn aside by force.

As to the means of obtaining information by force there exist a wide difference of opinion and two distinct schools of thought: those who favour the principle of using all available Cavalry for exploration; and those who consider this method unsound, and recommend the employment of a portion of the available Cavalry only, and that this should be supported by a force of all arms.

Our regulations are definite on this point: the view expressed in them being that some Cavalry will be required for protective purposes, but that as strong a force as possible should be detailed for exploration, and made 'independent Cavalry' for that purpose; the term independent being defined as meaning 'relieved of protective duties.'

Strategical reconnaissance or exploration by the Army Cavalry infers the massing of as strong a force of Cavalry as possible under one commander, in the hope of its being able to brush aside any resistance that may be encountered in advance of the enemy's main columns.

This principle has, since 1870, become very popular with military writers on Cavalry, and, provided an undeniable superiority in Cavalry is assured, it would appear quite logical to make the most use of it in this way.

This doctrine, for which Germany is responsible, has been generally accepted by other European nations, including our own; and though several French writers have recently expressed doubts on the efficacy of the system when applied to an army with a weaker Cavalry, their recent regulations appear to follow the popular fashion of the day, and deficiency in strength is to be minimised by cyclist supports.

Let us consider for a moment the arguments in favour of exploration by the whole available Army Cavalry.

1. History proves the enormous importance of reliable information, and that such information must be fought for if it cannot be obtained in any other way.

Before committing his forces to any definite plan, the Commander-in-Chief will require reliable information of the enemy's dispositions, his places of concentration or the direction of march of his forces, and

the nature of the country between the two armies. For this information he trusts to the commander of his independent Cavalry.

On receipt of his instructions, the Cavalry commander moves his force in the direction in which it is desired to reconnoitre. There he may meet the bulk of the hostile Cavalry, and, if so, on his success against it will greatly depend his ability to acquire information. If he is able to establish his superiority over the hostile Cavalry, he can drive its disorganised units back on to the hostile Infantry, and will then be in a position to discover all he wants to know. If defeated or forced to retire, owing to weakness, moral or physical, his Cavalry will not be able to operate in the presence of the hostile Cavalry without the support of the protective Cavalry or of Infantry detachments.

2. If successful in the Cavalry duel, the independent Cavalry will be able to force its way up to the enemy's protective line, which it will endeavour to brush aside, or, as it is sometimes expressed, to tear a rent in the hostile protective screen. Through this opening or rent, special scouts or patrols will be sent forward to reconnoitre the enemy's main columns.

In the meantime, the independent Cavalry will be fully engaged. The enemy will endeavour to close the gap, concentrating all available troops in the vicinity for this purpose.

On the other hand, the independent Cavalry must endeavour to keep a passage open for the withdrawal of the patrols, who otherwise may be unable to return, or be so much delayed that their information, when received at headquarters, may have lost its value.

Having accomplished this mission of exploration, the independent Cavalry will be available for other duties, but will keep touch with and closely watch the enemy.

3. It will be noticed that the defeat of the enemy's Cavalry, though only a means to an end, becomes almost a necessity if both are operating in the same zone, and though reconnaissance is the primary object, the importance of overwhelming the enemy's Cavalry and establishing the superiority of one's own can hardly be exaggerated, for this may decide the eventual issue of the campaign.

Much has been written about the Cavalry encounter during the past few years, and the best way of defeating the hostile Cavalry. The means used must depend on circumstances, and especially on ground. If the latter is favourable to a mounted attack, there is very little doubt

that shock tactics, supported by the fire of Horse Artillery and machine guns, will be employed; and in all European armies Cavalry is being trained in masses to defeat hostile Cavalry masses.

To endeavour to overwhelm the enemy's Cavalry by means of fire action only would take far too long, and the delay would militate against the fulfilment of the primary object: to gain information of the enemy's main columns. Moreover, such actions usually produce indecisive results.

If large forces of Cavalry meet, the duel will extend over a considerable front, and unless the ground is very exceptional it may be expected that parts of it will favour fire action, and, if so, a combination of fire and steel will be seen on the same field. In 1863, at Brandy Station, in Virginia, we have an historical example of the combination of fire and shock on the same field. Ten thousand Cavalry on either side fought for ten hours. In the end the Federal force retired, but the victory was in no way decisive, and the results may be said to have been almost negative.

Although a decisive and quick victory is wanted, it is now generally admitted that it will often be advantageous to employ the fire action of dismounted portions of the Cavalry to prepare the way for the mounted attack, and when the nature of the country necessitates the employment of dismounted action. The object to be attained is not only to defeat, but also to cripple, the enemy's Cavalry, and the quickest and best means to this end will be employed.

Of all military subjects, there is none which has excited so much interest or so much acrimonious discussion as the employment of Cavalry. The controversy is not new, nor is the prominence given to it in the past ten years in any way extraordinary. It recurs periodically, and has done so for the past 200 years.

Science is progressive, and must be met by changes in tactics and organisation. We cannot afford to ignore the increased power of modern weapons; but we must not fail to realise that the moral qualities of the man behind the gun remain the same. It is even reasonable to estimate the value of short-service soldiers of the present day considerably below those of 100 years ago, who made soldiering a life-long profession.

In recent years there has been much intemperate matter written on this subject, and even eminent military writers of the various Great

Powers have raised doubts as to the possibility of great Cavalry successes in future wars. Such views have roused intense irritation in the minds of others who hold entirely opposite opinions. Nevertheless, our present ideas on the tactical employment of Cavalry have been evolved by the amalgamation of such opinions, tempered by war experience, and the true appreciation of the constant factor, the man behind the gun.

In face of the acute feeling which prevailed in all European Cavalry on this question during the past decade, it is most interesting to refer for a moment to that excellent article on 'Cavalry Tactics,' written for the *Times Encyclopædia Britannica*, of 1903, by that shrewd and able writer, the late Colonel Henderson. In this article he reviews the history of Cavalry, and asks what modification is necessary to meet the altered conditions of modern war. 'The answer,' he writes, 'comes from across the Atlantic. The American Cavalry, owing to their native ingenuity and the length of the war, solved the problem. It could charge home with the sabre or revolver. In addition, it was so equipped that it could fight on foot as readily as in the saddle, and it was so armed and trained that when dismounted it was but little inferior to the Infantry.'

This article, written during or shortly after the South African War by Colonel Henderson, is remarkable in that he foresaw what it has taken European military experts some years to realise : that the successful handling of Cavalry depends on appreciating at their true value the advantages of fire and steel.

The opponents of the modern conception of the strategical exploration by the Army or independent Cavalry hold just as strong views against this method as those who advocate its use are in favour of it. Although the majority of writers in favour of the independent Cavalry idea are themselves Cavalry officers, a fair proportion of those who oppose them also belong to this arm. The Cavalry officers who oppose the exploration by the Army Cavalry do so chiefly on the ground that they think Cavalry is far more important for co-operation in the battle, for pursuit, or in retreat, than in the services of acquiring information which can be procured in other ways : by secret-service agents, by reconnaissance by stealth, and by aerial scouts.

Several eminent French military writers, such as Bonnal, Foch,

Foucart, and others, hold very decided views on reconnaissance by force, but not by Cavalry acting independently.

Their arguments may be summarised as follows :—

1. The independent application of force is not admissible in a strategical sense, and to risk the annihilation of one's Cavalry, operating without support, is held to be as unsound in strategy as to risk the defeat of an army by attacking in detail without mutual support.

2. The doctrine of exploration by the Army Cavalry cannot be said to have received proof in the test of war, and until verified must be looked upon as unproven. It cannot be said to have been proved in 1870, for the Germans at the beginning of the war used their Cavalry as protective Cavalry only, until the French Cavalry had lost all power of organised resistance. We cannot admit that it was tested in South Africa or Manchuria. In the last campaign, the victors, being weak in Cavalry, used it for protection only. This is the course recommended by the late General de Galliffet, who held that if the effective strength of Cavalry is not sufficient to divide into independent and protective, it must be kept for the latter duty. It is only fair to add that the large numerical superiority of the Russian Cavalry appears to have been discounted by want of capable leaders. The Japanese, however, do not appear to have suffered from want of accurate information in spite of having had no Cavalry for exploration, and trusted to an excellent secret service instead. Their want of a Cavalry reserve, however, was much felt, and prevented them reaping the fruits of victory.

3. In view of the fact that Napoleon kept his Cavalry in reserve, and for special missions, and that the modern idea of the employment of strategical Cavalry still requires to be proved by war, this method is held to be only a temporary innovation which will soon change again to those of Napoleon, the great master of war, who knew more about the use of Cavalry than anyone before or since.

Let us consider for a moment how Napoleon used his Cavalry for strategical purposes in advance of, or detached from, his army.

We find him following no doctrine or general theories, but he used his Cavalry for special purposes, giving very clearly-defined instructions on each occasion. Not once did he send all his Cavalry reserve on a vague mission of exploration. He sent only as much as was



necessary to a defined place, and specified exactly what he wanted the Cavalry to do.

In 1805 he sent it across the Rhine as a screen to deceive the enemy, and when the Grand Army executed its turning movement on Ulm, this Cavalry, supported by two Corps, acted as a flank guard. On October 2 the Emperor wrote to Murat: 'You will protect my flank as I move obliquely to the Danube, which is a delicate operation. If the enemy intends to take the offensive, I must be warned in time to take action, and not be obliged to conform to that of the enemy.'

Finally, after the capitulation of Ulm, when the Army was moving on Vienna, the same Cavalry was sent on in advance, supported by Infantry Divisions, to seize successively the crossings of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and the Ips.

In 1806, in the Jena Campaign, the Cavalry having crossed the Frankenwald, it was sent rapidly to the Saale, supported by Bernadotte's Corps, from where reconnoitring detachments were sent on to Leipzig.


To gain a proper idea of the definite nature of the orders Napoleon issued to his Cavalry we must refer to his letter to Murat, dated October 7, 1806.

This letter is remarkable not only for the very definite nature of the instructions sent by the Chief of the General Staff to Marshal Murat (Duc de Berg), but also for the manner of dealing with the demand for information. It deserves to be studied by all leaders in the field with Cavalry under their orders. This arm has often had to bear the blame of any want of success in reconnaissance, but the cause has usually been due to the indefinite nature of the instructions issued to it.

At the beginning of the Jena Campaign, Murat, with three Cavalry Brigades and the First Corps (Bernadotte), formed the General Advanced Guard. The position of each Cavalry Brigade, and the First Corps, and the strength of the Cavalry Reserve and its position, were all laid down. As regards reconnaissance, Saalfeld, Saalburg, and Hof were mentioned as the points of direction and allotted to Milhaud, Wathier, and Lasalle's Brigades respectively. An engineer officer was to be attached to each of these Generals specially to report on the country and roads. These three places on the River Saale are each 25 miles apart, and the foregoing instructions might have been

thought sufficient when addressed to a Field-Marshal. Napoleon, however, specifies what information he requires in the form of questions as follows :—

- (1) Is communication possible between Saalfeld and Saalburg?
- (2) Is communication possible between Saalburg and Hof?
- (3) Is communication possible between Lobenstein (10 miles in rear of Saalburg) and Grafenthal (10 miles in rear of Saalfeld)?
- (4) Is communication possible between Lobenstein and Hof?
- (5) What are these roads like?
- (6) Are they fit for Infantry, for Cavalry and Artillery?
- (7) What is the position of the enemy about Hof, about Saalburg, and above all on the main road to Leipzig?



- (8) What is its position about Grafenthal and Saalfeld—that is to say, between Coburg and Naumburg?

Could anything be more precise? Such questions indicate clearly on what points exact information is required, and enable the Cavalry to direct its energies towards solving the answers, and not to waste energy in any indefinite service.

A further remark with reference to his reconnoitring detachments. These were generally strong parties from 100 to 200 sabres, specially selected for ability from volunteers, and largely composed of non-commissioned officers. Being all specialists and led by the best officers, they were able to achieve far more than the ordinary contact squadron. Moreover, these detachments were usually supported at a short distance by the rest of the regiment and even by a brigade. The reconnaissance

was, therefore, of a telescopic nature, such as was sometimes used by us with success in South Africa.

Napoleon himself originated this form of reconnaissance when he wrote to Lannes in 1805. ' Marshal Lannes,' he writes, ' will remain to-morrow at Rastadt, extending if necessary to Baden, and will send Cavalry reconnaissances as far as Wildbad. These will start before daylight. Two regiments will proceed six miles, the third another six miles, one squadron three miles further and a patrol on the best horses the last three miles.'

Later on, when the superiority of his Cavalry was established, such precautions were dispensed with, but in all his campaigns he was able to acquire accurate information of the enemy's forces, while masking his own movement by means of unimpenetrable screens.

4. To resume the arguments against the Cavalry exploration, some writers hold that however important it is to acquire information of the enemy, reconnaissance by force, unless successful, will damage the *morale* as well as the effective *personnel* to such an extent that a defeat of the Army Cavalry may lead to a defeat of the Army.

5. Even if successful, the loss in men and horses and the fatigue of the remainder must lower the fighting value. Long distances must be covered before the independent Cavalry gains touch with the enemy's columns; a fight is certain to take place; for days the Army Cavalry will have no rest, and at night the services of protection will be very severe on men and horses.

As the armies approach, the Cavalry will have to clear off to a flank, often at a considerable distance, and when wanted in the general battle or for pursuit, may be physically unfit for this work.

6. Aerial reconnaissance is a factor which must be considered, though no writer would wish to see Cavalry reconnaissance abolished on this account. Aeroplanes cannot be entirely depended on yet for acquiring information, though recent developments tend to show that every year they are becoming more reliable, and we may expect the time will come when Cavalry will be used more to verify information acquired by Air Scouts than to procure this information primarily.

7. There is a tendency among several military writers to think that the duty of confirming reports of aerial reconnaissance might be entrusted to the protective Cavalry, which is already responsible for close or tactical reconnaissance, and with little more fatigue could push

their reconnoitring detachments further to the front. This would leave the Army Cavalry in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief for special missions, such as operations against communications, screening a manœuvre, for co-operation in the general battle, for pursuit, or to cover a retreat in case of a reverse.

8. In the case of the weaker Cavalry, these arguments apply even more forcibly, and one writer describes in detail the possible effect of this last suggestion against the enemy's stronger Army Cavalry used in exploration.

He imagines the former army marching on a broad front with columns five to ten miles apart, covered by advanced guards of all arms, and the first line of security formed by the protective Cavalry. This again is covered by a line of reconnaissance squadrons about 15 miles apart with their patrols in front, each squadron supported by a company of cyclists.

From the head of the columns to the patrols would certainly be 25 miles and might easily extend to 50 miles.

As the hostile independent Cavalry advances in a concentrated formation, also marching on several roads, it would be reported by the patrols, and meet with some resistance on reaching the line of squadrons with their cyclist supports. More delay would occur at the line of the protective Cavalry, which would normally fall back on the line of the advanced guards.

In the meantime those reconnoitring squadrons not held up by the independent Cavalry would continue to push on to acquire information by stealth.

On reaching the Infantry advanced guards, the independent Cavalry would have to fight in order to break a rent in the protective screen, and this fight would necessarily be a serious affair and on a comparatively wide front, necessitating an extensive dismounted action.

It is at this point that the Commander-in-Chief of the army attacked would have a favourable opportunity of using his reserve Cavalry with signal success. While the hostile independent Cavalry has been marching for days, on outpost at night, and continually engaged for at least 24 hours, the other reserve Cavalry has been kept in hand, and billeted in rear of the outpost line. Tactical reconnaissance would have placed at the disposal of the latter Cavalry commander all details regarding the country, and about the hostile Cavalry mass. Although

the weaker Cavalry, his would be stronger than the mounted reserve of the enemy, and if the latter were attacked with rapidity there would be no time for them to withdraw from the fire fight the units already dismounted.

Should the force which keeps its Cavalry in reserve employ a general advanced guard, the risk to the hostile Army Cavalry would be even greater. It must either attack the general advanced guard or pass it by. In the latter case, it might find itself held up in front by local advanced guards, attacked on both flanks and even its retreat cut off by the reserve Cavalry pushed out for that purpose, assisted by the general advanced guard.

9. The writers I have quoted fully admit that with the stronger Cavalry the German doctrine regarding its employment is perfectly logical, but do not approve of the weaker Cavalry being sent out unsupported to meet it, with every chance of being overwhelmed, and so being useless for the time it will most be required, during and after the battle.

There appears to be much worth considering in these arguments, which are founded on the importance of maintaining at its highest fighting value a large Cavalry reserve for use during and after the battle.

At the same time, these ideas do not solve the difficult problem, how to employ successfully the weaker Cavalry against the stronger. If the weaker Cavalry is never to risk defeat, it will rapidly lose its fighting value, and become useless in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. We have many historical examples of Cavalry sheltered behind the Infantry outposts until it was unfit to act alone.

From the first, therefore, Cavalry must learn how to maintain its own security even when opposed by a stronger force of this arm.

There are several ways open to the weaker Cavalry. The rifle in the hands of the Cavalry gives it a defensive power never yet possessed, and a delaying power still hardly realised. It is true that in the open country, other things being equal, the numerically stronger Cavalry will probably win, and may even achieve a very decisive victory. The weaker Cavalry will be wise, therefore, to advance by a line more suited to the use of the rifle than the sword, pushing its own protective reconnoitring detachments sufficiently far to the front and flanks to give the main body of the Cavalry time to reach a suitable

position where its numerical inferiority may be compensated by the advantage derived from the ground.

If the proportional strength of the two Cavalry forces is very marked, the weaker must be supported by strong bodies of Infantry, one or more divisions following as a *point d'appui* on which to fall back if hard pressed, or with which a forward movement may be carried out.

This combination partakes of the nature of a general advanced guard, a form of reconnaissance which was often used by Napoleon.

The action of a force of this nature has not received as much attention in this country as it deserves, and as far as I can discover we have no military literature of a recent date to assist us.

We have, nevertheless, an interesting and recent example of our own in which the whole of our independent Cavalry was closely supported by a division of Infantry. The example to which I refer, one closely studied by foreign critics, is that of the relief of Kimberley by General French's Cavalry division.

We are inclined to look on this only as an incident of which we are proud. Foreign writers, however, regarding it from a military aspect, describe it as a brilliant feat of arms. To have turned a defence, and not altogether a successful defence, into an offensive attitude is always a difficult feat in war, and on this occasion the way Field-Marshal Lord Roberts massed his Cavalry for a strategical purpose, supporting it with the 6th Division, is looked upon as a masterly act which saved the nation from disgrace, and proved to the world that the national character of dogged tenacity of purpose still exists.

There is also a wide difference of opinion among military writers regarding the employment of Cavalry in co-operation with the remainder of the army in battle. Some think Cavalry can be and should be used on the system that Napoleon adopted. Others believe that modern weapons will make this impossible, and think the Cavalry should assist their Infantry in the firing line. Our own Text Book advocates the massing of the Cavalry under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief for the moment when it can be slipped with a reasonable chance of success, and indicates a flank as a most suitable situation for it.

All great leaders have made the best use of their Cavalry, and we cannot do better than consider Napoleon's method for a moment. He

had the utmost faith in Cavalry during the battles but he bound himself by no doctrine. 'Cavalry charges,' he wrote, 'are equally effective at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of the battle.'

At the same time his usual custom was to reserve the Cavalry for the great culminating blow, or the '*evenement*' when the enemy had used up his last reserve.

Sometimes he massed his Cavalry on a flank, sometimes in the centre, and sometimes it was even distributed along the line. At Austerlitz he placed the whole, except that of the Imperial Guard, on the left flank, under Murat. At Eylau it was concentrated in the centre; and at Friedland it was distributed in four groups, but that on the left flank was strongest and consisted of two divisions.

His faith in the importance of a strong Cavalry is evident. In 1806, his Cavalry was 65,000 strong out of a force of 325,000, or in the proportion of one to five. Later, on being dissatisfied with the strength of his Cavalry, he raised it to nearly 100,000, both officers and men being carefully selected.

It is no exaggeration to say that his successes during the years that the French Army was at its zenith were chiefly due to his excellent and numerous Cavalry.

At Marengo, it was the charge of a few squadrons under Kellerman which converted a disaster into a decisive victory, and brought about the capitulation of the Austrians under Melas.

At the battle of Austerlitz it was his Cavalry under Murat which, by repeated charges, enabled Soult and Bernadotte to reach the plateau of Pratzen; and afterwards it was the famous charges of Rapp and Bessières, with the Cavalry of the Guard, which broke the counter-attack of the Allies and completed the victory.

At Eylau, the 80 squadrons of Murat decided the issue of the day, piercing the centre of the Russians when the French centre was threatened by them.

At Essling, the repeated onslaught of the Cavalry divisions under Lasalle, Espagne, and Nansouty enabled the two corps under Lannes and Massena, some 30,000 strong, to maintain a defence for a whole day against the Austrian Army of 80,000 men.

At Wagram, at Borodino, it was again the Cavalry which decided the victory.

On the contrary, at Lutzen, Bautzen, and Hanau, when the Imperial

Army had been deprived of the bulk of its Cavalry, the French certainly won the fights after considerable difficulty, but were powerless to make victory decisive or to reap the advantage such victory should bring.

In spite of the fact that we have no historical examples of decisive victories without the assistance of Cavalry during and after the battle, and many examples of the converse, the question as to whether the same thing will be possible in the future must remain unanswered until the next great war.

In my own mind, I am confident that a Cavalry like the Cavalry of Napoleon, comprising the most dashing officers of the Army, and men who, on numerous battlefields, showed the most supreme disregard of death, will still be able to achieve the same brilliant results.

1. When we read the account of the campaign in Manchuria, we find Infantry on both sides, without ammunition, fighting hand to hand, and even using stones as missiles. So much ammunition is now used, and the difficulty of replenishing it is so great, that we may expect to find armies in the future, towards the end of the battle, facing each other, but unable to bring matters to a conclusion for want of it.

2. Another point in favour of the Cavalry reserve is the fact of the youth and inexperience of modern armies. Veteran soldiers, with confidence in their officers and in their own steadfastness, may be trusted to remain firm in the face of a Cavalry onslaught. It is very doubtful if continental armies of one- and two-year men, who have no experience of war, can be expected to behave as well, and the threat of a Cavalry charge may produce a panic.

There is a point, however, which, like other countries, we are also inclined to overlook. Cavalry, to be successful, must be led by fearless commanders, and such commanders of Cavalry should be young. The success of Napoleon's Cavalry was, in a measure, due to the youth and personality of the leaders. Take, for example, the French Cavalry Corps which, from 1807 to 1812, Napoleon used as his Cavalry reserve. Murat was in command, Lasalle commanded a Division, and after his death was replaced by Montbrun; Colbert was one of the Brigadiers. Of these famous leaders Montbrun was the eldest, and he was under 40 years of age, Lasalle was only 35. Their personality, however, was more remarkable than their youth. Their disregard of danger or losses, provided they carried out their orders, permeated down to the junior ranks, and made their Cavalry invincible, until the snows of Russia destroyed it.



Then consider their disregard of losses. The German Cavalry in 1870-1871 lost 3,000 Cavalry out of its total strength of 63,000. Napoleon at Eylau and Essling alone lost 2,000 Cavalry in those famous charges. With well-handled Cavalry, losses in battle are no bad test of bravery.

3. Then again, we must consider the increased moral depression which takes place during a modern battle. It is a far greater strain to submit to hostile fire when unable to see or reach the enemy.

Most of us have seen something of this in our small wars; cases of men being utterly prostrated after lying in the open for twelve hours and being sent to hospital in a state of physical collapse. We have also witnessed cases of panic caused by the possibility of a charge of savages armed with spears. We read of similar cases of physical exhaustion and panic in 1870, during the American War, and in the small wars in Algeria. This will always occur in war, and the younger the troops the more easily will they give way to the strain, or to the instinctive fear of Cavalry.

It is on such occasions a well-led and intrepid Cavalry may find a favourable opportunity for a great success.

4. The idea of using the Cavalry reserve to strengthen any weak part of the firing-line is no doubt very attractive, as its mobility enables it to move to any weak position in so short a time; but we must remember that once committed to the firing-line, Cavalry cannot be used for any other purpose. Even in case of a victory, to re-organise it for pursuit will take much time, and this loss of time may be fatal. Moreover, unless fresh, men and horses will succumb to the fatigue of pursuit, which is more exhausting than any of their other duties.

I have discussed Cavalry in reconnaissance, acting either independently or as part of a general advanced guard, and Cavalry in co-operation with other arms during and after the battle.

These are the chief duties of Cavalry, and the commander who possesses an arm proficient in these will find himself not only relieved from his chief anxiety, but will soon realise that the spirit of intrepid self-sacrifice of this arm will raise the *morale* of his army, and enable it to succeed against an enemy numerically stronger.

We who have faith in Cavalry are confident that the next great war will confirm the truth of the famous remark of Frederick the Great: 'In war success depends on the superiority of one's Cavalry.'

## STRATAGEMS

WAR is begun and ended by opinion. The destruction of the enemy's army is only a means to the end of breaking down the will-power of the enemy and convincing him that resistance is hopeless. A country that has suffered defeat in the past is perhaps more easily convinced or deluded into submission. Thus in the events that occur upon the great stage of war we find the antagonists, in their endeavours to outwit one another, resorting to various degrees of deceit, which may be expedient and deserving of imitation, though hardly worthy of admiration.

Gourgaud states that Napoleon vindicated his conscriptions as sanctioned by the Senate, but says they were never so numerous as had been represented. The maximum of the number of troops which Napoleon ever had on foot was 600,000 men. The population of his empire was above forty millions of souls, double the population of France under Louis XIV., who long kept 400,000 soldiers in pay! It would be an extraordinary mistake to imagine that all the conscriptions decreed were actually levied: these decrees were stratagems of war employed to deceive foreigners; they were used as a source of power, and it was the constant adherence to this system which always made people think the French armies more numerous than they actually were.

The diplomat cannot afford to ignore the existence of stratagem in military policy, and the student of military history may observe the recurrence of successful stratagems in the domain of tactics from the earliest times.

Our ancestors in North Britain have evinced a genius for war throughout our era. In 208 A.D. the Emperor L. Septimius Severus, at the head of an immense army, took the field in person with the object of quelling the Meatae and Caledonians. In the course of his campaign he penetrated as far north as the shores of the Moray Firth. The invasion of the north was on so large a scale as to preclude the Caledonians from contesting the progress of his army in any pitched

*Note.*—A previous article on 'Stratagems' by the same author appeared in No. 23, Vol. vi., of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.—ED.

A A

battle; but yet according to Dion Cassius, the historian of the Roman Empire (from its rise to the year 229 A.D.), he lost 50,000 men during that expedition, especially by the ambuscades of the natives. The same author states that the Romans were entrapped into the lifting of cattle which had been purposely put in their way by the Caledonians themselves, and while the former were thus occupied the highlandmen fell upon them from their ambuscades so that the Romans, rather than become a prey of these people, often entreated their own companions to slay them.

Analogously, the primitive races of Africa, whose wealth consists of cattle, not infrequently place these as a snare for their enemies.

In 1851 the Basuto tribe overran the native reserves of the Orange River Sovereignty, and the following year General Cathcart, with the expressed intention of levying a fine in cattle from Moshesh, chief of the Basuto, led a force of 2000 men against the mountain fastness of Thaba Bosiu. On December 20, having crossed the Caledon River at daybreak, the force advanced in three columns, which were to concentrate before nightfall. The two subsidiary parties, tempted by the sight of decoy herds of cattle, varied their instructions; the Basutos feigned a retreat and, waiting till the troops were mixed up with the cattle, charged down upon them. In the skirmishes which ensued on the Berea Mountain the British lost fifty killed and wounded, and were extricated with difficulty. Sufficient cattle, however, were lifted to cause the Basuto chief to sue for peace, which General Cathcart was only too ready to agree to, while Moshesh simultaneously announced to his followers and the neighbouring black tribes that he had won a decisive victory against the white invaders.


As in many instances in civil wars, a similarity of dress or language has often been turned to account by resourceful leaders. In 1611, at the age of seventeen, Gustavus Adolphus\* was given a small command in the war with Denmark; he shipped his detachment over to Oland and took that island and the fortress of Braghholm (south-east of Sweden). On his return there fell into his hands a letter from the Danish commander of the small fortress of Christianopel begging the Danish king for 500 horse. Gustavus at once made use of this lucky accident. He clad 500 Swedes in Danish fashion, led them himself to Christianopel, reached the place at night, was admitted, and took possession of the fortress.

\* *Gustavus Adolphus*, by Colonel T. A. Dodge, United States Army.

In Turenne's Italian campaign of 1642 his feints to draw the enemy from his intended point of attack resulted in driving the Spaniards out of Piedmont under the following circumstances :—

Turenne pretended to invest Alessandria, but left intervals to allow the enemy to bring succours of half the garrison of Trine. Then Turenne, who had everything in readiness, hurried with all his men to Trine and invested it. The Spaniards now tried to send help to Trine, but Turenne had provided against this; whereupon the Spaniards attacked Asti, but they met with no success, for Turenne had provided for its efficient defence. In six weeks Trine fell, and Turenne was rewarded with the bâton of a marshal of France.

With reference to Turenne's use of stratagems Napoleon said, 'The manœuvres by which the Archduke was dislodged from his camp between Meiningen and Landsberg display great boldness,




sagacity, and genius; they are fertile in great results, and ought to be studied by all military men.'

These events occurred in 1646. The Archduke Leopold, with the Imperial and Bavarian armies, marched west and entrenched near Meiningen, facing east, with marshes covering his front.

The French and Swedes under Turenne and Wrangel followed the Archduke, and took up a position as if intending to attack him. Turenne ascertained that the enemy had a large supply dépôt at Landsberg, with only 100 horse as garrison. He withdrew the whole of his force in the night, leaving, however, 2000 horse facing the Archduke's position, as if preparing to deliver an attack. Giving out that he intended to march upon Ulm, he moved on Landsberg, and the next day his whole force crossed the river Lech, having been joined by the 2000 horse that he had left behind to mask his movements; he seized the supplies in Landsberg, and sending forward

3000 horse to Munich, surprised and captured the Archduke there, thus terminating the campaign, although the Imperial and Bavarian armies still largely outnumbered the confederate forces.

After the battle of Oudenarde, July 11, 1708, part of the allies moved in pursuit of the disordered and retreating French army, and during the night the drummers were caused to beat the French 'retreat' while a number of French refugee officers who had joined the allies shouted 'à moi, Picardie,' 'à moi, Piémont, Champagne,' and thus named the various regiments which had been opposed to the allies during the day. By this ruse the French stragglers rallied on



them and were taken prisoners to the number of 3000, or, according to some, 7000 were thus captured.

The morning after the battle of Zorndorf, August 25, 1758, ably described in Colonel Maude's 'Cavalry: Its Past and Future,' owing to the carnage and dispersion of the Russian troops, it became a matter of difficulty to present a bold front to the Prussians. Out of 82,000 combatants the casualties amounted to 33,000, and of the Russian force of 50,000 men the losses were computed at 18,600 killed and wounded, 2800 prisoners, 104 guns, and 32 stands of colours.

Tielke \* records that during the night the dispersed Russians collected. General Fermer also rejoined, he with most of the generals having been on the right wing when it was routed and so cut off. He now formed the army again into a square, the rear face of which consisted of wagons, which appeared to the Prussians to be a com-

\* *The War of 1756-63*, by J. G. Tielke, 1764.

batant force, till enough troops could be collected to fill it up. The baggage was then placed behind Zorndorf and covered by the Cavalry. The Prussians, deceived by the apparent readiness for defence of the Russian square, made no attack, and the disorganised Slavs subsequently withdrew unmolested.

The following is a striking example of the utter consternation and loss of mental balance of the Austrians after the dreadful battle of Rivoli, won by Napoleon, and of the confident and audacious presence of mind which the French officers gained from their unvaried success. General René was in possession of the village of Guarda, on the lake of the same name, and on visiting his advanced posts he perceived some Austrians approaching whom he caused his escort to surround and make prisoners. Advancing to the front to reconnoitre, he found himself close to the head of an imperial column of 800 men which a turning in the road had concealed till he was within twenty yards of them. 'Down with your arms!' said the Austrian commandant; to which René answered with the most ready boldness 'Do *you* lay down your arms! I have destroyed your advanced guard, as witness these prisoners: ground your arms or no quarter.' And the French soldiers, catching the hint of their leader, joined in the cry of 'Ground your arms!' The Austrian officer hesitated and proposed to enter into capitulation: the Frenchman would admit of no terms but instant surrender. The dispirited Austrian yielded up his sword, and commanded his soldiers to follow his example. But the Austrian soldiers began to suspect the truth; they became refractory and refused to obey their leader, whom René addressed with the utmost apparent composure as follows:—'You are an officer, sir, and a man of honour; you know the rules of war; you have surrendered; you are therefore my prisoner, but I rely on your parole. Here, I return your sword—compel your men to submission, otherwise I direct against you the division of 6000 men who are under my command.' The Austrian was utterly confused between the appeal to his honour and the threat of a charge of 6000 men. He assured René he might rely on his punctilious compliance with the parole he had given him, and speaking to his soldiers, persuaded them to lay down their arms—a submission which he soon afterwards had the mortification of seeing had been made to a twelfth part of their number.

Napier recounts the following incident at the third English siege of Badajos in March 1812:—

'The 19th.—Wellington having secret intelligence that a sally was intended, ordered the guards to be reinforced. Nevertheless, at one o'clock some Cavalry came out by the Talavera Gate and 13,000 Infantry under General Vielland. . . . Previous to this outbreak the French Cavalry had divided and commenced a sham fight among themselves on the right of the parallel, the smaller party pretending to fly, and answering in Portuguese to the challenge of the picquets were allowed to pass, and elated by the success of this stratagem galloped to the engineers' *parc*, a thousand yards behind the trenches, where they cut down some men—not many, for succour soon came. Colonel Fletcher was badly wounded and several hundred entrenching tools were carried off; for Phillipon had offered a high price for each.'

Before the passage of the Bidassoa, October 7, 1813, the tidal fords at the river's mouth, where the flood rose sixteen feet, were sounded and staked out by fishermen who pretended to be fishing under the eyes of the unsuspecting French vedettes. The British marched at midnight in a thunderstorm, leaving all tents standing, and fording the river turned the French position, forty miles in extent, beyond its right flank. The surprise was so complete that Soult would not credit the report that the British had crossed, but believed the red uniforms to be those of Swiss troops in the French army. By nightfall the attack had everywhere succeeded.

General de Brack\* recommends for Cavalry an insidious *ruse de guerre* in charging Infantry: to shout the word 'prisoner,' which is understood in all languages; those who are imposed upon and throw down their arms to be at once divided off and conducted to the rear.

The astuteness and finesse of the dark races are notorious, and it is recorded that in the Afghan campaign of 1879 the prowling tribesmen creeping round our camps disarmed suspicion by imitating the cries of jackals, thus leading the sentries to believe that no enemy could be in their proximity. The writer has himself experienced that the stealthy Pathan on the darkest night, sounding for an unguarded entrance to camp, will throw handfuls of fine gravel in front of him to make certain there is no sentry in his way; for the unwary soldier inexperienced in frontier lore, surprised by the uncanny falling particles, generally betrays his presence to the marauder.


N. M. S.

\* In *Advanced Posts of Light Cavalry*, republished by Dumaine, Paris, 1880.



MARSHAL TURENNE.





A CAPTAIN—15th LIGHT DRAGOONS.

(circa 1763.)

*PORTRAIT OF A CAPTAIN*  
*15TH LIGHT DRAGOONS.*

THE original of this picture is an oil-painting, the property of Lord Aberdare, who has kindly allowed us to reproduce it in *THE CAVALRY JOURNAL*. It was painted by J. S. Copley, R.A., and is that of a Captain of the 15th Light Dragoons, which was executed shortly after the formation of the regiment, probably about 1763.

The owner of the picture is most anxious to discover the identity of the portrait. We are of the opinion that it is that of Captain David Dundas, who was subsequently Commander-in-Chief.

A. L.

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David Dundas was born in 1735. His parents were not wealthy. The boy, however, selected for himself a military career. It is said that he actually walked the entire distance from Edinburgh to Woolwich in order to enter at the R.M.A. At Woolwich he qualified, and his first employment was to assist in the great survey of Scotland under the direction of his uncle, General David Watson, and General Roy (1752-5).

In 1754 he was appointed 'Lieutenant Fireworker,' and in the following year 'Practitioner Engineer.' In 1756 he entered the 56th as a lieutenant, and immediately acted as A.Q.M.G. to General Watson. His regiment being ordered on foreign service in 1758 he resigned his appointment to accompany it, and saw service at St. Malo, Cherbourg, and St. Cas. At the close of 1758 he acted as A.Q.M.G. to Prince Ferdinand and also as 'Engineer' to the Army, being then only a lieutenant of foot. Leaving Germany at the close of the campaign he joined Elliott's Horse (now the 15th Hussars, and then a newly raised regiment) as Captain of a troop.

Elliott soon discerned the talents of young Dundas and appointed him his A.D.C. Dundas was present at Corbach, Warburg, Closter-campen, the siege of Wesel, and the battle of Fellinghausen.

In 1762 he went to Cuba on the expedition sent thither, and was present at the capture of Havannah. When peace was made after the Seven Years' War, Dundas turned his attention to military tactics, and in the course of his studies went to the French, Prussian, and Austrian manœuvres to familiarise himself with foreign military systems.

He was promoted Major in 1770. He did not serve in America in 1774, about the only campaign he missed. The next year he purchased a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the 12th Light Dragoons. He was Q.M.G. in Ireland in 1778; Colonel 1781; Lieut.-Colonel, 2nd Irish Horse, 1782. During 1785-6 and 1787 he was present at the Prussian and Austrian manœuvres in Pomerania, Silesia, and Magdeburg. In 1788 Dundas published his 'Principles of Military Movements chiefly applicable to Infantry,' by which he gained considerable professional reputation. Next year he was Assistant Adjutant-General (Ireland); Major-General April 28, 1790; next he became Colonel of the 22nd Dragoons. In June 1792 he published 'Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field Exercises, and Movements of His Majesty's Forces,' a treatise drawn up by the desire of the Horse Guards. 'Rules and Regulations for Cavalry' followed. In 1793 he was sent to Jersey to report on the chances of a successful descent thence on St. Malo. From Jersey he joined the Duke of York's Army at Dunkirk, where he had command of a brigade. Crossing Europe *viâ* Germany in the October of that year he proceeded to Toulon, where he was second in command to O'Hara. When O'Hara was taken prisoner Dundas succeeded to the chief command. He speedily discerned that Toulon could not be held; and, after repulsing the attacks of December 17 and 18, evacuated the place on the 29th. He carried his force to Elba and thence to Corsica, where he was present at the capture of San Fiorenzo. Again he crossed Europe and joined the Duke of York at Flanders. At Tournay he commanded the British Cavalry May 22, 1794. When the Duke returned to England Dundas remained on the Lower Waal in command of 8000 men. Though successful both at Geldermalsen and Tuyl he found it impossible to hold the line of the Waal. With his Cavalry Dundas covered the rear of the Army on the disastrous retreat to Bremen.

In 1795 he was given the command of twenty-four squadrons of Cavalry. Next year, after serving in Westphalia, Dundas returned

to England, having been appointed Colonel of the 7th Light Dragoons (now the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars) December 23, 1795. In 1796 he became Quartermaster-General; 1797 Lieutenant-General and Governor of the Landguard Fort. He also commanded at the Camps of Exercise at Weymouth and Windsor. In 1799 Dundas went on the expedition to the Helder. He commanded the second column on September 19 and the centre on October 2 at Bergen, distinguishing himself on both occasions.

In 1801 he was appointed Colonel of the 2nd Dragoon Guards and Governor of Fort St. George; 1802 General; 1803 on the Staff at the Horse Guards, and also had the command of the Southern District; 1804 Knight of the Bath and Governor of Chelsea Hospital; 1805 resigned his command and took up his residence at Chelsea. He was President of the Court of Inquiry held on Sir Henry Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, concerning the Convention of *Cintra* in 1808.

In 1809, when, in consequence of the Clarke scandal, the Duke of York resigned the Command-in-Chief of the Army, Dundas was appointed to succeed him, and was then sworn on the Privy Council. He acted as C.I.C. from March 18, 1809, to May 26, 1811, when he resigned, and the Duke of York was re-appointed. While he was C.I.C. the battles of Talavera and Busaco were fought, and the retirement of the lines of Torres Vedras took place. Sir David Dundas, in 1813, was transferred to the Colonelcy of the 1st (or King's) Dragoon Guards. Dundas married the daughter of General Oliver de Lancey, the builder of barracks, but had no children. This gallant old veteran died at Chelsea Hospital February 18, 1820, aged 85. Truly his was a strenuous life.



*TRYING AN EXPERIMENT*

I HAVE been lately trying an experiment out here in India. As the problem has particular reference to the action of Cavalry, I venture to hope that those who read it will take an interest in it.

We hear a great deal about how Infantry advancing to attack a position may be covered and protected in their advance by the fire of their guns. We also know that the advance of attacking Infantry may be covered by the long-range rifle fire of other bodies of their own Infantry coming on behind them. This happened frequently in the Manchurian campaign.


But I do not remember hearing of, or reading of, any case in which a body of Cavalry was brought up to within a convenient charging distance of the enemy's Infantry, protected by the fire of its own guns, machine guns, or rifles. And I failed to see why such a movement should not be possible. Theoretically, it worked out all right. The trajectory, or the path described by the bullet in air, is in parts of its course so high above the ground that there should be no danger to Cavalry manœuvring at certain distances from the firing-line and the hostile Infantry. The following diagram may help to make the problem clearer.

AB is the enemy's Infantry advancing in line; CD is our own Infantry; and the distance, XY, between the two lines is, let us say, 1500 yards. At the point F, 300 yards in front of X, the flying bullet is already 45 feet above the ground; and at the point G, within 200 yards of the enemy's line, it is 48 feet up in the air; while at K, about half-way between these two points, it is 85 feet high.

Now let us take the height of the Cavalryman's head above the ground as 9 feet. At the point F, 300 yards, the Cavalry could not manœuvre in front of the firing-line, as they would hide the enemy from view. But a hollow or depression in the ground, 10 feet lower than the level of the firing-line, would make the Cavalry safe even at this

distance. However, there would not be much advantage gained even if the Cavalry were well protected at the 300 yards' mark, nor yet at 400 nor 500. But at 600 yards, where the bullet is 75 feet above the ground, the firing-line is no longer prevented by the Cavalry from seeing the enemy under normal conditions; and from here, in a zone up to within 200 yards of the enemy, they are practically safe.

Let us now imagine a body of Cavalry moving against the enemy's position AB, from the two points M and N, under the cover of its firing-line CD, and, of course, fully assisted by its own machine-gun sections. What is to prevent this body of Cavalry getting safely into



a position from which it can deliver its charge, over a stretch of only 300 yards, against an Infantry already shaken by the fire from the position CD and the *rafale* of the machine guns? Going at a speed of fifteen miles an hour they will cover the distance in a little more than half a minute; and then it's *Vive l'arme blanche!*

I set down here some of the replies I got to this question of mine; they may prove interesting.

A. said, 'What about your third-class shots in your firing-line? Why, man, they'd be shooting your Cavalry in the back!'

B. said, 'I don't think you'd get any Cavalry to try it!'

C. said, 'How would you make the Infantry cease fire just in time to permit the Cavalry to charge?'

D. said, 'What would the enemy be doing all this time?'

*E.* (who is a *p.s.c.* man) said, 'You do not take into account what we call the "fog of war."'

*F.* said, 'I think you'd find the game isn't worth the candle.'

Now I shall endeavour to take these objections in order.

*A.*'s objection forms a poor compliment to the company officers who are directing the firing; and the number of third-class shots in the average well-trained British Infantry regiment is not so large that they would do much harm to a body of rapidly-moving Cavalry.

*B.* evidently knows nothing about what Cavalry will try and will succeed in.

*C.*'s objection is fair; but, if the 'cease fire' is done by a well-arranged system of simultaneous signals, not by whistle-blowing, there should not be any great difficulty about it.

*D.* In reply to *D.*, I have already supposed that the enemy is shaken and shattered by the fire from my main position and my machine guns; and that it only requires the Cavalry charge to put him to flight and cut him up.

To *E.* I should say that what he and others call the 'fog of war' is far oftener found among the Staff than in the ranks of the Cavalry.

And to *F.* I reply that, as the game has never yet been played, it is impossible to say definitely whether it is or is not worth the candle.

In order to carry out a practical test of the problem I got a number of canvas screens, 8 feet 6 inches high, and I had them placed, on a breadth of about 40 yards, at the 800, 1000, 1200, and 1300 yards ranges. The whole range was of the length I have taken in the diagram—namely, 1500 yards. I got 100 men, average shots, to fire ten rounds each, in rapid succession, at the enemy nearly a mile away. This enemy was represented by a number of coarse earthenware pots; two rows for his firing-line, and two for his supports. They were stuck on the top of sticks about 4 feet high. I used no machine-gun fire, as I had to leave it to the imagination.

The result was that 45 per cent. of the enemy—namely, the earthenware pots—were destroyed; that the screens at 800 yards and 1000 yards were absolutely untouched; that one bullet had gone through a top corner of the screen at 1200 yards, and five bullets through that at 1300 yards.

But, as the 'cease fire' was signalled when the charging Cavalry was supposed to be at the 1200 yards range, this could not have done much damage.

There was no difficulty whatever about the ceasing fire; it was done at once all along the line.

The Cavalry, if they had been there in reality, would have got up to convenient charging distance of the enemy's line with little or no loss.

I have, in my time, carefully observed the action of Cavalry in three different campaigns. I have seen men, good men too, and well trained, throw down their rifles and run clear away when the thundering charge was already more than a hundred yards away from them. And these Infantry had not been previously shaken to any considerable extent by fire; but they simply saw the horses as they had never seen them before.

It is all very well for instructors to tell the Infantryman that he has nothing to fear from Cavalry; he will not console himself with the words of his instructor when he sees the cloud of horses and horsemen dashing down on him like a raging whirlwind, and when he feels the earth shaking all around him. And if his ranks have already been shaken, he and others will find that the day of Cavalry is by no means past and gone.

F. L.





*MODERN INVENTIONS AND THE FUNCTIONS  
OF CAVALRY*

By 'VINDEK'

THE next European war will find Cavalry, as well as other arms, confronted with vastly altered conditions owing to modern invention.

I say 'European' for obvious reasons, as outside our own continent the difficulties are often those of the ground and climate, and the enemy, having no strategic points to defend, is not easily brought to bay—witness, Tripoli, South Africa, Somaliland, Algiers, and to a less extent Morocco. However, our text is modern invention, and the principal ones can be at once detailed.

1. Greatly improved railway systems.
2. Motor vehicles (including motor-bicycles) for Staff, transport orderlies, riflemen, &c., &c., and improved bicycles for messengers, and even whole corps of riflemen.
3. Dirigible balloons of a far more reliable character than the former observation balloons.
4. Aeroplanes.
5. Wireless telegraphy.
6. Searchlights.

Besides the general advance in range, accuracy, and rapidity of all classes of fire—artillery, infantry, and machine guns—and a similar advance in education among all ranks, possibly accompanied by some deterioration in physique.

As regards the first item—railways—there is probably little that need be said here: they belong mostly to the realm of strategy and the preliminary mobilisation, and less to the actual battlefield and to the tactical problem.

It may be said, however, that inventions in war tend to neutralise each other, as each one may be used to disconcert hostile machinery, either of the same nature as itself or of another variety.

For instance, the mobilisation of troops by railway, and their

concentration at the frontier, depends, among other things, on the smooth working of the railway system at the important junctions—not only those near the frontier, but those in the hitherto peaceful centre of the country until now remote from the chances of war.

Can these points be any longer considered safe from attack and dislocation?

Surely it would be worth many dirigible balloons and their crews if, at the outset of war, one or more of the links in the hostile railway system could be severed by the destruction of bridges, dépôts of locomotives, and of the most vulnerable parts of the railway by mines, bombs, or other methods, reached by properly equipped parties descending from balloons, possibly in the capital itself.

Naturally these parties would be speedily sacrificed, but possibly not until they had secured days of delay in the mobilisation which could never be made good later.

Here is a distinct possibility under favourable circumstances.

On the other hand chance might decide that the conditions were so unfavourable that even the attempt might be futile.

Mobilisation might occur when a gale was raging that might last four days, or even longer. Such an accident during mobilisation would paralyse both dirigibles and aeroplanes for the time being.

And whenever or wherever such paralysis supervened it would obviously be imperative for Cavalry instantly to wholly reassume those functions of reconnaissance and raid which nowadays may ordinarily be partly performed by aerial means.

At various, if not at all, stages of a prolonged war there will probably be a deficiency of aeroplanes, or pilots, or dirigibles, &c., and in all these cases Cavalry must be ready to supply the whole of the needful service; and at all times observation from aeroplanes is almost impossible at night, and difficult where troops occupy forests, woodlands, or even cities and towns. Surmises obtained from airmen may often need verifying by some Cavalry demonstration, in order to locate the enemy unmistakably.

Wireless telegraphy will no doubt play a very important part in war, and when working there are, of course, no wires to be cut.

Like everything else it has a weak point, and messages are as readable by the enemy as by friendly operators; but needless to say they are in cypher.

The most difficult cypher is, however, possible to read, and some individuals have a natural capacity for sifting the transmutations necessary to get at its meaning. For those who have this capacity it is one well worth cultivating, as the work becomes comparatively easy with practice, though always a speciality. Wireless telegraphy is probably subject to magnetic or electric storms which would vitiate the transmission for the time; but these storms are of short duration, and receiving-stations are so easy to erect that they are hardly worth destroying as a special enterprise.

The use of motors will seemingly be altogether favourable to Cavalry.

When in general use for transport and supply of ammunition, food, and other stores, not only will the supply of horses for the Cavalry be *pro tanto* increased, but there will be less demand for forage, so that the Cavalry will be easier to provide for when the departments are less dependent on horses for transport. What the roads would be like after a long campaign with modern conditions one can hardly imagine, and it is only a pious and possibly mistaken hope that future campaigns will be short, sharp, and decisive. If possible they will be made so, but unexpected powers of resistance on the side supposed to be the weaker may well defeat such calculations.

The same relief to Cavalry is supplied by motor-cycles and cycles.

Not only do cyclists form the best orderlies and messengers under ordinary circumstances (since they have no horses to feed or fatigue), but they form the best mounted riflemen, as they require no horse-holders and are more easily concealed.

Cavalry are, through cyclists, more than ever freed for other and their main duties.

These will still include the mounted attack, the charge at speed with the *arme blanche*—primarily employed against the hostile Cavalry, but eventually (according to a mass of evidence which gathers weight daily) in the final and most critical period of the main Infantry attack in battles of first-class magnitude.

It is not argued that Cavalry can dispense with any of the aid that fire can supply. Nor can Infantry do so, but are dependent on every ounce of support they can obtain from the Artillery.

Cavalry therefore will also need not only artillery, but also machine-guns and riflemen.

Of the last the preference seems to be with cyclist riflemen.

Mounted Infantry not only absorb horses and forage which the Cavalry need, but are hampered by horse-holders and by their only partial instruction as mounted troops.

Notwithstanding the British partiality for this hybrid, notwithstanding the Boers, and notwithstanding the successes of the Confederate mounted riflemen in the raids of the War of Secession, no other European army has followed us in the institution of mounted Infantry. The Russians, who have most nearly moulded the training of their Cavalry on the lines of mounted riflemen, have seen most cause to regret their action in the ineffectiveness of their numerous squadrons in the late war in Manchuria.

Reverting once more to the co-operation of Cavalry in the final assault on a position (or to repulse such an assault), there exists a factor which perhaps Cavalry officers have not had many opportunities of considering. I refer to the intense fatigue and exhaustion under which Infantry labour at this and many other moments.

An officer\* who died only recently has described to me the attack on the Heights of Alma, where he served as a lieutenant in the 34th Foot. It was to them, as he said, merely an assemblage of utterly wearied-out men climbing a hill. All other sensations were swallowed up by intense fatigue, and they could neither think nor observe.

I have observed the same lassitude more than once on addressing an officer marching on foot in the stifling dust of an Infantry column. Questions had to be repeated twice or more before they were understood, and the man seemed dazed as well as foot-weary. Marches will be longer than ever, to deploy the huge masses now used to crush resistance and constantly reinforce till this is effected. Of course it is partly for this reason that the Germans prefer large Infantry companies of 250 men under a mounted captain. This officer uses his horse merely as transport and fights on foot, but is fresh enough at first to be able to command intelligently. At the close of a prolonged action it would be doubtful if the Infantry could make anything like full use of the accuracy permitted by their rifle. How then, it may be asked, did not the Russian columns hurl the British down the slopes of the Alma?

\* General Julius Dyson Laurie, late 34th Regiment.

Probably because they were then serfs, and behaved as slaves always do.

As to this I have the evidence of the late General Sir Arthur Hardinge, who served through the Crimea as Assistant Quartermaster-General on the Staff.

At Inkerman he, with his horse, was forced by the crush into a moving column of Russian Infantry. As they passed him they shrank and cowered away from him as from a slave-master. Not a man attempted to lift a hand against him, and he regained his own forces.

Sir Arthur also took an active part in the Heavy Cavalry charge at Balaclava.

As our brigade mounted the boggy slope at a trot (the best pace they could make in the heavy ground) the Russian Cavalry, who had crowned the crest, retired.

A few Russian troopers were however, as he described it, 'sucked into' our ranks. Our men were calling to each other 'Cut his bally liver out Bill!' and hacking at them mostly without being able to cut through the Russian heavy greatcoats, owing to blunt swords not held with the edge leading.

As to the Russians they did not even draw their swords, but merely hunched up their backs as they were being belaboured.

The Russian army is, one may hope, very differently composed now; but the physical and personal factor still maintains its value in war.

And in the future, as in the past, the tactics of the charge, and the eager and indomitable spirit that gives it life, will, when occasion offers, triumph over material and mechanical difficulties, whatever these may be.

I write in the hope that these few imperfect lines may suggest an abler handling of the theme I have chosen than I am able to give it.

## ON SHOEING

By Lieut.-Colonel C. B. BULKELEY-JOHNSON, *Royal Scots Greys*

It has been my good fortune to save two horses, which had been condemned by experienced veterinary surgeons for incurable laminitis, from being shot, and to cure seven others intermittingly lame from the same cause. And these cures have been effected, not by any deep veterinary knowledge, but by applying the principles of a common-sense theory to shoeing, which principles I have been learning and observing for the last three years as they were being applied to the horses belonging to the Scots Greys, on the advice of Captain Martin Millar, A.V.D., it being the good fortune of the regiment to be under the veterinary charge of that officer for that period.

As I have met the above-mentioned cases by pure chance among my acquaintances, it appears probable that there must be a large number of horses throughout the country suffering from the same cause, and it might be of service to the mounted branches, and to horse-owners in general, if an attempt was made to explain the principles which I have seen so successfully applied by Captain Millar.


There is nothing novel in the theory, as most books on the horse have something to say on the perfect foot and the right way to shoe, but the novelty lies in the application. Everyone knows the ideal foot, but what is not recognised is that by good shoeing practically every horse can be given one.

The system is based on the fact that all horses should walk on a level bearing. In the unshod horse, such as the Arab, which is famous for its well-shaped foot, Nature provides the cure should the animal be inclined to walk on its toes, which, coming first in contact with the ground, are worn away, a level bearing resulting. In the case of

our horses, on the contrary, Nature is prevented by the shoe from performing its beneficent duties on those feet which are inclined to go wrong, while the incompetent or careless farrier unconsciously encourages them in their perversity.

In preparing a foot for shoeing a deal of manual exertion is required in rasping down a month's growth from the toe end of the sole, while at the heel end two or three firm strokes will suffice. Thus our friend above, at each successive shoeing, will probably leave a fraction of an inch too much at the toe, and will remove the whole or more at the heel.

At the end of a year then, or less, the mischief is done; the toe is an inch or more too long, while the heel is too low, altering the natural angle of pastern and joints by causing the toe to act further beyond the perpendicular which passes through the fetlock joint, thereby throwing a greater strain on the tendons and ligaments. The following illustrations may make the matter clear :—



(1) Represents the short toe and high heel, the weight of the horse being borne more or less in the centre.

(2) Represents the lengthened toe and, consequent to the weight being shifted further back, a lowered and contracted heel.

Should the horse have a normal growth of horn nothing much will result from the long toe, except a liability to stumbling, to unexpected strains to ligaments and tendons, and a tendency to contracted heels. If, on the other hand, the strength of the wall be less than normal, as is the case with a certain percentage of horses, the effects will be far more marked. The extra length of foot, and the long leverage ensuing, will cause the walls gradually to become concave, causing at first an intermittent pressure on the sensitive laminæ, and therefore inflammation; hence that often mysterious lameness or dottiness after a hard day's work, sometimes diagnosed laminitis, sometimes

unexplained. Should this be allowed to go on with the cause unremoved, the pressure becomes perpetual, and eventually the foot drops and becomes incurable.


Provided, however, that the foot has not reached this last stage, the remedy is simple.

Remove the long toe, allow the heel to grow, and Nature will do the rest in three to six months by allowing the fresh growth to take its natural course—*i.e.*, slightly convex. The pressure will thus be removed, and the inflammation disappear. The illustrations will help to explain my meaning :—

(a) A well-shaped foot.

(b) A foot which has been allowed to become concave, showing the rings or marks which formed during periods of inflammation.

(c) Shows the different angle which is given the foot by removing the toe and leaving the heel. This amount of toe cannot, however, be



removed by less than two or three raspings at intervals of about a fortnight. The strain being removed from the wall, the new growth, taking from three to six months, will begin to grow naturally and straight or slightly convex, as shown by the dotted line, causing no pressure on the laminae. In bad cases the growth can be stimulated by a blister to the coronet.

In the case of a horse which is actually lame from this so-called laminitis, as it is necessary to remove the extra length in as short a time as possible, the sole of the foot at the toe must be rasped until it almost bleeds. The sole will then be so tender that the horse will hardly be able to walk for a few days after rasping. Should blood be drawn, disinfectants must, of course, be applied to prevent septic poisoning, always possible when the foot is in an inflammatory condition.


To obtain the benefits of this method of shoeing in ordinary cases



where no trouble has been encountered the following method is adopted :—

The toe is rasped away (from the sole surface only, of course) as much as possible, at the same time great care must be taken not to rasp the heels and not to cut the bars. If the bars are rasped or cut away, as is very commonly done in civilian farriery, the heels will contract. To guard against this it is our custom, when the shoe is removed, to chalk the heel and bars; when the foot is ready for shoeing the toe should have been taken down as far as possible, while the chalk marks should be still visible.

In four to six months' time the foot will be somewhat of the shape intended by Nature, and when this has been accomplished many advantages are obtained. Owing to the more upright position of the pastern and fetlock there will be less strain on the ligaments and tendons, less liability to stumble, no shelly and brittle feet, less chance of losing shoes, and practically no laminitis except temporarily from stomachic troubles.



THE SHAPE DESIRED

(Note the upright wall, the high heel, and the circular shape)

It is possible that the horse, as he will be using his joints and tendons in an unaccustomed way, may move as if shin sore, sometimes for months. This should cause no apprehension, as with work he will gradually become as sound and fine in action as of old.

It must be borne in mind, however, that if this system is overdone we are only escaping one set of evils to come across another.

If the heels are allowed to become too high, or if the front wall of the feet becomes too upright, we discount the value of Nature's wonderful shock absorber, the pastern joint, and encourage concussion with the concomitant bone diseases. If there was nothing to be feared from concussion we would naturally make the foot as upright as possible to gain the greatest mechanical advantage for the working of the tendons.

It is found in practice that the best compromise is that the angle of the fore-foot should be as near 50 degrees as possible, and for the hind possibly a little more.

The following figures copied from the yearly sick report of the Royal Scots Greys will show how the horses of the regiment have benefited from this method of shoeing :—

	Sprained Tendons	Sprained Ligaments
1908	8	25

*(This year is the one previous to the adoption of this system.)*

	Sprained Tendons	Sprained Ligaments
1909	13	10

*(System adopted from April.)*

	Sprained Tendons	Sprained Ligaments
1910	8	9
1911	1	4
1912	1 (Charger)	Nil

So many horses have been cured from what was diagnosed as permanent laminitis, and, in some cases, even as navicular, and so many more improved in their general soundness, that it seems a great pity that the practice advised by Captain Martin Millar is not more widely carried out. It is hoped that the above may be of some assistance in disseminating his views, for it does not seem to be known by the average horse-owner that foot troubles can be treated in any but a makeshift manner.

The truth actually is that any foot, with the exception of abnormal feet from birth, can be, with knowledge and patience, made and kept in a more or less perfect shape.

When I joined the Army, amongst the horses in the mounted branches there was every conceivable shape and size of foot, as there commonly are amongst half-bred horses, suffering from all the ills and ailments that such feet are heirs to.

To-day I can say, without exaggeration, that under the present methods in this regiment there is only one shape, and that more or less a perfect one, and also that sprains and foot trouble, both in front and behind, are as rare as they were formerly frequent.

*TRAINING YOUNG HORSES TO JUMP*

By 'SCARLET LANCER'

## PART I

MUCH has already been written on this subject, and I do not claim to propound any new theories. There are innumerable books about horse training, many of which are excellent, but there is a general tendency amongst the readers of such books to become too bigoted in their views, accepting in its entirety the method of one author, and discarding much that is useful in that of another.

Some people through love of innovations, others through lack of reasoning rush at extremes, and if one but casts the right fly, a bright and dazzling one for preference, it will seldom fail to attract the unwary and the lazy.

In these pages my plea is for moderation and for the acceptance of what one considers *best* from such books that one can read on horse training.

Finally, experience must be our best and most reliable teacher.

I once asked the commandant at Saumur if their system was based on the same lines as 'Fillis,' who was then at the St. Petersburg Cavalry School. I was answered by an apt reproach. 'No!' he said, 'the training at Saumur is the product of the old *haute école* of France, step by step progressively widened, improved and kept up to date. Should we find in Fillis or other exponents any new idea that might be worthy of acceptance we might try it, and perhaps accept it. But to accept in entirety the method of one man would be to forfeit our experience of centuries. The experience of centuries is a priceless heritage.'

Space must necessarily prevent discussion on certain points which are open to argument. In such cases I must ask my readers to regard any assertions that are not proved to be such as are sufficiently obvious, or requiring too technical discussion for an article of this description.

No doubt there are many methods, other than those that I shall suggest, which are possibly equally good or even more adapted to special circumstances.

I shall endeavour to lay down a basis for training on broad lines, so that a reader may have a sound idea as to how he should start on an entirely unschooled young horse and as to the best means of finishing one that has passed the early stages. I have found the methods I advocate successful, and trust that anyone following them will meet with equal success.

I shall deal first with the education of the young horse that is to become a first-class hunter, with a few notes on show-jumping at the end.

The riding of young horses is an excellent nerve tonic and, besides improving one's horsemanship, it helps to keep down the stable expenses if the young horses remain sound, and can be sold at a fair profit.

Most men who ride sufficiently well like to have at least one young horse to make or finish during the winter. Certainly the horse that one has made oneself and which is in absolute sympathy with its rider is a greater pleasure to hunt than a similar horse trained by another.

I do not propose to discuss the choice of a horse. They go in all shapes, though personally I prefer a good-looking one. But I strongly advise the intending buyer to make sure that his contemplated purchase moves *low* and *smoothly* in his gallop, swinging freely from his loins and shoulders. Secondly that, given a good take-off over a stiff though possibly small fence, the horse gives its rider a really good feel when he jumps. If he fails in these two tests he will neither be a really big fencer nor a good ride. If, owing to youthfulness or lack of training, these tests must be dispensed with, the buyer is entirely dependent upon breeding and looks.

I would further suggest that when possible young horses should be bought early in the summer, or, better still, at the end of the previous winter. This will give sufficient time to condition and train them, and if they have already been hunted, a better opportunity to correct their previous faults before the coming hunting season.

Age and condition are the first considerations that must be taken into account. *It is necessary to bring the young horse on to hard food gradually*, and his exercise must be in proportion to his condition.

I cannot emphasise too strongly the importance of moderation with regard to conditioning and the amount of work to be given to a young horse. *His training must be progressive and by no means hurried.*

Good manners are essential for all horses if they are to be a pleasure to the rider. Patience and common sense are the guiding factors to attain these requirements.

Perhaps this very word will check further perusal of the pages of this article. But there is often such a misconception of this essential requirement in horse-training that a few words here are necessary.

A certain degree of balance is essential for all riding horses. Apart from jumping, balance makes a horse less likely to pull, more agreeable to ride, and more likely to stand the wear and tear of work.

The Italians maintain that any attempt to lighten the horse's fore hand is unnecessary, and advocate complete liberty of rein throughout the training. Their horses consequently do by far the greater part of their work on their fore hands, and seldom have what we would consider a good mouth. We know that with their methods they produce wonderful fencers and show jumpers.

Are we to accept their theories on training in entirety? I think certainly not, although I know many men who have done so both here at home and on the Continent. Again I ask for moderation.

To accept the Italian theory would mean that one fails entirely to understand the true meaning of 'balance,' although as opposed to the old *haute école* idea of balance, the Italian method is obviously preferable.

The former was attained in a riding school and produced permanent lightness in front in all movements. The head and neck were raised to the maximum height and then bent from the poll. The higher the carriage of the head the greater the curvature of the neck. The haunches were continually kept well under the horse to raise his fore hand and the head kept what was termed *a fixed profile*.

The horse became gradually muscle-bound in his loins and shoulders. Balance of this nature, or akin to this, prevented the horse from using his powers of extension and accentuated the difficulty of propelling the body over a fence.

Owing to the head being raised and bent at the poll the muscle which extends the shoulder joint and *controls the free forward move-*

*ments of the fore limb* became contracted, and the horse's energy was perforce spent in high action and pawing the air.

It is a fact that a horse at full gallop can never extend his fore feet beyond a plummet line dropped from his nose. Obviously a horse balanced on the above lines becomes useless as a practical fencer.

What is required is balance in a more rational and wider sense. Namely, a horse that knows how and when to raise his fore hand and bring his weight back, and how and when to lower his head and bring his weight forward.

The former is required at the slower paces and when stopping, and the latter when extending himself and to assist him when jumping.

To attain this kind of balance it is necessary to get a horse up in front and back on his haunches in moderation, at the same time give him frequent periods of extended work with a free rein. It will be necessary for him to work at all paces both up and down hill. Let him jump plenty of small banks and small fences on the slope of a hill. This up-and-down-hill work teaches horses to balance and extend themselves in a way that is unattainable on the flat, and also improves their shoulders very considerably. I think a sound understanding and balance is so necessary that I will give two examples.

The action of jumping slowly on and off a bank clearly exemplifies my meaning. The particular effort required is the reason for most Irish hunters having a fair natural balance, though they are generally unfinished.

Coming up to the bank the horse in steadying himself brings his weight back, and almost simultaneously raises his fore hand to scramble up the bank. At the same time it will be found that he has brought his hocks under him to propel himself upwards. When he has raised his fore hand he extends his head to help him to bring his hind legs on to the bank. On the top he collects himself again, then throws his weight forward to enable him to extend himself and get clear over the ditch on the far side of the bank.

Thus it will be seen that he is learning to balance himself in both bringing his weight back and forward.

Again, one can walk, trot, or canter down a hill, starting the practice preferably at the slowest pace. Halfway down the hill feel the reins and raise the horse's head, closing the legs against the horse's side and leaning one's own body back.

One will soon find that the horse learns to bring his weight back, and that his hocks will come naturally underneath him going down the hill. Thus he combines raising his fore hand and pulling up on his haunches in preference to pulling up so that his weight and the force of propulsion are borne on the fore limbs.

I trust that these two simple examples may have proved both the necessity and possibility of attaining balance in moderation.

The important point regarding the use of bits is the necessity of not interfering with a young horse's mouth when he is actually jumping.

There is nothing better than a good snaffle for schooling a youngster in the early stages. For this reason we find it the almost universal bridle in Ireland.

But though a snaffle is preferable for the early education of a jumper, I would seldom, if ever, except for racing, continue to ride a horse in a snaffle. Many people, chiefly through ignorance, believe that a snaffle is essentially the best bit for hunting, and no doubt it may be more suitable for a rider with what Surtees described and John Leach admirably depicted as a 'washball seat.' But these conditions do not apply to the readers of this Journal.

I have seen a man ride over the biggest banks in a certain Irish Hunt, with his horse in a gag and a long cheek-bit. When he first appeared he was looked upon by the field as some mad or ignorant stranger. But after having had a good view of his heels in a fast twenty-five minutes, they quickly changed their opinions, and I have no doubt that some of them at any rate profited by the lesson. This particular horse was a charming ride, bitted as he was, but unwieldy and unbalanced in a snaffle. Hot horses require to be ridden very quietly with a loose rein and even a loose seat. Some horsemen possess the peculiarity of putting excitable horses to sleep, so to speak. Take no notice of them if they shy, instead of catching them short by the head, as a lazy horse can be made even more so by a lazy rider, similarly a hot horse can be made temperate by the same treatment.

Generally speaking, a medium double bridle is the bit I like a young horse to go in when he is finished. This must not be understood as a hard and fast rule, for the severity of the bit must be in proportion to the lightness of the horse's mouth and the flexibility of his neck. I think there is undoubtedly a danger of horses that bridle too freely

and are over-bent becoming affected in the wind. Certainly cases occur of horses whistling in a double bridle but not in a snaffle, or at any rate they are at times more difficult to detect as whistlers in the latter bit.

The young horse must be gradually taught to face his bit. If he is not up to it, he will neither jump nor gallop freely when ridden in a double bridle, but when this is attained, the advantages over the snaffle are many.

The horse must ride lighter. He is more easily collected, more readily brought back to the hand, and his stride can, if necessary, be shortened—*the bending of the neck at the poll mechanically shortening the stride*. Example :

#### FIRST LESSONS.

The first lessons may be given without a man on the horse's back. For this free jumping several methods are useful. For the first lesson a small bank is almost the best obstacle.

The trainer should have his horse so that he will lead freely. An occasional mouthful of oats given to a young horse by his trainer will soon induce him to follow kindly.

The trainer will then start by walking over quite a small bank, leading the horse on a cavesson or rein attached to the noseband. If the horse is inclined to play up, it may be necessary to attach the rein to the snaffle. Sometimes an assistant may be required to drive the horse on from behind. On no account must the trainer keep looking back towards the horse he is leading, or in all probability the latter will stop. After incredibly few times the horse will be found to negotiate the banks kindly and with ease. Each time he should be rewarded with sugar or oats.

In this manner a horse can be led over all sorts of small obstacles, but at the commencement it is essential that they should be very small. For instance, a pole on the ground, which should only be heightened very gradually when the youngster shows sufficient ability and confidence.


It is the horse that has absolute confidence in himself that becomes the brilliant hunter.

The following method may often be found more convenient than the last described. The fence will be placed as in the sketch with a



triangular wing along which the reins will slide as the horse jumps the fence. First of all the horse must be taught to go kindly on either circle in the long reins. When the trainer finds the horse has settled down quietly, for example on a left-handed circle, he will manipulate the reins so as to bring himself (the centre of the circle) to the position X. When he is standing at this point, the horse moving on the left-handed circle must cross the line A B. It is best to start the practice at the walk and let the first obstacle the horse encounters be a pole on the ground or something of that nature.

The long reins may be on the noseband, but if the horse gets out of control it will be best to put the reins on the snaffle-rings with the outer rein over the horse's neck. In any case it will be wise to drive him over in this manner when he has learned to jump well with the



TEACHING A HORSE TO JUMP IN THE LONG REINS

reins on the noseband. It is advisable to reverse the wing and make the horse jump whilst circling to the right as well as to the left. This will teach him to jump with equal facility with whichever leg he is leading at a canter. His efforts must be rewarded liberally.

A third method is jumping entirely free in a lane. Personally I dislike using the straight lane with fixed jumps, though undoubtedly excellent results have been obtained with a certain percentage of young horses trained in this way.

If a free lane is used, I think an oblong or elliptical manège with no fixed jump, except possibly a ditch, is by far the best.

It is advisable not to have any upright jump at all in the manège for the first one or two lessons.


The horse must first understand what is required of him when put in the manège. For this purpose the trainer will stand in the centre

with a long whip to keep the horse on the move. He must first be taught to go round the manège free at all paces to either hand, by which he will soon learn to take the bends cleverly with either leg leading at a canter. During this time he will also learn to understand the words 'walk,' 'trot,' 'canter.' The turns at both ends teach the horse to collect himself as he comes round into the straight, and will soon prevent him from attempting to rush. If he tries to whip round, and not go on the required circle, he must be instantly checked. About the third day a jump can be put in. By degrees more numerous and larger obstacles can be placed at various distances from the turns, so that he obtains practice in judging his distance, when suddenly coming on to a jump.

It is necessary to commence with a small but solid obstacle, so that the horse will not attempt more than once to chance a fence.

For a horse that takes off too close to a fence a guard rail just off the ground will be found useful to correct this fault.

ELLIPTICAL MANÈGE  
25 BY 50 YARDS WITH SIX FENCES



Young horses will sometimes be found, when jumping, to get their noses right down between their knees, at the same time often failing to get their hocks properly under them and to raise their fore hand properly. On the other hand, if they jump big and well with their weight very far forward, they are apt to over-jump themselves. Although of course considerable liberty of rein is essential, this is a bad habit, and this mistaken effort of the horse should be checked by putting on a dumb jockey. On no account must the reins on the dumb jockey be so short as to stop his freedom in jumping, but merely to suggest a higher carriage of the head. They can then be shortened up gradually.

It is a good plan for those horses who appear to bungle their fences and are unable to judge their distance properly, to place a bar one foot high at seven yards from the obstacle. The horse will then at the canter have to jump the bar, take one stride, and jump the obstacle.

It also helps to balance a young horse, by putting several bars at

seven yards apart and perhaps one at four yards. In the latter space the horse will not take an extra stride, but will have to change his legs and jump. This is, I believe, continually practised in Italy.

In the early stages, and in fact throughout the training, all possible excitement should be avoided. This is most important, and can only be arrived at by starting with very small obstacles jumped at a very slow pace, even at a walk. As the horse's ability and confidence increase the obstacles can be made correspondingly more difficult. If a young horse is refusing through nervousness the rider must show the greatest patience, and if possible, lower the fence and reward the horse liberally when he eventually jumps it.

The idea is to teach the horse to like jumping and to pop over a fence as quietly and kindly as he would go down a road.

Now an old horse may often be useful to give a lead to a youngster jumping free, but this is by no means necessary if the schooling has been systematically progressive—in fact it may even be harmful. The old horse will generally want to go faster than the youngster should at the commencement of his training, in which case the services of the former should be dispensed with.

The length of time that a young horse should be kept jumping free depends upon the following points:

His condition and state of his legs.

The state of the ground, good or otherwise.

His age and the weight of the rider who is training him.

Whether he has shown himself proficient in jumping free or not.

Generally if the horse is fresh on his legs and fit to carry his rider there is no object in continuing to jump him free.

Personally I would not jump some horses free at all, but one must make allowances for the above conditions.

If the youngster has been schooled free on the lines suggested, he should not have contracted bad habits, such as rushing at his fences, jumping out of his stride, getting his head lower than is required to balance himself properly over the fences.

The horse eventually has to jump with a man on his back, so he must necessarily learn to balance himself differently under these new conditions.

For this reason it is not advisable to continue free jumping longer than may be required by any special circumstances.

Selection of obstacles.

The fences must be selected exactly on the same lines as for free jumping.

Never attempt a larger fence with a young horse if he has failed to jump successfully, and *with confidence*, a small one.

A horse, like a man, when he has lost confidence in himself is unreliable.

By *starting over small obstacles and only increasing the size as the horse becomes perfect*, it will be found quite possible to dispense with wings. They will be quite unnecessary, for now, when ridden up to a fence, the horse's inclination from habit will be to jump it. When driven into his bridle his inclination is to canter or gallop, and jumping is merely rather more exertion; but he *must know* that the effort is *not* going to cause him any pain, and he must be confident of his own prowess. If schooled over fences without wings your horse can be relied upon to jump exactly where you put him at a fence when he is out hunting. So often one sees the necessity for this. Only quite recently I saw a man knock down two unfortunates at two consecutive fences. One of them happened to be Captain Burns-Hartopp, who is rather large to be trifled with in this manner. The offender himself soon came to grief by jinking off into a gap that was wired, and so ended his exhilarating gallop.

I mention this instance as furnishing convincing proof of the necessity for a reliable straight jumper, and dispensing with wings when schooling is an excellent and certain method of attaining this.

I suppose we have all of us, when travelling in a railway carriage, chosen our own line and picked out places at the fences in an imaginary run as the train goes through a hunting country. Our imaginary horses never tire, falter, or refuse, and we negotiate rails, banks, cut and laid fences, and bullfinches with equal facility. Even navigable rivers and canals are taken on in a manner that would do justice to the Spring Captains of Surtees.

Now the real thing is not quite so easy. As a small boy one was seldom, if ever, taught how to present a horse at a fence, or how to sit over a fence. There was the inevitable golden rule which apparently never fails—'sit back'—so we sat back and there was little moderation about it. Sometimes the youthful rider would commence to sit back half-way across the field, anticipating the unpleasantness of a fall.

Often the horse would mistake the laying back for the signal to stop, and this he did when he got to the fence. Sometimes we did not sit back far enough and so got jumped off. Generally, if our horse took off sooner than we expected, we received a shock of surprise, and this shock reacted even more on our horses' mouths.

We now approach dangerous ground, for Mr. Jorrocks said 'That there was no young man wot would not rather have a himputation on his morality than on his 'ossmanship.' In fact he is sometimes rather flattered by the former.

Presenting a young horse at a fence for his *very first lesson* should be done at a walk, then at a trot, over the smallest possible obstacles. When he shows absolute confidence he can go at a collected canter, but to get confidence in himself he must always learn to jump slowly at first. He can easily be taught to go faster later, and if given a nice free head at a canter a young horse will soon learn to extend himself well over ditches, &c.

Slow jumping will teach him to jump off his hocks and arch his back over a fence, as a hunter should do.

In approaching the fence young horses may have one or two *faults*: either they are inclined to be sticky or to rush. If anything the former is preferable, and is the easier for the rider to deal with. It generally means that the youngster is careful and will look after himself. When coming to the fence he must be driven well up to his bit by the rider's legs, but on no account must his mouth be interfered with when actually jumping, otherwise he will be afraid to jump out when required.

The pressure or more extreme use of the rider's legs besides driving on the horse will tend to keep his hocks under him. Thus a sticky horse will generally be found to jump well off his hocks, propelling himself upwards as well as forwards over the fence. Such horses can easily be sharpened up, especially in company with others, provided the rider is fairly strong.

The case of the young horse that is inclined to rush at his fences is not quite so easy to deal with, but if his early training has been on the right lines this should seldom occur. The young horse generally rushes from nervousness, possibly from the jump being something that he dreads and which he is anxious to get over. Light hands and considerable patience are necessary to correct this bad habit. Young horses that have been trained to jump wildly must be treated in

similar manner to those that have learned to rush from nervousness. The rider must endeavour to gain the horse's confidence—let him understand that he will not be hit, nor his mouth be interfered with, so that he has nothing to fear. He must be given plenty of jumping at a walk, backwards and forwards over small obstacles, and in a short time he will cease to show undue excitement. At the trot or canter he must be circled round in front of the fence as though he was going to jump it, and then when he has settled down he can be popped over once and circled round again. He must be taught to stand quietly in front of a fence, then rein back a couple of lengths, and if he still shows considerable excitement, slowly walked up to the fence again. The rider must be careful not to overtax the horse's temperament by reining back too often (once or twice is enough as a rule). Eventually, instead of walking up to the fence, he can jump it with the two lengths run, which is quite sufficient for a small fence.

On no account must the horse be jumped over too big an obstacle if he is still inclined to rush at a small one. Very often this class of horse will try and jump without getting his hocks sufficiently under him.

The slower the pace (either at a trot or canter) at which he comes up to the fence, the more easy it will be to keep his hocks under him. Similarly, reining back puts a horse on his hocks before presenting him at the fence. Jumping slowly down hill will also teach him to keep his hocks under him when taking off at a fence. A series of small obstacles from one to three feet high at seven yards apart is useful for bringing horses back on their hocks, and tends to check the habit of landing with too much of their weight on their fore hand.

Not infrequently, on the other hand, one comes across a young horse that jumps with his head up and his weight too far back. Such a horse will often land on his hind legs first, he cannot extend himself well, and will consequently leave his hind legs in the ditches when out hunting. The best treatment in this case is to school the horse for several days, or as long as is required, in a snaffle, and when a double bridle is resumed it must not be too severe, and the curb chain must be fairly loose. It may sometimes be necessary to school with a standing Martingale attached to the nose-band to induce a horse to keep his head down and get his weight forward.

The rider must also assist the horse to lower his head and get his


weight forward. He can do this by giving the horse complete liberty of rein when he is jumping, and at the same time keeping his own weight forward off the horse's loins. The horse, relieved of the weight behind, will learn to bring his hind quarters higher, and, his head being free, he will learn to extend it instead of lifting it up. He will thus soon attain his true balance over the fences and consequently land correctly.


#### END OF PART I

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#### NOTES ON ILLUSTRATIONS.

1. This shows two chasers—one jumping kindly and the other with his mouth being interfered with. A violent jerk like this would be very disastrous when schooling a young horse with a light mouth.
  2. This horse has his weight too far back, owing to his head being raised through getting a chuck on his mouth, or anticipating one. He may drop on the gate, or land hind legs first.
  3. Schooling a horse over a gate without wings. The horse has jumped badly, though the rider is assisting him in every way. The rider has kept his weight off his horse's loins and given him a free head. The horse has failed to raise his forehead sufficiently, but a free head facilitates doubling his fore legs back under him. His chief effort is still to raise his hind-quarters clear of the gate.
  4. Coming down the slope, the horse is learning to bring his hocks under him, and to bring his weight back at the same time.
  5. Cantering up a steep slope. The horse gets his hocks well under him, and at the same time brings his weight well forward.
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TRAINING  
• A •  
YOUNG  
HORSE  
• TO •  
JUMP







THE 7th QUEEN'S REGIMENT OF DRAGOONS.

Dettingen—27th June, 1743.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

*Revue de Cavalerie*, March.—In this number is commenced a series by General Baron Rébillot entitled 'Reminiscences of the Crimean War.' During this campaign the author, then a captain, was employed with the Artillery. He is disposed to find considerable fault with the British; he complains that the journey from Varna to the Crimea was a long one—*par la faute des Anglais*; that we kept our allies waiting on the morning of September 20, and that our Cavalry did not pursue because their commander had led them into a swamp and was unable to extricate them! General Rébillot gives an amusing account of the drill of a Turkish battalion which he was privileged to attend at Varna; when the movements were not executed to the satisfaction of the Turkish officer in command of the parade, he threw stones at the offenders! The soldiers received these marks of displeasure by bending their heads and turning their backs! 'L. N. C.' has some suggestions to make for the more practical organisation of the 'raids' carried out in peace time by Cavalry regiments. He complains that these are too often got up by private individuals, the management of newspapers or societies, and that consequently the purely military character of the results looked for is apt to disappear. He suggests that in lieu of selecting representatives from a whole regiment, a fraction of it only should be taken as constituted on a certain date, discarding all horses under a certain age or drawn from foreign sources of supply; competitors to be armed, and the raid to wind up with a timed ride over a certain line of enclosed country, under such conditions as a patrol might find it necessary to face when escaping from an enemy or endeavouring to make a capture. Under the title of 'La Mise au Point,' 'A. A.' offers some instructional 'notes' in advance of the new Cavalry regulations now on the point of appearing; these are naturally with reference to the special conditions obtaining in France—the date at which recruits join and that at which they are to be ready to take their place in the ranks—and are therefore not of *general* application, but it will interest Cavalry soldiers to read what 'A.A.' has to say in favour of the 'point' as opposed to the 'cu.' Commandant de Bermond d'Auriac urges the inclusion of machine-guns in the armament of Cavalry, and would have them grouped in sections; he further discusses the advisability of supplying these weapons with an automatic traversing action. There follows a detailed description of the German Cavalry manoeuvres of 1908—now rather an old story—and Colonel Sainte-Chapelle continues his account of last year's French operations in Morocco.

April.—In the January number of this journal General Durand, for many

years commander of the 4th Cavalry Division, elaborated a doctrine on the Cavalry fight; he follows this up in the current issue of the *Revue* by a paper called 'Evolutions de Combat,' wherein he claims that the regulation movements lack *souplesse* and rapidity, and offers in their place those which he has devised. Questions of strategy and tactics are put on one side: the General merely discusses the actual *mechanism* of the attack—the movements immediately antecedent to, and in preparation for, the deployment for attack. In this month's instalment of the 'Reminiscences of the Crimean War,' Baron Rébillot recalls the events of the march on Sebastopol from the Alma, the opening of the bombardment, the action of Balaclava, and the battle of Inkerman; the writer never misses an opportunity of finding fault with our unpunctuality and general unreadiness, but on the other hand does full justice to the bravery of our Heavy and Light Cavalry charges at Balaclava, and to the extraordinary steadfastness of our Infantry at Inkerman. Naturally, he attaches very great importance to the assistance rendered us by General Bosquet at the latter battle, in regard to which he makes a curious observation—viz. that the result of the fighting on November 5 would have been altogether different had the rôles of the allies been reversed. 'We,' he declares, 'would not have displayed the tenacity of the British, and they, had they been called upon to assist us, would not have arrived in time.' In an article called 'Heroes of the Beresina,' Captain Sautai publishes certain documents, probably disinterred from the archives of the War Office, dealing with the part played by the 4th, 7th, and 14th Cuirassiers at the passage of the Beresina under General Doumerc, and the honours awarded to certain of the officers and other ranks. One notices that in those days, as in more modern times, the recommendations are very greatly in excess of the rewards bestowed.

May.—In an article entitled 'Aviation et Cavalerie,' the well-known military writer Captain d'Aubert offers some remarks in explanation of the influence which the new arm may exercise upon the tactics of Cavalry. He is of opinion that at no distant date aviation will altogether displace Cavalry for the work of exploration, and that by its means the commander will be kept accurately informed about his opponent while contact is taking place and during all the phases of the battle. He reminds us that in the present day the large armies engage on such wide fronts that unity of action tends to disappear, while the direction of the battle slips more and more from the hands of the commander-in-chief; but, thanks to aeroplanes, the *liaison* between corps and armies will once again become as close as during the battles of the First Empire. As an agent of destruction, Captain d'Aubert believes that it will only be possible to employ the aeroplane during the period of concentration. He finds that it can never altogether take the place of Cavalry, and that, when executing long reconnoitring flights, it must indeed be supported by Cavalry to transmit the information it has gathered and to protect it during the interval between its flights. The aeroplane can never, he contends, be an *arme de combat* like the Cavalry, which must also be always ready to replace the aeroplane when, owing to rain or snow storms, mist or darkness, it is unable to do its work. Captain d'Aubert holds that were Cavalry to be content to be merely the instrument for exploration,

it must in course of time disappear from the field, and that it must grasp the fact that it is eminently the *arme de bataille, de liaison, de réalité*. The general conclusion to which the author seems to come is that aviation will make future wars more than ever before wars of movement, strategic and tactical, and that consequently for the Cavalry, the arm of movement *par excellence*, a new era is about to open. 'A. A.' continues his instructional notes, which he calls 'La Mise au Point,' and General Rébillot supplies another instalment of his Crimean reminiscences. His strictures upon his allies are not very pleasant reading, the less that there is so much of truth in them; but he is equally outspoken about some of his comrades and commanders, notably General Forey. According to General Rébillot, the Russians were on infinitely more friendly terms with the French, during the brief cessations of operations, than they were with the British troops.

*Spectateur Militaire*.—In the numbers of this journal for the quarter dealt with in the April issue of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, the reviewer was unable to discover anything of especial interest for the mounted arm. The Cavalryman will, however, find in the numbers of the *Spectateur Militaire* dated March 15 and April 15 a good deal that will repay perusal, among a series of papers called 'Questions de Doctrine' contributed by Commandant Descoins. In the *Spectateur* of March 15 he takes Colonel von Unger's account of the operations of the Cavalry division, commanded by General Gebssattel on September 13, during the German Imperial manœuvres of 1909; and the writer uses this account in support of an argument which he elaborates as to the imperious necessity for Cavalry units to be of a certain strength—that, in the first place, a Cavalry division should contain at least eight regiments—regiments, *bien entendu*, numbering each five squadrons. Gebssattel had no more than six regiments, or thirty squadrons, under his command, and Commandant Descoins proceeds to show that when the ordinary reductions of field service had taken place, this force, large as it may appear on paper, was actually far too weak for the work required of it. On the morning of September 13 the division had detached three squadrons *pour la découverte*, and as many more *pour la sûreté éloignée*, thus at once reducing the division, as a fighting instrument, to the equal of no more than four regiments, and having the further result of making it impossible that the division could move unless covered by a strong advanced guard containing Artillery. Descoins disclaims any intention of criticising the German manœuvres—he is merely employing a concrete case for the study of a question of *doctrine*, in this instance the question of Cavalry advanced guards. In an open country Cavalry does not need a strong advanced guard—it needs merely to be scouted for; but if, as in the case of Gebssattel's division, it is moving in an enclosed country through which it has incessantly to clear its way and overcome resistance, the advanced guard should not only be strong, but must also be provided with guns, and when Descoins says 'guns' he means a brigade of Horse Artillery, properly and effectively supported. In Gebssattel's case on the date mentioned the advanced guard consisted of one regiment without any guns; this was checked by a single Infantry company holding a position. The

Cavalry could not effect anything of itself, and it became necessary in the end to reinforce it with a battery and a complete Cavalry brigade, with the result that the whole Cavalry division was 'held up' for upwards of an hour by a company of Infantry. The division, Descoins maintains, should have been preceded by a brigade of Cavalry and two Horse Artillery batteries as advanced guard, in view of the nature of the country to be traversed; but this was impossible owing to the detachments furnished and the initial weakness of the division—six regiments each of five squadrons. *Les unités de cavalerie doivent être fortes, parce que, en toutes circonstances et dans toutes les missions elles devront faire nombreux détachements de découverte ou de sûreté.* Commandant Descoins has some useful remarks on the dismounted action of Cavalry; he points out that the Cavalry on the occasion above quoted attacked the Infantry in position, *in the manner of Infantry confined to one sole avenue of attack*, instead of fixing the defence with the least possible number engaging him in front, while making use of their horses to gain the flanks or rear, and thence attacking anew with fresh dismounted parties.

The *Spectateur Militaire* of April 1 contains a very good account, accompanied by excellent comments, of the action at Bir Tobras between the Turks and the Italians on December 20. It seems clear that on this occasion the Italians narrowly escaped a disaster, from which they were saved by the calmness and skill of Colonel Fara and by the pluck of those under his command; while their retreat without effecting the purpose for which they had left Ain-Zara was looked upon as a victory by the Turks, whose spirits were in consequence greatly raised. The force sent out by General Pecori-Giraldi (since relieved of his command) was either too weak or too strong—too weak to 'take on' the large body of the enemy which might well have been expected to be in occupation of the oasis of Bir Tobras; too strong for a mere reconnaissance, for which it was also improperly composed. The writer condemns General Lequio, who commanded the reinforcements sent out from Ain-Zara to Colonel Fara in response to his urgent requisitions, but who halted for the night for fear of losing his way in the darkness! This despite the critical situation of Fara's detachment, and the fact that individual horsemen had got through from Bir Tobras to Ain-Zara without difficulty. The critical moment of the action was when a battalion of Bersaglieri was ordered to fall back upon some rising ground in the rear, and when for a time there was considerable disorder. This proves, as the writer points out, that as a tactical principle no body should retreat merely upon a position in rear, however favourable, but that the position must first be occupied by other troops than those falling back upon it.

In the number dated May 1 will be found what appears to be the first part of an article on 'Le Nouveau Règlement sur les Exercices de Cavalerie.' In this the writer declines to discuss the usual interpretation of the probable commencement of a war between France and Germany—the rapid German mobilisation and advance across the eastern frontier of France. He insists upon the need for the offensive being at once taken by his own countrymen—the immediate invasion of German Lorraine, *soit par*

*les couloirs de Morhange et de Sarrebourg, soit—par ailleurs*, and claims that there will be fifteen to sixteen Army Corps at disposal, while neither the covering troops, nor the works of the Germans on that frontier, constitute a serious obstacle to a French invading force properly organised and led. So far the writer has not elaborated any scheme of employment for the Cavalry of France—that will probably be outlined in a future article, but for the present, like many of his arm, he cries aloud first for a *doctrine*, a *règlement*, and then for a great Cavalry leader.

The number of May 15 contains the first portion of a paper describing in full detail the organisation and composition of our Mounted Infantry.

*Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, March.—Lieutenant-General von Unger continues his dissertation on 'Cavalry in the War of the Future,' but his remarks in this number constitute in the main a review of what General von Bernhardi has to say about the Cavalry arm in his new and much-discussed book 'Vom heutigen Kriege.' He is not always of one mind with the writer of that work, but he is in fullest agreement with him in earnestly deprecating the modern tendency to regard overmuch possible losses in the action of Cavalry—to speak of every stoutly contested action as a *Todesritt*—and General von Unger particularly blames umpires in peace operations for having, by their decisions on Cavalry attacks, done much to create and encourage this tendency. Major von Czerchov, of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, writes on 'Reconnaissance by the Divisional Cavalry'; he divides this duty under eight heads, and discusses them in detail and in turn, but concludes by a lengthy expression of regret that the want of suitable ground and the weakness of peace establishments often prevents the training being as thorough or as practical as could be wished. There has during the past few months been much discussion in the military journals of Germany about the distance which in future campaigns we may expect to be covered by Cavalry bodies at the commencement of and during the war, with regard, too, to the interval which may necessarily separate them from their patrols, &c., in the front. Bernhardi, in his 'Reiterdienst,' lays down certain distances, and in this number of the *Austrian Cavalry Journal* a writer discusses this point, having regard to the proper maintenance of the necessary 'fitness' of man and horse. He gives several instances from the Cavalry operations of past campaigns where unusual distances were covered by large Cavalry bodies; one of these is the pursuit of Holkar by Lord Lake and General Smith in 1803 and 1804, 'when for fourteen days the Cavalry (3000-4000 strong) marched over sixty miles a day, concluding with a forced march of 222 miles in twenty-four hours to bring the enemy to action.' (The German writer would surely seem to have greatly exaggerated the distances covered by the 8th, 27th, and 29th Light Dragoons and old James Skinner's Horse, for Thorn, the Cavalry brigade major, does not claim to have marched much more than half these distances, and the German writer is scarcely more correct when dealing with Smith's pursuit of Amir Khan in the year following.) He says that Lake's Cavalry did not lose many horses, and compares it in this respect with Murat's horsemen in the pursuit after Jena,

covering much the same distances, and whose squadrons, though remounting themselves largely from captures, were reduced in strength nearly 50 per cent. Major von Chernel has a short paper on 'The Attack on Machine-Guns,' in which he complains that there is no real *doctrine* for such an attack, the Cavalry, ignorant of the situation, either 'running up' against guns in action, or rushing in anyhow to some convenient place where to dismount and open fire, or again attacking mounted in a formation offering an ideal target to the machine-guns. The author of the article pleads for the partition of the squadron into *Jagdzüge* and *Bedeckungszüge* for the initial stalking and ultimate attack on machine-guns. General von Gersdorff has a very short paper on 'The Future Result of the Cavalry Fight,' which is actually a plea for an increase in this arm. Then follows a *précis* of a lecture given by a professor of the Russian War Academy on 'The Independent Action of Cavalry Bodies on the Enemy's Flanks and Rear,' wherein it appears to be suggested that Russia can meet effectually the rapid mobilisation arrangements of her neighbours, and their joint overpowering strength, by well-planned and well-executed enterprises by her numerous bodies of Cavalry. There is a brief but informing paper on the remount question in Denmark.

April.—Perhaps the most important paper in this number is one which, while entitled 'Aviation and Cavalry,' is rather a *résumé* of the progress up to date of the science of aviation as applied to war generally than a treatise on the work which aviation and Cavalry in combination may be expected to accomplish. The writer, whose name is not given, concludes his paper with a remark with which most of his readers will be in agreement—that whatever may be performable by airships and aeroplanes in the way of reconnaissance, very much, and indeed the main part, of the work of reconnaissance must still be left in the hands of the Cavalry. A General of the Austro-Hungarian Army contributes something in the nature of a reply to a paper which appeared in the February number of the JOURNAL criticising the manner of employment of the Horse Artillery in the great Cavalry manoeuvres held in 1911 in Hungary. The writer contends that for the opportune employment of Horse Artillery in the Cavalry fight, and for the retention in action of the guns to the last possible moment, it is above all things essential that the commander, in making his dispositions, should consider the guns first of all. Apparently this is laid down in the Austrian 'Artillery Manual,' but not in the Cavalry regulations. Baron von Vesteneck continues the discussion on the Cavalry attack on machine-guns which was commenced in the last number; he has not much to say that is new, but in describing the attack, whether by carbine or mounted, upon these guns, he reminds us of the difference in manner of employment between the machine-guns of Infantry and those of Cavalry. The former move more slowly and less frequently, and when used in the firing line become a supporting point for the line of firers; whereas Cavalry machine-guns move at a much faster pace, being infinitely more mobile, are usually employed on a flank and with constant change of position.

May.—The opening article of this number is rather too long a one to deal with in a few sentences, and could only be properly understood by

means of a *précis*. It is really the publication of a lecture delivered at the Military Club at Olmütz on 'Divisional Cavalry.' The author is Major Schöbel, of the 4th Landwehr Uhlans. He commences with a brief discussion of the general uses of Cavalry under modern conditions, and gives his opinion that while present-day weapons have very greatly increased the difficulty of obtaining information, on the other hand the enormous masses now employed and the additional time required for bringing them into line add to the importance of the early gathering and transmission of precise information. He then describes the work of the divisional Cavalry during the advance of an Army into the manœuvre area, the distant reconnaissance being seen to by a larger Cavalry body covering the whole front. The points upon which he seems chiefly to lay stress are: (1) The saving of fatigue to the Cavalry division as much as possible; and to this end he particularly advocates that on no account should men and horses be employed for the maintenance of ordinary communication between columns or the component parts of a column; (2) the training of despatch riders: these, he declares, must be specially selected, specially trained, and especially well-mounted men, able to ride across any country, and thereby able to evade the enemy's patrols when carrying back information by the most direct routes. On this account the writer is dead against the employment as divisional Cavalry of any but Cavalry—and that of the very best; he will not hear of the use of Mounted Infantry or of anything of the nature of second-line troops. He is also altogether against making any *permanent* distinction between Cavalry regiments employed as divisional Cavalry and those forming part of the Cavalry divisions. Major-General Buxbaum writes on the 'Taktik der Reiterei.' This is an essay on the Cavalry tactics of Frederick the Great, Murat, and of the great Cavalry leaders of the War of Secession, and he seems to claim that, greatly as the conditions of the Cavalry fight have changed, the maintenance of the 'Cavalry spirit' will permit of advantage being taken in the future of the opportunities which will surely present themselves. Then follows a very short review of the new Russian 'Cavalry Training.' Colonel von Horn contributes a paper criticising the remarks of the Military Correspondent of the *Times* on the work of the German Cavalry in the manœuvres of last year, and in doing so he avoids the somewhat violent language which other German writers have permitted themselves in reply, and takes the first line that the different faults mentioned in the *Times* articles must either be met and answered, or else the necessary lessons must be drawn for future guidance from those which it is impossible altogether to deny, still less to ignore. The tone of the paper is admirable; naturally, the writer does not admit the existence of all the faults rather ruthlessly laid bare by the *Times* Military Correspondent, but he recognises the value even of a somewhat severe criticism from so good a judge, and admits that there is much in the German Cavalry—as in others—which is capable of improvement. Major-General von Gersdorff writes crisply and vehemently on the danger which he considers Germany is incurring by steadily refusing, from considerations of expense, to form Cavalry divisions during peace, and of being satisfied with their improvisation on the outbreak of war from brigades



and regiments which have seldom or never worked together previously. He points out that already in almost every single point, except the shorter service of the men, the French Cavalry has the advantage over the German. While the number of regiments in the division is identical, the German squadron has only 135 horses, the French 150; the French Cavalry division has twelve machine-guns to the German six; the French division has four companies each of 100 cyclists, the German has no cyclists at all. Further, not only do the French permanent Cavalry divisions manœuvre in varied country, but this year ten French divisions will engage in Cavalry manœuvres, while in Germany only three Cavalry divisions are to be thus exercised.

*Militär-Wochenblatt*.—There have recently been published in this journal several papers by combatant officers and by veterinary officers on the losses among horses in war. Lieutenant von Müller-Kränenfeldt has a paper on this subject in the number dated March 26; and in this he mentions that during the investment of Metz, the 8th Uhlans of the 1st Cavalry Division being quartered at some distance from water, with a forage ration reduced to 6 lb., and hay and straw often for days together unobtainable, tried giving troop-horses wine mixed with their water, with excellent results in regard to keeping up the strength of the horses. Some drank the mixture greedily, while others could only be induced to take it after being given rock-salt to lick. At the time a large quantity of wine was available—presumably the spoils of war. Emphasising the fact that disease accounts for far more losses among horses than does the actual combat, he reminds us of the enormous casualties in the 4th French Reserve Cavalry Corps in 1812, which crossed the Niemen with 43,000 horses, possessed but 18,000 two months later, and at the Borodino could only muster 9000; and also of those of the Landwehr Cavalry of Yorck's Corps, which lost five-sixths of its strength in horses within three months. Kränenfeldt puts much of the loss down to taking immature and unfit horses into the field, and is also of opinion that a good deal is due to bad and ignorant shoeing. Even in the regiments where really experienced farriers are to be found, they shoe for the purely *normal* hoof, and this, the writer of the article contends, is as rare as the perfect horse.

The number dated May 7 contains a short paper complaining that it is becoming a practice to bandage horses to such an extent that a horse with unbandaged legs is now seldom seen. The writer, who admits the advantage of a bandage both as a preventive and a cure, contends, however, that bandaging is often very ignorantly done, and that frequently much harm results.

In the issue of the *Militär-Wochenblatt* of May 30 an anonymous writer meets the plea, constantly put forward in the lay press, for the general reduction for all arms of the period of service to two years, by quoting from an article by a French officer in the *France Militaire* of May 17. The French writer characterises the introduction of the two-year period of service for the Cavalry and Artillery as a tremendous mistake; horses are not properly trained, the men are inefficient, while the units belonging to these

arms could not possibly be mobilised between September and May. The writer also points out that the Infantry suffers from the application to the mounted arms of the Infantry period of service; more men are now annually available for service than are actually required for the needs—from the reserve-production point of view—of the Cavalry and Artillery, and the surplus is passed into the Infantry companies in thousands. The German commentator clinches all these arguments by pointing out that a *general* reduction of service to two years would result in an all-round lowering of the standard of training, and thus reduce the value of the Army as a weapon of war, while expenses would be increased and mobilisation be rendered more difficult.

'The Napoleonic Campaign of 1805.' By Captain F. W. O. Maycock, D.S.O., the Suffolk Regiment. (Aldershot: Gale & Polden. 3s. 6d. net.)

This book is primarily written for the purpose of assisting officers to pass their promotion examinations. It includes the period from the march of the Grande Armée from the English Channel to the armistice after Austerlitz. Dealing as it does with the period when Napoleon was at his zenith and the work of his Cavalry under Murat was especially masterly, we heartily commend it to our readers. It is short, lucid, and well written.

'Chances of Sports of Sorts in Five Continents.' By Colonel T. A. St. Quintin, late 8th (K.R.I.) and 10th (P.W.O.R.) Hussars. (London and Edinburgh: Blackwood & Sons.) Price 16s. net.

Colonel St. Quintin's reminiscences go back to the delight of a boy in the possession of a pony all his own, and this opening note of ardour and enthusiasm is sustained throughout the entire volume, which embraces sports of sorts in five continents. The author was one of the makers of our game of polo, and his recollections of its beginnings will remain an authoritative chapter in the history of the game. It would be incorrect to say that Colonel St. Quintin had wonderful luck in his horses. He was a born judge of horseflesh, and the keen eye that enabled him, time and again, to detect a promising hunter or polo pony from a scratch lot was of good service later to his country in the work of the remount department. But Colonel St. Quintin abjures in this volume all reference to his valuable work, and writes up to his title with praiseworthy consistency. It may safely be said he never missed a chance of any sort of sport—fish or fowl, boar or tiger. The charms of the book are its spontaneous enthusiasm that never flags, and its thoroughly sportsmanlike point of view. His failures are recorded with the same zest as his innumerable triumphs—the distinguishing mark of the hunter from the pot-hunter. Colonel St. Quintin is a keen lover of nature as well as of animals, and he writes of his old four-footed friends with a nicety of characterisation and dramatic skill that many novelists might envy. The book, which is amply illustrated, contains many quotations from Adam Lindsay Gordon and Whyte Melville, and its readers will not hesitate to place Colonel St. Quintin's volume on the select shelf that holds the works of those two laureates of horsemanship and manly sport.

## NOTES

[The Managing Editor is much indebted to Captain H. M. J. McCance, late the Royal Scots, for the Table which appears in this Number of the Regulations for the Standards, Guidons, Clothing, etc., of the Cavalry, 1768, which he obtained from the original in the library of the Duke of Buccleuch, K.G., K.T.]

## OBITUARIES

The late Lieutenant-General E. A. Gore, Colonel Inniskilling Dragoons, whose death took place on Sunday, June 16, at his residence, Derrymore, Co. Clare, was born in 1839, being the only son of the late Mr. Joseph Gore, of Derrymore, one of the largest landed proprietors in that county. He received his first commission in the Army in 1858, and commanded the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons from 1878 to 1883. He served in the Transvaal campaign of 1881, and was for some time in command of the Cavalry Brigade; was Assistant Adjutant-General Northern District from 1887 to 1889, and also in the North-Western District (Chester) from 1889 to 1892; and Inspector-General of the Army Remount Establishment from 1894 to 1899.

He was promoted Lieutenant-General in 1900, and became the Colonel of the Inniskilling Dragoons in 1904, and was a Deputy Lieutenant and a magistrate for Co. Clare.

We also regret to have to announce the death, which took place at Lucknow on May 2, 1912, of Lieutenant John Noel Sinclair Blacklock, 8th Hussars, from injuries received through a fall while pig-sticking at Tallia on April 20.

Jack Blacklock, as he was best known to his friends and in the regiment, was born on Christmas Day, 1886, at Newnham Hall, Daventry, Northamptonshire.

His father was the late W. T. S. Blacklock, Esq., whose widow is now Mrs. H. S. Horne, the wife of Brigadier-General H. S. Horne, Inspector of R.H. and R.F.A.

Educated at Eton and the R.M.C., he obtained his commission as Second Lieutenant in the 8th Hussars September 4, 1907, being promoted Lieutenant September 29, 1909.

Blacklock joined his regiment at Colchester, and before they proceeded to India collected a pack of hounds, which accompanied the regiment on foreign service. At Lucknow the pack was strengthened by some more couples which were taken over from the 'Royals.'

The pack was hunted regularly by Blacklock, who provided the 8th Hussars with very good sport. He was also keen on racing, and having formed a racing partnership with a brother officer trained and ran their own horses and ponies with great success. With one horse, 'Stone-hall,' which was only brought out in the autumn of 1911, Blacklock rode and won the three 'chases in which he rode—the 'Military 'Chase' at Lucknow, the 'Jodpur Cup' at Meerut, and the 'Calcutta Turf Club Steeplechase' at Rawal Pindi. He also rode in the 'Kadir' this year for the first time, winning his heat, though he was unfortunate in the second round, as his horse fell.

At polo he played No. 2 in the regimental team when the 8th Hussars won the '*Country Life* Challenge Cup.'

On August 21 of last year, at Kildonan Lodge, Helmsdale, this young officer performed a sporting feat which one would think constituted a record—viz. he landed two salmon, killed two stags, right and left, and shot a brace of grouse, also right and left.

Among his brother officers and equally with his men he was extremely popular. Writing of him, a brother officer describes Lieutenant Blacklock as 'an ideal Light Cavalry soldier.'

The early death of this promising young officer—he was only in his twenty-sixth year—is much to be regretted.

## THE ROYAL DRAGOONS

### THEIR 250TH ANNIVERSARY

ON the arrival of the Royal Dragoons at Pretoria last November, the regiment celebrated the 250th anniversary of its foundation; and perhaps on this occasion it does not come amiss to give a short account of the early history of the oldest Cavalry regiment of the Line.

No regiment dates from before the time of the Restoration with the exception of the Coldstream Guards and the Royal Scots, both of which claim that they were never disbanded, but taken on the strength of the British Army as units—the former being Monk's regiment, and the latter recalled from the service of France in 1678. Colonel Russell's regiment of Guards, now the Grenadiers, was raised early in 1661, together with two troops of Life Guards and Oxford's Horse, which became the 1st Horse, and somewhat later became known as the Royal Horse Guards (The Blues).

When Charles married the Portuguese Princess, Katherine of Braganza, she brought as her dowry half-a-million of money, and in addition the properties of Bombay and Tangier. The latter place required a garrison to protect it, and the Earl of Peterborough was commissioned to raise a force to hold it and operate against the Moors, who in those days were no mean antagonists, and had only recently been rolled back out of Europe from Spain; they also had many renegade Europeans in their pay to help them. Peterborough raised a regiment of Foot, known as 'The Tangier Foot' and later as the 2nd Queen's, and a strong troop of Horse, which later

was increased to seven troops,\* known as 'The Tangier Horse,' and now as the Royal Dragoons.

These troops, mostly raised from the well-seasoned veterans of the Continental wars, were mustered in October 1661, the Foot on Putney Heath and the Horse on St. George's Fields, Southwark, and, sailing in December, arrived at Tangier in January 1662.

From this time onwards, till 1680, they were constantly engaged in a vexatious sort of warfare, but with continued, small, successful engagements—a mere handful of men against hordes of Moors. Fortescue relates that 'in March 1663, after long endurance of incessant harassing attacks from the Moors, the Governor, who had hitherto stood on the defensive, took the initiative and launched the Royal Dragoons straight at them. So signal was the success of this first venture that it was repeated a fortnight later by the same regiment and renewed on a grander scale after two months by a rally of the whole garrison, which, after desperate fighting, ended once more in victory.†

In 1663 the veteran Earl of Teviot was appointed Governor of Tangier in succession to the Earl of Peterborough, and he occasionally penetrated into the neighbouring country at the head of a party of Horse, performing numerous and gallant exploits. In February 1664 the Tangier Horse covered themselves with glory and captured a Moorish standard, routing the enemy; and so the war went on, the Earl of Teviot being killed in an engagement in May of that year. Hostilities continued, with occasional peaceful intervals, for seventeen years, and the Moors made several attempts to capture the city.

In 1679 a large army of Moors made desperate attempts to take Tangier, and in the following year returned in increased numbers, when King Charles despatched a battalion of Grenadiers and Coldstream Guards and sixteen companies of the Royal Scots to assist the garrison. In an attack on the enemy's lines in September, Sir Palmes Fairborne, the Governor, was mortally wounded.

'On September 27 the Garrison, amounting to about 4000 men, issued from the fortress and attacked the Army of the Moors, estimated at 18,000 men, in their entrenched camp with signal audacity. So eager were the Cavalry to engage that a dispute actually arose between the English and Spanish Horse, each claiming the honour of making the first charge, when the matter being referred to the Lieutenant-Governor, Colonel Sackville, he gave the Spaniards the precedence because they fought as "Auxiliaries." The English and Spanish Horse stood in column of troops until the first entrenchment was carried, and a space cleared for the passage of the Cavalry, when they dashed through the opening and charged at full speed on the defenders, who were broken, trampled down, and pursued with great slaughter, while the Musketeers, Pikemen, and Grenadiers followed with loud shouts as the dismayed Africans fell beneath the sabres of the English and Spanish troopers; many of the Moors faced about and confronted their pursuers; numerous single combats took place, and the vicinity of the camp was covered with slain. Captain Nedby's Troop of English Horse

\* Only four troops served in Tangier, the remainder disbanded.

† Fortescue's History of the British Army.

particularly distinguished itself, and captured a standard of curious workmanship.'<sup>1</sup>

This decisive victory over the Moors was followed by a treaty of peace, and in 1684 'this ill-fated possession, having cost many thousands of lives and witnessed as gallant feats of arms as ever were wrought by English soldiers, was finally abandoned' (Fortescue).

The improved military system introduced among the Moors by European renegades rendering it now necessary to employ at Tangier a much stronger garrison than hitherto, the question was brought before Parliament, but, no grant of money being voted, it was decided by the Government to destroy the works and withdraw the troops. Tangier was fated not to become the stepping-stone to an African, as Bombay was to an Indian, Empire, and the



only memorial now to be seen at Tangier to mark the occupation of the British is the remains of the mole at the harbour.

The Tangier Horse returned to England in 1684, and King Charles, deciding to keep on the Tangier troops, added two more troops to the already existing four troops of Horse, and renamed the regiment 'The King's Own Royal Regiment of Dragoons.' 'The King's Own' was very soon dropped, and the regiment styled 'The Royal Regiment of Dragoons,' by which name it has always been known—unlike other regiments, which were known by the names of their commanders: Colonel Churchill, who saw his first active service in Tangier, and who, becoming later the first Duke of Marlborough, was recognised as the equal or superior of any British or European General in history, was given command of the Royal Dragoons.

<sup>1</sup> From the Regimental History.

The Royals came home, and were soon employed in the suppression of Monmouth's rebellion; they played an important part, together with 'The Blues,' at Sedgemoor; afterwards escorted Monmouth up to London, and were present on guard at Tower Hill at his execution. Then came the Battle of the Boyne; but it is not proposed here to give a history of the regiment, and only one more campaign in Spain will be noticed, as it was one of a very peculiar nature, and one which is little known and provides very interesting reading.

The regiment, having gone to Holland in 1702, under the command of the Duke of Marlborough, was shipped off in 1703 to Portugal, and there served under the Earl of Peterborough, nephew of the Earl who raised the regiment for service in Tangier. The Royals served in Spain from 1703-12, and, missing all the big battles of Marlborough, were engaged in all the enterprises under the brilliant but somewhat erratic Peterborough. He had nearly all the qualities of a great soldier: extraordinarily energetic, he was never fatigued, extremely vigilant and active, and by the astounding rapidity of his movements alike amazed his friends and baffled his enemies. Macaulay says of him: 'His courage had all the French impetuosity and all the English steadiness. His activity of mind was almost beyond belief.' He would certainly have made a great Cavalry soldier, and his character is a most interesting one. What he might have done with a larger force, and if he had not been stinted of money, can, of course, be only conjecture. The Royals took part in all his enterprises, to their great credit.

This not being a history of the regiment, the various campaigns of the Peninsula, Waterloo, the Crimea, not to mention South Africa, I pass over in silence, as the Cavalry work, except that in the Peninsula, is well known.

The past year was not a good one for the Royals to celebrate their 250th anniversary. The hot weather in India and the impending move of the regiment precluded the possibility of its taking place in that country, so it was left till our arrival at Pretoria. The regiment did not reach South Africa till the end of November, and then all the taking over and settling into new quarters in the new country made things difficult; but everyone set to with a will, and 'the Royals' Mad Week,' as the garrison of Roberts's Heights nick-named it, is now a thing of the past.

The ceremonial parade, when Field-Marshal Lord Methuen was present and inspected the regiment, making it a very spirited address, and then a big dinner in the evening, attended by all the principal members of the garrison, with a boxing entertainment afterwards, concluded the first day. Military sports and a gymkhana, with a performance of the theatrical troupe of the regiment in the evening, to both of which the whole of the Garrison and Pretoria were invited, were held the second day. On the Thursday the sergeants' mess gave a very successful ball, which 600 people attended. Everything went with a swing, as such hastily improvised entertainments frequently do, and the celebrations proved not unworthy of such a unique occasion.





1661



1809



1825



1815

R. SIMKIN






THE OBSERVATORY AT WATERLOO.

## THE OBSERVATORY AT WATERLOO

By C. R. B. BARRETT

In the June number of the *Cornhill Magazine* Dr. W. H. Fitchett refers to a platform which Napoleon is said to have ascended at Waterloo in order to view the battle. A description of a structure on the battlefield is given on the authority of Sir Charles Bell, the celebrated surgeon, who was present at the battle. He narrates how he ascended to the first platform, and that there were three platforms. He estimates that the total height of the structure was from sixty to sixty-five feet. The first platform, to which he climbed, was 'four times the length of my body,' or about twenty-four feet, and this he calls 'a giddy height.' Commenting upon the article in the *Cornhill Magazine*, Sir Harry Poland in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and also in the *Daily Telegraph*, quotes from the 'Diary of Frances Lady Shelley.' Her ladyship was, it appears, shown over the battlefield about three months after the event by the Duke of Richmond. Lady Shelley states that the 'Observatory' was built about a century previously for topographical reasons by a former Governor of the Netherlands—as a matter of fact it was a fixed point for a trigonometrical survey. She also informs us that Napoleon was not in the Observatory after the battle began, nor from that spot could he have directed his troops, and she was probably right. To the distance of the Observatory from the fighting-line we shall refer later.

The story has also been investigated in *Notes and Queries*, and has been alluded to in both Lockhart's 'Life of Scott' and in Kelly's 'History of the French Revolution and Subsequent Wars.' Sir Harry Poland also visited the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution in Whitehall and inspected Siborne's wonderful model of Waterloo which is there preserved. Here, he states, he found the Observatory duly visible on the model, and constructed to scale. That scale is nine feet to one mile. Sir Harry Poland found the Observatory in the model in a somewhat dilapidated state; and while admitting that it might have once possessed a second platform, concludes that it was of old construction because it so appears, and considers that it was thus when Siborne modelled it.

OBSERVATORY FROM SIBORNE'S  
MODEL (present state.)

As a matter of fact, some portions have fallen off; one piece lies amid the tiny trees at its base; the rest have been carefully preserved and are to be replaced when the opportunity for opening the glass case presents itself.

It should, however, be remarked that as far as the model is concerned, there are no records of more than two platforms having ever existed.

That Napoleon ascended some artificial look-out station on the morning of the battle, and possibly on the night before, is, we believe, conceded, but the question is, What station was it, and where was it situated?




Had Sir Harry Poland pursued his inquiries at the Museum he would have obtained a side-light on the matter which would have interested him. On the wall behind the model hangs a framed linen or calico print of undoubted age—the fabric employed is not now made, and must be nearly contemporary with the battle. On this is shown not only the three-storied ‘Observatory,’ closely resembling the illustration here given and labelled ‘Observatory of the Prince of Orange,’ but also a single platform look-out station labelled ‘Observatory of Buonaparte.’

Assuming that Siborne’s model is accurate in detail—and its accuracy has never been called in question—the ‘Observatory of the Prince of Orange,’ as far as details go, must be a fancy picture. On the linen print, it may be noted, a figure in uniform is visible on the second ladder. We give illustrations of both the ‘Observatory of Buonaparte’ and of Siborne’s model in its present state.

With regard to the latter, it is to be noted that the structure was made by lashing lengths of rough poles together at each story, and that it was not constructed of squared timber.

And now the question of distance requires to be considered.



BUONAPARTE'S OBSERVATORY.

Sir Charles Bell states that ‘about half a mile of ascent brought us to the position of Buonaparte.’ On his arrival at the spot he ‘climbed up one of the pillars of the structure.’

On the model the ‘Observatory’ is rather more than nine feet from the centre of the rear of the French army, or one mile distant therefrom, and one mile and a half from the centre of the fighting-line.

This spot is marked on the model by a tricolour flag, and this flag is, as nearly as possible, half a mile up-

hill from the British line. It is this spot which has always been considered to be the position occupied by Napoleon during the greater portion of the battle. As for the distant Observatory, we are told that Napoleon had it moved. This is absurd, for when we consider the object for which it was built, rigidity would have been a *sine quâ non*. Sir Charles Bell saw his structure on June 19, and distinctly states that there were no ladders, for he had to borrow one. If used on June 18 there must have been ladders; and considering the events of the twenty-four hours preceding, who, it may be asked, would have removed them? The only solution to this difficulty is that they might have been converted into fuel for camp fires. Still, there was plenty of fuel without.

The probability is that a smaller platform was roughly and hurriedly erected somewhere nearer the fighting-line, and was furnished with a stair hastily looted from the nearest cottage. It would not have required to be very lofty, as the contour of the ground shows, and could easily have been near the tricolour. But Sir Charles Bell is mistaken certainly in his

distances, and might equally well have been mistaken in his facts. Besides, near the fighting-line it is far more probable that the structure, whatever it was, perished on the night of June 18 by fire. Hence it does not appear on Siborne's model.

### APPOINTMENTS AND COMMANDS

Lieut.-General Sir Douglas Haig, K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., C.B., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Aldershot Command, has been appointed Colonel of the 17th (D.C.O.) Lancers, vice the late Major-General T. A. Cooke, C.V.O.

Major-General E. C. Bethune, C.V.O., C.B., Colonel 4th (R.I.) Dragoon Guards, lately commanding the West Lancashire Territorial Division, has now succeeded Major-General J. S. Cowans, C.B., M.V.O., as Director-General of the Territorial Force.

Major-General the Hon. Julian H. G. Byng, C.B., M.V.O., commanding the East Anglian Territorial Division, has been gazetted Colonel of the 3rd (K.O.) Hussars, vice the late Major-General R. Blundell-Hollinshead-Blundell.

Colonel Lord Kenyon, K.C.V.O., T.D., commanding the Shropshire Yeomanry, has been appointed Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty the King.

THE undermentioned officers have been appointed to the following Territorial mounted brigades respectively :—

Notts and Derby, Colonel P. A. Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C., late 21st (E.I.) Lancers.

2nd South-Western, Colonel R. Hoare, late 4th (Q.O.) Hussars.

### RELIEFS

The following is the programme for 1912-13 :—

	From	To
1st Life Guards . . . . .	Regent's Park	Windsor
2nd Life Guards . . . . .	Windsor	Regent's Park
3rd (P.W.) Dragoon Guards . . . . .	Hounslow	Egypt
5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards . . . . .	Curragh	Aldershot
6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers) . . . . .	South Africa	Canterbury
9th (Q.R.) Lancers . . . . .	Canterbury	Tidworth
10th (P.W.O.R.) Hussars . . . . .	India	South Africa
16th (The Queen's) Lancers . . . . .	Norwich	Curragh
19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars . . . . .	Aldershot	Hounslow
21st (E.I.) Lancers . . . . .	Egypt	India

## PRACTICE SCHEME FOR CAVALRY MACHINE GUNS

## OPENING FIRE BY SURPRISE

Communicated by the Austro-Hungarian School of Musketry to  
*Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift*, August 1911.

(Translated by the General Staff, War Office.)

*Conditions.*—Firing detachment, a half-squadron of the Instructional Squadron, 60 rifles. Afterwards one section of cavalry machine guns (4 machine guns).

40 rounds per carbine, and 4 belts (1,000 rounds) per machine gun.

Temperature 64° F., moderate wind towards firing point, sun on the right hand.

*Object of the Practice.*—Conduct of a surprise attack, pointing out target and choice of position, change of target.

Technique of opening fire by surprise, preparations for opening effective fire at once, distribution and rate of fire.

*Scheme.*—The half-squadron<sup>1</sup> with the Cavalry machine-gun detachment advances as a patrol by Bruck-on-Leitha and Spitalberg on Goyz. At 2 P.M. it arrives at Steinbruch Quarry (see Sketch No. 1). The commander thence observes hostile Cavalry resting at the edge of the Pirscher Wood, east of Spitalberg.

The commander of the detachment, with one patrol, and the commander of the machine-gun detachment, at the Signal Station. The half-squadron and machine-gun detachment still on the road north of the Quarry.

*Target Scheme.*—As in Sketch 1.<sup>2</sup>

*Execution.*—The commander of the half-squadron, who also commands the whole detachment, issues his instructions to the commander of the machine guns, and informs him of his decision to open fire by surprise on the hostile Cavalry.

The detachment having been ordered to halt at the Quarry, the commander gives the following order to the machine-gun commander and to the section commanders, who have been called to the front :—

‘ Surprise attack on the dismounted Cavalry to the front. Machine guns to come into action right of the signal station, first troop of half-squadron on ridge left of machine guns. Left patrol in small trench.

‘ The force to come into action without exposure, and to prepare to open fire. The machine guns will take the target right of the railway, the Cavalry that on the left.


‘ Range 1,200, accelerated (*sehr lebhaftes*) fire, commence firing at my whistle.

‘ Second troop, remain mounted, move to the right towards Spitalberg trench, and endeavour thence to act against enemy's flank. Go on.’

<sup>1</sup> A half-squadron can only be looked upon as an escort to machine guns, but on this day no more men were available.

<sup>2</sup> Targets *a* and *b* were visible from the Signal Station as two distinct groups right and left of the railway.

The machine-gun commander with his section commanders and Nos. 1 then went forward, keeping under cover. He gave the following instructions :—



SKETCH 1.

' Surprise attack on dismounted Cavalry to the front, right of the railway, right section 12, left section 13. Commence firing at my whistle. Firing position right of small house (signal station). Into position at once.'

The commander of the first troop of the half-squadron goes through

the quarry with his dismounted men, halts them before climbing up the further edge, gives instructions to the patrol commanders, and orders :—

'Skirmishing line along the crest. Right and centre patrols left of small house (signal station), left patrol in trench.

'Surprise attack on dismounted Cavalry left of railway. First rank 1,200, second rank 1,300. Keep under cover. Ready. Commence firing at my whistle. Accelerated fire.'

As soon as all preparations were completed the commanding officer gave the signal to open fire by a blast on his whistle.

During the firing the machine commander ordered 'Correct your firing by sub-sections.'

After 30 seconds' firing, the commanding officer is informed by the Directing Officer that the Cavalry previously standing in front of the wood have disappeared into it. (This assumption had to be made, as the targets were fixed.)

The commanding officer orders 'Cease Fire,' and then :—

'Cavalry have disappeared into the wood.' Target, edge of the wood behind the standing targets. 1,400. Accelerated fire.'

This order was carried out at once.

After a further 30 seconds, fire at the edge of the wood was stopped.

Shortly afterwards targets appeared.

The commanding officer orders, 'Advancing infantry near small wood, 800, commence firing, accelerated fire.'

The machine-gun commander and his section commanders fail to hear this order; the target is not seen till very late, and then by the No. 1 of the right machine gun, who opens fire on his own initiative.

Target *e* disappears after having been visible 30 seconds, and target *f* appears. This is at once fired upon by the machine guns and the troop, at the order 'Firing line in front of the wood.'

After the fire has lasted 25 seconds, firing is stopped and the practice terminates.

*Conference.—First Phase.* According to the scheme, the commander of the detachment was in a very favourable situation.

He had an excellent opportunity of opening fire upon a target in unusually close formation. If all his preparations were judiciously and correctly made, he might hope to produce an annihilating effect upon the target.

Concealment and good preparation were therefore essential, and it was necessary to decide beforehand as to the employment of the half-squadron accompanying the machine guns.

The four machine guns represented such an immense volume of fire that, in comparison to them, the few rifles available (actually only 25) were of little importance.

On the other hand, there were other duties which might possibly fall to the Cavalry, such as the pursuit and dispersion of the enemy, in case he retreated, or the repulse of a hostile counter-attack, so that it would have been better, in the interest of secrecy, to keep the half-squadron together mounted, and to refrain from advancing one troop to the Spitalberg.

To avoid exposure, the firing-line should have first occupied the edge of the quarry, and there have made their preparations to open fire, instead of at once advancing to the crest, which, although only a few paces further on, no longer afforded concealment.

*Selection of Target.*—This cannot be considered a happy one.

Groups *a* and *b* represented targets of equal strength and density, and of equal tactical importance.

This being so, it was unsound to engage one group with a unit capable of delivering 1,000 to 1,200 shots per minute, and the other with a unit capable only of 100 to 150 shots.

If a troop of cavalry had already been dismounted, it might have been employed to fire upon one or other of the two groups, no matter which; but in any case one section of machine guns should have been turned upon each group.

The effect of the commanding officer's choice of target is plainly shown by the target diagram (Sketch 2).

As regards the technique of the fire-direction, the following remarks may be made :—

The time required to complete all preparations, from the moment when the target was seen to the first shot, was in this case very considerable. In such situations it is especially important to act as quickly as possible, since the presence of our own troops may be discovered by the enemy at any moment, and may perhaps have been discovered already. He will then hasten to escape from this dangerous situation. In this case it would have been especially easy for the enemy to escape, owing to the neighbourhood of the wood, and the opportunity for surprise would then have been missed.

With a view to hastening the opening of fire, it would appear advisable, in this case, to use the machine guns alone, since these are much the quicker arm of the two, and are superior to any Cavalry unit at deploying from the order of march to the fire position. In this exercise it was noted that the machine guns were ready to open fire much sooner than the troop of the half-squadron.


In a surprise attack on a mobile target, immediate effect is the principal consideration. It is of primary importance to make certain of producing effect; the amount of effect is a secondary consideration. The intention is that the sudden losses shall produce alarm and helpless confusion. If effect be not obtained at once, then the troops taken by surprise quickly recover; they first seek cover, and then take steps to strike back. But the confusion which results from even slight losses in such a situation immobilises the surprised troops, and gives the attacker time to improve the effect of his fire. It is not a case of ranging first and firing for effect afterwards, but exactly the reverse.

The leading principle of opening fire by surprise is to fire for effect at once, and then to improve on the effect at first obtained.

In the present practice the machine-gun commander, using elevations 11 and 12, struck 48 figures out of 50 in 30 seconds. The effect was practically annihilating. Hence it might be presumed that his procedure is worthy of imitation. It is therefore worth while to investigate the conditions



under which this effect was produced. The depth of the 50 per cent. bullet-sheaf at each elevation is 100 paces. Since these elevations differ by 100



SKETCH 2.

*First Phase.*—Targets a, b, and c, four groups each of 24 horses, with lying in the open at four inches interval (disappearing targets).

*Second Phase.*—Target e, three groups each of 16 running figures, disappearing 30 seconds after their appearance (disappearing standing targets).

In place of this, target f appears, consisting of three groups of 16 figures lying in the open at four inches interval (disappearing targets).

Targets a and b well illuminated; clearly visible. Targets c and d, lying back in the wood, not visible to men firing. Target e, difficult background, and not clearly visible. Target f, clearly visible.

Bullet-strikes clearly visible.

paces, an area 200 paces deep is uniformly covered with bullets. The depth of the target in the direction of the line of fire is about 30 paces, and if we add to this the danger zone of 50 paces for the last row of targets, we obtain a vulnerable depth of target of about 80 paces.

Should it happen that the axis of the section bullet-sheaf, 200 paces deep, falls only 100 paces short of the front edge of the target, or 150 paces beyond the rear edge, then the 50 per cent. bullet-sheaf will no longer reach the target. Therefore even this small plus or minus error is sufficient to prevent satisfactory effect from being obtained.

It is very generally noticed that commanders are reluctant to allow a sufficient depth of section bullet-sheaf in opening fire by surprise. The shallow bullet-sheaf then usually produces no effect at all. In the present case the commander not only judged the range correctly, thanks to his knowledge of the ground; he was also fortunate enough to choose the elevation corresponding to the error of the day.

The great effect obtained is to be ascribed to the combination of these two fortunate circumstances. But it will rarely occur that both range and elevation are correctly estimated, and hence it follows that in the majority of cases a greater depth of section bullet-sheaf will be preferable.

The simplest method of estimating the limits of the area to be searched is to judge the greatest possible and least possible distance of the target.

If, as is always desirable, the range is measured with the rangefinder, about one-tenth should be deducted from this range, and the same amount added; this will give a sufficient extension of the dangerous zone. If the number of machine guns is sufficient to use so many elevations as to leave no gap between the 50 per cent. bullet-sheaves, so that these cover the whole area, then the simplest method is to order an echelon of elevations; in other cases the method of searching should be used. In this case, with four machine guns, an area 400 paces deep could have been covered with effective fire.

Observation of bullet-strikes was easy; so much so, that the machine-gun commander ordered 'Correct fire by sub-sections' during the fire. The proper order would have been 'Sub-section fire.' To make himself understood, the commander would have had to stop the fire, which would have caused a delay, which would have been especially objectionable in this case. The loss of intensity of the fire caused by artificially increasing the depth of the bullet-sheaf must be atoned for by increasing the number of bullets fired. In opening fire by surprise at short range the attacking detachment should deliver a regular stream of fire. The machine-gun commander's judgment was sound on this point, and he wished to avoid a break in the fire. Since only one target was being engaged with section fire, and that at two elevations, and since the strikes were visible, the commander was able to maintain fire-control without interrupting his fire. If he wished to correct the situation of the bullet-sheaf of one section, he had only to correct its elevation by a direct order.

The use of section fire was justified by the commander's desire to cover the single target uniformly with fire, while himself retaining fire-control. If both the leading groups of targets had been assigned to the machine-

gun detachment, then the order 'Distribute' would have sufficed to cause each section at once to engage the target opposite to it. In this case either the order 'Section fire,' or 'Detachment fire,' would have been justifiable.

It is a matter for consideration whether, in either case, the original order 'Sub-section fire' instead of 'Detachment fire' might with advantage have been given. 'Sub-section fire' brings the full initiative and skill of the Nos. 1 into play.

An enemy surprised by a fire attack will, as soon as he recovers his senses, instinctively disperse and seek the shelter of the wood. Orders will then usually be too late. The No. 1 must not only know that the bullet-sheaf is on the flying enemy; he must, if necessary, direct the sheaf a sufficient distance in front of him, and he must have the power to do so. Therefore, if it is possible to observe the strikes, as in this case, it is desirable, with trained detachments, to use sub-section fire from the outset. And this not only because it is the simplest method, but because it is the most permanently effective method.

The decision of the officer commanding the force, when informed that the enemy had retired into the wood, to follow him up with fire, was sound, for it was a question of further increasing the losses inflicted on him; and this might be, and actually was, achieved by firing on the ground behind the original target, although the enemy was no longer visible. (See Target Diagram, Sketch 2.)

*Second Phase.*—Before commenting on the second phase, it should be remarked that the Cavalry who were taken by surprise would hardly have been able to commence a fire-combat, as is here assumed to be the case. This assumption was made in order to oblige the commander of the force and of the machine-gun detachment to form new decisions, and to give the detachment an opportunity of firing on fresh targets.

The appearance of target *e*, the group advancing at the double, was not noticed for some time.

The range was judged as 800 paces, whereas it was actually 950. The very trifling effect produced is to be ascribed to this error, to the short period of fire, and to the fact that only part of the detachment fired on this target.

The commanding officer's intention to direct the full volume of his fire upon this new target must be characterised as sound, since the first troop of the half-squadron could not have been disengaged from the combat without loss of men and of time.

But regard should have been had to the possibility of solving the problem by Cavalry methods. If, as above remarked, the half-squadron had been kept mounted, at the disposal of the commanding officer, then this would have been the moment to make a dash at the enemy's horses, or to reach a position from which an enveloping fire could be brought to bear on him, and so complete his defeat. The enemy was tied to the ground by the fire-combat with the machine guns in which he was engaged, and the mobility of the half-squadron could have been utilised. But as one troop was in the firing-line, the other troop should have been used for this offensive movement. This the commanding officer had foreseen at the outset, but it was then too early to attempt such an attack.

The execution of the commanding officer's intention was defective, but only one machine gun and one patrol actually fired at the target. This is to be ascribed to a bad look-out being kept on the foreground, and to want of attention to the commanding officer's orders.

The No. 1 of the right magazine gun opened fire on his own initiative on the new target. In principle, the choice and allotment of targets is one of the most important duties of the commander, but it is desirable occasionally to test the suitability of the various modes of procedure. If the No. 1, in obedience to regulations, had first reported the new target and then waited for orders from his section commander, this favourable target, which would soon have become a formidable antagonist, would have escaped unmolested. So long as the initiative of the No. 1 does not lead to their getting out of hand, it should be encouraged.

The advancing group now opens fire (target *f*), and is engaged by the machine guns, the order being 'On the firing-line in front of the wood.' The target is an unfavourable one, consisting of lying figures, more or less well concealed. It is not to be taken by surprise by frontal fire. In this case it is less important to obtain immediate effect than to fight down the enemy by utilising the full intensity and effect of machine-gun fire. Therefore the most favourable situation of the bullet-sheaf must be determined by careful ranging before opening fire for effect.

The target consists of several groups in echelon. After the machine-gun commander had completed his ranging upon one ranging-point, he had next to distribute his fire and to recommence the ranging process upon the several parts of the target. In view of the short range and favourable conditions for observation, effective fire would probably have been obtained sooner if fire had been distributed before ranging. Three target groups were visible. For sub-section ranging, the section to which two targets were allotted should have ranged with one machine gun upon each, and the other section should have ranged upon the opposite flank of the remaining target. If the commander of the latter section wished to range himself, either with one machine gun or with two, he would have had to give a special order to this effect.

Since the previous target *a b* had been engaged with 'detachment fire,' the correct order to be given by the machine-gun commander should now be:—

Signal, 'Stop firing. Firing line on the right. Elevation 9. Sweeping limit, the road. Sub-section fire. Go on.' Or instead of 'Sweeping limit' he might have ordered 'First section, right sub-section.'

If the detachment had already been at sub-section fire, a shorter order would have sufficed:—

'Firing line of the right. Elevation 9. Sweeping limit, the road (or, first section right sub-section). Go on.'

Finally, it may be remarked that when the first troop was dismounted it was not necessary to leave sufficient men with the horses to lead them, but only sufficient to hold them. This would have rendered a larger number of carbines available for the firing-line, and the horses could have been kept concealed and under cover in the Quarry immediately behind the troop.

*Record of Hits* (Sketch 2).—Targets shown: 96 horses, 144 running figures, 48 figures lying in the open. Total, 288 figures.

Rounds fired by the Cavalry machine-gun detachment, 1,355; by the troop of Cavalry, 195; total, 1,550.

Figures struck, 92 figures, or 31.9 per cent.

Hits made, 207, or 13.3 per cent.

Rate of fire per man per minute, 5 rounds; per machine gun per minute, 289 rounds.

The great effect produced upon the first target (Cavalry resting) is certainly such that this part of the task may be regarded as successfully accomplished. The very noticeable irregularity in the distribution of the hits between the right and the left of the group plainly shows the defective fire-direction. The effect produced in the second phase, upon the men advancing and deploying to fire, is insufficient, and is to be ascribed to the mistakes noted above.

### FOREIGN

*Austria-Hungary*.—It has been decided that for the future in every regiment of Cavalry an addition shall be made to the regimental staff in the person of an instructor of musketry, who shall be trained at the Musketry School, and will be wholly responsible for the carbine or rifle practice throughout the regiment. Eight majors will this year be gazetted to these new appointments, and each year others will be posted until every Cavalry regiment possesses a musketry instructor.

*France*.—In this country the *section technique de l'artillerie* has turned out at the factory at Châtellerault a new cuirass weighing only 7.7 lb., against the 13.23 lb. of the regulation cuirass now in use. The light cuirass is made of a metal the composition of which is the secret of the inventor, and which is proof against a revolver bullet. It has not yet, however, been definitely adopted.

As an experimental measure, all Dragoon regiments, and all regiments of Light Cavalry belonging to the Cavalry divisions, are to receive the lance, and accordingly a certain number of regiments have been provided with three hundred lances, model 1890, but the final adoption of the lance by all Cavalry regiments will not be decided upon until reports are received at the close of the autumn manœuvres. There seems to be some doubt as to whether the small men composing the Light Cavalry regiments of the French Army are strong enough to wield the lance effectively. The factory at Châtellerault has evolved a steel lance from which great things are expected; it is said to be less brittle than the bamboo shaft, and of better balance in the hand. The Cavalry School at Saumur is now carrying out exhaustive trials of the new steel lance, model 1911, as compared with new lances, model 1890, and the reports on the two should shortly be published.

The probable issue to all regiments of a lance, the possible introduction of a bayonet, together with additional ammunition and an extra pouch, have made it absolutely necessary that the weight carried on the horse should be correspondingly reduced. Orders have been issued from the War

Ministry that tests are to be instituted, but it is strictly enacted that no reductions are to be made in the weapons or ammunition carried, nor yet in the reserve rations or spare shoes, but only from among articles considered to be not absolutely necessary in the field.

*Italy.*—Camel corps enlisted in Erythrea are now being employed in Tripoli. These have a strength of 150, are commanded by an Italian squadron commander, and are armed with sabre, carbine, and revolver. They are also equipped with mountain-guns on camel pack mountings. A battalion of Askaris from Erythrea is also employed. This comprises four companies; the men have a white uniform, but are barefooted; they are armed with the magazine rifle M. 91, and have attached a machine-gun section with two guns. The Italian officers with this battalion are mounted on mules. There is another body of native troops employed in Tripoli, known as 'Banda del Gharian'; this is 200 strong, raised from local Arabs, and is armed with a Vetterli-Vitali single-loader. It is commanded by an Italian officer, but the men select their own non-commissioned officers; they dress as they please, but wear a distinguishing badge on the head-dress.

*Equitation.*—The following may possibly be of interest to those who have not had the opportunity of seeing something of the ordinary routine work of a Cavalry regiment in Italy.

The whole principle of the training, both of the horse and of the man, appears to be founded on the fact that there are only two years in which to train the latter. Everything being therefore subservient to this end may account for some of the criticisms an English Cavalryman may make upon his Italian *confrères* when comparing the Cavalries of the two nations.

The recruits come to their regiment in one batch in the autumn. They are at once put on horses fully saddled, and, as far as possible, each recruit is taken charge of by one of the previous year's recruits. The latter accompanies the recruit directly he is mounted, tells him what to do, inspires him with confidence, and helps him generally in his difficulties. From the very commencement great stress is laid on the recruit not being frightened by his mount, and that he should leave his horse's head alone. The non-interference with the horse's head, or riding with a somewhat slack rein, is one of the chief things a stranger would notice, as it is not only in principle held as a necessity, but is a point greatly emphasised. The reason for this seems to be as follows: Few recruits, if any, have ever ridden, and owing to the short-service system, which necessitates passing the men through the ranks so quickly, there is but little time available to teach them, as far as riding is concerned, more than is absolutely necessary to enable them to remain on their horses and to be able to control them sufficiently well for practical purposes.

If a young soldier is allowed to have too great a 'feeling' of his reins it is held there is danger of the horse's mouth being too much interfered with, which would, with so many men passing through the ranks, soon mean the horse's mouth being entirely spoilt. Sooner than that this should happen the slack rein method is therefore allowed, which, to an onlooker, makes the horses appear wanting in balance and even at times not under perfect control. To counterbalance this, however, when jumping, or

scrambling up and down banks, the horse is given his head, and does not receive a jerk in the mouth, very common with indifferent riders or even with good ones, should a horse make a small mistake or jump awkwardly.

That men can be taught to ride in the manner indicated is to some extent due to the breed of horse on which the greater part are mounted. The Italian troop-horse is small, active, with quality, and having a good deal of Arab blood in him makes him probably more placid and easier to handle than the average horse of Central or Northern Europe. At the same time there are a certain number of imported Hungarian and Irish horses, but even with these the same system appears to have satisfactory results.

There is comparatively no civilian riding element in the country, consequently the military school of thought is the guiding light in all matters of equitation. The officers, as is well known, devote themselves a great deal to jumping their horses, and as few natural fences exist, artificial ones have to be put up; hence the Italians excel in this form of sport.

In consequence of the nature of these jumps, a seat and method of holding the reins has been adopted which, under the circumstances, is held to be the most satisfactory.

The seat is such as may be seen at any good jumping competition at home—that is, the body bent slightly forward over the horse's head, and jumping with the horse, so to speak, as against the ordinary English method of sitting down in the saddle and throwing the body back. With the body bent forward, and stirrup-leathers shorter than the ordinary man must use, it is maintained, and no doubt with some justice, that the rider's weight is as much as possible taken off the horse's hindquarters.

The hands are held somewhat far to the front, and when the horse jumps they are thrust forward still more, with the object of giving the horse his head, the hold of the reins being not supposed to be released, but the hand and arm going forward from the shoulder when it is desired to allow more rein.

Such, briefly, appears to be the method adopted by the officers in their jumping competitions, and the principle on which the men's riding is based.

To a stranger it appears as if the men were riding much too short and not down in their saddle sufficiently, so that if a horse pecked, or made a mistake, with the body and hands so far forward the rider would find it difficult to avoid going over his horse's head; or again, with a pulling, free-jumping horse, or landing at a drop fence, it would take him all his time to remain in the saddle.

It might also be supposed that the man would be handicapped in the use of his sword or lance, as the general idea is that to use these arms effectively it is necessary to sit well down in the saddle, with stirrup-leathers of normal length. Polo players also appreciate the advantage of such a seat.

Putting criticism aside, every nation must know the best method of training its Cavalry in accordance with its national characteristics, available material, and time at disposal, and the Italian, as compared with the British Cavalry soldier, is taught to ride in a very short space of time.

The writer had the good fortune, through the kindness of a squadron commander—an exceedingly keen, quick-witted, wiry-looking man, whom

one might expect to be an ideal squadron commander—to see his squadron doing some new movements. The squadron was almost entirely composed of men with less than three months' service, and it was astonishing to see how well they moved. They trotted, they galloped, they scattered, they rallied, not, indeed, as steadily as a well-drilled British squadron, where perhaps the average length of service might be two years, with few, if any, men under eight or nine months' service; but still the formations were kept, even if a little ragged, and no horse seemed to be out of hand. But perhaps what might strike one still more was that, apart from the squadron leader's word of command—and these were few, the whistle and signal being greatly used—there was not a sound to be heard; no checking of the men by the N.C.O.'s, no instructions by the troop officers, nothing to distract the men's attention from the signal and whistle of command of the squadron commander.

That success is so rapidly achieved is partly due to the men themselves, their keenness for cavalry work, and their patience in learning, and partly to the infinity of trouble taken by the officers in training their men. It must be remembered equitation is taught almost entirely by the squadron officers, the squadron commander being alone responsible for the training of his men and horses from the moment they join. It will be realised that to bring about satisfactory results all concerned must be very keen on account of the constant repetition which passing men through the ranks in two years necessitates.

There is one formation that seemed, at any rate to the writer, a new one. From a squadron in line, advancing in sections direct to the front, from centre, right or left of each troop, so that the squadron was formed in four columns of sections (there being four troops) abreast of one another. The advantage of this formation over squadron column is that all troop commanders riding at the head of their leading sections can move easily, see and hear their squadron commander, there being no troops between them as is the case with the rear troops in squadron columns. The formation is a good one over broken ground, as the intervals between the sections are easily increased or diminished, and line can be quickly formed.

Coming to the barracks, there is nothing, at all events in the more modern ones, very different to the British barracks, excepting that everything is large and roomy; for instance, the squadron commander, who has apparently even greater latitude and responsibility than is usual in the British service, has an excellent office, stores, &c.

The riding schools are very large, with a looking-glass in each, and a notice on the wall to the effect that efficiency depends on individual instruction and that nothing should be taught which does not tend to proficiency on service.

The stables are large and airy, bails are seldom provided between horses, but as great care is always taken to keep the same horses next to one another, bites and kicks seem almost unknown. The straw bedding is kept down permanently, which may have something to do with the horses standing quietly, and is only taken out every four months. There is no


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smell whatever. The fact that the climate is much drier than in England makes the bedding question an easier one to deal with.

The horses' shoes are not so well finished off as the machine-made ones supplied to the British Army, but they are all hand-made, and the shoeing of a squadron is entirely done by three men—the entire shoeing staff. There is an ingenious form of shoe of aluminium carried as a spare by patrols. It is counter-sunk on either side for the nails, so if it does not fit one way it can be turned over and tried the other.

When sending horses by rail they have rather a good method of fastening them up which reduces the chances of their damaging themselves, and they can easily be fed and watered.



The diagram shows how this is done. Two ropes are put across the truck, as shown by the dotted lines, and the horses' heads are tied to them, four at each end of the truck. There is consequently a gangway across the truck from door to door which allows of feeding and watering.

This brief account would in no way do justice to the impressions received without mention of the exceedingly good fellowship evidently existing between the officers and their men, which may perhaps be best explained in the words of one of the squadron officers: 'We look upon ourselves as one happy family, and in difficulties we all help one another.'

**Russia.**—There has lately been some attempt to make out that glanders, which in Russia appears to be greatly on the increase, has been spread by the infected among the Army horses. This report is combated in the *Ruski Invalid* by the military veterinary department, which gives some extraordinary figures. It appears that during the last twenty years, from 1892 to 1911, the presence of glanders was detected in 3,000 horses offered for purchase to the Russian Remount Department, and which were, of course, rejected. Besides these, another 1,000 remounts, which had been purchased with dormant glanders, had to be destroyed on the disease showing itself. During the same period it is stated that, in the Chersonese, no fewer than 51,000 horses belonging to the civil population had to be destroyed as suffering from glanders, while the disease was discovered among no more than 4,707 animals employed in the Army. Glanders is especially bad in the Chersonese, in Tabriz, and in Ekaterinoslav, and here during the twenty years from 1892 to 1911 the enormous number of 109,906 horses had to be destroyed on account of this disease. From 1899 to 1904 the Army lost annually 132 horses from glanders, on an average; but in 1905, when the Cavalry was distributed about the villages and farms, the loss rose to 324 from the same cause, but the casualties were again reduced to the normal on the return of the Cavalry to their garrisons. It appears that in Russia there are very few civil veterinary surgeons, when the enormous amount of stock in the country is taken into consideration. It is estimated that there are thirty-one million civilian horses—not counting cattle and other stock—while there are just under 3,000 civilian veterinary surgeons, or nearly 10,400 horses to each horse-doctor!

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Roy	Harp and Crown	
Roy	ing's Crest within the Garter	Emsdorff
Roy	een's Cypher within the Garter	Aut Cursu, aut cominus Armis
White, with	Castle of Inniskilling	
White, with	ank of the Regiment VIII. D.	
White, with	Rank of the Regiment X. D.	
te, with Re	ank of the Regiment XIV. D.	
	Roy	een's Cypher within the Garter
White, with	ank of the Regiment IX. D.	
White, with	ank of the Regiment XI. D.	
	Roy	thers issuing out of the Coronet, he Rising Sun and Red Dragon
Yellow, with	ank of the Regiment III. H.	Ich dien
	Roy	en's Cypher within the Garter
White, with	Death's Head	Or Glory
	Red ak of the Regiment XVIII. L.D.	
White, with	ank of the Regiment II. H.	Vestigia nulla retrorsum
White, with	ank of the Regiment IV. D.	
White, with	ank of the Regiment XIII. D.	
White, with	ank of the Regiment IV. H.	
	Roy	thers issuing out of the Coronet, he Rising Sun and Red Dragon
		Ich dien

Our -Reign,  
Majesty's Command,

BARRINGTON.

[illegible]

## SPORTING NOTES

### POLO

#### INTER-REGIMENTAL TOURNAMENT

There was a large entry this year for the Inter-Regimental Polo.

In the *second* round the 4th Dragoon Guards easily beat the 18th Hussars at Tidworth. The 9th Lancers w.o., 3rd Hussars scratched. The Royal Horse Guards w.o., 2nd Life Guards scratched. The 11th Hussars beat 19th Hussars at Aldershot. The 5th Dragoon Guards beat the 5th Lancers at Dublin. The 16th Lancers, Royal Scots Greys, and 20th Hussars had byes.

In the *third* round the 9th Lancers beat the 4th Dragoon Guards at Ranelagh by six goals to four. The winners all played well, and Mr. Noel Edwards was most prominent. The Royal Horse Guards beat the 16th Lancers at Hurlingham by seven goals to six. It was a most exciting game, the sides being very even, the Blues just leading all through and winning by a goal. For the losers Captain G. Bellville played a fine game. The 20th Hussars w.o., the Royal Scots Greys scratched. The 5th Dragoon Guards beat the 11th Hussars at Roehampton by three goals to two. This was a great game, and victory for the 5th Dragoon Guards was mainly achieved by the fine play of their Commanding Officer, Colonel G. K. Ansell.

#### SEMI-FINALS

The 20th Hussars beat the 5th Dragoon Guards by five goals to two. Played at Hurlingham on July 2, in rain and sodden turf. The 20th were the first to score, which Colonel Ansell, however, equalised with a real good shot, but the Hussars soon asserted a decided superiority, each member of the team rendering an excellent account of himself. Teams :—

20th Hussars : Captain J. S. Cawley, Mr. C. G. Mangles, Captain F. B. Hurndall, and Mr. H. M. Soames (back).

5th Dragoon Guards : Mr. A. D. Winterbottom, Captain M. A. Black, Major W. Q. Winwood, and Lieut.-Colonel G. K. Ansell (back).

Royal Horse Guards, five goals; 9th Lancers, four goals. Played at Hurlingham on July 3 in dull, threatening weather, and the ground in a very heavy and wet condition, which towards the finish of the match resembled a ploughed field. The 9th Lancers started well, and for some time it looked as if they would have an easy victory; but the Blues improved as the game progressed, and at the end of the hour the score was four all. Two extra periods had to be played before the Blues scored the deciding goal. The game, considering the state of the ground, was a very fast one. Teams :—

Royal Horse Guards : Captain G. V. S. Bowlby, Captain Lord A. Innes-Ker, Captain H. Brassey, and Mr. J. F. Harrison (back).

9th Lancers : Mr. R. L. Benson, Mr. G. Phipps-Hornby, Mr. A. Noel Edwards, and Captain F. W. Cavendish (back).

## FINAL

Royal Horse Guards, nine goals; 20th Hussars, three goals.

Played at Hurlingham on July 6 in fine weather, the ground having to a certain extent recovered from the battering it had received in the wet weather of the earlier part of the week during the semi-finals.

From the commencement of the game the Blues established a superiority, and the 20th were never able to get on terms with them; indeed, the collective form of the latter was disappointing in the extreme, and the absence of Mr. Mangles from the team was much to be regretted. The winners had a great advantage in pony power, and if they had found their form earlier in the game would in all probability have put up a record score for the final game. One remarkable feature of the match was the number of times sticks were dropped, and the unusual distance the ponies kicked the ball; indeed, two of the goals of the losers appeared to have been gained in this way. Teams:—

Royal Horse Guards: Captains G. V. S. Bowlby, Lord A. Innes-Ker, H. Brassey, and J. F. Harrison (back).

20th Hussars: Captain J. T. Cawley, Captain F. B. Hurndall, Major H. C. Hessey, and Mr. H. M. Soames (back).

Aldershot Day at Ranelagh was favoured with fine weather, and honoured by the presence of their Majesties the King and Queen. The massed regimental bands of about six hundred performers was a great attraction, and during the games Mr. Gustav Hamel alighted on the lawn in front of their Majesties, having flown from Hendon in his Bleriot monoplane with a passenger.

The Aldershot Challenge Cup was played this year on the players' official handicap—a new departure. The teams entered were Royal Horse Guards A and B teams, Queen's Bays, 2nd Life Guards, 11th Hussars, and 19th Hussars. In the final the Queen's Bays beat the Royal Horse Guards by five goals to three. Teams:—

R.H.G.: Captain Fitzgerald, Mr. A. Foster, Lord A. Innes-Ker, and Mr. J. Harrison (back).

Queen's Bays: Mr. C. Champion de Crespigny, Captain A. D. Sloane, Major G. Ing, and Major A. E. W. Harman.

The entries for the Aldershot Infantry Cup were Coldstream Guards, Grenadier Guards, B team School of Mounted Infantry, Irish Guards, 2nd Coldstream Guards, and King's Royal Rifles. In the final the School of Mounted Infantry beat the 2nd Coldstream Guards by six goals to one. Teams:—

2nd Coldstream Guards: Mr. V. Gordon-Ives, Captain F. Hardy, Mr. H. Bentinck, and Captain G. B. Follett (back).

School of Mounted Infantry: Captain Wilson, Captain E. Webb, Captain Forester, and Major G. Parker.

ENGLAND *v.* IRELAND

Played in alternate years in Dublin and at Hurlingham, this annual match for the Patriotic Cup was contested at Hurlingham on June 15. Ireland began well, and at the end of the third chukker led by four goals to two; but then, with an alteration in the placing of the English team, a change came over the scene, and England eventually won easily by ten goals to four. Teams :—

England: Captain R. G. Ritson, the Duke of Westminster, Captain A. Noel Edwards, and Captain Leslie St. C. Cheape (back).

Ireland: Mr. L. Morrough Ryan, Mr. J. A. Trail, Mr. J. McCann, and Mr. J. A. E. Trail (back).

The Messrs. Trail who played for Ireland are cousins who came over from the Argentine, and have been a feature in London polo this season on account of their fine play. In the final tie of the Whitney Cup Tournament their Argentine team defeated the Eaton team, which was a strong combination with a view to representing England in the match *v.* America.

## CHAMPION CUP

A remarkable and exciting match was witnessed for the Champion Cup final at Hurlingham between the Old Cantabs and the Tigers. The Old Cantabs, who had beaten Eaton in the semi-final, were favourites, but at the end of the third period the Tigers led by six goals to one. Then Mr. Railston, owing to a cannon, was unfortunately knocked over and sustained slight concussion. Although he pluckily resumed the game, the fall affected his play, and the Old Cantabs gradually increased their score. In the last chukker it was six all, and close on time the Old Cantabs got the final goal and won a great struggle by seven goals to six. Teams :—

Old Cantabs: Captain G. Bellville, Mr. F. M. Freake, Mr. W. S. Buckmaster, and Lord Wodehouse.

Tigers: Count de Madre, Mr. H. G. M. Railston, Major B. Matthew-Lannowe, and Captain L. St. C. Cheape.

## TERRITORIAL CUP

This cup, open to teams from any Territorial Regiment, was competed for at Ranelagh by the Northamptonshire Yeomanry and the Norfolk Yeomanry, the former winning by eleven goals to five. Teams :—

Northamptonshire Yeomanry: Mr. R. de L. Cazenove, Captain F. D. Alexander, Captain Sir Charles Lowther, and P. W. Nickalls.

Norfolk Yeomanry: Mr. R. G. Buxton, Captain G. T. Bullard, Mr. I. Buxton, and Mr. Barclay.

## ABROAD

Thirteen teams entered for the Native Cavalry Tournament at Umballa. The final between the 17th Cavalry and the 3rd Skinner's Horse resulted in a win for the former by four goals to three. Mrs. Pirie handed the cup to the winners, and Brigadier-General C. P. W. Pirie, commanding the Umballa Cavalry Brigade, congratulated both teams on the play.

The Indian Army Infantry Tournament final, played at Nowshera, resulted in the 24th Punjabis beating the Guides Infantry by four goals to three after playing extra time.

The Subalterns' Inter-Regimental Polo Tournament took place at Meerut with an entry of eight teams. The final between the 10th Hussars and the 17th Lancers resulted in an easy win for the 10th by eight goals to one. Teams :—

10th Hussars : Lieuts. Fielden, Sir B. Brooke, Palmes, and Palmer (back).

17th Lancers : Lieuts. Eckstein, Dubs, Turnor, and Boles (back).

### RACING

The Aldershot Races in April took place in glorious weather, and the sport was good and interesting. On the first day the Past and Present Military Handicap Steeplechase (two and a half miles) was won by Captain Foljambe's (Oxfordshire and Bucks Light Infantry) Enoch (Mr. J. Ainsworth). The Aldershot Cup (three miles) was won by Captain Wright's (The Queen's) Sterling Lady (Captain Springfield). On the second day Mr. Worthington's (3rd Dragoon Guards) Lacken (owner) carried off the Tally Ho! Hunters' Steeplechase; Captain Foljambe, on his own horse, Enoch, won the Hunters' Handicap Steeplechase; and Major Peel's (R.F.A.) Ruffle, ridden by Mr. R. M. Potter, won the Aldershot Command Hunters' Steeplechase.

Their Majesties the King and Queen attended the West Norfolk Races, at which the King's Cup, a three-mile steeplechase, was won by Mr. B. Cook's Half-Time (owner); the Prince of Wales's Cup by Mr. E. C. Keith's Bob Sawyer; and the 16th Lancers' Challenge Cup by Mr. Beddington's Kerry Lad (Mr. J. Brook). At the conclusion His Majesty personally presented the cups given by himself and the Prince of Wales.

At the Witherby Races the Royal Scots Greys' Steeplechase Challenge Cup was won by Major Swetenham's Plumstead, with Mr. Pigot-Moodie in the saddle.

The Ward Union Hunt Races at Fairyhouse produced enormous fields and fine sport. The Hunt Cup was secured by Mr. H. B. Alexander's Cathair (owner). The Military Steeplechase (three miles) was won by Major C. Dalton's (R.A.M.C.) Thowlpin (owner), eleven runners; The King's Cup, a three-mile steeplechase, was won by Mr. McDermott's Mavourneen's Ideal, ridden by the Hon. H. C. Alexander.

The Household Brigade Meeting at Hawthorn Hill in April was favoured with glorious weather and a large attendance, but the long drought had made the going very hard, so falls and refusals were numerous. Results :

The Household Brigade Selling Hurdle Race : Mr. T. Rhodes's Daniel the Drake (Mr. M. K. Lloyd).

Open Military Selling Steeplechase: Captain Denny's The Chemist (Captain O. A. Beatty).

Household Brigade Hunters' Challenge Cup (about three and a half miles): This, as usual, was a splendid race, with twenty starters, and resulted in a dead heat between Mr. J. F. Harrison's (R.H.G.) Vesper Bell (Mr. C. Phillips) and Major E. H. Trotter's (1st G.G.) Alice II., with Mr. J. G. Leigh's (1st L.G.) The Priest VI. (owner) third, and Captain Ashton's (2nd L.G.) Ebony (owner) fourth. The 1st Life Guards won the cup with forty-six points, Royal Horse Guards were second with forty points, and 1st Grenadier Guards third with thirty-seven points.

Household Brigade Handicap Steeplechase: Lord Petre's Sir Abercorn (Mr. W. G. Shaw-Stewart).

Second day results:

The Irish Guards' Challenge Cup: Mr. Greer's Modesty IV. (owner) walked over.

The Grenadier Guards' Challenge Cup: Mr. Ames's Blucher II. (Mr. C. Sykes).

The 1st Life Guards' Challenge Cup: Mr. Wyndham's Mouthmill (owner).

The Household Brigade Cup: Mr. Wyndham's Another Delight (owner).

The Coldstream Plate: Lord Petre's Sir Abercorn (Captain Maitland).

The 2nd Life Guards' Regimental Challenge Cup: Captain Ashton's Jack Straw II. (owner).

The Royal Horse Guards' Regimental Race: Mr. Phillip's Starlight VIII. (owner). In this race Lord Castlereagh's Paddy VII. fell, giving his rider Lord Alistair Leveson-Gower, a very severe shaking.

The Kildare and National Hunt Races at Punchestown were favoured this year with delightful weather. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the Countess of Aberdeen paid her customary State visit, and the sport was of a high standard. Twenty horses faced the starter for the Irish Maiden Military Hunters' Race of three and a half miles, which was won by Captain G. S. Chance's (R.W.F.) Mayfield Lass (Mr. J. Ainsworth). The Kildare Hunt Cup was secured by Mr. T. J. Burrow's Bruce Hall, with the Hon. H. C. Alexander in the saddle. The Maiden Plate of four miles was a most popular win for the veteran, Mr. W. P. Hanley, who trained and rode his own horse, Ruddygore, to victory, finishing the last three-quarters of a mile with one stirrup-leather, having broken the other at the stone wall. The same good sportsman's Little Rover won the next race, the Prince of Wales's Plate, but unfortunately Mr. W. P. Hanley, despite wasting, was unable to do the weight in order to ride himself.

On the second day the Devonshire Plate was won by Mr. J. Bates's Jamestown in a field of twenty-one runners, the Hon. H. C. Alexander being the jockey, and riding another good race.

The Irish Grand Military of three miles had eleven starters, and was won easily by Major C. Dalton's (R.A.M.C.) good horse Thowlpin, with the owner up. Mr. B. Johnson's (K.O.S.B.) Bachelor's Walk second, and Sir J. D. Tichborne's (4th Hussars) All Gold (owner) third.



The Royal Artillery Steeplechases were successfully brought off at Aldershot on April 11. Results :

Royal Artillery Gold Cup (three miles) : Mr. Keith Parbury's Ruby Light, first; Major E. J. R. Peel's Ruffle, second. Unfortunately, Colonel G. H. Geddes, riding his horse Royal Monte in this race, had a bad fall, sustaining slight concussion of the brain.

Royal Artillery Ubique Plate (two miles) : Mr. G. Hermon Hodge's Dimples.

Royal Artillery Light-weight Hunters' Steeplechase (two and a half miles) : Captain N. P. R. Preston's Yorkshire Relish.

#### ABROAD

The 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers held a capital point-to-point meeting at Jubbulpore in April over a course about two and a half miles long. The race for Native Cavalry was won by Sowar Nizah Khan, 32nd Lancers. The Artillery Plate was won by Sergeant Smith, 83rd Battery R.F.A., from eighteen competitors. The St. Mani Challenge Cup, open to military officers, was won by Captain de Trafford's Chance, and the Fusiliers' Cup by Mr. Tod's Discussion.

#### POINT-TO-POINT

The 16th Lancers held their meeting at Ketteringham, near Norwich. The Chargers' Cup for catch-weights not under 12 st. 7 lb., three and a half miles, was won by Mr. Nash's Puck II. (owner)—a fine race, won by a length. The Light-weight Cup was secured by Mr. D. R. Cross's Jerry (owner). The Heavy-weight Race had to be withdrawn after the riders had weighed out, owing to the regiment being suddenly ordered to proceed to Wigan through the riots.

The 20th Hussars' races took place near Colchester. Results :

Light-weight Chargers' Race : Captain A. C. Little's Shy Lady (owner).

Open Race : Captain Fairfax's Ace of Hearts (owner).

Regimental Challenge Cup : Mr. Darling's Joan of Arc (owner).

Heavy-weight Chargers' Race : Captain P. G. Mason's Erebus (owner).

The 3rd Dragoon Guards held a meeting at Northolt, at which Lance-Corporal Turner won the Light-weights and Corporal Kendrick the Heavy-weights, and an inter-squadron team race was won by C Squadron.

The Staffordshire Yeomanry Race, run for at the North Staffordshire Hunt Meeting, was won by Colonel Wiggins's Hill Top.

The East Riding Yeomanry Race, run for at the Holderness Hunt Meeting, East Yorkshire, was won by Sergeant Hatfield's Signal III. (owner).

At the Kirkham Harriers' races the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry Race was won by Mr. C. Birley's Woodbine (owner), and the Lancashire Hussars' Challenge Cup was captured by Major C. Dewhurst's Performer (owner).

The Worcestershire Yeomanry Race, run for over the sporting Crowle course, was won by Mr. E. Holland's Klem (owner).

At the Shropshire Hunt Meeting, near Shrewsbury, the Yeomanry Race was won by Trooper Bathe's Dollar Princess II. (owner).

The 4th Hussars had their races at Curragh, near Naas, co. Kildare. The Kincaid-Smith Memorial Challenge Cup was won by Captain Falkner's Whisper II. (Lieut. H. Godson), and the Regimental Race by Sir J. D. Tichborne's All Gold (owner).

The Household Brigade Drag Hunt Race, run for near Hawthorn Hill, was won by Mr. D. Bingham's St. Coleman III. (owner).

The Mounted Infantry held a good meeting near Alton. Results :

M.I. Heavy-weight Race : Captain Grant's Peacock (owner).

Open Sweepstakes : Captain Grant's Castle Bagot (owner).

M.I. Light-weight Race : Mr. J. S. M. Matheson's Remnant (owner).

Inter-Battalion Cup : Mr. B. C. J. Havelock's The Star (owner).

#### FOOTBALL

The Army Football Association annual general meeting was held at the United Service Institution on June 13, with Colonel Ford, D.S.O., A.S.C., in the chair. A very satisfactory balance sheet was presented, the Committee showing a balance of £118.

The Army F.A. Cup final was played at Plymouth before a crowd of about 12,000. It was the first time the final had been played away from Aldershot. The 2nd Sherwood Foresters, for the second year in succession, were victorious, beating the 4th Batt. Middlesex Regt. by five goals to one. General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, at the close of the game, handed the cup and medals to the successful side.

#### CRICKET

The annual match between the Royal Navy and the Army was played at Lord's on May 31, and resulted in a win for the Army by 161 runs. The Army scored 154 and 375, and the Navy 134 and 234. For the Army Captain T. Spring made 30 and 117, and for the Navy Lieut. C. Abercrombie scored 37 and 100.

#### PIG-STICKING

There was a record entry of 137 nominations for the Kadir Cup, which included four Generals. Pigs were fairly plentiful, and the show was splendidly run by Major Wardrop, R.H.A. There were innumerable falls, but few casualties; two horses broke down, and Mr. Leech (8th Hussars) had the misfortune to break his collar-bone.

The final round took place between Mr. Astor's (1st Life Guards) Lone Hand, Captain Gatacre's (11th Lancers) Karim, and Mr. Sherston's (11th Lancers) Record. All these had previously won in the semi-final rounds. Lone Hand is an English thoroughbred, but Karim and Record were bred on the 11th Lancers' stud farm and trained in the regiment. The result was a win for Gatacre on his fast country-bred Karim.

## THE ROYAL NAVAL AND MILITARY TOURNAMENT

There was an enormous attendance at the Military Tournament this year, which was a greater success than ever. It was patronised by their Majesties the King and Queen, Queen Alexandra, and most of the Royal Family. On some days 12,000 were present, and thousands had to be refused admittance. Colonel Wallis King, Assistant Director of Transport, was the directing head, having been connected with the Tournament for fifteen years as hon. treasurer and hon. secretary. To him, among others, is largely due the collection of £80,000 which in recent years has been the profit for the widows and fatherless. Some of the results were as follows :

Sabre *v.* Sabre (Navy, Army, and Territorial Forces) : Co. Sergeant-Major R. J. Ryan, Army Gymnastic Staff, 1st; Corporal Moore, 2nd Life Guards, 2nd.

Sabre *v.* Sabre (officers) : Lieut. R. C. Dagleish, Royal Navy, 1st.

Foil *v.* Foil : S.-S.-M. T. Elliott, Royal Scots Greys, 1st.

Foil *v.* Foil (officers) : Lieut. H. F. S. Huntingdon, 2nd Welsh Regiment, 1st.

Bayonet *v.* Bayonet (officers) : Lieut. J. M. Tuke, R.A., 1st.

Foil *v.* Foil (Championship of Navy and Army) : Lieut. J. Betts, Army Gymnastic Staff, 1st.

Sabre *v.* Sabre (Championship) : Lieut. J. Betts, Army Gymnastic Staff, 1st.

Bayonet *v.* Bayonet (Championship) : S.-S.-M. Grainger, 2nd Life Guards, 1st.

Tug-of-War (Navy *v.* Army) : Final—2nd Leinster Regiment beat Royal Marine Artillery by two pulls to nil, the second pull in record time of 10 sec.

Sergeant C. Vesey (18th Hussars) was the best man at arms in the mounted events, and S.-S.-M. Grainger (2nd Life Guards) won the challenge shield for the best man at arms in the dismounted events.

The riding and jumping competition for teams was won by the Cavalry School. Among strictly regimental teams, the 11th Hussars were best, and only beaten by the Cavalry School by a fault and a half.

Officers' Jumping Competition : Lieut. G. Brooke (16th Lancers), on Combined Training, 1st; Lieut. T. Lawrence, V.C. (18th Hussars), on One Two Three, 2nd; Colonel P. A. Kenna, V.C. (Staff), on Harmony, 3rd; Lieut. G. Brooke, on Alice, 4th; Lieut. P. Thwaite, on Prussian Eagle, 5th. Lieuts. Alcock, Stewart Richardson, Worthington, Ryan, and Captain Crawshay also competed, and showed good horsemanship.

The jumping this year was splendid, and a vast improvement on anything seen in former years.

## GOLF

The Army Championship, played at Hoylake, was won by Captain Skene (Black Watch) with 79 plus 79—158. Captain Boyd, R.F.A., formerly open champion of Ireland, was second with 88 plus 76—164. There were forty-three players. This is the fifth time the Black Watch have secured the cup.

## ATHLETICS

The London Territorial Championship Meeting was held at Stamford Bridge on June 15. The London Scottish again won the Marathon Race. With twenty-three points, this same battalion won the Grand Aggregate Challenge Bowl, 'The Rangers' being second with seventeen points, and 'The Artists' third with twelve points. It is interesting to note that these three battalions finished in the same order last year.

At the conclusion H.R.H. Prince Arthur of Connaught kindly distributed the prizes.

## THE INTERNATIONAL HORSE SHOW

This great show, which has achieved a world-wide reputation, took place at Olympia June 17 to 29. It was, as usual, ably managed, and daily attracted a large concourse from all over the world. The great hall was beautifully decorated with flowers, and the arena was more like a flower show than a horse ring; but the horses soon got accustomed to the artificial jumping amongst flower-beds. Space prevents a full description of the show, but we append the results of the jumping. This year England, and especially the British officers, gave as fine an exhibition of horsemanship as any of the foreign nations, and in the jumping classes carried off by far the largest number of prizes.

Jumping: Class 99 (open to the world), Mr. Foster's (England) Paddy divided with M. Le Vionnois's (Belgium) Centurial, no faults; 2, with half-fault, Lieut. Lawrence's, V.C. (18th Hussars) One Two Three, Captain d'Exe's (Russia) Epice, Colonel P. Kenna's, V.C., Harmony, Lieut. Scott's (4th Hussars) Shamrock, M. Le Vionnois's (Belgium) Biscuit, Miss Mona Dunn's (Canada) Comet, and Baron de Meslon's (France) Amazone.

Class 100 (open).—Lieut. Baron de Meslon's (France) Amazone; 2, Lieut. Jaffe's (England) Dainty, two Belgian, and a Russian, all with half-fault.

Class 104 (for ponies).—Mr. Trail's (England) Aviator; 2, with half-fault, Mr. Philip's (England) Laddie.

Class 111, High Jump.—Lieut. Horment's (France) Jubilee, 7 ft.

Class 112, High Jump.—Lieut. Sefton's (Canada) Confidence. Confidence cleared 7 ft. 5½ in., which is a world's record.

Class 113, High Jump.—Messrs. Glencross's Lady, 7 ft. 4 in.

Class 102 (open).—1, Captain Crawshay's (3rd Dragoon Guards) Sue, Mr. Trail's Aviator, Lieut. Lewenhaupt's (Sweden) Medusa, Lieut. Baron de Meslon's (France) Amazone, and Messrs. Glencross's Lady all with no fault.

The King George V. £500 Gold Cup, open to foreign officers of all nations, was won by Lieut. Delvoie's (Belgium) Murat.

The Duke of Connaught's Cup, open to British officers, was won by Lieut. Geoffrey Brook's (16th Lancers) Combined Training.

The King Edward VII. £500 Gold Cup for jumping by teams of three officers of the same nationality always creates the keenest rivalry, and was

contested before an enormous crowd, in the presence of their Majesties the King and Queen. The following officers took part :—


#### NAMES OF PARTICIPANTS.

Country	Rider	Name of Horse
Belgium	Lieut. Daufresne de la Chevalerie, 3rd Lancers	Timber Topper
	Lieut. du Roy de Blicquy, 3rd Lancers	Magali
	Lieut. Delvoie	Murat
Canada	Lieut. Clifford Sifton, Jr., Corps of Guides	Elmhurst
	Lieut. W. B. Sifton, Corps of Guides	Ironsides
	Lieut. J. W. Sifton, Corps of Guides	Mayfair
England	Col. P. A. Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C.	Harmony
	Lieut. Geoffrey Brooke, 16th Lancers	Combined Training
	Lieut. H. S. L. Scott, 4th Hussars	Shamrock
France	Lieut. du Sel, 14th Dragoons	l'Ami II
	Lieut. de Rochefort, 1st Dragoons	Peter Piper
	Lieut. de Meslon, 1st Cuirassiers	Amazon
Holland	Lieut. Coblyn, Royal Dutch Hussars	Irene
	Lieut. Baron Von Wassemää	Honeysuckle
	Lieut. Baron H. F. M. van Voorst tot Voorst, Royal Dutch Hussars	Powerful
Russia	Capt. d'Exe, Cuirassiers of the Guard	Epice
	Capt. Paul Rodzanko, Chevaliers Gardes	Extra
	Lieut. D. Ivanenko	Barynia

Amidst great excitement Russia won, with France second and England third. On the first round France led, but on the second round the Russians did much better, and just won. In the first run Lieut. d'Exe on Epice did a faultless round, and in his next had only half a fault. Lieut. du Sel for France, on L'Ami II., the winner of the Canadian Cup, did a faultless round, and on the second round had only half a fault. The three brothers Sifton did splendidly for Canada on the first round, but failed on their second attempt. For England Colonel Kenna and Lieut. Brooke did excellent rounds on both occasions, but Lieut. Scott's Shamrock was not jumping up to its form, and so lost the good chance England had of winning. Lieut. Lawrence was to have been England's other representative on One Two Three, but the horse unfortunately met with an accident, so Shamrock was substituted. As it turned out, it might have been better if Captain Crawshay's Sue had been selected. At the conclusion the King congratulated the Russian officers on their fine performances, and presented them his father's cup.

On the concluding day the championship for jumping and gold cup presented by the *Daily Mail* was won by that superb horseman Lieut. G. Brooke (16th Lancers) with Combined Training; Lieut. Comte G. de Rochefort (1st Dragoon Guards, France) was second, Lieut. J. M. du Sel (France) and Messrs. J. and T. Glencross (England) equal third. The High Jump Championship was also won for England by Mr. W. Singer's Springbok, with the Hon. C. Sifton's (Canada) Confidence and Skyscraper second and third. The military riding display was won by the French team, with the Cavalry School (England) second.





THE BATTLE OF THE BOYNE.

1st July, 1690.

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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OCTOBER 1912

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## *THE BATTLE OF THE BOYNE*

By PERCY CROSS STANDING

THE short but sharp and decisive campaign of 1690 in Ireland was epoch-making in a double sense. It settled in favour of the House of Orange the succession to the throne of Great Britain and Ireland, while it may also be fairly said to have inaugurated something like a new era in the history of the British Army. Its lessons for the Cavalry arm of that service are numerous and valuable, since it was a Cavalry mêlée on the grand scale which played a determining part in the crisis of the Battle of the Boyne.

Spending some months in France after the Revolution in England, King James landed in Ireland, backed by French gold and French troops, on March 12, 1689, and made a triumphal entry into Dublin on March 24. Catholic Ireland naturally welcomed her returned monarch with fervour, but his siege operations at Londonderry were not inspiring. Moreover, a Franco-Irish force 5000 strong was badly beaten in the battle of Newtown-Butler, Sligo was evacuated, and in August King William III's trusty lieutenant Schomberg landed at Carrickfergus with a mixed force 16,000 strong. A campaign after a fashion followed during the winter of 1689-90, and it was not until June 14 of the latter year that William in person arrived to commence the campaign of the Boyne. Ten days later he marched south to fight James, who was in retreat on Drogheda. On the last day of June, William discovered his adversary drawn up in force along the south bank of the river Boyne, whereupon the Orange King

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joyously remarked, 'I am glad to see you—if you escape me now, the fault is mine.'

William could dispose of about 36,000 troops, mainly English and Dutch, as against the 30,000 of James, Irish and French.\* The latter flew the flags of the Houses of Stuart and Bourbon, and every soldier wore a badge or favour of white, out of compliment to the co-operation of France. About one-third of the whole was made up of French Infantry (under the brave Count Lauzun) and Irish Cavalry both good; but little can be said in praise of the *morale* of the rest of the force, while James himself, of course, was no soldier. He had with him, however, leaders of tried capacity in Sarsfield, Richard Hamilton and Tyrconnel. The Anglo-Dutch host on the other hand, if of heterogeneous elements, was compact of good stuff all through. About half of it was British. Oxford led the Blues, the Duke of Ormond the Life Guards, Sir John Lanier the 'Queen's Regiment of Horse' (now the 1st Dragoon Guards), James Douglas the Scots Guards, and the celebrated John Cutts two fine regiments of Infantry. In the Dutch contingent were conspicuously placed Portland's and Ginkell's Horse and Solmes's 'Blue' Regiment, the latter numbering 2000 picked men. In this motley array there even marched a Danish brigade (under Duke Charles of Wurtemberg), a Finnish regiment, and a corps of Brandenburgers. Intent on learning the rudiments of war in the best company, the youthful Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt accompanied King William in the field, just as, on the other side, the young Duke of Berwick was with James's Headquarters Staff. Finally, William's ranks were swelled by the presence of Sir Albert Conyngham's fine regiment of 'Enniskillen Dragoons' from Lough Erne, an organisation destined to make much history in generations to come.

It is necessary to devote a few words to the two foremost military characters who fought at the Boyne—viz., Patrick Sarsfield, Earl of Lucan, on the Jacobite side, and Frederick Hermann, Duke of Schomberg, on the Orange side. Both of these great leaders and judges of the Cavalry arm were fated to fall on the field of glory. Sarsfield's genius for war dated back to the ill-fated Duke of Monmouth, with

\* Walpole's *Kingdom of Ireland* makes the remark that 'James's army was the smaller of the two. He had 30,000 men including 6 regiments of French Infantry and but 12 field guns. William had 40 pieces of heavy artillery and 4 mortars. His army consisted of about 36,000 men. About half were English; the other half foreign mercenaries, Danes, Swedes, Dutch, Swiss, Fins, Brandenburgers and French Huguenots.'

whom he fought on the continent and, afterwards—against him—on the fatal day of Sedgmoor. Passing over into Ireland at the Revolution of 1688, to be created Earl of Lucan by James the Second, he fought at the Boyne and Aughrim and conducted the ever-memorable defence of Limerick. After its final fall, Sarsfield entered the service of France and fought nobly for her on the bloody fields of Steenkirk and Neerwinden, receiving his death wound in the latter contest on July 29, 1693.

On the other hand, the Marshal Duke of Schomberg was already a veteran of half a century's service when he accepted the position of second-in-command to the Prince of Orange in the latter's descent upon England in 1688. Born in 1618, he was essentially a soldier of fortune, for after fighting through the Thirty Years' War, he took service with France in 1650 and—albeit he was a Protestant—received the bâton of a Marshal a quarter of a century later. For his services in the raid upon England, William of Orange showered rewards upon Schomberg, making him K.G., a Duke, and Master of the Ordnance. The veteran spent the winter of 1689-90 in Ulster as Commander-in-Chief of the 'Army of Ireland.' He was actually in his seventy-third year when he joined William for the campaign of the Boyne. We shall see how he fared therein.

To render the coincidence yet more complete, the afterwards famous Duke of Berwick, who as a youth of nineteen accompanied his father, James II, on this campaign, was also destined to die in battle. The natural son of James by Arabella Churchill (the great Marlborough's sister), Berwick lived to become a Marshal of France, to win the famous battle of Almanza, and to be killed by a cannon-ball while besieging Philippsburg in 1734. His campaign of 1709 against the Duke of Savoy is still classed as a masterpiece of strategy.

The last striking episode of the day before the battle was the narrow escape of King William. By incautiously breakfasting with his staff on the bank of the Boyne exactly opposite to where the heads of the Irish Army were conducting a reconnaissance, he drew upon himself the fire of a couple of field pieces which, screened from view by a troop of Cavalry (Macaulay), were hurriedly brought to the river's brink. The first shot struck the charger of Prince George of Hesse, who was riding by William's side. 'Ah!' sharply exclaimed the King, 'the poor Prince is killed.' Such was not the case; but scarcely

had William uttered the words than he himself was hit by a six-pound shot. From the Irish side of the river went up a shout of fierce exultation, but it was premature. The graze was only a flesh wound, though it bled a good deal, and William showed his contempt for the hurt by remaining nineteen hours on horseback that day. He was resolved to attack the Irish Army on the morrow.

Old Schomberg is understood to have been opposed to an offensive movement as too hazardous in the circumstances, but he nobly obeyed orders. July 1, 1690, dawned bright and clear, and the Battle of the Boyne commenced with an affair of Cavalry. William's immediate object, as planned overnight, was to turn the enemy's left flank by crossing the Boyne at the Bridge of Slane, several miles higher up. This honourable and important duty was assigned to Schomberg's son, Meinhart, assisted by Douglas and Portland. James had anticipated some such flanking move, and had despatched Sir Niel O'Niel to defend the crossing with a regiment of Dragoons. These met the horsemen of the young Schomberg in hand-to-hand conflict, but the weight of numbers was against them. The gallant O'Niel fell mortally wounded, his troopers fled in confusion, and the turning movement by the Orange Army was by way of becoming an accomplished fact. King James was feeling sore perturbation of spirit.

Alarmed for his communications, Lauzun now took the extreme step of leading the French contingent and Sarsfield's Cavalry to the threatened spot; in other words, leaving the defence of the main fords near Oldbridge to the care of the Irish alone. Here 'The Meath bank bristled with pikes and bayonets. Tyrconnel was there, and under him were Richard Hamilton and Antrim.' Of Tyrconnel, by the way, Macaulay unkindly says that 'his military skill was so small that he hardly ever reviewed his own regiment in the Phoenix Park without committing some blunder.'

By an arrangement which must appear sufficiently strange to us, the left wing of King William's Army (which he commanded in person) was composed exclusively of Cavalry. With it he aimed at passing the river above Drogheda, leaving to the veteran Schomberg the duty of attacking the Irish at Oldbridge, at the head of a centre composed exclusively of Infantry. With him were Solmes's Blues. Soon, very soon, the Boyne for a quarter of a mile was 'alive with muskets and green boughs'—the green bough in his men's hats having been adopted as a device by William's command. And here

**EXPLANATION.**

T Spot where St John's Regiment repulsed the Irish Cavalry.

U Irish second position.

V Morass and ford passed by the left wing.

W A Regiment of Irish Dragoons.

X Spot where four troops of Inniskillings defeated the Irish Cavalry.

Y And were here routed in turn.

Z Curt's Foot in support.


A-A Spot where Hamilton routed the Inniskillings.


B-B Spot where Hamilton was checked and captured.


C-C Irish left wing detached.

D-D British right wing detached.

E-E Irish Battery.


K William's British Troops. 

    Ditto Foreign Troops. 

K James's Troops. 

A. *Irish entrenchments.*  
 B. *Blue Dutch Guards.*  
 C. *Two British Brigades—with-  
 drawn to right attacks.*  
 D. *French Protestant Brigade.*  
 E. *Irish Protestant Brigade.*  
 F. *St John's Regiment.*  
 G. *Hunmer's Brigade.*  
 H. *Support of Danish Cavalry.*  
 I. *Danish Brigades.*  
 K. *Light troops (Anaskillingers).*  
 M. *Left wing led by K. William.*  
 N. *British Batteries.*  
 O. *Fords at which the troops*  
 P. *crossed.*  
 Q. *Line of advance after fording*  
 R. *the river.*

SKETCH OF THE  
BATTLE OF THE BOYNE



occurred something like the crux of the conflict. Often, during the crossing, William's men of Londonderry and Enniskillen were up to their armpits in the water. It cannot be said that the Irish Infantry made a good fight of it, though doubtless there were numerous instances of individual valour. It was reserved for the Cavalry of James's Army to play the part of heroes, and it would be difficult to exaggerate or overestimate the rôle enacted by them in this crisis of the Battle of the Boyne. With it the name of the heroic, if time-serving, Richard Hamilton must ever be honourably coupled.

Placing himself at the head of a body of horse, Hamilton determined to do his uttermost to dispute the ford. Many of William's troops were still engaged in crossing when this gallant Cavalry, ill-supported as it was, dashed into the turbid stream. They 'maintained a desperate fight in the bed of the river with Solmes's Blues. They drove the Danish brigade back into the stream. They fell impetuously on the Huguenot regiments which, not being provided with pikes, then ordinarily used by Foot to repel Horse, began to give ground. Caillemot, while encouraging his fellow-exiles, received a mortal wound in the thigh. Four of his men carried him back across the ford to his tent. As he passed, he continued to urge forward the rear ranks which were still up to the breast in water. 'On, on my lads! To glory, to glory!' During nearly half an hour the battle continued to rage along the southern shore. All was smoke, dust and din. Old soldiers were heard to say that they had seldom seen sharper work even in the Low Countries. But just at this juncture William came up with the right wing. His arrival decided the fate of the day. Yet the Irish Horse retired fighting obstinately. (Macaulay.)

The final stand of this gallant Horse took place at Plottin Castle, a mile or more south of Oldbridge. At this point, and though animated by King William's presence and his inspiring query to them, 'What will you do for me?' the Enniskillen Dragoons gave ground. That is, indeed, to put it mildly, for in the sabre-to-sabre tussle at Plottin Castle they lost fifty killed and wounded, gave ground and fled, and were only re-formed and rallied by their monarch's own personal example. William, in fact, behaved splendidly, having the heel of his boot carried away by one shot and the cap of his pistol struck by another. Richard Hamilton was at this juncture wounded and taken prisoner, and hence the familiar story of his being ques-

tioned by William, 'Is this business over, or will your Horse make more fight?' 'On my honour, sire,' says Hamilton, 'I believe they will.' '*Your* honour!' mutters the King—and this is the only revenge William ever takes on Hamilton for his double-dealing and perfidy. At the same time, the wounded man's personal valour is recognised by friend and foe alike, the brave Lauzun writing of him: 'Richard Amilton a été fait prisonnier, faisant fort bien son devoir.'

He was wrong, however, in surmising that there was much more power of resistance left in his Cavalry. How indeed could there be? One regiment of them had but thirty unwounded men in the ranks, and in some cases whole troops were decimated.

It remains to speak of the death of the Duke of Schomberg, also a Cavalry episode. Scorning or neglecting even to don his cuirass—an extremely foolhardy omission, one would suppose—the old General rode his charger into the river when there was a momentary falling back in the advance after the death of Caillemot. Speaking in French, and pointing at the Irish Cavalry, he exclaimed; 'Come on, gentlemen—there are your persecutors!' With that, he was suddenly set upon by several of these 'persecutors' and, ere his rescue could be effected, he was struck down and killed by a couple of deep sabre cuts in the neck. The loss of Schomberg was an irreparable one to William of Orange, since he was something approaching to a military genius. Yet in some sense the veteran's work was done. He took rank as the first General in Europe, and William decreed his friend and lieutenant a magnificent public funeral in Westminster Abbey.

The Irish Army was by this time thoroughly well beaten, and nine days after the Battle of the Boyne the fugitive King James landed in France, never more to quit its shelter. Of the defeated army, about 1500 had been killed and wounded, a great proportion of them in the Cavalry. The Orange Army had not more than five hundred casualties, the killed including Schomberg, Caillemot and Walker, Bishop of Derry. The King, however, bluntly said that the latter had no right, as a Churchman, to be exposing his life on the field. William also, very much to his credit, directed the immediate execution of a soldier who had started butchering the Irish who asked for quarter.

Sarsfield with a bodyguard accompanied James in his flight to the coast. Lauzun with the French contingent marched into Dublin, but he and Tyrconnel decided that it could not be defended successfully, and so they marched out again. The campaign of the Boyne was

ended, and William entered the Irish capital in state on Sunday July 6, 1690.

The battle was made the subject of an Orange play, a wretched thing called *The Royal Flight* or *The Conquest of Ireland*. In this, all of the Irish were represented as cowards and runaways save Sarsfield. A single extract from the edifying work will suffice: *King James*: 'This fellow (Sarsfield) will make me valiant, I think, in spite of my teeth' . . . *Sarsfield*: 'O that I must be detached! I would have wrested victory out of heretic Fortune's hands.'

It is worthy of note that Meinhart Schomberg, who nominally commanded the right wing of the victorious army, was subsequently superseded and sent home for alleged incompetency during the war of the Spanish Succession. Meinhart evidently failed to inherit any considerable measure of his illustrious parent's genius for war.

If it cannot be said that the Battle of the Boyne was overcrowded with episodes illustrative of strategy tactics or leadership of the highest type, it was picturesque, and decidedly it was epoch-making. In this sense, of course, it stands for one of *The* battles of history. Of its interest to the Cavalry soldier there can be no question. It foreshadowed the employment of great masses of Cavalry by Marlborough and Eugène in the battles of the next reign, while it certainly demonstrated the crushing effect of a mobile force of horsemen thrown suddenly upon the threatened point at a crisis.

Finally, the engagement won glory and renown for half-a-dozen different regiments of the mounted arm. It brought fame to the Life Guards commanded by Ormond, the 'Queen's Regiment of Horse' led by the gallant John Lanier, to the Blues, and to the several mounted regiments in William's Dutch contingent. The latter himself, by the by, apart from his personal gallantry, exhibited no inconsiderable skill in the handling and direction of large bodies of horse troops. On the defeated side, as we have seen, the Cavalry, both Irish and French, emerged from the conflict with even brighter laurels. A good half century separated the Boyne from the bloody day of Fontenoy, where:

' Right up against the English lines  
The Irish exiles sprang !'

But the splendid Irish brigade who, on that memorable day of 1745, fought and bled under Saxe against Cumberland were in numerous instances descended from the men of the Boyne and of Limerick.



## APPENDIX

It is unfortunate that the memories of the Battle of the Boyne should have become the inspiration of party strife. From this circumstance have come not a few popular errors as to its history. The most glaring is that of the Orange lodges of Ulster, which annually celebrated the Battle of the Boyne on July 12, the date of the Battle of Aughrim. The traditional accounts of the battle are full of misstatements, nor can we expect that the story of the day will be generally viewed in the cold light of historical truth—*sine ira aut studio*—while its memories are used as commonplaces of political oratory. Some day Irishmen of the North and South will be able to discuss it as Americans from New York and Charleston are now able to talk over the story of Gettysburg. But even if that day is far distant, students of military history may at least be able to leave politics aside and consider only the technical aspects of this miniature Armageddon, in which soldiers of half the countries of Europe met on Irish ground.

The Irish of the West and South who fought on the defeated side need have felt no shame at their failure. They were outnumbered and outgunned. They had in their ranks fewer trained soldiers and among their leaders not so many veterans. The partial failure of their Foot was due to no lack of the courage in which Irishmen with weapons in their hands are never wanting. It was the result of opposing roughly organised levies of volunteers to the trained fighting men of half a dozen northern nations, many of them professional soldiers whose whole life had been passed in camps and who lived under the iron discipline of the Continental services of the day. The dashing valour of the Irish Horse more than atoned for any defects of their comrades on foot. And among the leaders of these bold riders was one of the best soldiers of the day, Patrick Sarsfield, who a few years before had led the English Life Guards into action across the Sedgmoor marsh in the confused night engagement which was the last battle fought on English ground.

'Change kings and we will fight you again,' is the exclamation attributed by popular tradition to Sarsfield after the Battle of the Boyne. Leadership had counted for much. In King William the victors had for their guide one of the great generals of the century. King James was little more than a spectator, relying as he did on Sarsfield and Lauzun, though the Irishman and the Frenchman could hardly have worked well together. The same popular tradition in Ireland makes King James the scapegoat of the day, and even accuses him of cowardice. But he was not wanting in the courage that can face death in action; he had proved this on the quarterdeck of his flagship in the naval war of his brother's reign. He was lacking in the resolution that enables a man to confront events, whether in peace or war. A stronger man would never have had to face the whole crisis of which the fight on the Boyne was but an episode.





### THE WEAKER CAVALRY

By CAPTAIN G. M. ORR, 11th (K.E.O.) Lancers

BEFORE discussing the way in which the Cavalry may best attain its own object it is well to bear in mind two things: First, that the force referred to in this Paper is numerically inferior to the enemy opposed to it; secondly, that Cavalry is only a portion of the army which a supreme commander is going to use in order to attain his ultimate object of defeating the enemy's army in battle. A Cavalry commander should not lose sight of this.

#### STRATEGICALLY

The first difficulty will be for the supreme commander to decide what proportion of his Cavalry shall be allotted to strategic missions; he must 'clearly determine what he requires of it and group his units accordingly. . . .' (F. S. R. Part I., sec. 65 (1), and Cav. Training, sec. 144). If certain information has to be got, it can only be obtained by a force strong enough to look after itself and fight. In spite of reinforcing the strategic Cavalry at the expense of the protective Cavalry, the former may still be numerically inferior to the Cavalry it is likely to meet. If this Cavalry is not sent forward because it is numerically inferior the effect on its own ranks will be bad morally, since they will think they cannot face the enemy. War is uncertain and risks must be taken, therefore the weaker Cavalry should be sent forward.

What, then, are the means by which the weaker Cavalry can hope to make good its inferiority?

Firstly, the necessity of keeping concentrated, and using every means in the domain of grand tactics to make the enemy disperse. Of course detachments will have to be made to probe for information. Therefore, bring every man to act on the line on which penetration will give the best results, and let there be the minimum of Cavalry elsewhere

in the theatre, if necessary less than the minimum supplemented by Infantry. 'Use dismounted tactics in order to economise force in one part of the theatre of war; whilst the bulk acts with energy at the decisive moment on the main line of operations' (Cav. Training, sec. 141, p. 187). Where Cavalry force has to be economised, there machine-guns are of the greatest assistance. Secondly, careful utilisation of the terrain through which the force will have to work in order to get at the information required. Thirdly, mobility. It is not true to say that Cavalry is mobile because it is composed of men mounted on horses. With Cavalry, more than any other arm, mobility means ability to subsist, and to utilise the resources of the country, as well as power to bring those resources to itself, or carry them along: further, it means a just appreciation of the use of railways, as well as a methodical exploitation of the country's resources; it means in a civilised country the ability to get into, and out of, billets, and it means a carefully organised remount system.

The first and second of the means depend on leadership, and success will be the measure of the leaders' self-education in peace, used with boldness and determination in war. The third can only be obtained by ever so careful attention and training in peace by all ranks.

When the inferiority is really great and it is felt that, in spite of resolution and boldness in the Cavalry leaders and of the concentration and mobility of the force itself, the chance of the weaker Cavalry succeeding in its strategic mission is small, then some further support must be given it which is both material and moral. It is advocated that the Cavalry under these circumstances should be sent forward supported by a strong detachment of the other arms. There is no necessity for the Cavalry to be out of reach of all support from the other arms. The weaker Cavalry will want to save every sabre or lance it can, and will be weak in fire power. A mixed force of this nature may not be able to penetrate so far in the time as a strong force of Cavalry; but, after all, the main body of a large force of Cavalry does not move so far day by day; it is only its patrols and supporting squadrons which do great distances.

It will be said truly that there will be the risk of the Cavalry becoming tied and not getting far enough forward to get the information desired, or that there will be the danger of the advanced force getting too far ahead of the main army and consequently putting itself in a

position to be defeated in detail. These are the risks. After all would the Cavalry, if comparatively very weak, get any further without the advanced force behind it? 'War is a matter of expediciencies' and it is only a knowledge of the real situation and the proportion between the opposing forces that could determine whether the weaker Cavalry should depend on itself or whether some other support, moral and material, should be afforded it. In paragraph 2, section 91 of Field Service Regulations, Part I., the possibility of independent Cavalry having to avoid a collision with a superior force is foreseen, and the Regulations suggest that in such cases detachments of Infantry as supports might be an advantage.

There are certain special tasks which may be assigned to the independent Cavalry, one of which is to carry out raids against the enemy's communications. The German General Bernhardt has lately advocated raids somewhat strongly, especially for a numerically weaker Cavalry, but he would employ a large force of Cavalry on this errand. While venturing to disagree with advice which would employ a comparatively large number of the Cavalry, it would appear that inferiority in numbers need be no bar to using some of them on raids. At first sight it would appear madness to diminish the already known inferiority by sending any portion of it on raids. But Oyama's use of four of his precious fifty-six squadrons, in the face of 164 of the enemy's squadrons, before the battle of Mukden, shows that the weakness of the Cavalry is no bar to the employment of a few squadrons at a carefully chosen time, when there is a definite object to be obtained. The real point is that the raid must synchronise with some decisive operation.

#### PROTECTIVELY

'The protection of an army requires a wide extension of front, and consequent subdivision of force' (Cav. Training, sec. 144, p. 195). At the same time it is necessary to arrange the distribution, if possible, so that concentration can take place in strength enough to oppose any hostile force endeavouring to break through and surprise the force covered.

But with a weak force, if a reserve be kept in hand and a broad front covered, the reserve will be necessarily weak, and, owing to distance, will probably fail to reach a threatened point in time. This is the objection to a thin line of observation, with as strong a reserve as

possible. Under such circumstances it is suggested that, while still covering the whole front with Cavalry for the purpose of protective reconnaissance, small detachments of Infantry take the place of the reserves. In this way an army would be covered and protected in a manner similar to that of the Japanese Army in 1904.

#### TACTICALLY

It is always the tendency for a numerically superior force to envelop the inferior. This is due to the tactical advantages of envelopment, and to the greater opportunity such a form gives of employing the whole force. An enveloping form of attack thus, in its turn, produces a tendency to sacrifice depth for breadth and extension of front. Extension implies that once the plan is initiated, any alteration will be a matter of difficulty. In the case of fast-moving Cavalry this difficulty is increased, because there will be no time to correct any error in the original distribution. Herein lies the opportunity of the weaker force. Owing to its comparative smallness, it can manoeuvre longer. It is by manoeuvre that the weaker will surprise the stronger, and, by 'compelling the latter to fight before his troops are united, get the opportunity of establishing a local superiority' (Cav. Training, sec. 150 (vi) (b)). It will be best to bring the whole weight of the attack on to the enemy's flank (Cav. Training, sec. 150 (v), p. 210). In this case let the guns and machine-guns take the place of what would have been a frontal attack, if the force had been strong enough to attack in front as well as in flank.

We have seen the disadvantage which a large force labours under if committed to an enveloping form of attack. To a limited extent a large force, in the face of one numerically inferior, also suffers from the disadvantage of its size, even if it keeps concentrated, in that its deployment to the front takes time. A mobile and energetic, though weaker, force can create a favourable opportunity to attack and overwhelm some portion of its larger opponents.

For psychological reasons a Cavalry mass is easily affected; suffering defeat it would give way more suddenly than an Infantry mass. It is dependent more than any other arm on the ability of its commander, the nature of the ground, and chance. For these reasons numerical superiority is perhaps a less certain guarantee of success with Cavalry than with any other arm. It has already been pointed out that the opportunities of the weaker force lie in its power of

manœuvre. But this will avail it not at all unless it is combined with initiative in its higher leaders, and a spirit of the offensive in its ranks. The weaker Cavalry must be imbued with the idea of self-sacrifice when necessary, tempered by the discretion of its leader.

The formation which the weaker Cavalry should adopt cannot of course be foretold, so much depends on terrain. Surprise will be the best of weapons and formations must adapt themselves to take advantage of ground and cover. It would appear more than ever advisable for the Cavalry force when weaker to avoid deploying to the front; it should be manœuvred so as to deploy to the flank. Deployment to the front takes time; every second, literally, is valuable in the last phase, when Cavalry is manœuvring prior to shock action.

Our Cavalry Training lays stress on Cavalry holding the balance correctly between fire power and shock action (Cav. Training, sec. 141, p. 187). There was a tendency, a very short time back, to believe that the way for Cavalry to overthrow its immediate enemy was to use shock action only. Before that the tendency was to dismount on every opportunity. True co-operation will be to make use of every weapon available—lance, rifle, and gun—in order to annihilate the enemy. The moral effect of rifle fire ('Rifle fire' includes the fire of machine-guns—it would be a more correct name for the latter to be called machine-rifles) from an unexpected direction when guns are already in action from another direction is greater than is generally imagined. For Cavalry to be imbued with the offensive spirit does not necessitate charging only. In an open country there will be a much greater proportion of lances, or sabres, to men dismounted; in broken country the proportion may be the other way. On the battlefield, in proximity with Infantry, the latter may provide the additional fire power.

Under all circumstances the responsibilities of a Cavalry leader are great. Face to face with superior force, the Cavalry leader must never be at his wits' end to neutralise the superiority. The weaker force will need to have the more able leader since success will depend more than ever on his ability to seize the right opportunity. Cavalry leaders are not born and consequently must be made—by practice, in manœuvres when handling several brigades in situations likely to arise in war; by constant thought and self-education in the study.

To sum up shortly it may be said that the weaker Cavalry's chance lies in fostering a high form of initiative, of mobility, of manœuvre, and of the offensive spirit.

## THE ENLISTED CLASSES OF THE INDIAN CAVALRY (Continued)

By CAPTAIN R. W. W. GRIMSHAW, 34th (P.A.V.O.) Poona Horse

### RAJPUTS

IN the historical outline published in the July number of this Journal there was an account of the supposed origin of Rajputs—namely, that they are descendants of the Kshatriya division of the Aryan Hindu community.

Rajputs are divided into a considerable number of well-marked divisions, of which the Cavalry absorbs two, viz. Rajputs of Rajputana, sometimes known as Rajistan and Rajputs of Hindustan—*i.e.* the United Provinces. There also exist what are termed Mussulmen Rajputs, that is, Rajputs who have been converted to Islam.

The greater bulk of the Rajputs enlisted in the Indian Cavalry are drawn from those in Rajputana, and consequently most of what follows concerns them. A few general remarks on Rajputs, however, will, it is hoped, interest readers.

Amongst the Hindu community, to be able to style oneself a Rajput or a Brahmin puts the hall-mark on one's social position. Even Mussulmen of Rajput extraction prefer to incorporate the word 'Rajput' into their official designation in preference to using the usual Mussulman form. The right to style oneself a Duke in England carries with it a far less exacting social obligation than that to style oneself a Rajput in India, provided, of course, that the leaders of the Rajput community accept the claim. A Rajput who is only so in name has no responsibilities, and there are many thousands of such individuals whom the true Rajput utterly refuses to recognise, and with whom they will neither eat nor intermarry. After all, the wearer of the strawberry leaves can eat with and marry whom he likes. The idea of a Sesodia prince or noble allying himself with the daughter of a Bombay merchant prince is unthinkable. Not only would he be com-

pletely ostracised, but he would cease to be a Rajput. And yet he could marry the poorest and humblest Rajput provided her family and birth were in accordance with custom and tradition. Times without number famous Indian princes and statesmen have wished to enhance their social importance by allying themselves to some Rajput family of distinction; but with rare exceptions they have failed, and some of the bloodiest wars and sieges have been brought about by endeavours to obtain by force what no diplomacy could extract.

Speaking broadly, to qualify as a Rajput, in the highest social senses of the term, a claimant has to adduce proof of descent from one of the ancient Royal houses alluded to in the historical retrospect, and for a considerable number of generations back give a satisfactory account of his matrimonial affairs. As a rule, it is very much easier to produce the first qualification than to comply with the second. This latter is practically accomplished by a remarkably careful system of clan registration, and, considering the happy-go-lucky way that the average Indian conducts his affairs, these registers are very accurately written up and preserved. Everybody who is not on them is considered outside the pale; and a Rajput who happens to indulge in any backslidings is immediately struck off. Needless to say, the interpretation of 'backsliding' is on a fairly broad basis, but a matrimonial solecism meets with short shrift, and mere endowment with this world's goods carries very little weight.

If two Rajputs happen to meet who are complete strangers, and one invites the other to a repast, both take the most punctilious care that each of them is entitled to the presence of the other. Questions affecting their personal history are interchanged which in Europe would be looked upon as the height of inquisitive impertinence.

The Rajputs of Rajputana are a very considerable community, possessing a long and ancient history, of which they are intensely proud. They represent the highest rung on the Indian social ladder.

The preponderating reason for this is that they held out against the Mussulman invasion, and resisted Mussulman demands for their womenfolk with greater vehemence than most. Not that they succeeded—far from it. Their present hopelessly impoverished condition is entirely due to their obstinacy. Brave and self-sacrificing as these Rajputs undoubtedly were, they lacked all power of combining against a common enemy, and were consequently defeated in detail, and several

Rajput princes of high distinction eventually gave their daughters in marriage to the Emperors of Delhi; but only because they were beaten to the ground and were unable to refuse, and in doing so made it the price of some degree of integrity, not only for their own kingdoms, but against the forcible seizure of the womenfolk of their more humble compatriots. As a matter of fact, more than one Moghul Emperor endeavoured to win the goodwill of the leading Rajput rulers, and many of the latter led armies for the Moghul Administration; but the fact remains that few of these Rajput rulers ever really recognised the Delhi Emperors as their suzerain in the same manner as they accept our present King. From the days of their first defeats till the final collapse of Mussulman authority these Rajputs loathed and detested everything connected with their Mussulman overlords.

The Rajputs of Rajputana are descended from the same stock as those of the Punjab and Hindustan, but owing to their geographical position they were more effectually able to withstand the buffétings of successive waves of Mahometan invasion, and in consequence were better able to preserve their purity than those who were not so fortunately placed.

Amongst those chiefs who were most prominent in their opposition to everything connected with the house of Timour may be cited the Ruler of Udaipur. As already mentioned in the historical retrospect, one of the great Hindu kingdoms existing at the time of the first irruptions of the Mussulmen into India was that of Mewar, the capital of which was Chitor. The rather diminutive State of Udaipur is all that now remains of that once important realm; but, however much its territories may have shrunk, the Maharana not only considers himself the leading prince by birth in India, but is accepted as such by all the others, and he is one of the few, if not the only one of the ruling chiefs, who hold sway over territory that their ancestors ruled before the advent of Islam.

The Maharana of Udaipur is a Ghelote Rajput, the most exclusive clan in India, and, like the Mikado of Japan, claims descent from the Sun. This clan headed and maintained the opposition to the Mahometans. Long and bitterly did they prosecute the struggle, and practically lost all, except their honour, in the effort. Their capital was Chitor, the sieges and general history of which make fascinating reading in Tod's classic on the history of the Rajputs.

G G



At one epoch in the history of Udaipur the ruler was a mere fugitive, finding an asylum in the rocky fastnesses of the Arravulli hills. Eventually Udaipur, the present capital, was founded amongst these hills, and the historic Chitor was abandoned for ever as the Royal seat of Mewar. The only compensation the rulers of Udaipur ever received was that they never attended Delhi or Agra as vassals, and never gave a daughter to a Moghul prince. Possibly they have their reward in their unquestioned social supremacy, recognised even by our own Government.

When his Majesty, during his recent visit, was pleased to appoint the Maharana as an Indian Chief-in-Waiting, the awkward question of precedence was suitably settled.

As far as the writer is aware, there are no Sesodia Rajputs in the Indian Army, and the above details are merely given to explain in some degree the intense spirit of pride of race which permeates all Asl (pure born) Rajputs.

The majority of Rajputs enlisted in the Indian Cavalry are drawn from what are known as Rahtore Rajputs, of whom the Maharajah of Jodhpore is the most important chief. The history of this particular branch is as follows: In A.D. 1212, eighteen years after the sack of Canouj (see July number) by the Mussulmen, one Sojee, the grandson of the last king of that place, migrated with some 200 followers to the desert country round about the present Jodhpore. They rapidly multiplied, and eventually completely superseded the indigenous inhabitants, who, by the way, were chiefly Jats. A descendant, one Rao Rimmul, left twenty-four sons, the eldest of whom was Joda. These twenty-four sons founded the great Rahtore vassalage of Marwar, and Joda founded the city of Jodhpore.

The present State of Bikanir was at one time part of this vassalage. Rutlam, Kishengarh, and several minor principalities are all ruled by Rahtores descended from one or other of these twenty-four sons, and any fairly well-educated Rahtore can tell you from which one his own family springs. Previous to 1893 there were few, if any, in the Regular Indian Army. Their enlistment was commenced by the present Maharajah, Sir Pertab Sing, who wished to find an outlet for their many natural military gifts, especially from a Cavalry point of view. The experiment was successful, and to-day there are six squadrons of these men, distributed as follows: The

3rd Skinner's Horse, the 32nd Lancers, the 26th, 27th and 28th Light Cavalry (1 each), and the Poona Horse (2).

The Rahtore Rajputs are divided into many clans, based approximately on the above-mentioned twenty-four sons, the most important being the Jodas. The most numerous, however, is the Merteas. Others are Chompawats, Champowats, Udewats, Bidawats, &c. They nearly all lie to the north-west of the Rajputana-Malwa Railway (Amadabad-Ajmere branch). Their country is vilely inhospitable, being practically desert. Marwar, the Indian name for this part of the world, means the abode of death. The writer has been through a portion of it, and for mile upon mile one is up to one's fetlocks in fine sand. There are no roads and no carts, the camel being the usual means of conveyance. The wells are very deep, water often being 100 to 150 feet from the surface.

Needless to say, a man who is reared in such a country is of a pretty tough fibre. It is excessively bleak in the winter and a scorching furnace in the summer. The villages are far apart and miserable places, and yet no man is fonder of his home than a Rajput from these parts. There is a prevailing opinion, although quite a mistake, formed, it must be presumed, in the days when the lakh sabres of Rahtore Horse formed a powerful asset in the Moghul armies, that the Rahtore is brought up on a horse from infancy. A few thukers do keep horses, but the bulk are far too poor to afford such luxuries, and most of those enlisted in the Cavalry do all their moving about on camels. It is this constant use of the camel from earliest youth that gives the Rahtore his graceful seat.

Another class of Rajput closely allied to the Rahtore are the Shekawats, and a goodish number of them are to be found in the six squadrons. They hail from Jaipur territory, the Maharajah of Jaipur, a Kachwaha Rajput, being their chief. In their manners, customs, and institutions they so closely resemble the Rahtores that what follows may be taken as applying to both. Socially they are not considered as quite on the same level with the Rahtore, since it was a Kachwaha Maharajah of Jaipur who first surrendered to the blandishments of the Delhi Court and offered their womenfolk in marriage to the hated Mussulman. He was in uncomfortably close proximity to Delhi, however.

Some authorities consider the Shekawats of less sturdy build to the

Rahtore, but the writer has seen a good deal of both, and can detect no difference in this respect, though he considers the Shekawats as the superior in intellect. There are quite large numbers in the Infantry, which speaks for their physique, whereas very few Rahtores join the Infantry.

A few remarks about their characteristics. The Rahtore is small of stature, but exceptionally wiry and supple. They have a figure of their own, which is well shown off when they don the semi-European apparel which they adopt on joining the Army, and many of them are exceptionally well modelled. If one was asked casually to state their most striking characteristic, one would unhesitatingly say 'manner.' They possess a manner quite different to any other class. It is courtly and polished to a degree considering their crude surroundings and upbringing.

They treat their women with great deference, although they accept purdah. Notwithstanding their Spartan-like upbringing, they do not relish cast-iron discipline. They like plenty of leave, and frequently overstay what is given them. They speak a language called Marwari, using the Nagri character when writing. Marwari contains a great many everyday Hindustani words, but they are difficult to catch, as the average Rahtore blurs all his hard letters. A favourite rejoinder of the Rahtore when given an order is, 'Jo Hukum,' and they are often given the sobriquet 'Jo Hukums.'

They give no trouble over caste matters, as they consider that, where the exigencies of life demand it, they can ignore the trivialities of caste conventions, since they, the Asl Rajputs, are above the law.

Those that have entered the Army dress in rather a comical pantomime style if left to their own devices when selecting their 'plain clothes' apparel. Very loud checks or a startling combination of colours, a tightly fitting, unnecessarily short-skirted coat, Jodhpore breeches, and a multi-coloured puggaree is what they fancy when walking out.

In their villages, if they have not been in the Army or have no relatives therein, they wear the simplest of coarse cotton garments, with a dagger or sword stuck in the kumabund.

In the Army they tie their puggarees, all coiled up snake-like, over one ear, but this is not so noticeable in their homes. They love dress and jewellery, and wear the latter on all possible occasions.

Those that come to the Army grow a moustache; very few wear beards. They avoid the beard in order that they may not by any chance be mistaken for Mussulmen. In their own country this 'anti-Mussulman' dressing of the hair is not observed, and many will be found wearing the beard brushed back from the point of the chin, giving the wearer a rather ferocious air.

If treated with consideration, and allowance made for their simplicity derived from lack of intercourse with other nations, the Rahtore Rajput makes an excellent Light Cavalry soldier. They are not, however, particularly brilliant at anything. They have a natural aptitude for sword work, and look upon our English-made tulwars as a crude joke. At one time no Rahtore would touch a plough, but nowadays many of them have had to bow to the inevitable and handle all agricultural implements; but the old prejudice dies hard, and if asked casually their views on the propriety of handling a plough, they will disdain all knowledge of the contemptible but necessary implement. Their womenfolk will not carry food to their husbands when out in the fields, nor will they draw water even if their lord protector lies on a mortal bed of sickness.

A visit to Jodhpore is well worth the trouble. There will be met some of the most hospitable and captivating people in India, living in a state of feudalism closely resembling that of the fourteenth century in England.

The Rajputs of Hindustan or the United Provinces claim descent from the same source as those of Rajputana, and many of them are Asl Rajputs in the strictest sense of the word. Unfortunately, however, there are very large numbers who by no stretch of the imagination can be looked upon as the genuine article, with the consequence that one has to accept with caution those claiming to be Rajput and who hail from these parts.

As already pointed out, there is little or no question as to who is or is not a Rajput in Rajputana, owing to the system of clan registration. This is not kept up in the United Provinces with that degree of scrupulous care that marks its preparation in Rajputana, one of the results being considerable laxity over matrimonial affairs. For example, the Rajputs of Rajputana are strictly exogamous, which prevents any chance of too much inter-breeding, while the rule that a Rajput must marry a Rajput maintains the characteristics of the

race. Such an arrangement does not prevail amongst the average Rajput of the United Provinces, with the consequence that their race characteristics may be considered nil, and they differ little from any other Hindu from those parts.

One point is incontestable, and that is that the Asl Rajput of Rajistan will neither eat with nor intermarry with the average Rajput from Hindustan, and no more delicate test can be applied.

At one time a large portion of the community who now call themselves Rajputs were known as Hindustani Hindus, and there is at present one regiment of Cavalry which enlists a class of man officially known as a Hindustani Hindu; but, if asked what he is, replies, 'I am a Rajput,' and apparently has quite as good a claim to say so as any man officially known as a Rajput.

As a class, the Rajputs of the United Provinces possess few striking characteristics, but none the less make good soldiers. Most of the doubtful material finds its way to the Infantry. Those that come to the Cavalry are generally able to adduce fairly good credentials as to their extraction. There are two and a-half squadrons of them. As already mentioned, they offer little scope for comment, and can be summed up in the terms, honest, sober, steady, and essentially worthy.

#### PUNJABI MAHOMETANS

Before proceeding any further, it will simplify matters and save repetition to give some details which concern all classes of Mahometans enlisted in the Indian Cavalry.

Firstly, they may be divided into two great religious factions—namely, Sunnis and Shiah. In the Indian Cavalry there is an enormous preponderance of Sunnis. As it may interest some readers to know the difference between a Sunni and a Shiah an attempt will be made to explain.

On the death of Mahomet in A.D. 632, the Saracen (the name of a tribe in Arabia) Empire embraced little more than Arabia, but within 100 years the Caliphs, as the successors of Mahomet were called, ruled from India to the Pyrenees. The amount of bloodshed, outrage, violence, and vandalism that accompanied this rapid spread of Mahometanism was immense. In A.D. 655 one Ali, a cousin of the Prophet, became fourth Caliph. He married Fatima, the daughter of

the Prophet. Shiahhs maintain that Ali was the rightful successor, and that the three previous Caliphs were usurpers. The Shiahhs reject the Sunnah or traditional law which had grown up to supplement the Koran. Taking Ali as the successor of the Prophet they trace from him twelve successors, the last being Imam Mehdi, who is to return to earth and complete the establishment of Islam throughout the world. The so-called Mehdi who was destroyed after the battle of Omdurman represented himself as this person.

Every year during the Mahometan festival known as the Mohurram, riots, more or less serious, occur in India between the two sects if they happen to be at all equally balanced in any particular locality. To explain the cause of the riots one cannot do better than quote direct from Betham's work on Deccani Mussalmans.

The Mohurram festival is in memory of Hussain, one of the Prophet's grandsons, who was murdered. Timurlane the invader of India used to pay a pilgrimage to Hussain's tomb, but owing to the disturbed state of his empire his ministers begged him to abandon the custom, and Timurlane, by way of salving his conscience, had a model of Hussain's tomb made and paid his devotions to it. This model is known as the Tabut, and the custom introduced by Timurlane prevails to this day. On the ninth day of the festival (it lasts ten days) the Tabut is paraded in a procession. On the tenth, the Tabut is again brought out in procession and thrown into a river or pond. Now the Sunnis make this a day of general rejoicing, whereas the Shiahhs make it a day of mourning, and, in addition, altogether object to the Tabut. What generally happens is that the Sunnis deliberately thrust their rejoicings down the throats of the Shiahhs by parading past the houses of the latter, who retaliate.

Many hundreds have been killed in Bombay and elsewhere by these riots. In addition to these two main divisions all Mahometans who join the Cavalry can be divided into:—

(1) Converts. Descendants of converts and descendants of mixed parentage.

(2) Descendants of the Mahometan conquerors and of imported Mahometans from Arabia and Persia, of which there were no inconsiderable numbers. All under this head are either Sayyids, Shaiks, Moguls, or Pathans.

(3) Special communities.

Class (1) are almost as much Hindu as Mahometan, often joining in Hindu festivals and refusing to eat beef, and some are not even circumcised. Very few come to the Cavalry.

Class (2) conform fairly strictly to all Mahometan customs, and as far as the United Provinces and Deccan are concerned are the class most sought after both by Cavalry and Infantry.

Sayyids take Sayyid before their name and Shah after. Shaiks take Shaik or Mahomet before their name. Sayyids claim descent from Fatima and Ali, and Shaiks from Abbas, one of the Prophet's uncles, but needless to say their ancestry is rather clouded. There are considerable numbers of both in the Cavalry.

Moguls are only found in small numbers. They claim descent from the Mogul conquerors of the seventeenth century. They add Mirza or Beg to their names.

Pathans are found all over the country. They claim descent from the Afghan mercenaries who accompanied, or were imported by, various Mahometan conquerors. They add Khan to their names. No Mogul or Pathan of the United Provinces or Deccan is a Shiah. These Pathans must be carefully distinguished from what are nowadays recognised as Pathans, and who hail from the North-West Frontier. Very few of Class (3) find their way to the Cavalry except as artisans in the workshops.

Above classification only applies to India and does not include Persia or Arabia.

Next to the Sikh in order of numerical preponderance comes the Punjabi Mahometan, known as the P.M. As far as the Cavalry are concerned the term P.M. may be said to apply almost exclusively to those who come from the vicinity of the Salt Range, in the Jhelum district. There are, of course, many hundreds of Mussulmen in the Punjab other than the above, many of whom are to be found in the Army. One can divide those who come to the Cavalry into two well-defined divisions, viz. those who claim to be of Rajput extraction and those who do not. Amongst the former may be cited Tiwanas, Jenjuas, Manhas, Gondals, &c.; amongst the latter, Ghukkers and Awans, &c.

The claim of the former to Rajput extraction is, to judge by several well-known authorities, perfectly valid. Many of them can produce fairly valuable data to prove their contention.

The better-educated ones will tell you that their ancestors helped to defend Chitor against the Mussulman attacks. Whether such is true or not, Tod alludes to this 'colony' of ex-Rajputs in the Salt Range who were converted to Islam, and endeavours to trace their ancestors and immediate cause of migration. Anyhow, whatever their origin may be, they take great pride in styling themselves Rajput in their sheet rolls, especially the Jenjuas.

I mentioned, when dealing with Rajputs, that there is a class called Mussulman Rajput. They must not be confounded with those P.M.s who write 'Rajput' in their sheet rolls. A benign Government has laid down who are to be called Rajput Mussulmen and who are not, and Mussulmen of the Punjab from round the Salt Range and Jhelum district are, for recruiting purposes, classed as P.M.s.

Those P.M.s who are not of Rajput origin generally endeavour to lay claim to Moghul or Arab origin, which is not the case. The Ghukkers are undoubtedly of Tartar or Scythic, and the Awans of Jat, origin.

The Ghukkers are an exceptionally fine people, possessing all the instincts that one looks for in a Cavalry soldier. Practically all that are in the Army—and there are not many—come to the Cavalry, and they are much sought after. Awans are generally accorded an inferior position to the others. This is not due to indifferent behaviour on active service, but is founded, it must be presumed, on that very flimsy pretext, 'caste prejudice,' which, like an octopus, has its tentacles deeply embedded throughout all Oriental society, and which, whilst condoning with a lavish hand the most revolting excesses of the well-born, condemns unmercifully the petty failings of the humble.

Tiwanas, Jenjuas, and other P.M.s owning Rajput extraction may be classed among the best, Tiwanas enjoying, probably, pride of place.

Taking all in all, the Punjabi Mahometan is possibly the most popular class in the Indian Cavalry, and, in the writer's opinion, possesses fewer imperfections than any other class. A well-knit figure, suppleness and cleanness of limb, a pleasing manner, with an intelligent and generally good-looking face, coupled with exceptionally sterling fighting qualities, all appeal to the Englishman when searching for a material for his mounted forces.

For Indians they are fond of riding, and feats of horsemanship



are to be witnessed at most of their local fairs, especially amongst the Tiwanas and Jenjuas.

Their local dialect is Punjabi, but nowadays most of them know Hindustani and write Persian script of some sort.

Their ordinary everyday village attire is shown in the illustration. When attending important functions many of them don the most picturesque and brilliant garbs, gold embroidered purple and green plush coats being most popular.

The following units enlist them (only regimental numbers are given): 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 38, 39, Guides, and 43rd Erinpuras. Such a list alone is an eloquent testimony to their popularity.

#### NOTES ON ILLUSTRATIONS.

- 9, 10 and 11. Typical Punjabi Mahometans.
- 12. Rahtore Rajput Sowar in ordinary village dress.
- 13. Rahtore Rajput apparelled for a local gathering.
- 14. Punjabi Mahometan—Indian Officer.
- 15. Rahtore Indian Officer in mufti.
- 16. Rahtore Rajput—Rissaldar Major.



#### Errata.

July Number, page 296, last word 2nd line, for "Mogul," read "Mongol."  
On page 298 line 7, for "Punjab Rajputs" read "Rajputs of Hindustan."





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## SWORD V. LANCE.

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KÖNIGGRÄTZ.

3rd July, 1866.

## *SWORD v. LANCE*

As a contribution to the much-debated question of the relative value of sword and lance in the Cavalry combat, the following translation of the account of the fight, in the war of 1866, between the 1st Prussian Dragoons of the Guard and the 11th I. and R. Uhlan Regiment (Emperor Alexander II of Russia) is offered, by permission of the author of the History of the first-named regiment.

' It was Thursday, July 3, 1866, the day of Königgrätz. The 1st Prussian Dragoons of the Guard belonged to the First Light Cavalry Brigade, which was commanded by Major-General Baron von Rheinbaben, and formed part of the Cavalry Corps, under Prince Albert of Prussia, which had been put together out of the Reserve Cavalry of the four army corps composing the First Army led by the Red Prince. Early on the morning of this day, the Cavalry Corps had left its bivouac about Gutwasser, and, the 1st Dragoons of the Guard at the head of their brigade, were following the Second Corps, the right wing of the First Army, with the view of establishing and securing communication with the Elbe Army under General von Bittenfeld. About 8 A.M. the Cavalry arrived upon the little river Bistritz, from the further bank of which and at extreme range its batteries were engaged with a hostile battery. It was about this time that Prince Frederick Charles somehow received the mistaken impression that Bittenfeld was in need of support, and he consequently detailed the 1st Cavalry Division—containing Rheinbaben's brigade—to move to the assistance of the Elbe Army. The Cavalry Corps was thus early on this day divided into two separate commands, which did not again unite.

By 11 A.M. Bittenfeld had seized Nechanitz, on both banks of the river, and having driven the Saxons back upon the village of Probus, further to the north-west, he directed the 1st Cavalry Division to follow them up. The river seems, however, to have been here unfordable, the only bridge was choked with the advancing Prussian Infantry, and

the Cavalry Division was recalled and remained for some considerable time inactive on the right or western bank.

About 3 P.M. the Cavalry was once more ordered to move forward, and, the 1st Dragoons of the Guard again leading, passed over as well as they could the shaky bridge, and threaded the narrow lanes of the village of Nechanitz, beyond which Colonel von Barner hurriedly re-formed his squadrons. The remaining regiments of the division could not clear the river and village for some time, and the divisional commander ordered the 1st Dragoons to move forward and locate the enemy. Forming squadron columns, von Barner advanced at a trot over heavy and difficult ground in a north-easterly direction, until he reached the cover of the angle of a wood immediately to the west of the village of Probus, whence he rode forward to reconnoitre the front. Immediately before him, on rising ground, was the village of Probus, which had just been stormed, and was then occupied by a regiment of Prussian Infantry; to the left was the village of Stresetitz; and to the north of it could be seen a regiment of Prussian Dragoons, afterwards found to belong to the 2nd Division of Prince Albert's Cavalry Corps. On the further side of the village of Probus hostile Cavalry could be discerned; these belonged to Coudenhove's Cavalry Division, which had been thrust forward to cover the retirement of the Austrian Infantry, and which was advancing against the Prussian Cavalry visible about Stresetitz. In the execution of this movement the left of the leading line approached so near to the position now occupied by the 1st Dragoons of the Guard, that the fourth squadron of the regiment moved forward to attack.

Immediately in support of the left of the first line of the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry followed the 11th Uhlans, and these, seeing the advance of the Dragoons, formed to the left to meet the attack, prolonging their right with a portion of the 12th Cuirassiers.\* As they drew nearer, the left flank squadron of the Uhlans very cleverly used a piece of undulating ground, covered with high corn, as an offensive flank.

By this time Colonel von Barner had rejoined his regiment and drew it forward again at a trot.

Arrived within about 500 metres of the Austrians the pace was

\* According to Austrian accounts there were only 2 squadrons (about 300 strong) of Uhlans; the number of the Cuirassiers is not given.

increased, then the 'gallop,' followed by the 'charge,' was sounded, and the Dragoons, their commander in front, broke through the ranks of the Uhlans, and then, the whole turning about, joined in the *mêlée*. At this moment the 4th Squadron of the Dragoons, relinquishing its pursuit of the enemy's first line of attack, had returned to the scene and charged in on the flank.

On the right flank of the Dragoons, Rittmeister Count Dohna had noticed in time the left flank squadron of the Uhlans, and while advancing at the gallop had formed his squadron half right. The Uhlans, at the moment of contact, finding themselves in danger of being outflanked, again sought to extend further to the flank, and thus the *mêlée* was fought out over an ever-widening extent of ground, in the middle of which were the white-cloaked Austrians, enclosed on three sides by the Prussian Dragoons. Just before the contact, the Austrians had lowered their lances to the charge—for us an unwelcome sight, for we had up to then taken them for Cuirassiers. In single combat our horses seemed more handy than theirs, but while both sides made the fullest use of their weapons, the lance appeared to weaken; instead of being employed to thrust, it was used to strike with, for which purpose the heavy leaden head, nine inches from the point, proved itself well adapted. Many of the Uhlans threw away the lance and drew their swords; others took to their pistols and fired at random and without any perceptible result; while on our side one only, a subaltern, found occasion to use his revolver. Our men had all been previously carefully instructed to point and never to cut in action. But the nature of the German was against the point, and forgetting all they had been taught, and shouting 'Cut him down,' they laid about them, aiming chiefly at the heads, now no longer protected by the crimson lancer caps. The Uhlans, who were for the most part Poles, had brought from their homes the shout of 'Psia Krew!' while those among them who spoke German echoed with 'Verfluchtes Deutsches Hundeblut!'—a curious sign of the German 'Bruderkrieg' of which at that time there was much talk! Both sides wore cloaks, and if ours were a tolerably good protection, the thick cloaks of white frieze were not much behind in that respect.

So it was fought out—man against man. Colonel von Barner received a lance wound in the hand; two of the opposing officers gave themselves up to him personally. During the charge Count Dohna

galloped past the opposing squadron commander, Baron von Gaffron-Oberstradam, and exchanged harmless blows with him; they did not meet again in the *mêlée*. Rittmeister von Kleist, completely surrounded by Lancers, used his sword with extraordinary skill and ability, and his horse only received a few thrusts and a heavy cut over the croup. First Lieutenant von Thadden received a sabre cut on the arm; Ensign von Dachroeden a lance thrust in the chest, which wounded him severely; the short-sighted von Bismarck heard somebody near him call out, 'Give him one,' and was pierced in the left eye; Sergeant Teetz received five lance wounds, one a thrust through the breast, and was not killed. Sergeant-Major Loska was lifted out of his saddle by a fourth thrust, which struck the pouch on his pouch-belt. The older ones among our men, as with the Uhlans, distinguished themselves by their behaviour; but among the Uhlans the difference in age was very noticeable—there were beardless boys and old grey-bearded men.

The ground over which we fought was wholly unsuitable. The second troop of the third squadron came, at the moment of the charge, upon a small pond, while the first and second squadrons had to jump at an angle the stream by which this pond was fed. And although this was of course no serious obstacle, still in the *mêlée* it brought down many of the Dragoons and Uhlans. Several of the latter, thus dismounted, tried to reach on foot the cover of the neighbouring wood, but were shot down by our skirmishers holding the walls and hedges of the village of Probus. Some of our Dragoons also came under this fire, and a bullet found in the stock of a carbine of the second squadron is a proof of the impartiality of these Infantrymen.

After about five minutes the crowd of fighting-men broke up, when some of the Uhlans fled in the direction of Tresowitz—that is in the direction from which we had ourselves come. Seeing this their comrades followed them, and cheering loudly, the Dragoons pursued. Our horses were the speedier, and many Lancers threw themselves on the ground and opened fire upon us thence with their pistols.

The 5th Blücher Hussars were now plainly visible on the high ground between Tresowitz and Streselitz, and these hurled themselves upon the Uhlans whom we were following, and obliged some of them to turn off in the direction of Probus to avoid the encounter. A Prussian battery there in action received them with grape, which



knocked many over but did not spare the Dragoons following in their wake. Further, some troops of the 1st Prussian Uhlans of the Guard coming from Nechanitz also took up the pursuit, and but few of the opposing Cavalrymen can have succeeded in escaping.

The 1st Prussian Dragoons of the Guard went into action with 21 officers, 49 non-commissioned officers, and 462 of other ranks, and with 532 horses: it had one non-commissioned officer and 7 men killed, 3 officers, 11 non-commissioned officers, and 52 Dragoons wounded. Of the horses, 45 were killed or so injured that they had to be destroyed, and 12 were wounded.

The 11th Uhlans had 5 officers wounded and 1 taken prisoner, 26 non-commissioned officers and men killed, 95 wounded, 45 taken prisoners and 4 missing; while of the horses 55 were killed, 8 were wounded and 147 missing; it should, however, be noted that these figures represent the losses incurred during the *whole day of the battle*, and not merely those due to the Cavalry combat above described, of which no exact roll appears to have been kept.





*THE 'FOOT CAVALRY' OF STONEWALL JACKSON*

BY CAPTAIN A. E. H. LEY, *20th Deccan Horse*

MAJOR T. J. JACKSON, professor of natural philosophy and Artillery tactics at the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, used to say that not a man since Napoleon had understood the use of Cavalry. That he had studied the problem deeply and understood the use of the mounted arm was proved over and over again in the desperate battles of Northern Virginia.

A brief account, therefore, of Jackson's operations in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign with his 'Foot Cavalry,' as he called his army of the valley, whom he taught to march twenty-five to thirty, and on one historical occasion even thirty-five miles a day, particularly noting how he used his Cavalry in this campaign, will not be altogether out of place in a journal devoted to Cavalry matters.

As regards the man himself. To look at he was by no means one's '*beau ideal*' of the Cavalry leader. He was no '*beau sabreur*' or fine horseman like Ashby J. E. B. Stuart, or Fitzhugh Lee, but an awkward, inarticulate, and peculiar man, with strange notions about his health and other matters.

Also being always clad in the oldest of tunics, with a battered old cadet cap well over his eyes, and his feet thrust into enormous Cavalry boots, there were not lacking, at the commencement of his victorious career, smart and dashing youths in his command who were vexed to the soul at the idea of being led into battle by such a figure; until one and all, officers and men, learnt to adore 'Old Jack' as they affectionately nicknamed him.

It is said that there was about him no breath of grace, romance, or pomp of war, but that he was ungenial, ungainly, with large hands and feet, with poor eyesight, and stiff address.

The fact that he had fought very bravely in Mexico, and that he

had for the Federals a cold and formidable hatred were for him; most other things against him.

He drilled his troops seven hours a day. His discipline was of the sternest, his censure a thing to make the oldest blench. A blunder, a slight negligence, any disobedience of orders, down came reprimand, suspension, arrest, with an iron certitude, a nature-like relentlessness.

Apparently he was without imagination. He had but little sense of humour, and no understanding of a joke. He drank water and sucked lemon for dyspepsia, and fancied that the use of pepper had caused a weakness in his left leg. He rode a raw-boned nag, named 'Little Sorrel,' with his toes and elbows well stuck out. He carried his sabre in the oddest fashion, and said 'oblike' instead of 'oblique.'

His greatest pleasure was going to the Presbyterian Church twice on Sundays and to prayer meetings through the week.

All his orders began with an honourable mention of God, and closed with 'Put all deserters in irons.' Finally, he had the gifts of keeping all plans with the secrecy of the grave; of rarely requiring sleep; and of rising at dawn, which latter, incidentally, he required his staff to do likewise. Such was the man whose fighting career we will now follow.

He first began to come to the front at Harper's Ferry in May 1861, where as Colonel T. J. Jackson he commanded until General J. E. Johnson's arrival, and where he began to bring order out of chaos, and weave from a high-spirited rabble of Volunteers a web that the world was to acknowledge remarkable.

In the small affair, too, on July 2, at Falling Waters, he seemed to the critics in the ranks not altogether unimposing; at any rate, he emerged from this as a brigadier-general.

His brigade, the first, consisted of the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 27th, 33rd, and 65th Virginia Infantry, with the Rockbridge Artillery Battery attached. This afterwards became the ever-famous 'Stonewall' Brigade.

Behold, then, this brigade encamped, during July 1861, to the north of Winchester, in the Valley of Virginia; to the west were the brigades of Bee, Bartow, and Elzey.

At noon on July 18 these four brigades marched south along the turnpike, much to the disgust of the rank and file, who were itching to get at Patterson, entrenched behind stone walls at Martinsburg, and to drive him back across the Potomac to whence he came.

In spite of heat and dust, sorely trying to inexperienced and raw

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soldiers, the army of the Shenandoah managed to cross that river before nightfall, to climb up through Ashby's Gap, and reach the lower slopes by Paris at midnight, where they halted.

At daybreak the march was resumed, and after a six mile march the railway at Piedmont was reached by the 1st Brigade at 8 A.M. Into the cattle and freight cars of the waiting trains the troops were piled, even the roofs had their quota, and the 1st Brigade, with 7th and 8th Georgia, arrived at Manassas that evening.

Unfortunately, owing to a collision, the track was blocked and the remaining Infantry waited perforce at Piedmont for two whole days, without rations.

The Artillery and Cavalry—the latter having now come up—marched by road and arrived in fair time. Luckily the Federal General McDowell, who, with an overwhelming force with 'On to Richmond' blazoned on banners and chalked on trunks, encamped around Centreville, still remained confident that Patterson had detained J. E. Johnston in the valley. This confidence was also shared by Patterson himself, thanks to the Confederate Cavalry, who demonstrated before him, and thoroughly screened all movements of the main body. Consequently McDowell remained inactive the whole of the 20th, which allowed Johnston himself and the remainder of the army, except Elzey's brigade, to reach Manassas and join up with Jackson on that date.

At dawn on Sunday, July 21, a cannon shot awoke the men, McDowell's signal that the interrupted march on Richmond would now be resumed. During the whole of that day the first battle of Manassas or Bull Run raged in all its fury.

McDowell, crossing the Bull Run at Sudley Ford, threatened the left flank, and Jackson's, Bee's, and Bartow's Brigades were hurried up to support the hard-pressed Colonel Evans.

Bee and Bartow were in the first line; Jackson in support.

Bee and Evans, bearing the brunt of the attack, outnumbered, decimated by the superior Federal batteries, broke and fled.

Bee, a tall and large man on a great roan horse, trying to rally his men, rose in his stirrups and shouted, 'Look! Yonder is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!' As he spoke a shell struck him and he fell mortally wounded, but not before he had christened Jackson and his brigade with a name that will for ever remain famous.

Stuart eased the pressure with a charge of two hundred horsemen, while Jackson stood fast, though desperately assailed by superior numbers; until, reinforced at last by Elzey's missing brigade, he charged with the bayonet, and finally routed the enemy.

Stuart pursued for twelve miles, capturing great spoil and many prisoners.

Thus we see the Cavalry used, first of all as a screen and to deceive the enemy; that duty accomplished, they are hurried to the battlefield, well to the front on the threatened flank, where by an opportune charge they check a rout and give the hard-pressed Infantry time to reform; finally, they take up a vigorous pursuit for twelve miles. Jackson was heard to exclaim that night, ' Give me 10,000 fresh troops and I will be in Washington to-morrow ! ' So it is to be presumed that if Stuart could have been supported he would not have stopped his pursuit after twelve miles, but pressed on to the capital itself, and perhaps thus ended the war.

#### THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN

In December 1861, we find Major-General T. J. Jackson commanding the Department of the Valley with his ' Stonewall ' Brigade at Winchester. He had under his command some 4,000 men, raised to a strength of 11,000 on Christmas Day by the arrival of Loring's Division from Staunton.

His Cavalry, the Valley Troopers, about 15,000 strong, were commanded by Ashby—of whom it was said that ' with Ashby between any body of Infantry and an enemy not in unreasonable force, that body worked, and ate, and slept in peace of mind ' !

So, whilst Jackson was drilling his men from daylight to dark, Ashby's Vedettes were everywhere affording absolute security to his own Infantry, whilst reconnoitring and discovering the enemy's movements and dispositions.

An example of Jackson's ideas as to how his Cavalry should be employed whilst the main Army is resting and reorganising.

Whilst waiting for General Loring, Jackson found work for his troops in cutting Dam No. 5, and doing other damage to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.

Facing Jackson on the north bank of the Potomac was General Banks

with 18,000 men, headquarters at Frederick; whilst thirty-five miles north-west of Winchester, near Romney, were 5000 troops, under General Kelly.

Jackson determined to attack this isolated detachment.

On January 1 he left Winchester with 9000 men, and reached Bath on the 4th; but its garrison escaped across the river, leaving all its baggage and stores.

Jackson's Cavalry and Artillery were utterly exhausted after the most awful march, through snow and sleet and biting winds, over slippery mountain roads, their baggage waggons miles behind, so that, although he pushed them on, they were unable to prevent the enemy reaching the Potomac by the Hancock Road, at a point where they had boats moored, and getting clean away.

On the morning of the 5th he opened fire on Hancock, and under cover of the bombardment destroyed the railway bridge across the Big Cacapon River, and made arrangements to cross the Potomac himself. However, again well served by his Cavalry, he received information of heavy reinforcements for the enemy, approaching from Hagerstown and Williamsport, which decided him to retire; for Romney, when all was said, not Hancock, was his destination.

Doubtless it had been his hope to capture every Federal in Bath, to reach and cross the Potomac, inflict damage and retire before those reinforcements could come up. But the Infantry he commanded were not yet his 'Foot Cavalry,' and neither knew nor trusted him as they learnt to know and trust.

On January 7, therefore, we find Jackson and his weary, cold, and shivering army retracing the frightful road to Bath, under a sky of lead, in a harsh and freezing wind.

He halted at Unger's Store, twenty miles to the southward, for three days in order to rough-shoe his horses, that were in a pitiable plight, especially the Artillery horses, from the mountain roads, which, slippery as glass, gave no foothold.

On again through Bloomery Gap, with Loring's regiments in a semi-mutinous state, this terrible march attended with hunger, cold, sickness, and worn-out boots, was continued.

Past Hanging Rock and Jersey Mountain, with the wind howling along the crest, until at last Romney was reached. Too late! The enemy had fled, with Ashby's weary Cavalry at their heels, abandoning

all their stores. Jackson says, ‘ You are too slow. You should have marched faster.’

Jackson wished to push on to destroy Banks’ communications with the west, but his men and horses were utterly worn out, so, putting Loring’s Division in winter quarters at Romney, he retired with his ‘ Stonewall Brigade ’ to Winchester, arriving there on January 24.

He had in these twenty-four days won back three counties to the Confederate cause; secured the exceedingly fertile valley of the south branch of the Potomac as a source of supplies; and placed the enemy, who were prepared to assume the offensive, on the defensive.

We will pass over the interference of the Civil Authorities, which resulted in the recall of Loring from Romney, immediately to be re-occupied by the Federals, thus undoing all Jackson’s work.

Suffice to say that Jackson’s resignation, which he was only persuaded with great difficulty to withdraw, soon brought the Cabinet to its knees, and taught the Government the much-needed lesson not to interfere with a general in the field carrying out operations already sanctioned by the Cabinet.

#### KERNSTOWN

We now come to an example of how a general can be ‘ let in ’ through faulty information from his Cavalry patrols.

Jackson remained at Winchester drilling and drilling his army, now known as the Valley Army, and rapidly hardening and welding them into his ‘ Foot Cavalry.’

March 9, 1862, found Jackson and his Valley Army of 4600 men and eighteen guns isolated. His nearest reinforcements were at Culpeper Court House, sixty miles away.

Opposed to him was the Federal General Banks, with 38,000 men and eighty guns, holding the Charlestown-Martinsburg line.

To Jackson had been entrusted the duty of holding the whole of Banks’ force in check and preventing him detaching any part of it to McClellan’s aid, who was advancing on Richmond by the York Town peninsula, *i.e.* from the south-east.

Jackson fell back to Mount Jackson, hoping to draw the Federals in pursuit up the valley.

Of Banks’ four divisions, one had already been detached to join McClellan, one had been sent to cover Harper’s Ferry, which left the

third (Shield's) opposed to Jackson. The fourth (Williams') was to cross the Blue Ridge and hold Manassas.

On March 22 Ashby's Cavalry came in contact with the Federal picquets, a mile or two out of Winchester.

Now came the error. Ashby reported that the force he had encountered only consisted of four regiments of Infantry, with Cavalry and Artillery. Jackson was thus led to assume that he had only a rear-guard to deal with, and determined to attack, in the hope of recalling the troops marching to Manassas.

On the night of the 22nd Jackson's Army marched twenty-two miles, and next day fourteen miles, which brought them close to Kernstown.

The battle started at 4 P.M., and after three hours' desperate fighting, during which Ashby's mistake as to the enemy's numbers was fully demonstrated, the Confederates were forced to retire to Newtown, Jackson skilfully using his Cavalry to cover their retreat.

The Valley Army had thus marched thirty-six miles, fought a hard battle, in which they had been forced to retire, though not defeated, all within twenty-four hours.

They were rapidly becoming Jackson's 'Foot Cavalry,' and were beginning to cheer him whenever they saw him.

Jackson had for once fallen into a trap, owing to faulty reports from his Cavalry; but, though forced to retire, he succeeded in the object for which he fought, for the Federal Government, fearful for the safety of Washington, detached no less than one corps and two divisions from McClellan's Army. He also stopped Banks from interfering with General Johnston's march from the Rapidan to Richmond.

#### MCDOWELL

We now come to a brilliant example of the art in which Jackson excelled, namely, that of deceiving the enemy as to his intentions.

How did he use his Cavalry to assist him in so doing?

We shall see that he first of all employed them to guard all the bridges and fords of a river between him and the enemy, thus preventing the latter gaining any information as to his whereabouts or movements, whilst his plans were maturing.

When all was ready he launched them in force against the enemy, with two objects in view: firstly, to make the enemy think he was advancing against them, whilst in reality he was marching right away

from them; secondly, in order to drive in all the enemy's advanced patrols and picquets so that they could glean no information as to his whereabouts or the direction of march of his main columns.

After Kernstown, Stonewall Jackson and his Valley Army retreated slowly up the valley turnpike, through Strasburg and Woodstock, to a strong natural position called Rude's Hill, near Mount Jackson. Here he remained nearly three weeks, drilling as usual all day and every day; his army safe and quiet behind that vigilant and valiant screen composed of Ashby's troopers and Chew's Horse Artillery. Recruits flowed in, men returned from hospital and furlough, so that during this time the Valley Army grew to number nearly 6000 men.

Edward Johnson with his brigade was at West View, seven miles west of Staunton, whilst Ewell's Division was encamped round Gordonsville.

Banks, with 19,000 men, was moving slowly and cautiously up the valley, and Frémont's Army was pressing south through Romney, Moorefield, and Franklin, with Milroy's Brigade advancing east from Monterey.

All these troops, some 40,000 men, were to combine on Staunton, and, having there secured the Virginia Central Railway, were to push on into East Tennessee and capture Knoxville.

Jackson was bound to strike a blow before Banks and Frémont could unite. Banks was the nearer, but his troops were more concentrated. Jackson, therefore, determined to turn upon the weaker and more scattered force, with the help of Johnson's Brigade, then uniting with Ewell to crush Banks.

In order to carry this out successfully it was imperative to mislead and mystify Banks, and to do this Jackson made full use of his Cavalry screen. He fell back on Harrisonburg, and, evacuating that place on April 18, turned sharp to the east, over Swift Run Gap, into Elk Run Valley, where he remained for ten days, Ashby's Cavalry guarding all the bridges and crossings over the Shenandoah River. Now to deceive Banks. On April 29 Ashby, from the west side of the Shenandoah River, made a demonstration in force, and drove back the Federal Cavalry into Harrisonburg, thus closing the eyes of Banks' Army.

That evening the Valley Army, through rain and mud, along abominable mountain roads, marched towards Port Republic. So abominable were the roads, with mud up to the men's knees, that it was



with the greatest difficulty the guns and waggons could be got through; general, staff, officers, everyone had to labour in the pouring wet to make the road at all passable with stones and brushwood. The army crawled along like a tortoise, a mud tortoise, making five miles a day.

On the morning of May 3 the clouds broke and the sun came out. It found the troops bivouacked just east of Port Republic, and there clear before them was the valley turnpike, the road to Staunton, no longer a neglected mountain road to struggle along, but a fair, high road, with a good marching surface.

They would easily do the eighteen miles to Staunton before night-fall, for, of course, they were bound there.

But it was first of all necessary to lead Banks to suppose that they were bound for Richmond. The column fell in and stepped out briskly along the highway, when to their surprise and disappointment the head turned to the left and began to ascend the rough and stony Brown's Gap road. That night found them across the Blue Ridge, bivouacked in the meadows beside Meechum River, where they went to bed in a resigned frame of mind, supposing they were badly required at Richmond, which supposition was shared by all ranks, including even the staff, so carefully did Jackson keep his plans to himself.

That evening, too, a boy on a breathless horse brought the news to Staunton that Jackson and the Valley Army had crossed Brown's Gap, and were on their way to Richmond.

Soon the whole of that part of the valley rang with the news 'Called to Richmond.' No need now for Banks to push forward. He could advance at leisure, occupy Staunton, and there join with Frémont and Millroy.

Jackson kept up the deception to the very end.

Next morning, Sunday, May 4, his troops were marched down to the Meechum River station, where they found the long lines of cars so arranged as to give them the impression they were going to Richmond. The first train was packed, men on the roofs as before, and started to move, but *west*, not *east*.

That evening his whole army reached Staunton, and next day, May 5, he effected his junction with Edward Johnson.

Four days after, from Sitlington Hill, on the Bull Pasture Mountain, Jackson sent the following characteristic despatch: 'God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday.'

## FRONT ROYAL

And now for Banks. He had been ordered to fall back on Strasbourg, where he had 4476 Infantry, 1600 Cavalry, and sixteen guns. Between Strasbourg and Manassas were a further 2500 Infantry, six squadrons of Cavalry, and six guns. Winchester was garrisoned by 1500 men, and in Front Royal were 1000 men, and two guns, under Kenly.

Frémont, though shaken at McDowell by Milroy's defeat, was still a force to be reckoned with, who could assist Banks. To isolate Banks, therefore, in order to destroy him, was Jackson's first care, and both to isolate and destroy he again made use of his wonderful genius for employing his Cavalry, as no general had done since Napoleon.

By burning all bridges, blocking all passes and gaps across the Shenandoah Mountains with trees, abatis, and boulders, and drawing his Cavalry screen straight across the valley below Woodstock, he not only completely guarded his left flank, and prevented Frémont from assisting Banks, but he stopped Banks from even getting a spy through from Strasbourg, and thus all Banks knew, or could find out, until the blow fell, was that Jackson's Army was somewhere west of Harrisonburg, and he believed he was in no immediate danger of being attacked.

Jackson moved fast, averaging his twenty-two miles a day with his 'Foot Cavalry,' and on May 17 met Ewell at Mount Solon.

Two days later the Valley Army, moving down the valley pike in a beautiful confidence that it was hurling itself against Banks at Strasbourg, swerved to the east about Newmarket, with a suddenness that made it dizzy, and climbed straight up and over that strange and bold wall of the Massanuttons, over and down into the lovely Luray Valley, where it was joined by Ewell's 8000.

Jackson's force now numbered 17,000 men. On the afternoon of the 23rd the storm broke on the devoted garrison of Front Royal. They were entirely taken by surprise, and only a handful escaped to Winchester.

Jackson handled his Cavalry in his usual masterful fashion, and gave us an example how to attack demoralised and surprised Infantry. Kenly, commanding the Federals, made a stand on the west bank of the Shenandoah, which was in flood at the time. He fired both bridges, but the Confederate Infantry, dashing on to them, beat out the flames

with their rifle butts before much damage was done, although the bridges were sufficiently damaged to prevent Cavalry crossing.

Jackson, who had himself led the 6th Virginia Cavalry to the enemy's left flank, never hesitated, but ordered all the Cavalry to swim across, and in a short time the river below the bridges was thick with swimming horses.

Ashby, with the 7th Virginia Cavalry, who had crossed at McCoy's Ford, lower down, was already at Buckton Station, burning the railway bridge, cutting the telegraph, staying the troop trains, and capturing the Infantry there.

Whilst the Cavalry, led by Jackson himself, struggled in columns of twos across the deep and turgid Shenandoah, swollen with the spring rains to its banks, the Confederate Infantry, who had been pouring across the damaged bridges, attacked Kenly fiercely.

Soon the Cavalry were across, and having formed, they galloped straight at the small body of Yankee Cavalry, who broke and fled straight through their own unfortunate and already much shaken Infantry. These had no time to re-form before Jackson's charging, cheering, dripping squadrons came thundering down on them.

Kenly, with his foremost company, fired one point-blank volley at twenty yards, which emptied ten saddles of the leading squadrons. But it could not stay the unstayable; in a moment, with a roar as of undammed water, with smell of sweat and powder, with impact of body, with sabre blow and revolver shot, with a yell of Berserker rage and battle ecstasy, came the shock—the 'shock' that some people say is out of place in Cavalry tactics—and then the *mêlée*. In the wild quarter of an hour before the surrender of the whole many Federals were killed, many more wounded. Far and wide they scattered, and were pursued, both guns were taken, and out of Kenly's one thousand Kenly himself, twenty officers and nine hundred men, dead, wounded, and surrendered, with all his stores, remained in Jackson's hands.

Jackson pushed on the 2nd and 6th Regiments of Virginia Cavalry, under Stuart, to Newton, and marched on to Middletown with his 'Stonewall' Brigade, but he failed to cut off Banks' retreat, although his 'Foot Cavalry' marched their eighty miles in five days. He, however, captured the whole of the Federal baggage trains and stores.

Banks was strangely slow to realise the truth. His first impression was that the attack on Front Royal was merely a Cavalry raid; when,

however, at 10 A.M. on the 24th, he realised the gravity of the situation, he ordered an immediate retreat, but though he managed to slip through Middletown before Jackson arrived there it was only with the greatest difficulty, harassed as he was by Ashby's squadrons in hot pursuit.

We now come to an example where the fruits of a victory were partially lost, through the Cavalry getting out of hand in the pursuit.

The road from Strasbourg to Middletown was a scene of indescribable confusion, choked with waggons, guns, dead horses, wounded men. Over all hung dust, smoke, and uproar. There were horses enough unhurt still harnessed to waggons, or corralled in fence corners, or huddled with prisoners in the trodden fields.

Now Ashby's men, although full of wild courage, much manliness, much chivalry, and many other attributes of the ideal Cavalry soldier, yet had that fatal defect of all citizen soldiery, the lack of real discipline.

A horse to the trooper of the valley was the prized spoil of battle, a valued trophy. Each man of Ashby's owned the horse he rode, and burned to provide himself with a second mount. Their homes were near. Why not gallop a few miles, deposit the prize, return and catch up before Winchester? The consequence was that Ashby found his ranks gradually getting thinner and thinner as he continued the pursuit.

On the 25th Banks stood at bay at Winchester, with 6500 disorganised troops, against Jackson's victorious 15,000. Jackson moved against him by the turnpike with his ' Stonewall ' Brigade, whilst Ewell came in on the Federal left flank by the Front Royal Road.

By 10 A.M. Banks' Army was in full flight for the Potomac in a disorganised and broken mob, and the Valley Army, pouring into Winchester, tasted all the sweets of a patriot soldiery relieving a patriot town.

And what a chance for the Confederate Cavalry was now offered! But alas! by now Ashby had only a handful of troopers, and so by midday on May 26 Banks was safely across the Potomac.

Had Ashby's Cavalry only remained in hand there is little doubt that Banks and his whole army would have had either to surrender or be cut to pieces.

Steuart—not to be confounded with the brilliant and dashing J. E. B. Steuart—gave an example of failing as a Cavalry leader through

allowing himself to be tied hand and foot by 'red tape' and pedantic notions, and by possessing no initiative. Jackson sent him orders to pursue vigorously with his two regiments, which he refused to do until these orders were corroborated by General Ewell, in whose division he was, although he knew Jackson commanded the army. He wasted two precious hours trying to find Ewell, who was actually in *front* of him with the Infantry, and who promptly sent him highly 'corroboratory' orders indeed, but by the time Stuart reached the Potomac Banks was half-way across.

#### CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC

Washington was in a panic at the news of Banks' defeat. On that very day McDowell was to have moved forward from Fredericksburg to join hands with McClellan, when 150,000 men would then march against the doomed city of Richmond.

Jackson, to increase the panic, advanced to Harper's Ferry.

In spite of McDowell's protests, the terrified amateur strategists at Washington ordered him to detach half his corps to the valley to cut off Jackson's retreat, while at the same time Frémont was ordered into the valley from the west, to co-operate with McDowell.

On May 30 Jackson, well aware of his danger and not wishing to sacrifice his immense train of captured stores, fell back to Winchester, leaving the 'Stonewall' Brigade, under Winder, at Halltown, near Harper's Ferry, for the night, to make a final feint.

Now commenced the famous march which gave the name of 'Foot Cavalry' to the Valley Army.


Three armies had for their objective Strasbourg. One came from the north-west, twenty miles away, under Frémont, and counted 10,000. One came from the south-east, twelve miles away, under Shields—the leading division of McDowell's Army Corps—and numbered 12,000. These were clad in blue. The third army, in grey, led by a man in an old forage cap and tunic, with a sabre tucked under his arm, on a sorrel nag, came from Winchester, eighteen miles away, with a brigade detached at Halltown, *forty-three* miles away.

Frémont, Indian fighter, moved fast; Shields, Irish born, veteran of the Mexican War, moved fast; but the man in grey on the sorrel nag moved Infantry with the rapidity of Cavalry.

At dawn on the 31st the Valley Army left Winchester and bivouacked

that night at Strasbourg, while the 'Stonewall' Brigade bivouacked at Newtown, having actually marched thirty-five miles that day. Between 2 A.M. and 3 A.M. on June 1 they were off again, and reached Strasbourg at dawn—forty-three miles in twenty-four hours. At noon they moved off again with the main army.

Far in advance moved Stonewall Jackson's Cavalry screen, under Ashby. Supple, quick travelling, keen-eyed men, burning to make amends for their late fault.



A Cavalry which made not only an effective cloud, behind which to execute intricate manœuvres, but also a drawer-up of information like dew from every by-road and path and wood. Thus Jackson was always kept well informed of Frémont's and Shields' whereabouts.

Shields was still at Front Royal, so throughout the whole of that long, hot, dusty Sunday afternoon in June, Stonewall Jackson marched up the valley pike, holding Frémont off with one hand, while he passed Shields.

All next day the march continued, with Frémont pressing hot in pursuit. Jackson again made masterful use of his Cavalry. They were first sent to burn the Conrad Store, White House, and Columbia bridges over the south fork of the Shenandoah, thus preventing Shields from connecting with Frémont through the Newmarket Gap. He then used Ashby to check the pursuit, and to form his rear-guard.

That evening Jackson crossed the west fork of the Shenandoah, leaving his Cavalry to burn the bridge and keep guard between him and Frémont, and that night his army bivouacked in safety at Newmarket, with the Cavalry and an unbridged river between it and Frémont, and a range of mountains and another river, with bridges destroyed, between it and Shields.

On the 6th Jackson and his Valley Army, continuing their retreat, bivouacked at Port Republic. There he held the one bridge by which his pursuers could unite, and at the same time menaced Frémont's line of advance, if he tried to move on Staunton.

Two days later Frémont, having bridged the Shenandoah, crossed and found himself opposed by Ashby's Cavalry, backed up by Ewell, whom Jackson had detached to Cross Keys, halfway between Harrisonburg and Port Republic.

Ashby and his Cavalry harassed Frémont's advance considerably, thereby giving time for Jackson to turn on Shields, who was approaching up the Luray Valley in a straggling line twenty-five miles long, under the remarkable impression that Jackson was at Rude's Hill, near Newmarket, with Frémont effectively dealing with him and his 'demoralised rebels.'

In one of these delaying actions, Ashby, finding himself attacked in strength, asked Ewell to reinforce him with two Infantry regiments, and it was at the head of one of these, the 58th Virginia, that he fell, shot through the heart, while gallantly rallying them and leading them on to a last victorious charge, which drove back Frémont's advance to Harrisonburg.

On June 8 Frémont again advanced and attacked Ewell at Cross Keys, but was again repulsed and driven back to Harrisonburg.

On this same day Shields was gaily marching along, his army strung out, full of his ideas of rounding the mountains at Port Republic, of turning north again, of joining with Frémont and stamping out rebellion.

One may well ask, ' What was his Cavalry doing ? '

But they were not controlled or used by a master hand as Jackson's Cavalry were; they also missed now the best chance they ever had in the war of capturing Jackson himself.

The woods for miles around were extremely thick. Working up through these, they managed to rush the Confederate picquets and galloped straight into the village of Port Republic, where Jackson's headquarters lay. Luckily ' Little Sorrel ' was at the door ready, and the Blue Cavalry were a little bewildered at the very success of their dash. Jackson mounted with his usual slow deliberation. Turning in his saddle, he looked back to the shouting Blue Horsemen; then pulling his old forage cap well over his eyes, sitting stiffly, bolt upright, with elbows and toes well out, looking anything but the great Cavalry genius he was, away he went with his staff across the weather-beaten wooden bridge over the Shenandoah, and up the ridge to the other side, to where his main body lay, concealed among the woods.

He was soon back again with his Infantry, who quickly cleared the village of the hostile horsemen and drove them back a mile or two into the deep woods on to the top of Shields' Infantry advance.

That general remained halted all that day listening to the guns at Cross Keys.

On the next day, the 9th, Jackson, reinforced by part of Ewell's division, attacked Shields and drove him far down the valley towards Luray. And now was seen the strange sight of Frémont's Army darkening the heights upon the further side of the river of burned bridges, looking impotently on, while their friends were being driven helter-skelter down the valley.

Jackson now wished to turn against Frémont, but that general had managed to drive back the small force left in front of him, forcing them to burn the bridge to cover their retirement. It was therefore impossible for Jackson to re-cross and attack him.

These Confederate successes had, however, again, for the third time, stopped McDowell from making his long-looked-for advance on Richmond. And thus ended the Valley Campaign.



*A DRAGOON OFFICER'S EXPERIENCES AT SALAMANCA*

By CHARLES DALTON, F.R.G.S.

NORCLIFFE NORCLIFFE, the writer of the letter given below, served at the battles of Talavera, Busaco, Albuhera, Cavalry action of Usagre, and battle of Salamanca, in which last he was severely wounded and taken prisoner. He was made a Knight of Hanover by William IV. and received the Peninsular War medal with four clasps in 1848. General Norcliffe, who owned the Langton estate in Yorkshire, died February 8, 1862:—

Salamanca, August 10, 1812.

My beloved Father,—\*

Thanks to the Almighty and the very great care of my surgeon I am quite out of danger from the severe wound I received, but it was perhaps the most hair-breadth escape that ever was heard of; the skull was just injured, and the tenth part of an inch more must have consigned me to an eternal rest. We were pursuing the French Infantry, which were broken and running in all directions. I was cuffing them down as well as I could when, in the hurry and confusion, I lost my regiment and got with some soldiers of the 5th Dragoon Guards; on looking behind me I could only see a few of the 5th, and we were in the centre of the enemy's Infantry, amongst whom were a few Chasseurs and Dragoons. Nothing now remained but to go on, as we were in as much danger by going any other way. I rode up to a French officer who was, like the rest, taking to his heels, and cut him just behind his neck; I saw the blood flow and he lost his balance and fell from his horse. I perceived my sword was giving way in the handle, so I said to the officer who lay on the ground: 'Donnez-moi votre épée.' I really believe he was more frightened than hurt; I sheathed my sword and went on with his. I had not gone ten yards further before my horse was wounded in the ear by a gun shot; he turned sharp round, and at the same instant I was shot in the head. I turned giddy and fell off. I can recollect a French Dragoon taking away my horse. I was senseless a few seconds, and when I recovered I saw the French Dragoons stripping me of everything; they began by turning my

\* Colonel Norcliffe of Langton, Yorkshire, who had served some years as captain in the 11th Dragoons and was appointed Lieut.-Colonel Commandant of the York Volunteers in 1795. He died in 1820.




**NORCLIFFE NORCLIFFE.**

*(In the uniform of Major, 17th Light Dragoons—1823.)*

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Joined the 4th Dragoons as Cornet February 5, 1807, promoted Lieutenant April 28, 1808; Captain February, 29, 1816; Major 4th Light Dragoons August 9, 1821; exchanged to 17th Light Dragoons December 20, 1821; half-pay 18th Hussars May 22, 1823; attained the rank of Major-General August 31, 1855.



**SALAMANCA.**

22nd July, 1812.

pockets inside out to look for money, which they stole, my sword and sash, hat, boots, and spurs off my feet, dragging me along the ground in the most barbarous manner, saying, 'Eh — Anglais, vous n'êtes pas à cheval.' Another said, 'Eh, je sais bien le garçon, il m'a poursuivi, — ! In fact I never saw such usage in my life. 'Allons donc enleve toi' said another. I shook my head, as much as to say I am unable to rise, when he held a sabre over me, crying out : ' — ! je vous mettrai à coup de sabre.' At last I was left by the Cavalry, and the French Infantry came all round me, and I expected the same treatment. Judge of my surprise when I experienced quite the contrary : 'Courage, mon ami.' I asked for water, being very faint from loss of blood. 'Ma foi, je n'ai point de l'eau, pauvre garçon'; and another, 'Etes vous officier?' I stammered out : 'Oui, lieutenant de Quatrième Regiment de Dragons.' Presently an officer came up with five soldiers; each took a leg or an arm, and the fifth supported my head, which was bleeding profusely, and I will say I never saw men more careful; if ever I groaned owing to the pain of being carried they said to each other : 'Gardez vous, gardez vous, camarade.' They carried me into the very centre of the French column, close to a very fine battalion of Grenadiers with great bear-skin caps. I rested here a little, for I was very weak, and a great number of French officers came round me, and were most particularly civil. One colonel of Grenadiers poured some brandy into a cup and wanted me to drink it. I just wet my lips. He then ordered five Grenadiers to fall out and carry me further into the wood. I made a sign that I had rather be carried by the men who brought me there, fearful of falling into fresh hands. Our Infantry was at the time advancing again to the attack; the five men who had carried me were desired by all the French officers to take particular care that no one ill-used me, and that if I could not get away I was to be laid under a tree. The five men, seeing our Infantry advance, laid me down very carefully under an olive tree, and each of them shook hands with me before they left me, and said : 'Je vous souhaite bien, Monsieur,' and they also desired that I would remember they belonged to the 65th Regiment. Our Infantry I could now see (though it was getting dark) were bayonet to bayonet, and I had at last the pleasure of seeing the enemy running in every direction. I had the presence of mind to take off my jacket and cram it into a bush, and as my boots were off I lay as if I was dead, and when they were running away they all passed my tree and took me for a French-

man. Several of the musket shots from our men struck the back of the tree where I was, but I lay very close to the root. Drums, muskets, and everything they could not easily carry, were thrown away by the enemy. One Frenchman was wounded by a musket ball in the side, and fell close to me. I waited till the French had all passed me, and then ran as fast as my strength would let me towards our Riflemen. I was so delighted at getting back, I actually threw my arms round the necks of our Infantry. They led me up to where the 6th Division was, and I fell down quite exhausted at the feet of the Grenadier Company of the 32nd Regiment. A corporal and a file of men led me under a bank, and I really think I owe my life to the corporal, who took his blanket out of his knapsack and went three miles to search for water for me. They then tied a blanket between two sergeants' pikes, and carried me more to the rear, to the 5th Foot—the surgeon of which regiment just tied a bandage round my head and I was obliged to stay in the cold all night. The agony I suffered was beyond all description. The next morning I was carried on a mule to the Regiment, and Mrs. Dalbiac,\* whose kindness I shall never forget, got me carried into Salamanca and washed my head and put me to bed; she then got Dr. Gunning to come, who dressed my wound properly and bled me. The next day I was bled again, and also the day following; in the whole I lost 48 ounces of blood. I am now doing well, and I hope to get up to the Army, which is marching on Madrid, with General Cotton, who is wounded in the arm and who starts in a fortnight; he has been very civil. This is the second horse I have lost in action, as also my saddle, bridle, collar, sword, sash, musket, boots and spurs and pouch. My beloved Father will see I have been obliged to draw largely on the agent owing to these losses. It was a glorious day for our Brigade. They behaved nobly; four men killed of the troop I commanded and several men and horses wounded. It was a fine sight to see the fellows running, and as we held our swords over their heads fall down on their knees, drop their muskets, and cry: 'Prisonnier, monsieur.'

You see I am not born to be a prisoner. Love to my Mother.

I am, &c. &c.

N. NORCLIFFE.

\* This lady (*née* Dalton) was first cousin to the writer of above letter and wife of Lieut.-Colonel Dalbiac, 4th Dragoons. Napier, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, pays a deserved tribute to the courage of this lady, who, on the memorable 22nd July, 1812, 'rode deep amidst the enemy's fire' whilst her husband was charging with his regiment.



## CAVALRY FIRE ACTION

By COLONEL F. ST. D. SKINNER, A.Q.M.G., MHOW DIVISION

The following notes by an Infantry officer are respectfully offered for the consideration of Cavalry officers. The subject is dealt with under the following headings:—Strategical Reconnaissance; The Raid; The Battle; The Pursuit; Rear-guard Actions; Fire Positions; Distance of horses from the firing line; Training.

THERE is constant dispute between extremists, those who would have Cavalry little more than Mounted Infantry, and those who see in the fire combat 'an expedient, a last effort, which ought not to be resorted to except in extreme cases.' With neither extreme are we concerned here, but solely to consider how the rifle with which Cavalry is armed can be best employed.

This Paper is not an attempt to magnify the relative importance of the rifle, and wherever its use is illustrated it is presupposed that for this particular occasion it is the right weapon to use. We need not discuss whether the Cavalryman can become as good an Infantryman as a Cavalryman; when he uses his rifle he is still a Cavalryman just as much as when he uses sword or lance.

To decide on the most suitable form of training for Cavalry in fire action we must consider its probable tactics in the field. How far will these resemble those of Infantry, and where will they differ greatly therefrom? We may say at once that what Infantry can do Cavalry can do, and that therefore they must be trained on similar lines; but the nature of the work that falls to Cavalry will ensure for it opportunity to apply certain forms of fire tactics, and its mobility will enable it to find targets, which will not often fall to the lot of Infantry. Thus, before the battle, Cavalry covering a wide front will, though its main object is to be achieved by concentrated effort, engage in many isolated actions, with opportunities of surprise and ambushade. In battle Infantry will find its main employment in the attack, a marked feature of its action being the early dissolution of battalions and companies into sections and squads, in which alone, as the fight progresses, can control be maintained. Infantry may at any moment have to use long or short

range fire, rapid or slow, concentrated or distributed, enfilade or oblique, but the greater part of its action will be confined to firing straight to its front at a steadily decreasing range. Cavalry, on the other hand, though as a last resort it may have to play the part of Infantry pure and simple, will find its main action in a more congenial sphere, where the importance of the rifle is enormously enhanced through the speed of the horse. Thus what is the rule with Infantry is the exception with Cavalry, and *vice versâ*.

#### THE WORK OF CAVALRY IN THE FIELD.

*Strategical Reconnaissance.*—(It is, perhaps, advisable to repeat here the stipulation made above that the man on the spot has decided to employ the rifle.) To gain information we must first defeat the hostile Cavalry. In this phase, whatever the relative proportions of our mounted and dismounted work, we are certain to have many opportunities for fire action. An incautious enemy may be lured into an ambushade and allowed to approach until we can destroy him with rapid fire. Here two points arise for our consideration :—

(1) How close can we with safety permit the enemy to approach? Nothing is to be gained by withholding our fire till after he reaches 200 yards from us, as at that distance every shot should be on the target; but 300 yards would probably be a judicious range to open fire at, and if we do justice to our training it is hard to believe that any could escape out of a troop or squadron in anything like close order.

(2) Should we concentrate or distribute our fire against such a target? In action against another firing line we (a) distribute our fire to neutralise that of the enemy, (b) concentrate it to more effectively beat down his moral. Against charging Cavalry at close range, the case is somewhat different. If we place all our fire on the centre of the target we probably cause much less loss of life and moral than if we bring the whole front under fire. A moving body would not lose moral in the same way as one that is glued to the ground; as it moves on its losses would be ignored. At close range, then, fire should be distributed against Cavalry.

Chance may commit us to dismounted action against a superior force which closes rapidly on us. Should we use long range fire or wait until our enemy is within, say, 1000 yards? At long range we shall probably have a more compact target than at short, and the power

of the rifle at such range cannot be questioned provided the men are steady and the range is known. There may, however, be no time for range-taking, but by selecting one well short of the enemy we can at all events make sure that he will have to pass through our fire. Here fire should be concentrated at the centre of a reasonably broad front, such as that of a squadron in line, for in action at such range the splay of the cone of fire will be considerable, and if distributed along the whole front, much of it would go wide of the target. As the enemy closes on us we should distribute our fire, and to do this effectively it must be systematically taught in training, so that it shall not be necessary to point out to individuals the particular part of the target they are to fire at in action. It will be impossible in war for the leader to do this.

In long range fire against Cavalry there is great danger that the men, getting excited, will forget to alter their sights. On the march from Kimberley to head off Cronje some of our Cavalry came under the long range fire of a considerable party of Boers, and, galloping for them, had several casualties. If it was like this at long range, what would it be like at short? However, as close range was neared the casualties ceased, and the rifles of such Boers as were killed or captured were all found sighted for long range. This is what, it is to be feared, may often happen unless troops are well disciplined and fire control is strong.

Against mounted troops at close range fire should of course be rapid, for the opportunity is a fleeting one, but at long range it should be slow, lest the men get out of hand and forget to alter their sights. In a fire fight it will be rapid or slow according to a great variety of circumstances.

'The enemy's Cavalry having been defeated the independent Cavalry will be free to concentrate its efforts upon breaking through the hostile covering troops and discovering the dispositions of the enemy's main forces.' In this phase opportunities may occur for enfilade, if not for reverse, fire. Enfilade targets, to be taken advantage of, may have to be approached both quickly and stealthily. At manœuvres we see Cavalry openly moving round the flanks of hostile Cavalry in firing positions, and no heed being paid by the latter to the fact that they will shortly be enfiladed. This spirit of *laissez-faire* will lead to minor disasters at the opening of a war, but a few



such episodes will suffice, and every indication of a hostile movement round our flanks will be keenly watched for. Similarly our flanking movements will be carefully watched by the enemy. Thus, if we wish to surprise him with enfilade fire, we must combine stealth and celerity. Let us suppose now that we have reached our fire position and that our target, unsuspecting danger, lies before us in enfilade. If it is not more than 1000 yards from us, or if it is a long one, with reasonable accuracy in judging distance we can make sure of taking heavy toll of our enemy. But if the range is a long one or the target a fairly short one, average judging distance, even with the employment of combined sights, may lead to our not accomplishing anything. We must leave nothing to chance. Every squadron should have a one-man range-finder. These are expensive things, but their provision should depend on whether they will repay their cost. One range-finder per battalion may have to suffice. When Infantry comes under fire in the attack practically every section has to work on its own, and we cannot afford to give each section an instrument costing £65. But the squadron need rarely be broken up for fire purposes, and thus the benefit of a range-finder would be available for all four troops. On the other hand, a whole regiment together would not often come into action dismounted. Its several squadrons would probably be well separated, and thus the one instrument would be of no use to three of the squadrons.

Having a good range-finder we must not only know how to use it but also how to make allowance for what the instrument cannot allow for, the error of the day. Let us suppose we are 2000 feet above sea level, and that the temperature is 100 degrees, the range being 1500 yards. These conditions will alter the range by about 100 yards, and if not heeded may ruin our best efforts. There is nothing abstruse in calculating the error of the day. For every 1000 feet above sea level deduct  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the range, and for every 10 degrees above 60 degrees Fahr. deduct 1 per cent. of the range. Suppose we are operating at about 4000 feet above sea level and that the average temperature at mid-day is 100 degrees, then we should deduct 10 per cent. of the range. Thus for 1000 yards we should deduct 100 yards; for 1500 yards, 150 yards; for 2000 yards, 200 yards. This rough calculation, made in the morning, would hold good for a great part of the day.

The effect of wind from the front or rear must be considered. It

might be a toss-up whether we should allow 150 or 200 yards, say, for the error of the day. The fact of there being a head wind would decide us in favour of the lesser deduction, and *vice versa*.

Then a firing line is a very narrow target when viewed end on, and a mild wind would deflect the cone of fire from it at 1500 yards. The squadron commander must therefore carefully note whether there is a wind or not, and may have to direct his fire at some point to one side of the target, or he may prefer to give varying points of aim to his several troops.

It is evident that making the most of an enfilade target implies much more than merely getting into position and firing at it.

Oblique fire is similar to enfilade. The target is not such a good one from the ranging point of view, but allowance need not be made for deflection.


At times Cavalry may have to resort to dismounted attack to break through the enemy's covering troops. Here Cavalry action is on different lines to that of Infantry; as lacking the numbers essential to success in the Infantry attack Cavalry, in order to develop the maximum of fire power, will from the first ordinarily put all available rifles in the firing line, and to the same end employ its mobility to enable it to open fire from unexpected positions, and, accordingly, its horses must be at hand. To cover movements, of whatever nature, mutual support is invaluable. To get the best results Cavalry should employ both concentrated and distributed fire. Concentrated produces the more decisive results, but without neutralising fire we leave a great part of the enemy free to fire at us with the deliberation of the practice ground.

*The Raid.*—A good example of an extensive raid, though not well organised or well carried through in some respects, is Mischenko's raid on Yinkow. One of the objects of the raid was the destruction of stores at Yinkow or Niu-chia-tun. The attack on the latter locality seems to have failed through want of determination. As to how it might have been carried through successfully:—Reconnaissance having shown the outlying villages unoccupied, the hospital, A, might first have been attacked from San-chia-tze, machine-guns in that village and guns near Chien-lu-shu-kao covering the attack, and threats being made against the general front from Ta-kuan-tun and Hon-chia-yufang. Next, from Ta-kuan-tun the front C-D would be attacked, as soon as the guns were free to co-operate.

In this action all the available rifles would be put in the firing line at the outset. Sudden bursts of fire from several directions would keep the enemy tied to his position throughout. Different portions of the attack, A and C-D, push forward in turn, other portions covering them

with their fire: naturally those points are selected first for attack which necessitate a short advance only, for 'Cavalry should seldom undertake long advances on foot.'

In the assaults on A and C-D, Cavalry would be handicapped for want of a bayonet, but not sufficiently so as to justify the horse having to carry the added weight of that weapon. If Cavalry are trained in real snapshooting, such as the Boers were masters of in 1880, they will need no bayonet to ensure their victory at close quarters over an enemy not so trained. Again, for the



attack to be pushed *à outrance* by dismounted Cavalry is quite exceptional, and a very strong case would have to be made out for the bayonet before the whole of the Cavalry could be burdened to ensure isolated instances of successful bayonet attacks.

**The Battle.**—Here Cavalry is a mobile reserve, ready to apply its fire wherever required. At some particular point the attack has made headway in spite of heavy losses, and it is decided to push it home, but the troops still in hand are few, and no more are available save those who are providing covering fire. Well, replace them by Cavalry; here the work is that of Infantry, distributed fire so long as the firing line is pushing on, concentrated when the fight for superiority of fire rages, beating down the enemy's moral bit

by bit. Even if it were not necessary to take away the original covering fire troops it might be advisable to supplement their fire by that of Cavalry, for it is volume of fire that tells. Now it may be argued that all this dismounted work, this playing at Infantry for covering fire, will kill the Cavalry spirit; but why should it if the spirit is of the right sort and training has been on broad lines? Latterly in South Africa our Cavalry was restricted to fire action, but is it not true that to the end of the war, though they recognised, perhaps, its necessity, they despised it, and would have seized any opportunity of charging? Besides, though opportunities for fire action will frequently offer, it will be to small bodies rather than to large, and by the end of a general action possibly a large proportion of the Cavalry will not have fired a single round.

The flanks seem Cavalry's more legitimate sphere, and it is here that its influence will be most felt. One of Cavalry's trump cards is 'bluff'; while the Infantry engages the enemy all along the line, seeking to pin his local reserves to their ground, the Cavalry, by a heavy burst of fire on his flanks or rear, may induce him to draw off his general reserve from the point where the main attack is intended to be pushed home. But bluff, pure and simple, may not suffice, and Cavalry may have to push home the threat, otherwise the enemy may come to recognise that it is bluff and nothing more. Here it will make use of its mobility to outwit the enemy and gain tactical points which would otherwise have to be carried by force, as in the Infantry attack.

The value of a given number of rifles at a given point is the same whether they are fired by Cavalry or Infantry; the added value of the Cavalry rifle lies in the mobility of the firer. Speaking of the Battle of Te-li-ssu, de Negrier says, 'The right Japanese flank, being vigorously attacked and outflanked by a considerable force, was in a critical position. Although reinforced twice over, it was on the point of giving way, when a strong detachment of Cavalry succeeded in turning the left flank of the Russians, and in attacking it in reverse. The Russians were thus stopped, and the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity: thus their Cavalry decided the victory.'

At Mukden Akiyama's Cavalry, continually outflanking the Russian right and pinning it down, enabled Nogi's turning movement to reach and defeat that flank. In both these instances the Cavalry used fire action. No Infantry could have accomplished what the Cavalry did, for time and space were against them.

An illustration of what Cavalry could accomplish by fire action where the employment of Infantry is out of the question may be based on the situation at Mukden in March 1905. Supposing, with de Negrier, that the Russian Cavalry was rationally placed, 5000 on either flank, with a general reserve of 8000 at Mukden, the 5000 on the right flank would have delayed the advance of the Japanese Cavalry and, eventually reinforced by the reserve, have destroyed or immobilised it. The mass of the Cavalry might then have acted against the outer, or the inner, flank of Nogi's advance, preferably the latter; for Nogi's inner (eastern) echelons, endeavouring to make headway against the Cavalry, would inevitably have suffered severely, and lost distance from those on the left; thus when the Russian counter-stroke came, the way would have been prepared for it. If we suppose the Cavalry sent on a wide turning movement to take Nogi's army in rear the action would at first be offensive, profiting by the element of surprise to throw the enemy into disorder. A heavy burst of fire along a front of several miles would be calculated to wholly disorganise the attack, if already engaged in front, and without delay all reserves in hand would have to be defensive. In both attack and defence many opportunities would arise for oblique and enfilade fire, as well as long range fire against masses of Infantry, and probably, Artillery.

*The Pursuit.*—Fire action will be much the same in form as elsewhere—frontal, enfilade, reverse. What should be the nature of fire here—long range, short range, rapid or slow? If the enemy is mounted and your men well in hand, long range fire, altering sights by 400 yards at a time; but if not sure of your men, put their sights at 500 and make them wait till the enemy is within 900 yards, then rapid fire. If the enemy is Infantry, and in strength, open fire at long range, for you wish to delay him at all costs. Bursts of rapid fire may mislead the enemy as to your strength, while the intervals between the bursts will give opportunity for keeping your men in hand and for altering sights. If enemy is not in strength let him approach close, when he cannot escape.

*Rear-guard Actions.*—Cavalry will be able to hold on to positions much longer than Infantry. For good work here they must not only be good snapshots and good judges of distance, but their fire discipline must be of the best, for control may be impossible at the later stages of the fight and every man have to act on his own.

What proportion of men should dismount for fire action? Nor-

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10

100

*Distance of Horses from the Firing Line.*—This will vary with circumstances, and is without defined limit. If the horses, for whatever reason, cannot be brought up to the firing line the men may have to run back several hundred yards at speed if they are not to be caught by the enemy's fire while in the act of mounting; so to meet such a situation running drill is necessary. Against a mounted enemy, unless our firing line is prepared to fight it out on foot they must have their horses close at hand.

If it can be avoided, horses should not be kept immediately in rear of the firing line, unless the cover completely defilades them.

#### TRAINING.

To commence with, Cavalry has the same elementary and range training as Infantry. This training must be very thorough, whether in snapshooting, or slow or rapid fire, if Cavalry is to make the most of the great opportunities that will fall to it.

The theory of musketry must be understood by leaders, N.C.O's as well as officers, and the fact that the fire of a number of rifles will cover certain definite areas of ground, varying with the range, must be thoroughly grasped.

Till the characteristics of the cone of fire are familiarised full value will not be got out of ranging fire, nor can we determine whether it is worth while opening fire at certain targets at long range. It is inevitable that the excitement of action will tend to greatly enlarge the fire-swept zones, and it is most important that all should recognise the value of thorough training in counteracting the adverse influence of war conditions.

The practical application of fire can be taught only by field practices. What Cavalry must specially learn is the turning of its mobility to good account previous to the delivery of its fire. To mount and dismount, to hand over or link up horses with great rapidity, to move at speed without disclosing movement and, on arrival at the fire position, to quickly make complete arrangements, under cover, for the simultaneous opening of fire, are essential preliminaries to surprise by fire. The manner of opening fire admits of variation, and men should also be trained to rush forward individually immediately they are free of their horses, and open fire without special orders, as in a race for an important position. Exercises fostering rapid decision on the

part of subordinate leaders are particularly advisable for Cavalry. The supply of extra ammunition to those who are to form the firing line, as well as to the firing line in action, should also be practised.

Great as is the importance of fire control to Infantry, it is equally important to Cavalry. Much of their firing will be at long ranges, and for good value here control is absolutely essential. Again at close range, let the men once get out of hand, especially in face of Cavalry, and the factor that makes one hundred Cavalry the equivalent of perhaps a thousand Infantry, their mobility, may be lost beyond recovery. Control fosters calmness in the men, and again, calmness assists control, therefore field practices introducing the elements of suspense and surprise are of value. The troop, &c., should be kept for some time in a state of tension, not knowing what the target will be nor where it will appear, nor for how long it will be exposed. By accustoming the men to the excitement of uncertainty, and by giving them self-confidence we shall increase their self-control and their fire discipline, the foundation of fire control. We can give them self-confidence by teaching them to shoot straight and to mount quickly. Then if they have confidence in their leader, in his power of handling the fire, we can afford to hold positions to the last moment. In a fight at close quarters the tendency to disorder is apt to be greater with Cavalry than with Infantry. By training Infantry hold their ground or go forward. Cavalry, in addition, may go back or to a flank; with one eye on the enemy and the other on their horses the temptation to the men to move to the rear before the order is given is very strong: fire discipline and control then, must be very strong.

'In retiring under fire men will be taught to move from cover to cover rapidly: portions of the line will retire alternately, affording each other mutual support by taking up successive fire positions from which they can develop a heavy covering fire.' To get away unnoticed, men must crawl back, as is done in hill warfare, until they can stand upright without being seen by the enemy.

As before stated, the method of actually applying fire is the same with Cavalry as with Infantry, but a great deal more preliminary work will attach to Cavalry schemes for field practices than is the case with Infantry. To make such preliminary work realistic and of value in training, it should be carried out under natural conditions. To do this it may be necessary to separate the preliminaries from the actual firing.



For instance, a frequent phase of Cavalry action is the raid against the hostile line of communications, involving possibly the attack on a railway station, bridge, village or post. Such objectives abound around cantonments, and more thorough instruction will be given by operating against them directly than if carried out against make-believe objectives on the field practice ground. It is obvious, however, that we cannot carry our practice to its logical conclusion against villages or railway stations; it must stop short at the stage where fire would be opened, and the succeeding stages transferred to the field practice ground.

In the preliminary work, ranges would be taken or estimated, and preliminary orders issued for the opening of fire. On the field practice ground we would hark back a little from where we had left off, and gallop, or steal up, to our fire position, whichever was done in the manœuvre stage, and, completing our fire orders, push up into the position and open fire. It may be objected that the men, whether British or Indian, would not understand the connection between the manœuvre and the practice stages, but I think a little patience would secure comprehension. Anyhow, it would be an attempt to develop intelligence.

In extension of the above principle, in the preliminary stage the enemy might be represented by a troop, &c., firing blank.

*Example.*—Rear-guard action. Tests to see how long Cavalry can hold on to a position when enemy is (a) dismounted, (b) mounted. (a) A dismounted troop holds a position to delay the advance of hostile Infantry. Enemy attacks frontally. Defender awaits attack till enemy is within — yards, then withdraws to horses and rides off to the next position. (b) As above, but part of the enemy, mounted, approaches unseen till within — yards. Defenders at once ordered to mount. The horses are — yards in rear. The time will of course vary with the expertness of the men and the distance of the horses. After rehearsal with blank carry out the practice with ball on the field practice ground, and see if the men can get away in the time determined.

*Example.*—A troop makes an attack on foot against Infantry or dismounted Cavalry. While it is so engaged a second troop makes a wide outflanking movement and gets into position to enfilade enemy at long range, not being able to approach closer unseen. Both sides using blank. Repeat practice against a line of dummies:—

(a) Frontal attack, 1 troop, about 600 to 400 yards.

(b) Flank attack. Enfilade fire at about 1500 yards.

These two practices could not well be carried out simultaneously in peace for fear of ricochets from the enfilade fire, though in war the risk would not be considered, but a great many could be put through, using sometimes not more than one or two rounds of ammunition per man, troops not firing looking on. Those to benefit most from the application of fire in such practices are the officers and non-commissioned officers, and they could not well have too many of them. Once the men have thoroughly benefited from their elementary training and range and individual field practices, collective firing is to them little more than target practice. So long as control lasts all they have to do is to work with their leaders and fire steadily; the leaders do all the brain work.

To train men in working independently when control has ceased we must give them practices for troops and sections, where the control gradually dies away through leaders falling out, and the onus of responsibility falls on the several individuals.

Sometimes the position of the led horses behind a fold in the ground can be detected from such indications as lances carelessly exposed. A few rounds fired so as to just graze the covering feature and strike such a target would bring home the value of indirect fire and the need for careful concealment of horses, as also the inadvisability of placing them immediately in rear of the firing line.

It may be said 'Cavalry have no time for all this extra training.' I do not know just how much time is given to musketry in regiments, but I doubt if more would be necessary provided instruction were improved and the matter taken in hand regimentally. In every squadron there is probably one really good musketry inspector, and every now and again an officer or N.C.O. comes back from a course at a school who could be used to bring the best men up to date, arrangements being then systematically made for the general improvement of all who may have to instruct? The main instruction for the men is in shooting on and off the range, fire discipline and control. The factors which enhance the value of Cavalry fire are part of the every-day training of Cavalry, and would still have to be taught if Cavalry carried no rifle. Where much time will have to be given to study, thought and practice, if Cavalry is to make the most of its fire power, is in the case of fire unit commanders, the officers and non-commissioned officers.

## TRAINING YOUNG HORSES TO JUMP

By 'SCARLET LANCER'

### PART II

Before going further it is necessary to discuss the rider's seat. For the man who hopes to make young horses successfully there are two considerations affecting the seat over a fence.

1. Assistance to the horse, and
2. The rider's own balance.

Let us try to picture a good horseman putting a young horse over a fence at a canter.

Most young horses require to be steadied on coming up to a fence.

Our rider will bring him up at a collected canter; by not allowing the horse to extend himself yet he just keeps him back on his hocks. Two to three lengths from the fence the rider lowers his hands, giving the horse a freer rein, but of course keeping contact with his mouth. This enables the horse to slightly lower his head the more easily to judge his distance and, if necessary, lengthen his stride. He gives the horse the so-called office to jump in accordance with its temperament. Experience alone can teach us the best method to employ with each separate horse. Young horses generally want a little driving the last length, so the rider will close his legs the stride before the take-off, and again deliberately at the take-off stride.

Some horses require to be driven *well into their bridles* right up to the time they take off. Others merely require the rider to sit still and give them their head. Thus the so-called 'giving the office' varies with different horses.

The rider should be leaning slightly forward coming up to the fence—*i.e.* the ordinary position at the gallop. The weight is thus off the back of the saddle and carried at a fixed point (roughly about the dees of the stirrup leathers). The rider should be holding the greater part of his weight on his thighs and knees, thus permitting

the lower part of his leg to be free to drive on his horse if necessary—this is most important.

If the lower part of the leg is stiff it is lost as a means of propulsion to a young horse.

If the leg is kept forward and stiff there are several disadvantages, especially if the rider is a long-legged man. Firstly, on landing the greater part of the rider's weight is borne on the stirrup, which is forward of the centre of gravity, and consequently comes too much on the horse's fore hand landing. Secondly, if the horse makes a bad mistake the rider may be thrown violently forward and, the pivot from the stirrup being longer than from the knee, the violence with which the rider's body is thrown forward is increased (with the leg stuck out straight) and he has less chance of recovery. In the case of a short-legged jockey these points are of small account. Thirdly, it is impossible for the rider to bring his weight forward when required if the lower part of the leg is kept forward and the knee stiff.

As the horse raises his fore hand our rider inclines his body forward with the movement of his horse, because he wishes to assist his horse. Any horse that has been schooled slowly can raise his fore hand to a very considerable height. Note the ease with which all horses can rear up in front to a great height, but it is a much greater effort to raise their hind quarters up to a similar height. As the hind quarters are raised the weight is still thus kept off the back part of the saddle to assist the horse, whose chief effort is to propel himself upwards with his hind limbs, when the fore hand is already in the air.\*

As the hind limbs are coming up and the horse is in mid-air, he is preparing and balancing himself to land. Consequently he will now wish to extend his head for this purpose. Unless he is a horse that continuously holds his head out, the *rider must be prepared to give him more rein as he is landing.*

It is easier for him to do this if he is not sitting back. In fact, it is not necessary for him to sit back till the horse is actually landing. Raising his weight off the back part of the saddle prevents the rider from feeling any concussion from the horse's efforts, should he have

\* On the other hand, at the gallop the horse's chief effort is borne by the leading fore leg. For different reasons, too long to explain here, the horse is assisted by bringing the weight forward as near as possible over the pivot of the fore leg; this also relieves the hind limbs that give primary propulsion.

jumped awkwardly, and consequently he will not jerk his horse on the mouth—this is most important when schooling a youngster.

As the horse is landing the rider can easily lean his body back; or if he thinks his horse will drop his hind legs in a ditch, he can keep his weight forward to assist his horse. In either case his weight will not go beyond the centre of gravity.

The hands should be kept low the whole time, and the horse should not be pulled up abruptly on landing, for fear he should mistake it for punishment.

It is advisable not to ride too long when schooling, as the seat is strengthened by riding rather on the short side. The stirrups, if used correctly, are a means of strengthening the seat. If the heel is kept down and the sole of the foot turned very slightly outwards it will be found that any weight on the stirrups will only assist to force the knees closer to the saddle. This argument may appear difficult to follow, but if, on the other hand, the soles of the feet are turned in towards the horse and weight is put on the stirrups, it will be found that the knees are mechanically forced away from the saddle.

The important points with regard to the seat described are :

(1) The weight during the actual jump is fixed roughly over the horse's centre of gravity (this is of course only approximate, as the centre of gravity moves during locomotion), which helps the horse to balance himself. Under these conditions he should jump as well as when free.

(2) The lower part of the legs is free to be applied to the horse when necessary.

(3) It is easy to give the horse more rein if required, also to give him the office at the right moment.

(4) There is small likelihood of interfering with the horse's balance by inadvertently touching his mouth.

(5) The horse's hind quarters are free; he can easily raise his fore hand, if the *position* of the weight carried is constant.

(6) The rider can lean forward or back as required on landing.

(7) He can never be jumped off or be unseated by a horse taking off previous to his anticipation. His seat being just off the saddle, he does not feel the concussion as he would if sitting down in the saddle.

Still it is important not to exaggerate the forward seat, or it will, like the laying-back seat, be found to have its drawbacks.

I once asked a well-known officer after a race how he managed to fall at the first fence. He told me that he was trying the Italian seat. Of course it was rather a bad occasion to experiment with a new style, still one does see it done chasing now, and always over hurdles.

Personally I think people are apt to be misled by watching show-jumping, when the rider sometimes brings his body *more forward* as the horse is *clearing the fence and coming down*. The reason is to get the weight well on to the fore hand, which is over the fence, and relieve the hind quarters of all weight, so that the hind legs may not even touch the fence. How the horse lands in this case is quite a secondary consideration. The practice is therefore unpractical for general purposes. On the other hand, one must not be misled by jockey-riding in the National over fences. In photographs one sees jockeys leaning back on their horses' quarters with their feet stuck out by the point of the horses' shoulder. This is an exaggerated effort to stick on. There is no intention to help the horse. This position would be impossible if it were not for the tremendous impetus of the horses and the fact that they are taught to take a strong hold of their bits.

I need hardly say that the greatest care must be taken with regard to shoeing horses that have to jump. Long feet and badly fitting shoes will soon cause lameness. Carelessness with regard to horse's feet is the origin of most lameness. If a horse is to be schooled and jumped in cold blood he must be fresh on his legs.

(1) Pain on landing is the most common cause of refusing, and not only is it brutal, but useless, to insist on making a horse jump under such conditions. Never school a young horse if the ground is likely to jar him on landing.

(2) Some horses refuse from having had their mouths injured by heavy hands when jumping.

(3) Some are afraid of their bits, which may be too severe.

(4) Some horses refuse through fear of falling or lack of courage.

In each of these cases it is necessary to regain the horse's confidence. Take the horse in hand very quietly and let him jump over quite small obstacles till he appears to have regained his confidence. This may take several days. If necessary let him have a lead and always let him have a free head when in the air. Avoid wearing spurs, and let the horse undergo no physical pain.

(5) Horses will refuse if they are continually asked to jump very big

obstacles, which is a considerable exertion. On the other hand, they will not become stale if the fences are of a reasonable size and everything else is well with them.

(6) There are horses that refuse from temper, generally called 'nappy horses,' but the temper is always due to one or other of the above causes. One must try to discover the cause and deal with each case in the most suitable manner.

(7) Horses that have become nappy from being ridden by *bad horse-men* are the most difficult to deal with. They are best in the hands of a quiet, determined horseman. It is advisable to humour such horses and get on good terms with them. Out hunting they are generally at their best if they get well away with the hounds and are kept with them. On the other hand, some may require a lead till they get warmed up. In either case it is advisable not to try them too high till the rider feels that he and his horse understand one another.

The rider by judicious riding must endeavour to make the horse feel that on no account will he get the upper hand. Thus by starting such a horse off at an exceptionally big fence, the rider may defeat his object at the start. If the horse refuses he cannot hold him up to the fence and make him jump it at a stand, which he could do if the fence was quite small. It should be remembered that punishment is the last resource, because if this should fail, the horse starts one up in the match between man and beast. If punishment is resorted to, it is essential that the horse must be got over the fence somehow: this of course will not be possible if the fence is a very big one. If a horse runs out say left-handed at a fence never turn him round to the left before presenting him at the fence again, but rather turn him round to the right or rein him quietly back for two or three lengths and then push him forward. When ridden in company young horses will seldom refuse, but the riders must bear in mind that slow jumping is the basis of good jumping. Unlike a chaser a hunter must jump with equal ease at whatever pace he happens to be ridden at a fence. The sharpening up of a horse is easily accomplished in company with others, but the best chasers have to learn to jump slowly at first. Unlike the latter the hunter must learn to arch his back over a fence. I remember riding a young hunter several years ago who showed absolutely no aptitude for jumping in hunter form. However he took to the other game, and since those days he has won two Grand Militaries.

If the reader schools *on the lines I have suggested* he can let his horse jump four days a week without any fear of his becoming stale. The action of jumping muscles a horse and helps to balance him. Poor Dugdale, late of the 16th Lancers, whose sad death took place last December near Rome, in a report he sent home wrote, 'It is impossible to lay down any rule about the rate of progression; at Pinerolo it seems extraordinarily slow, but the result is that all the horses jump exceptionally well. Start with a bar on the ground, go over this at all paces until the horse has absolute confidence, and then raise the bar a notch at a time. For the first six weeks at Pinerolo, the bar was never raised more than one foot from the ground. The Italian motto is "Patience and Progression." The final result is that no horse ever refuses or rushes.'

This extract gives some idea of the pains that Continental riders take to reach perfection in training their horses.

As a rough guide I will put down a reasonable period required for schooling a young horse bought, say, in June.

*July.*—Commence with careful conditioning. Mouthing, balancing, quiet riding. This, of course, will be continued throughout the training.

*August.*—Free or dismounted jumping. If the horse is *fit and in the hands of a competent horseman* mounted schooling is preferable in my opinion, but only under these conditions and carried out on the lines previously suggested. During this month a riding school will be found most useful, as the going outside will be unsuitable for schooling.

*September.*—Further advanced schooling, the obstacles being varied as much as possible, opening gates. Should the *ground permit* small obstacles, ditches, banks, and natural fences may be jumped.

*October.*—Schooling with other horses out-of-doors. Jumping faster. Shown hounds. Dogs or a goat kept in the stable will generally make young horses accustomed to hounds and prevent them from kicking. With an excitable young horse it is preferable that he should not be galloped the first few times with hounds. We want him to like hounds but not to go mad with them. When he has been out several times, at a suitable opportunity he should be allowed to extend himself right out, after which in all probability he will come back willingly to your hand again. The rider, having careful regard



to the temperament of his horse, must use his own discretion in introducing him to hounds.

*November.*—Two hours with hounds is quite sufficient for a young horse (five years old), and the meet should be handy.

Now we will assume that our rider has got his horse reasonably accustomed to hounds during October cubbing, and an early frost has to some extent cleared the fences. He has previously on several occasions followed at the tail of the field, jumping the gaps and fences slowly and deliberately. The time has come for the youngster to be allowed to slip along in a hunt. It is no longer desired to hold him back, nor should it be necessary with his previous training. The young horse must get well away with hounds, so that he sees and hears them. He will soon be keen to keep with them. The music and sight of hounds redoubles a young horse's confidence in himself. A good scent makes a good fox and a good hunter too. With hounds in front a good fit young horse requires no lead at a strong forbidding-looking fence. An inherent love to be with the hounds is born in every good horse. One finds it again in his later life, even as a doddering old cripple in a field. The music of hounds will make him prick his ears, snort and trot round the field, forgetting his old age, perhaps only remembering his first hunt with hounds.

But there is more required than a good start: the rider must at times steady his young horse, and whenever possible save him in this his first hunt.

With a ditch on the near side or a fence leaning towards one, pace is a secondary consideration. He must look and see the ditch and judge his stride correctly. It is advisable to pick out your place where the edge of the ditch on the take-off side is clearly defined, and steady your horse. He has previously been accustomed to having his head free before he reaches the fence to enable him to look down and correct his stride. He will not forget that lesson now, and the rider will be repaid for the trouble he took in the early schooling. In the same way a young horse should be steadied at open water or rails—it will enable him to get into his proper stride and he will be less likely to slip taking off. In each case he must be given the office with determination when required. At all fences, but particularly at an upright fence or rails, a good take-off is invaluable. It is preferable and safer to jump a large fence with a good take-off than a small one where the near side is

unsound or slippery. In fact, with horses jumping, as with men, 75 per cent. of the difficulty lies in the take-off. A young horse may also require to be helped if he is dropping his hind legs into a ditch, by the rider leaning his weight forward on landing. This can easily be done with practice, and may even save a back from being broken.

I must conclude with one word of warning. Though it may not be the rider's fault if he breaks his horse's back, it is if he breaks his horse's heart and rides a youngster to a standstill. We may all have done it, but it is criminal.

For the benefit of fox-catchers, I must append some of the verses from 'The Dream of an old Meltonian,' by W. Davenport Bromley, M.P., which describes a hunt on a youngster:—

He's away!—I can hear the identical holloa!  
I can feel my young thoroughbred strain down the ride;  
I can hear the dull thunder of hundreds that follow;  
I can see my old comrades in life by my side.  
Do I dream? All around me I see the dead riding,  
And voices long silent re-echo with glee;  
I can hear the far wail of the Master's vain chiding,  
As vain as the Norseman's reproof of the Sea.

Vain indeed! for the bitches are racing before us—  
Not a nose to the earth, not a stern in the air;  
And we know by the notes of that modified chorus  
How straight we must ride if we wish to be there!  
With a crash on the turnpike, and onward I'm sailing,  
Released from the throes of the blundering mass,  
Which dispersed right and left as I topped the high railing,  
And shape my own course o'er the billowy grass.

Select is the circle in which I am moving,  
Yet open and free the admission to all;  
Still, still more select is that company proving,  
Weeded out by the funker, and thinned by the fall:  
Yet here all are equal—no class legislation,  
No privilege hinders, no family pride:  
If the 'image of war' show the pluck of the nation;  
Ride, ancient patrician! democracy, ride!

Oh! gently, my young one; the fence we are nearing  
Is leaning towards us—'tis hairy and black;  
The binders are strong and necessitate clearing,  
Or the wide ditch beyond will find room for your back.  
Well saved! We are over! Now far down the pastures  
Of Ashwell the willows betoken the line  
Of the dull-flowing stream of historic disasters;  
We must face, my bold young one, the dread Whisindine.

No shallow dug pan with a hurdle to screen it,  
 That cocktail imposture, the steeplechase brook;  
 But the steep broken banks tell us plain, if we mean it,  
 The less we shall like it the longer we look.  
 Then steady, my young one, my place I've selected—  
 Above the dark willow 'tis sound, I'll be bail:  
 With your muscular quarters beneath you collected  
 Prepare for a rush like the 'limited mail.'

Oh! Now let me know the full worth of your breeding;  
 Brave son of Belzoni, be true to your sires,  
 Sustain old traditions—remember you're leading  
 The cream of the cream in the Shire of the Shires!  
 With a quick, shortened stride as the distance you measure,  
 With a crack of the nostril and cock of the ear,  
 And a rocketing bound, and we're over, my treasure:  
 Twice nine feet of water, and landed all clear!

What, four of us only? Are these the survivors  
 Of all that rode gaily from Ranksboro' Ridge?  
 I hear the faint splash of a few hardy divers,  
 The rest are in hopeless research of a bridge;  
 Væ Victis! The way of the world and the winners!  
 Do we ne'er ride away from a friend in distress?  
 Alas! We are anti-Samaritan sinners,  
 And streaming past Stapleford, onward we press.

Ah! Don't they mean mischief, the merciless ladies?  
 What fox can escape such implacable foes?  
 Of the sex cruel slaughter for ever the trade is,  
 Whether human or animal—yonder he goes!  
 Never more for the woodland! His purpose has failed him,  
 Though to gain the old shelter he gallantly tries;  
 In vain the last double, for Jezebel's nailed him!  
 Who-whoop! in the open the veteran dies!

No doubt some readers who have struggled through these pages will say, 'All this schooling is quite unnecessary. Surely horses have always jumped well enough without all these theories and systems?' But remember there is many a horse that might have been a 'top sawyer' if he had not been spoilt when young. Besides, hounds go faster and fences get bigger as we grow older. As a rule the horse is a kind and long-suffering animal, but there are exceptions. Whereas one horse will make it a point of honour actually to catch his rider rather than let him fall, another will give a good buck when he lands to ensure the opposite effect. It is hoped that these suggestions may be found applicable when dealing with the exceptions and aid successful results.

### SHOW JUMPING

In my opinion there is little to add with regard to the training of show jumpers. I believe on the Continent they keep horses especially for show jumping, and this class of animal is never hunted. Personally I can see little use or amusement in keeping a horse solely for this purpose and not for hunting, and I would be very sorry to do so. A horse schooled on the lines that I have suggested will probably not only be a good hunter but also a good show jumper. One often hears people say that a horse trained for show jumping is spoilt as a hunter. If this is the case it must be due to some very exceptional training that it has undergone.

In the early training we were careful to teach our youngster to jump fast and to extend himself. Now this is not essential for an Olympia jumper: he can go up in the air, dwell there, and land almost on the same spot. Needless to say this class of show jumper is neither a pleasant nor a reliable fencer.

As a rule I have found the more highly trained jumper is the more brilliant fencer, and surely it is a pleasure, both to horse and rider, if he sometimes does jump a bit too big. You feel that you have a bit in hand, as you can always go the shortest way. You certainly have a better chance when you come to a really big place than the rider on a horse that barely jumps big enough. This is probably contrary to the opinion of most men, but I find it gives me more pleasure to ride a bold young horse that feels like jumping the National course, than a safe old stager that has lost the elasticity of youth.

A horse that is to perform at Olympia naturally must be schooled in a riding school if possible, over solid fences, and the more peculiar the fences are in appearance the better.

It is ridiculous to expect the ordinary hunter to show his best performance in a school if he has not been used to it. In fact, if he is to be successful he must in all probability start at the beginning and work up gradually like a young horse. He will then learn to jump quietly, and go through the monotony of school jumping as a matter of course. He has to learn to jump slowly and with only a short run, to balance himself, to get his weight forward when required, and to raise his hind quarters. He will soon learn to do this if the rider assists him by getting his own weight forward and giving


complete liberty of rein when the horse is actually jumping. The rider will often find it necessary to exaggerate both these actions with a horse that appears to jump with his weight too far back, as the whole of show jumping for man and horse is an exaggerated effort.

A standing martingale may often be found useful in training a show jumper that is inclined to jump with his head too high.

The horse that rides with too much of his weight in front is more likely to raise his hind quarters, but perhaps not his fore hand, sufficiently. If he can be given one or two falls free he will soon learn that solid fences are not to be trifled with. If this treatment has little effect on him, and he continues to knock the fences with his fore legs, the chances are that he is not worth training as a show jumper, provided always, of course, that he has had a fair chance, starting over small obstacles at slow paces at the commencement. Remember that a jerk on the horse's mouth when in mid-air will raise the horse's head and down will go his hind quarters, and down will come the *railway gates* or *sleepers*, &c.

THE END





AN EXPERIENCED JUMPER.

SAUMUR.

FRANCE.





THE BYERLEY TURK.

## THE CHARGER PROGENITOR OF THE THORO'BRED.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL E. W. LARNDER, *Army Veterinary Corps.*

MOST officers in the Service who are interested in horses have a natural affection and preference for that most notable of all breeds, the English thoroughbred; it has therefore often struck me in the course of conversation as a peculiar fact that so small a proportion are aware how intimately the Army was associated with the laying of the foundation stone of this most remarkable breed, the influence of which is felt throughout the civilised countries of the world. It has consequently occurred to me that the accompanying illustration of the first of the three Adams of this breed—viz. the Byerley Turk—taken from a copy of the original painting in the possession of Lord Rosebery, would be of some interest to the readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL together with the following brief account of the horse and his connection with the Army.

Many of your readers are no doubt familiar with the fact that the English thoroughbred owes his unsurpassed qualities to three great sires of Eastern origin—namely, the Byerley Turk, imported by Captain Byerley, and ridden by him as a charger at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690; the Darley Arabian imported in 1705; and the Godolphin Barb, imported in 1728. All thoroughbreds of the present day trace back in the male line to one or more of these three great stallions—viz. to the Byerley Turk through Herod, the Darley Arabian through Eclipse, and the Godolphin Barb through Matchem, as reference to the attached table will show.

The following extract taken from the 'Book of the Horse,' by C. Richardson (Hunting Editor, *The Field*), published by Messrs. Cassell & Company, 1911, puts the case very clearly:—

'The first of the three Eastern horses from whom a line of blood has been directly handed down was the Byerley Turk, who was ridden



by Captain Byerley as a charger throughout the whole of the Irish campaigns of William III. At the Battle of the Boyne the Byerley Turk narrowly escaped capture, and this was lucky, as he became one of the three Eastern Sires from which all racehorses are descended in tail male.

‘ Keeping the list of Sires for our subject, the Byerley Turk (as has been stated) is one of the three horses which survive in tail male, the second being the Darley Arabian, brought to this country in 1705, and the third the Godolphin, sometimes called an Arabian and sometimes a Barb, who was imported about the year 1728.


‘ It follows, of course, that every thoroughbred of the present day goes back in direct male line to the Byerley Turk, the Darley Arabian, or the Godolphin, and as thoroughbreds all over the world are descended from English racehorses, the same thing applies to them whether they be European, American, or Colonial.

‘ To go a little more into detail concerning the famous trio, who may fairly be called the fathers of the Turf, it may at once be said that the descendants of the Darley Arabian disputed the supremacy for many years with those of the Byerley Turk, and that the descendants of the Godolphin were always in a rather subordinate position, despite the fact that the Godolphin was himself the most famous of all the Eastern Stallions which were imported.’

This puts the case for these three horses clearly and concisely, and brings us to the point which is of special interest to the readers of your valuable JOURNAL—namely, how the first of these horses became so intimately associated with the Army in general, and the ‘ Carabiniers ’ in particular, which is best described in the following extract from the ‘ Regimental Records of the 6th Dragoon Guards ’ :—

‘ Robert Byerley raised in June 1685 one of eighty independent troops of Horse for the Service of King James II. prior to the military operations against the Pretender, James Duke of Monmouth, which culminated in the defeat of the rebels at the Battle of Sedgemoor. The troop having been raised at Doncaster, Robert Byerley was appointed captain, and subsequently the troop was incorporated as one of the six troops of the regiment which is now the Sixth Dragoon Guards (‘‘ Carabiniers ’’).

‘ At the Revolution in 1688 when King William III. succeeded



Woodpecker (1773) . . . Dam, Miss Ramsden, by Cade, son of GODOLPHIN, but descended also on the dam's side from the DARLEY ARAB and the BYERLEY TURK.

Buzzard (1787) . . . Dam, Misfortune, by Dux out of Curiosity; Dux, by MATCHEM out of a granddaughter of the GODOLPHIN BARB. This horse was therefore full of the last-named strain of blood.

Selim (1802) . . . Dam by Alexander, son of Eclipse; granddam by Highflyer, son of Herod.

Sultan (1816) . . . Dam, Bacchante, by Williamson's Ditto, son of Sir Peter (grandson of Herod), out of a granddaughter of Eclipse and Herod.

Bay Middleton (1833) . . . Dam, Cobweb, by Phantom (a great-great-grandson of Herod, and of Sultrum, son of Eclipse) out of Filagree, combining the blood of all three of the lines.

Flying Dutchman . . . Dam, Barbelle, by Sandbeck out of Andover granddam by Defence.

The above is a pedigree of Herod, and his stock in the male line, showing his descent from the BYERLEY TURK on the side of his sire, and from the DARLEY ARAB in two lines on that of his dam; also showing the mixed blood of his descendants.

to the throne, Captain Byerley was appointed lieutenant-colonel, and after the decease of Viscount Hewytt, in 1689, King William promoted him to the colonelcy of the corps. He imported the Byerley Turk and rode it in 1689 as a charger. At the Battle of the Boyne, 1690, he was so far ahead reconnoitring the enemy that he narrowly escaped capture, owing his safety to the speed of his horse.

'He served with distinction in Ireland; but having suffered in his health, and being more attached to agricultural pursuits than to the adventurous scenes of military life in time of war, he retired from the Service.

'He died on the 2nd of November, 1731.'

When Colonel Byerley retired from the Service he put his valuable charger to the stud, and so practically laid the first stone in the building up of the English thoroughbred as he is to-day.

By the above remarks and quotations I do not wish to convey the impression that there were not good horses with a turn of speed to be found in the British Isles prior to the importation of these great horses, for such would be far removed from the actual fact, as it is recorded that the native bred horses beat the Eastern horses imported in the reign of James I. The following extracts from 'The Origin and Influence of the Thoroughbred Horse,' by William Ridgeway, will clearly show this:—


Page 376: 'We have learned from Blundeville (p. 363) that in his day there were those who bred light and swift horses for racing and galloping the buck. But it must not be supposed for a moment that these light and swift horses sprang from "a pure well of English undefiled," for in Elizabeth's reign both the North African horse and his Turkish offshoot were well known in England. Thus Shakespeare represents Bolingbroke as riding on a roan Barbary horse ("Richard II." v. 5).' Page 380: 'As the evidence puts it beyond doubt that no Arab horse had been imported in England prior to 1616, the excellent English hunters (such as the chestnut for which King James I. gave £70) able to beat Barbary horses probably derive their good blood from those Barbary and Turkish horses commonly imported into England during the second half of the sixteenth century.'

Page 391: 'It has now been proved that the typical Irish horse as described by Thomas Blundeville in 1580 was no recent outcome of Spanish Sires, as believed by the members of the Royal Commission,

but was already in general use in Ireland by the tenth century, if not earlier. But this is not all; three horse skulls lately discovered in a Crannog (lake-dwelling) are of the highest importance in proving that not only were horses of the North African type used in Ireland as early as the tenth century, but possibly at a considerably earlier date.'

The above quotations clearly establish the fact that horses of the lighter and swifter type were bred in this country long before the advent of the Byerley Turk, but it was the powerful influence of this and the other two great horses on the already existing breed of mare of this type in the country that established the English thoroughbred, and through him the thoroughbred horses of the world as we find them at the present day.

*Note by the Managing Editor.*—Byerley Turk was a bay horse with black points and no white marks.



*THE CAPE MOUNTED RIFLES \**

By 'Q. L.'

WITH the passing of the Defence Act by the Parliament of United South Africa the Regiment of the Cape Mounted Rifles, though it will not cease to exist, will no longer occupy the position it now holds of being the only corps of Regular Colonial troops in Cape Colony. The new force that will be called into being by the Act will, with other units, comprise at least five regiments of Mounted Rifles, and the original regiment will occupy the honourable position of being the first on the roll.

The late General Sir H. Scobell, in a speech made shortly before his lamented death at Capetown, after a reference to the necessity of organising the land forces of South Africa, said :

'There was already a regiment at the Cape which he thought they would do well to hold up as a model, one which the battalions or regiments of the future would do well to imitate. He meant of course the Cape Mounted Rifles. He spoke with some knowledge, as he was very closely connected with that splendid regiment for the best part of a year during a time of great anxiety and trouble to them, and there was no greater admirer of that regiment than he was ; and if they could get the Territorial Army of the United South Africa of the future to come within measurable distance of the Cape Mounted Rifles they would not only be able to do without what was called a Regular Army in England, but they would safeguard their country from the dangers of native risings and other possibilities, and would have an asset in the country which would add very greatly to the strength of the Empire.'

Everyone who has had anything to do with this gallant corps, either in peace or war, will fully agree with this well-deserved tribute of praise.

\* The writer of this article is indebted for much of the material of it to the interesting *Record of the Cape Mounted Rifles*, by Mr. Basil Williams, who was kind enough to lend him a copy of the book.

The history of the Cape Mounted Rifles, and of those earlier corps of which it is the legitimate descendant and representative, is indeed one with the history of the Cape Colony itself. The Cape of Good Hope was taken from the Dutch in the year 1795. In 1796 a number of Hottentots were employed on various duties, such as cooks and orderlies, at the military camp recently formed at Stellenbosch. These were found so useful that they were eventually formed into a regular corps of Mounted Rifles, under the command of Lieutenant John Campbell of the 93rd Highlanders. The corps soon after its formation was moved to Hout Bay as its headquarters, and from 1797 to 1802 it was chiefly employed in keeping order among the black population of the districts near Cape Town.

At the Peace of Amiens in 1802 the Cape was restored to Holland, then styled the Batavian Republic, and was consequently evacuated by the British troops; but the Rifles were allowed to retain their arms and to transfer their services to the new Dutch Government, and, with of course the exception of the British officers, the majority volunteered to do so. The peace, however, lasted for barely a year, and the war having been renewed, an expedition under Sir David Baird was sent out and after some fighting Cape Town was again taken possession of. The Dutch as well as the Hottentots of the Rifles were given the choice of either taking service under the King or of being deported from the Colony, and the majority of both agreed willingly enough to transfer their allegiance. The corps was then placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Graham and quartered at Wynberg, the strength being first fixed at 500 rank-and-file, which in 1808 was augmented to 800.

From 1806 to 1827 the regiment was continually employed on active service in the numerous Kaffir risings that took place during those years. When affairs assumed a more peaceful aspect the strength was reduced to three companies of mounted riflemen under Captain Aitchison, but on the renewal of the unrest in 1840 it was again raised to six companies. By this time only about one-third of the men were Hottentots, the rest having been recruited in England. The blacks were for the most part employed either as scouts or on camp duties. The uniform was dark rifle-green cloth, and consisted of a Hussar jacket and pelisse heavily braided with black cord, tightly-fitting trousers, and a very tall bell-topped Light Dragoon shakoe with an

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immense drooping plume of black cocks'-tail feathers—a dress about as unsuitable for campaigning in the wilds of Africa as even a combination of Army tailors and War Office officials could possibly have invented.

In 1840 a pair of guidons were presented to the regiment by Queen Victoria.

The corps, which was directly under the orders of the War Office in London, continued to serve under these conditions until 1870. It was the fashion for the Government at that period to get rid of as much responsibility for Colonial affairs as possible; so in pursuance of this short-sighted and selfish policy the Cape Rifles were disbanded and their guidons deposited in Cape Town Cathedral. But the Cape Government had long before recognised the urgent need of an armed force of some kind to keep order in the Colony. It had indeed had ample reason for this as far back as 1850. At that time both the Transvaal and also the Orange River Colony, not yet an independent State, were in a perpetual condition of unrest. In addition, there were frequent outbreaks of rebellion among the various tribes in British Kaffraria, and these became eventually so constant and so serious that the period 1850-58 is dignified with the title of the eighth Kaffir War.

On December 24, 1850, a British force was defeated at Boomah Pass by the Gaikas, and on the following day Woburn, Auckland, and Johannesburg were sacked and many of the white settlers killed. This outbreak was immediately followed by a rebellion in the Orange River State and the rising in Basutoland which commenced the first Basuto War.

The Regular British troops in the Colony were few and scattered over a wide extent of country; the Cape Government therefore was obliged to supplement these by local levies, and in 1852 steps were taken to raise a police force in the districts of Albany, Uitenhage, Somerset, Cradock, Albert, and Beaufort, the volunteers from each district being formed into independent bodies, under their own commanders. A great amount of desultory fighting followed, but by 1853 peace was restored and the disturbances ceased for a time.

By 1855 the Cape Colony had been granted a Representative Assembly. One of the first acts passed authorised the consolidation of the independent corps of volunteers into a single regiment, called the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police. This was placed under the command of Captain Walter Currie. It consisted of 4 inspectors, 12 sub-

inspectors, and 500 N.C.O.s and privates. The armament was a double-barrelled percussion gun, one barrel of which was rifled, a revolver, and knife. These the men had to pay for themselves, the gun costing £12 10s., the pistol £7 10s., but the ammunition was found by Government. The pay was much the same as that of the present Cape Mounted Rifles. The uniform was of yellowish-brown cord with a helmet of the same colour, and trousers with a narrow black stripe. The officers wore a kepi and black blucher-boots.

After the Crimean War a number of military settlers, chiefly men of the German Legion, were sent out and placed on the lands formerly occupied by the Galekas, a tribe that had been nearly entirely extirpated by famine, and many of these ex-soldiers joined the new corps, greatly to its advantage. This year the Transkei district was annexed, and the policing of it entrusted to the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, the whole force being concentrated in the territory.

In 1868 the Free State burghers became involved in a quarrel with Mohesh, the paramount Basuto chief. To keep the peace Basutoland was formerly annexed by Sir G. Grey, and the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police sent to occupy the territory, which was done without any fighting. The following year the Korannas were subdued, and in 1871 Kimberley and Griqualand West were annexed. The fighting with Langelibele followed, that chief being finally captured by two troops of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police.

Comparative quiet throughout the Colony followed these events, which lasted till the outbreak of the ninth Kaffir War in 1877; but after much fighting, in which the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police took a prominent part, the rising was suppressed towards the end of the year.

In 1878 the whole force was reorganised under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. Garrett-Moore, V.C., of the 88th Regiment, and its constitution changed from a nominal police force to that of a Regular regiment, with the title of the Cape Mounted Rifles.

During these years the numbers of the force had varied considerably from time to time, being sometimes as many as 1000 of all ranks, and in 1874 an artillery detachment, armed with three R.M.L. 7-pounder guns, commanded by Lieutenant J. C. Robinson, R.A., had been added. The new regiment was formed into two divisions, each under its own lieutenant-colonel, and the military ranks of captain and



lieutenant were substituted for those of inspector and sub-inspector. At the same time the uniform, which from 1871 had been grey, was altered to black velvet-cord.

The Cape Mounted Rifles were not engaged in the Zulu War of 1879, but the regiment had plenty of warlike occupation provided for it in the prolonged siege of a native fortress known as Morosi's Mountain. This formidable stronghold was situated on the left bank of the Orange River, from which it rose in a sheer precipice to the height of 800 feet. The other side of the hill was broken at regular intervals by rings of precipitous rocks; the topmost of these, which encircled a level plain of a few acres, was over 200 feet high. To this plain the only means of approach was by a rugged narrow path that went straight up the mountain, zigzagging up the several precipices as it encountered them. Colonel Griffiths, with two troops of the Cape Mounted Rifles and two 7-pounder guns, a number of volunteers and 100 Basutos, had been sent to apprehend Morosi, who had been giving much trouble, and when that redoubtable chieftain took refuge in his stronghold a regular siege became necessary.

The place was invested on March 25, and on April 9 a vigorous attempt was made to take it by storm. This, however, was beaten off with the loss of one officer and three men killed and six men wounded. Much gallantry was displayed by the storming party, and two V.C.s were afterwards awarded—one to Sergeant Scott for throwing live shells by hand into the defences, the other to Private Peter Robinson, who repeatedly carried water to the wounded under a heavy fire.

On June 5 another assault was delivered, which ended in another failure. In this a third V.C. was gained in the Cape Mounted Rifles, one being awarded to Sergeant-Major Hartley for conspicuous courage in leading and encouraging his men.

Colonel Griffiths was now succeeded in command by Colonel Brabant, who after some weeks handed over the conduct of the operations to Colonel Bayley. The siege became a blockade until November 20, when a fresh assault was made during the night. The attack was divided into five storming parties, and though the Basutos ran, the stronghold was finally carried by the Cape Mounted Rifles at the point of the bayonet, the first man in being Lieutenant Sprenger, who was after rewarded by his well-deserved promotion to

the rank of captain. Morosi and his three sons, with seventy of his followers, were killed before the place finally surrendered, for the besieged fought with great courage to the last.

The regiment was not employed in the Boer War of 1880, which terminated in the disgraceful and short-sighted surrender by Mr. Gladstone's Government and the betrayal and recall of Sir Bartle Frere after the action at Majuba Hill; but these shameful events were speedily followed by the fifth Basuto War, which proved a very much more serious affair than any of its predecessors.

Basutoland had been annexed without any opposition, and in 1871 had been handed over to the Cape Colony. The Basutos, however, were patiently biding their time until they were in a position to rebel with some prospect of success. In pursuance of this cautious policy numbers of them set off to work at the new Diamond Mines at Kimberley, where, wages being high, they soon amassed considerable funds, which were quietly expended in the purchase of Martini rifles and ammunition. This coming to the knowledge of the Cape Government, a Bill, styled the 'Sprigg Act,' was passed by the Assembly ordering their disarmament.

A meeting of the Basuto tribes was called together at Maseru, the chief village of the country, at which the Act was read and explained to the assembled chiefs, and Letzie, the paramount chief, after some discussion agreed to submit, but the others, headed by Lerothodi, Letzie's son, flatly refused to give up their rifles, and went off in a body to their strongholds among the mountains.

Both divisions of the Cape Mounted Rifles were at once sent into Basutoland, one under Colonel Bayley to Maseru, the other under Colonel Carrington to Mafeting. Both these places were immediately surrounded and besieged by the Basutos.

After some severe fighting Mafeting was relieved by Colonel Clarke at the head of 1500 men, and on October 22 he attacked Lerothodi's own village, which was taken by assault at the second attempt; but a further action was fought at Maquaesberg, three miles off, which resulted in the retreat of Colonel Clarke himself to Mafeting.

In November Colonel Clarke was transferred to the Transkei, and Colonel Carrington succeeded to the command. In January 1881 Martinis were served out to the Cape Mounted Rifles, instead of the obsolete Sniders with which the regiment was armed.

On January 14 Colonel Carrington was attacked at Tweefontein by 4000 Basutos and very nearly suffered a disastrous defeat, the enemy being with difficulty beaten off after prolonged fighting, and a few days afterwards a determined, but fortunately unsuccessful, attack was made on Maseru. Further fighting followed in which Colonel Carrington was wounded, whereupon Colonel Clarke again took command of the operations.

In April the war ceased by mutual consent. The Basutos were allowed to retain their arms, and practically to recover their independence under Lerothodi as paramount chief, though they agreed to receive a British Resident. Since this war the territory has given no further trouble.

The Cape Mounted Rifles were not engaged again in any serious fighting until the first Matabele War in 1893. During this period several changes were made in the internal organisation of the regiment. In 1883 the divisions were abolished and the whole corps placed under one command. In 1884 the Cape Field Artillery and the Cape Infantry were disbanded. Most of the men of these corps joined the Cape Mounted Rifles, and the artillery division was made into a battery of six 7-pounder M.L. guns. In 1881 the uniform was altered from black to blue, with pantaloons and jack-boots and a white helmet. The officers were now appointed by the Governor of Cape Colony after an examination. The rates of pay were also altered, the new scale being £1000 a year for the lieutenant-colonel commanding, major £700, captain £365, lieutenant 15s. a day, sergeants 9s., corporals 8s., privates 5s. rising to 7s. 6d. The arms and uniform were provided by the Government, but the horses continued to be the property of the men till 1903. In 1892 the Colonial Forces Act repealed all previous Acts relating to the armed force of the Colony, and by it the Cape Mounted Rifles were formally recognised as the only existing body of Regular troops. By this Act the term of enlistment was ordered to be for five years.

In 1893 the first Matabele War broke out. A detachment of 35 Cape Mounted Rifles under Lieutenant Woon was sent to Mafeking, and in recognition of their services Mr. Rhodes presented a maxim gun to the regiment. Pondoland was annexed this year, and the whole of the Cape Mounted Rifles were for some time quartered in the district, which was finally divided into four magistracies, an officer of the Cape Mounted Rifles and 50 men being assigned to each.

The regiment enjoyed a period of rest until the rising in Bechuanaland in 1897. This provided but little fighting at first, but the disturbance grew gradually until it was thought necessary to assemble 1000 men at Kimberley under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dalgety. A squadron of the Cape Mounted Rifles, with two maxims and an artillery detachment, formed part of this force. The whole then marched against the rebels, who had taken up a strong position on the Langeberg.

Two attacks were made and repulsed with some loss, but after reinforcements had been sent up which raised Colonel Dalgety's little army to a strength of 3000 men with five guns the position was stormed and taken, and the rebels finally dispersed after a six months' campaign.

In 1899 the Cape Mounted Rifles were called upon to take part in a contest which was much more serious than any in which the corps had been hitherto engaged, for on October 11 of that year the army of the two Boer Republics invaded Natal.

Cape Colony was then in a peculiarly defenceless condition, the frontier being guarded only by a few widely separated bodies of Regular troops, less in fact than five battalions, divided between Stormberg, Naauwport, De Aar, Orange River, and Kimberley. The local volunteer forces, about 5000 strong, were called out on the 16th, and were stationed on the line of communications and at the seaports. The Cape Mounted Rifles, 900 strong, were in the Transkei, Queenstown, and Lady Frere districts.

On November 16, General Gatacre landed at Queenstown and took command of the troops at Colesberg, which seemed to be the most dangerously vulnerable spot. His army was hurriedly increased by two more battalions of Regulars, 300 Mounted Infantry, 1000 men drawn from the local corps, and two squadrons of the Cape Mounted Rifles, with the field battery and the maxims. Of the remaining seven squadrons three, with headquarters, were with Colonel Dalgety in Tembuland, and four in East Griqualand.

The Colesberg disaster to General Gatacre's force on December 10 followed, but the Cape Mounted Rifles were not up in time for the action owing to a mistake in telegraphing their orders.

The detachment of the corps, 235 strong, with the artillery troops and maxims, the whole under the command of Major Sprenger, had been employed during November and December in

patrol duty at Penhoek, in advance of General Gatacre's headquarters at Queenstown. Before the action at Stormberg Colonel Dalgety's detachment had been ordered to move on Dordrecht, to co-operate with General Gatacre by guarding his right flank. On hearing of the untoward result of the fight Colonel Dalgety retired to Garryowen, but twelve days later he was again ordered to attack and occupy Dordrecht, which was done after some fighting on the evening of the 24th. Colonel Dalgety's three troops were then attached permanently to General Gatacre's division, and remained in camp at Birds River.

On January 18 Lord Roberts ordered all the Colonial troops in the Eastern Province to concentrate at Penhoek, where they were to be made into a division under Brigadier-General Brabant.

By the second week of February the division had been formed. It was over 3000 strong, and comprised the following corps: 450 Cape Mounted Rifles under Colonel Dalgety, the 1st and 2nd Brabant's Horse, the Kaffrarian and Queenstown Rifles, 450 Border Horse, 60 Driscoll's Scouts, the Xalanga Mounted Rifles, the Cape Mounted Artillery, and Maxim Detachment. Two companies 1st Royal Scots and two guns 79th Royal Field Artillery were also attached to the division.

General Brabant, as soon as his division was ready to move, on February 15, marched on Dordrecht, which was occupied after some fighting of little consequence, and the division remained there till the end of the month. On March 2, an attack was made on the position held by the Boers at Labuschagne's Nek; after two days' fighting the enemy were finally dislodged with the loss of 40 men and many wagons.

The advance north was continued on the 7th. On the 9th Jamestown was occupied, on the 11th Aliwal North, and on the same day Frere Bridge, over the Orange River, was seized just in time to prevent its destruction by the enemy. Fighting continued without intermission daily during these operations, and there were a good many casualties, the Cape Mounted Rifles themselves losing 8 killed and 17 wounded. The advance across the Orange River was not pressed as General Brabant had orders not to leave Cape Colony.

Lord Roberts entered Bloemfontein on March 13, and the Boer commandos in Cape Colony retired eastward into the Free State. General Gatacre was then directed to clear the country along the Basuto border, and to place garrisons in the villages lying between the Caledon

River and Thabanchu, while General Broadwood was sent with a Cavalry brigade to Thabanchu itself to co-operate with him. In pursuance of these orders Rouxville, Zastron, and Wepener were occupied by detachments of the Colonial Division.

The enemy were, however, found to be in much greater force than was expected. General Broadwood was obliged to retire to Bloemfontein, and on the march was ambushed at Sannah's Post, where he suffered a disastrous defeat on March 31, while on April 4, Mozar's Hoek, which was occupied by a detachment of 450 men, was surrounded and captured by De Wet.

Emboldened by these successes the Boer commandos descended in force upon Wepener, a position to which great importance was attached, where nearly 1900 men and 7 guns under command of Colonel Dalgety had been concentrated. This force included 18 officers and 409 men of the Cape Mounted Rifles under Major Sprenger, with 3 officers and 90 men of the artillery troop under Captain Lukin, and 6 maxims.

Wepener was an insignificant village situated between the Basuto border and the Caledon River,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles south of the Jammersberg Bridge. The place in itself offered no facilities for defence, and Major Maxwell, who had joined with a small party of Royal Engineers, was detailed to find a better position.

After examining the surrounding country Major Maxwell finally advised Colonel Dalgety to move to an oval-shaped hollow just above the bridge. This was a little valley on the north-west of the Caledon, about three miles in diameter, encircled on the north and west by three groups of hills which afforded good cover and good artillery positions along their crests, the perimeter being about seven miles in length. The weak part of the position lay at the south-west side, where there was a gap between the two hills covering it, and where the bushes along the river would afford cover to an attack. The interior also was to a certain extent open to artillery fire from the lower slopes of the Jammersberg Mountain on the east side of the river.

On the morning of April 5, the outposts reported the appearance of the enemy's advance parties. Colonel Dalgety then evacuated Wepener and moved his whole force into the new position, where the troops took up their allotted stations and commenced entrenching and strengthening the lines of defence, while a signal station was established at Mafeting, in Basutoland, in order to maintain communications in

case of a siege. The Cape Mounted Rifles had the honourable post assigned to them of defending the gap between the hills on the south-west.

Early on the morning of the 9th De Wet, with 6000 men and 7 guns, surrounded the place, and at 6.30 A.M. opened the action with a heavy shell-fire, which was shortly afterwards followed by a determined attack on every side of the position. It soon became evident that the main assault was directed on the gap held by the Cape Mounted Rifles, which was the weakest part of the defence, for here the solid rock had rendered entrenching almost impossible, and the bushes that fringed the river gave good cover to the Boer marksmen.

The fighting lasted all day and the fire did not slacken until it began to grow dark about 7 P.M. The regiment suffered very severely, Major Sprenger, who displayed conspicuous courage, was shot through the heart, Captain Goldsworthy was severely wounded, and Sergeant-Majors Court and Leedham were killed by shells. Many men were killed or wounded, and none could be removed from the firing-line until it became dark.

The night was spent in an attempt to improve the defences by sand-bags, as it was impossible to deepen the trenches. All next day a continuous fire was kept up by the Boers, and at 10 P.M. after the moon had set a fierce attack was again delivered on the south-western front of the defences held by the Cape Mounted Rifles. The fighting lasted without intermission for four hours, the enemy, who were led by an Irish-American named Banks, returning again and again to the attack as fast as they were shot down. Finally, when Banks and his men had actually forced their way by sheer weight of numbers into the trenches themselves, the order was given to fix bayonets. A hand-to-hand combat resulted in the Boers being driven out, after which the attack temporarily ceased. No resistance could be rendered to the hard-pressed Cape Mounted Rifles, as the enemy kept up a heavy and close fire on every part of the line while the main attack was in progress.

The siege lasted until April 25. Several other assaults were delivered, though none were pressed home with the same determination as the first. A continuous artillery and musketry fire was kept up night and day by the besieging Boers, and the troops suffered much from not being able to leave the trenches for a moment, the general discomfort being greatly aggravated by heavy storms of rain. At last

the various relieving columns that Lord Roberts had directed on Wepener began to make their approach felt; the Boer commandos commenced to withdraw, and on the 25th a relieving force under Generals Hart and Brabant marched into Wepener, and the siege was definitely raised.

The siege had lasted for seventeen days, during which time a force of under 2000 Colonials successfully withstood the repeated attacks of an enemy more than three times as numerous, aided by a superior artillery and flushed with recent victory over Regular troops. The brunt of the fighting as well as the glory fell to the share of the Cape Mounted Rifles, who, though forming less than a fourth of the whole force present, lost 21 killed and 75 wounded out of a total of 33 killed and 133 wounded. Of the officers Major Sprenger and Lieutenant Taplin were killed, and Major Waring, Captain Goldsworthy, and Lieutenants Cumming, Straw, and Clowes wounded. This successful defence of a very indifferent position against overwhelming odds ranks as one of the finest achievements of the war.

During the rest of the war the Cape Mounted Rifles did good service and fully maintained their reputation for discipline and valour. After the siege of Wepener the Colonial Division joined General Rundle, and took a prominent part in the campaign which ended in the surrender of Prinsloo and his army in the Brandwater Basin. In January 1901 the regiment were attached to Colonel Maxwell's column and were engaged in what was known as the 'Great De Wet Hunt' in the north of Cape Colony, a series of operations which effectually prevented De Wet's intended invasion of Cape Colony, though he himself escaped capture. In April 1901 the Cape Mounted Rifles were sent into Cape Colony. There they were employed for some months in chasing the various marauding bands that were ravaging the country, and it was chiefly owing to their exertions that the Colony was finally cleared of them. Towards the end of 1901 the maintenance of order in Cape Colony was entirely delegated to the local forces, the country being divided into two districts, of which one was placed under Colonel Lukin, whose staff was entirely composed of officers of the regiment. No further disturbance took place from that time until the Declaration of Peace on May 31, 1902.

During the war the Cape Mounted Rifles lost 60 officers and men,



whose names are recorded on tablets in the Cathedrals of Cape Town and Umtata. Fifty-one N.C.O.s and privates obtained commissions from the ranks. Colonel Dalgety gained the C.B., Colonel Lukin, Major Robinson and Surgeon-Colonel Hartley the C.M.G., five officers received the D.S.O., and six N.C.O.s the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

For four years after the war the history of the regiment is uneventful. A detachment attended the Coronation of King Edward VII. in 1902, and in January 1903 Colonel Dalgety retired and was succeeded by Colonel Lukin. In the course of the next two years the regiment was reduced to 750 of all ranks, and in 1903 the uniform was altered to drab, with brown belts and boots. In October 1904 H.R.H. Princess Christian presented a new King's Colour to the regiment at Cape Town.


In February 1906 a detachment was employed with the Natal Army in the suppression of the Zulu rebellion, and in November the same year a squadron was sent to Prieska, where it assisted in the capture of Ferreira and a band of freebooters who had crossed the border from German territory.

In April 1906 Marengo, a Hottentot leader who had been chased over the border by the German troops, took refuge in the same district, and a troop of the Cape Mounted Rifles assisted the Cape Police in breaking up and dispersing his band, Marengo himself being killed in the final action. This is the last occasion on which the regiment has done any fighting, South Africa having, it is to be hoped, now entered on a long period of peace. It only remains to wish that the Cape Mounted Rifles may have as long and as honourable a career as the first regiment of the new Defence Force as they have had hitherto as the only Regular regiment of Colonial troops at the Cape.

The illustrations on the opposite page depict the Battle of the Gwanga, June 8, 1846, in which the Cape Mounted Rifles, 7th Dragoon Guards, and the Royal Artillery, under the Command of Major-General H. J. Somerset, C.B., totally defeated the Kaffir Army, estimated at 9000 strong.

An Officer in Review Order, 1842.

The Cavalry Brigade, composed of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, 12th Lancers, and Royal Artillery, crossing the Great Orange River, December 1852.



THE CAPE MOUNTED RIFLES.



**CAPTAIN LORD W. HILL.**  
(Royal Scots Greys.)  
1844.

## PROBLEM NO. XII.

(For Non-Commissioned Officers)

A SMALL force of all arms is encamped near Truter's Drift, and at 5 A.M. the officer commanding receives a report from a native scout to the effect that a hostile force camped the previous night at Driefontein. On receipt of the above report the officer commanding sends for Sergeant X, 12th Hussars, and gives him the following instructions:—

'You will take your troop and will reconnoitre the country in the direction of Driefontein and will ascertain:—

- '(a) Whether it is true that a hostile force camped last night at Driefontein.
- '(b) Whether it is still there, and, if not, in which direction it has moved.
- '(c) What is its approximate strength. You will remain out until you have gained the required information. Your reports are to be sent in to me here, and it is unlikely that the main body will move until some more definite information as to the enemy's movements has been obtained.'

### SITUATION I

Q. I. As Sergeant X what are the various points to which you would attend before starting? The strength of the troop may be taken as 25 N.C.O.s and men.

Q. II. In what formation, and in what manner, would you move your troop?

### SITUATION II

On arriving within 1000 yards of Pienaar's Poort the advanced guard comes under fire from the high ground east of the poort. The fire is not heavy and no enemy can be seen.

Sergeant X decides to make a dismounted attack.

Q. I. Was Sergeant X right in his decision? Give reasons.

## SITUATION III

On gaining the high ground Sergeant X sees two of the enemy's scouts gallop away in the direction of Roode Kop.

Sergeant X decides to send a corporal and two men to follow up these two scouts and to make for Brand Kop, whence he hopes to be able to see Driefontein with the remainder of his troop.

Q. I. Do you concur with Sergeant X in this decision?

Q. II. Write the report, if any, which should be sent in.

## SITUATION IV

On reaching Brand Kop, from which Driefontein can be seen with the aid of field-glasses, Sergeant X can see no signs of the enemy. He therefore halts and awaits a report from the patrol which he has sent in the direction of Roode Kop. After waiting about half-an-hour he receives a report that this patrol is held up by an enemy holding Roode Kop, strength unknown. Sergeant X decides to advance against Roode Kop.

Q. I. What report, if any, should he send in?

## SITUATION V

On coming within 1000 yards of Roode Kop Sergeant X comes under a fairly heavy fire and is unable to advance direct on the Kop. He succeeds, however, in gaining a footing on Bosch Kop, and sends two intelligent men to Spitz Kop to see if any signs of the enemy can be seen from this point. About half-an-hour later one of these men comes in and reports that he has seen a column of the enemy moving south-east along the Driefontein-Klipbank road, and that it took two and a half minutes to pass over the bridge half a mile N.W. of the V in Vaal Kranz at a walk.

Q. I. Write the report, if any, which he should send in.

Q. II. Which of his men should he send in with this report?



## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

*Spectateur Militaire*.—In the numbers of this fortnightly dated June 1 and 15 are concluded the descriptive articles dealing with the organisation and employment of Mounted Infantry in the United Kingdom. The writer, Lieutenant Durette, speaks of our arm with no little enthusiasm, but curiously enough he appears to praise it for the very quality of which our own authorities seek to dispossess it. Lieutenant Durette finds that our Mounted Infantry is capable of performing *de précieux services en campagne*, but that the arm is not merely a mobile Infantry, or an Infantry whose mobility is enhanced by the dotation of a means of transport; it is rather, he declares, a kind of Cavalry in regard to its employment and methods of manoeuvre. In the issue for July the direction of this journal joins in the discussion lately initiated by Generals Bourelly and Maitrot in the *Echo de Paris* and *Correspondent* respectively, advocating the return to the three-year period of service for the Cavalry and Infantry, and proposes that a tax should be levied on those French families which have no sons, or which, having them, cause them to serve in the Infantry for two years only. It is considered that some advantage should be conceded to those who serve longer with the Colours, and that the amount realised from the tax proposed might be handed over to those who serve for the longer term. In this and the two following numbers will be found some interesting notes on the organisation and employment of the native Cavalry of Algeria. The writer, Captain Holtz, tells us that he has been led to put these notes together by the fact that a previous article, on much the same subject, drew an eulogistic general order from his Army Corps commander and also from the Minister of War—a form of encouragement which comes to the British soldier-writer as something of a surprise! Captain Holtz reminds his readers that the opponents of the French colonial forces in Algeria and Morocco are not the badly armed, ill-organised guerillas they are too often taken to be; they are, on the contrary, almost entirely armed with modern rifles, for which they are ready to pay good prices; and whether mounted or on foot they are enemies against whom *il faut en tout temps se garder*. The following is roughly the composition of the French colonial or local troops employed against them:—Cavalry: the regular portion of this arm is provided by the Spahis, recruited for the most part from the nomad tribes of the south, officered by Frenchmen and also by men of their own nationality, and who, without being in any way 'Europeanised,' are trained according to European methods, and form a very reliable body of light horsemen. They ride very light, their transport requirements are small, and their commissariat consists of little beyond

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dates, flour, sugar, and coffee. Great care is taken to preserve their irregular organisation, although the Spahis are considered to form the regular portion of the local Cavalry. The irregular portion is composed of the Makhzen or Goumiers, irregular horsemen furnished by the tribes under French control, who provide their own mounts, which are usually mares, in contra-distinction to the Spahis who ride stallions, and are armed with carbines; they do not receive high pay, and are as far as possible employed in the districts where they are recruited. The Goumier as a rule is a temporary levy, and, of course, knows thoroughly the country over which he is required to operate, the men who inhabit it, and the few watering-places with which it is dotted. The rôle of the *Cavalerie d'exploration* is filled, in the extreme south, by *compagnies sahariennes* mounted on horses or camels. For all these the Spahis form the more solid or disciplined backing. Captain Holtz describes the general methods of desert warfare, and gives several instances of small actions in which the local Cavalry has been engaged. Finally he proceeds to discuss the question of the possible employment of these Goumiers in European warfare, and comes to the conclusion that from three thousand to ten thousand excellent mounted men could be made available for such service. All these men can ride, and are permeated with the offensive spirit; all that they require is cohesion. Captain Holtz offers some valuable suggestions as to how this end might be obtained. Running through all these numbers of the *Spectateur Militaire* is an account of the Sardinian Expedition of 1792-93, in which, as a lieutenant-colonel, Napoleon played a more or less unsuccessful part so far as concerns the attack upon Santa Maddalena, due mainly to the mutiny of the crew of the corvette covering the operations. There is in this, of course, little or nothing of *Cavalry* interest, but it is of importance as being an account of an incident in the life of the great Corsican of which we know but little, and which most of his biographers dismiss in a very few lines; it was, moreover, Napoleon's baptism of fire. In the two September issues will be found a detailed account, derived from British and American sources, of the action of Châteauguay, which earned a clasp to the so-called 'Peninsular' medal, and in regard to which stress is laid upon the fact that Canada was saved for the English by the French-Canadians. This is the first of what promises to be a series entitled *Batailles oubliées*, and which should provide some interesting reading.

*Revue de Cavalerie*.—June.—The January and April numbers of this journal printed two articles by General Durand, formerly commanding the 4th Cavalry Division, the one containing his *doctrine sur le combat*, the other his *idées sur les évolutions*. To these 'Un Cavalier' makes reply in the form of certain reflections; and as regards the doctrine laid down by General Durand, while cordially approving the purely offensive character of the General's proposals, he asks how the attack is to be made when the Cavalry body has arrived in the immediate proximity of the enemy? Assuredly, he admits, *on ne manœuvre qu'un ennemi fixé*; this, he concedes, is a truth brought to light by Napoleon, accepted as the principle of the French tactical doctrine, and taught in all the French schools of military thought. But while agreeing that the principle is correct enough in dealing with the three arms, he pertinently inquires whether it is invariably and absolutely applicable to

Cavalry. So far as concerns the *idées sur les évolutions* put forward by General Durand, 'Cavalier' points out that in the Regulations dated this year the intention has been to impart to the Cavalry body that *order* without which anything of the nature of manœuvre is impossible, and that *rapidity in movement* without which Cavalry can never accomplish anything at all. This paper is followed by an analysis of the German Cavalry manœuvres of last year, based upon the account by Colonel von Unger which appeared in the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte* for December 1911. This is continued in the July number. 'The Souvenirs of the Crimea,' by General Baron Rebillot, are here concluded. As mentioned before, it is very clear that the alliance with the British was not very popular; many of the French officers and soldiers were the sons of men of the First Empire; the war in Spain, the English hulks, Waterloo, and St. Helena were too fresh in the memory for relations to be particularly cordial, and it would actually seem that the war rather tended to commence a friendship between Russia and France, than anything of the nature of an *entente cordiale* between the French and the British. There are some interesting reminiscences of Canrobert, Pélissier, Trochu, and Bosquet; but it is impossible to gather from a perusal of these recollections that the alliance was in itself a success, however correct the actual relations of the two armies, and of the individuals composing them, may have been, however much each may have admired the purely fighting qualities of the other. Colonel Sainte-Chapelle has another instalment of his account of the operations in Morocco, which he brings down to the troubles at Fez in the spring of this year. On page 659 will be found an interesting instance of how a rearguard, in a critical situation, and in which the Cavalry composing it was fighting dismounted, was relieved by the Spahis suddenly mounting and charging, thereby dispersing the enemy and recovering some wounded men who had fallen into their hands. The death of the English instructor Redman is mentioned. In this number appears an article on 'Riding on the Flat and Across Country,' and which aims at teaching young officers who aspire to be race-riders the *technique* of the art; this is evidently from the pen of one who is not only a thorough good sportsman, but a man of some humour. One of his axioms for beginners is worth repeating: '*Ne sautez pas avant votre cheval, c'est lui qui saute et non vous; lui aussi qui galope. C'est donc son allure et non votre propre gymnastique qu'il faut accélérer!*'

July.—General Canonge publishes in this number two documents, recently come into his possession, throwing some additional light upon the operations of General Margueritte's Cavalry Division at Sedan. One is from a subaltern officer serving in the 1st Chasseurs d'Afrique on the day in question, and the other is from an Artillery officer who made on the spot and immediately after the war an inquiry into all the events that transpired, and who was greatly assisted by the curé of Floing. The curé had, of course, abundant opportunity of hearing evidence at first hand from the many wounded who were accommodated in the local hospital. If these very human documents do not bring to light much that is new, they are of interest in regard to the further elucidation of great events in which Cavalry has played its part. Commandant L. D. has a long dissertation upon 'Cavalry and the



Manœuvres,' wherein he seems to plead for a more graduated system of Army manœuvres designed better to test the efficiency of his arm from all points of view; he complains—a habit which seems very general—of the extent to which Cavalry suffers at the hands of the umpires, and points out, what perhaps we have all at times recognised but have not always expressed, that each arm demands degrees and forms of umpire-ability. The umpiring of Cavalry operations requires immense activity, exceptional powers of intuition, *un coup d'œil ensemble instantané*; of Infantry operations, sound common-sense, careful attention, and a clear perception of detail; and for the work of Artillery, good information and a certain measure of imagination. 'Journal de Captivité' is an extract from a forthcoming work by Captain Chopin descriptive of long months passed as a prisoner of war at Hamburg after Mars-la-Tour and the capitulation of Metz. The account of the German Cavalry Manœuvres of 1911 continues, and Colonel Sainte-Chapelle's 'Au Maroc' is brought down to the beginning of June of the present year. In connection with this last it may be of interest to Cavalry officers to note the publication by Lavazzelle of *l'Emploi de la Cavalerie au Maroc*, by Colonel Riffault, who has served fourteen years in Africa and commanded the Cavalry in Shawia for three years.

*Kavalleristische Monatshefte*.—The opening article in the June number is the first part of a lengthy review of the French Cavalry Regulations issued last year. Space does not admit of any criticism of this review in these brief notes, but it is worthy of mention that the German writer, Major-General Wenninger, is careful to point out for the benefit of those of his comrades who are in favour of the reduction of the period of Cavalry service in Germany to two years, as in France, that such reduction makes absolutely necessary an increased establishment of thoroughly broken horses for the training of the recruits. With the three years' service now obtaining in the German Cavalry, the squadron can manage with forty or fifty such horses, whereas, should a period of service of two years only be introduced, each squadron would require at the very least sixty or seventy, and General Wenninger is of opinion that such an establishment could not possibly be maintained. The French try to get over the difficulty by encouraging re-engagement, which the German writer considers to be industrially and economically unsound. It is interesting to notice that this issue of the Austrian *Cavalry Journal* also contains an equally lengthy criticism of the Russian Cavalry 'Training' of this year, so that those who care to do so can study side by side the Cavalry ideas, as expressed in the latest regulations, of the Allied Powers of Northern and Western Europe. Lieutenant von Sanden writes on 'reconnaissance by Cavalry and aeroplane,' and discusses the uses of airships and aeroplanes. He has not much to say that is especially new, but considers that aviation can act best in combination with Cavalry in the distant reconnaissance, seeking out the enemy, observing railways and concentration routes. He does not think that observers in airships or aeroplanes, owing to the height from which they will be obliged to reconnoitre, will be able to make more than very general observations, and that the close reconnaissance must still fall to the Cavalry, which must also be charged with driving the opposing

Cavalry off the field, and with the transmission to the rear of all the information obtained, whether by the aviators or by the mounted men. This number closes with two articles on 'equitation.'

July and August.—As usual at this period of the year these months are represented by a single number. Major von Junk contributes an article of an historical character entitled 'The Cavalry in 1812,' and gives some interesting details of the composition of the *Grande Armée*. Thus the 6th Corps contained only Bavarians, the 7th Saxons, the 8th Westphalians. Of the 534 squadrons of Cavalry which took the field, only 247 were composed of Frenchmen, and the writer enumerates the many existing regiments of German Cavalry which entered upon the campaign in the Corps of Reserve Cavalry commanded by Nansouty, Montbrun, Grouchy, and Latour-Maubourg. He emphasises a fact, upon which due stress is not always laid—viz. that the Russians were able to preserve their superiority in Cavalry unimpaired, while the mounted arm under Napoleon was disappearing. When the Beresina was crossed in the retreat, Latour-Maubourg had no more than 150 horses in his command, despite the fact that on arrival at Smolensk another Cavalry corps had been amalgamated with his. Major von Junk gives a few details about the composition of the *Légion d'honneur*, two squadrons of Cavalry made up wholly of officers whose regiments had disappeared, but who still themselves possessed horses. The squadrons were commanded by the Generals Grouchy and Sebastiani, and the troop-leaders were Brigadier-Generals. Three officers of the Prussian Hussar Regiment, then numbered 2 and composed of two squadrons of each of the present Ziethen and Blücher Hussars, rode in this *corps d'élite*. 'The Moral Element in War' is the title of a paper by Lieut.-Colonel Dichtl, and Major-General Wenninger continues his review of the French Cavalry Regulations, as does another writer that of the Russian Cavalry Training; this last is to be continued in the September journal. Major Riedl writes on 'Schlachtenreiterei,' describes the employment of Cavalry before, at the commencement of, and during the battle, giving many instances from history in support of his statements; he points out that the position of the Cavalry body or bodies while the battle is in progress must depend upon the particular object with which they are to be employed—thus, at Wagram, Borodino, Aspern, and Jena Napoleon had different intentions in regard to the use of his Cavalry, and placed it accordingly. Major Riedl discusses also the influences which decide the intervention of the arm in the fight, the methods of its employment, and the effect of the Infantry and Artillery fire to which, during its rapid advance, Cavalry may be exposed, giving statistics of losses gathered from Sedan, Vellestino, Modder River, and Sandepu. Under no circumstances, he declares, should a commander hold back his Cavalry in cotton-wool until the end of the action, solely for employment in a possible pursuit; a flying Infantry can, he opines, be pursued at a trot, while a routed opponent will usually be at least as weary as the horses of the Cavalry following in his tracks. Major-General Buxbaum has a very short paper, which would well bear elaboration, on Schwerin, and Major von Thier writes eulogistically on the supply and quality of the French remount, in regard to which this officer would appear to possess some rather special knowledge. An article,

rather curious than interesting, is one by Captain Guzmann, of the Horse Artillery, called *Die Kurve der Reitleistung*, in which he endeavours to reduce to 'graphics,' by a form of arithmetical calculation, the speed at which a horse should be able to cover a certain distance or perform a specified length of journey. He takes the 'record' for such, and deduces calculated results from this by a simple rule-of-three sum. The value of his deductions lies in the data which, theoretically, they should provide for the man who has to ride a certain distance and wishes for something of the nature of a guide as to 'time' and 'rate of progression,' and the article is certainly interesting and the figures ingeniously worked out. It is, however, open to question whether Captain Guzmann takes either the human or the animal factor enough into consideration; neither man or horse is every day at his best, at the very top of his powers. Further, it may be argued that weather and the state of the road, &c., may make the most carefully drawn 'graphics' unreliable; while so far as the 'records' are concerned, upon which the writer bases his calculations, it may perhaps well be that the 'record' was not obtained by a rider merely anxious to compile one, but whose only anxiety was to be the first home in a competition—very possibly in indifferent company. The article will well repay perusal by those interested in the theory of performances, the actual practice of which in this country is not specially favourably looked upon.

*Militär-Wochenblatt*.—As is not unusually the case with this journal, there is rather a dearth of articles of purely Cavalry interest in the issues of the last three months. In that dated July 23 an officer of the Saxon General Staff gives a good account of the Battle of Salamanca and of the Cavalry action on the following day at Garcia Hernandez. As is not perhaps unnatural, we hear more of the part taken by the Brigade under Bock than by that commanded by Anson; the words 'Garcia Hernandez' were borne on the appointments of the two Hanoverian regiments, the Garde du Corps and Cuirassier Guards, which, as part of the Heavy Dragoons of the King's German Legion, took part in the action, and this 'honour' was in 1899 handed on by the German Emperor to the 13th and 14th Prussian Uhlans. The account seems to be drawn mainly from the histories of Thiers and of General Foy. The numbers dated August 1, 3, and 6 contain a detailed criticism of the new German 'Riding Instructions' promulgated on July 29 last, and which replace those which have been in use since 1882. The old book was contained in two volumes, was very diffuse and rambling, the print was small, and its study was not cheerfully undertaken; its successor is a single volume, and, although the actual number of pages is not appreciably fewer, the type is very much larger and pleasanter reading, while the whole contents have been greatly abridged. None the less it deals with several subjects not included in the old book, such as 'Long Distance Rides' and even 'Riding to Hounds.' The volume is very fully illustrated, the pictures of horses in motion being reproduced from instantaneous photographs, while in all 'bendings' and 'turnings' the horse has been photographed from above. The 'contents' comprise an Introduction, Four Parts, and an Appendix. Part I. is of a general and elementary character, rules for

riding-school instructors, telling-off into 'rides,' explanation of different expressions, instructions as to saddling and biting, mounting, and dismounting, &c. Part II. explains the seat and position of the rider, describes the different 'aids' and their uses, singly and in combination, the single ride, riding with the lance, jumping, procedure with troublesome horses, riding across country, and long-distance rides. Part III. describes the breaking of remounts and the training generally of young and older horses, explaining how the desired ends can be attained in the limited time available. Finally, Part IV. deals with the equestrian training of the soldier from enlistment until he is fitted to take his place in the ranks. In the Appendix is described the training of the riderless horse, and the use of the whip and other aids; there are two chapters also on the anatomy and motive powers of the horse. Throughout the book equal stress is laid upon individual training of man and horse, as upon combined training in the section and larger bodies. The squadron commander is, under the regimental C.O., solely responsible for the training in riding of all ranks under his command. Horsemastership is to be inculcated in all. The officer's ride is supervised by the most efficient instructor, regardless of rank. The regimental C.O. is responsible for arranging for *Jagdreiten* and long-distance rides in the autumn. One of the most important sections is that dealing with the breaking of the remount, in which the end aimed at is the production of the perfect charger at the height of its weight-carrying and endurance powers, and so broken as to be easily ridden. In breaking no attempt is to be made to turn out horses all of one pattern, but each is to be so individually trained as to use its conformation so as best to enable it to carry its rider in the field; there is no such thing as a *normal* position for the head and neck. Very great importance is attached to this subject, which in the new manual is thoroughly discussed from every point of view, and the aim of this training is summed up as 'the absolute and safe control of the horse in all kinds of country.' In Part IV. it is laid down that the school horses used for the training of recruits are not to be appropriated to other services. Especial stress is laid upon the care to be taken, not only of the remounts, but of the younger horses in the ranks; only a few of the older remounts are for the future to take part in the manœuvres, and *none* of these are ever to be employed on reconnaissance schemes. Formerly, apparently, the recruits were 'passed' in riding with the bridoon only before being permitted to ride on the bit; they are now, however, promoted to the bit-rein on their general riding efficiency. There is a small change in the method of holding the reins; the off-bridoon rein is no longer, as heretofore, drawn downwards through the palm of the hand, but between the first and middle fingers. The absolute stillness of the horse is insisted upon when mounting and dismounting; paragraph 32 declares that 'a horse which does not stand perfectly still on being mounted is not fully trained for field service.' In Part III. increased importance is attached to the *flexible* character of the seat; the lower part of the leg is no longer to be straight, but, according to its length, more or less sloped to the rear and pressed close to the horse's body; the toes are now turned slightly outwards. Considerably increased latitude is now permitted in the position of the rider, if due to the shape of the man himself or to the formation

of his mount. The different 'aids' are described, and the methods of their employment are thoroughly gone into; but it is declared that the propensity with most men of using their hands (reins) too much, and their other 'aids' far too little, must be combatted. In 'the use of the spurs' it is noted that increased action of the leg can be obtained by the application of the 'flat' of the spur. This Part contains a number of 'definitions.' In jumping it is for the first time laid down that the rider's trunk should during the whole performance remain perpendicular to the ground-level, and that the horse should be given as much rein as possible. This Part contains a special section on riding across country, with a new paragraph on 'hunting,' which is described as 'an admirable school for the young officer, as also the best means whereby the leader of every rank can keep himself saddle-fit for the important and serious business of war.' In 'Long-distance riding' advice is offered for the conduct of all such exercises. In Part III. there is much about the remount; during the first six months of his instruction he is jumped without a rider, and when mounted is only taken over very small obstacles for a further period of the same length. The remount is not only to be accustomed to troops, but to all kinds of street traffic. In Part IV., for the early instruction of the recruit the rule appears to be to teach him first to 'stick on,' and then to teach him the military seat. It is laid down that *every* horse is to be re-trained during the winter; every young officer must break a remount. From the closing words of the introduction to this new 'Riding Instructions,' it appears that the authorities attach great importance to the *spirit* in which the *letter* of its teaching is carried out. In the issue under date of August 21 will be found a very brief, and not an especially illuminating, criticism of the new French *Règlement de la Cavalerie*; here, too, as elsewhere, attention is drawn to the increased number of recruit or school horses required per squadron under the two-year period of Colour service. We are also reminded—and it is worth noting—that, contrary to the custom in England and in Germany, the French *Règlement* contains the whole matter of the Cavalry training, and that musketry, among other subjects, is not found in a separate manual. The number for the 31st of the same month has a very short paper on the 'Young Officer's Private Charger,' from which it appears that while the German officer has one admirable charger—that provided from the remount—his second charger, which he buys himself, leaves a good deal to be desired as regards both breeding and training.

'African Game Trails,' by President Roosevelt, is an account of the trek of the President of the U.S.A. in Africa, not on the lines that an ordinary sportsman uses, but on those of a man privileged by his position to have provided for him the best, not only from Government officials, but from all inhabitants.

He tells us little in his first chapter of his safari arrangements, which must have been huge, as, besides himself and his son Kermit, there seem to have been many other Europeans. These details would have been far more interesting to the soldier, or to a man who knows safari in East Africa

or bundobust in India, than the simple story of how he killed 512 head of game, besides wounding, according to the book, some 3,000 head.

To quote one passage : ' I saw a fine Grant, and stalked him, but the bullets ' (note the plural) ' from the little Springfield fell short as he raced away to safety.'

A few pages further on he writes of managing to get within 350 yards of a herd of hartebeest, and states again : ' My bullet went too far back.'

The most painful reading is the history of the slaughter of the so-called White or Square-mouthed Rhinoceros (*Simus*). This animal, as all interested in *feræ naturæ* know, is now exceedingly rare, and why he should have wounded many in order to kill the large number of nine is beyond our ken. We do not care for these records of cruel shooting in print.

Roosevelt went to Africa ostensibly to collect for some natural history museums in America, but it is to be wondered if there exists in America a natural history museum in every small village, to say nothing of cities. His ' Slaughter Book ' leads one to think so.

' Tripoli : The Italian-Turkish War.' By Lieut.-Colonel G. Ramaciotti. (London : Hugh Rees, Ltd., 5 Regent Street, S.W.)

In the space of 118 pages the author, who commands a battalion in the Austrian Army, gives a clear account of the operations between October 5, 1911, and June 8, 1912.

This book should be read by all soldiers who are eager to learn from this—the latest war. It is written in terse military style, confined to the narration of events.

There are no comments, and the fact that the reader can make his own, chapter by chapter, adds rather to the value and interest.

The author does not disclose the sources of his information. These are presumably Italian, but they are shorn of all attempts to magnify sensational incidents, and obliterate military lessons in the manner of civilian war correspondents.

It is early to deduce much from this war ; moreover, judgment must be reserved until the Turkish version of these events is presented.

The following are among the most interesting observations that occurred to us as we read the book :—

Science *versus* Mobility.

Good staff work, organisation, and discipline of the Italians. Mobility of the Turks and Arabs largely counteracts their advantages.

The very large amount of shock action—i.e. bayonet charges.

Co-operation of the three arms, especially in the Bengazi battle of March 7, 1912.

Close Artillery support of Infantry by mountain guns.

Artillery fire unable to stop determined advances, though inflicting material losses.

The use by the Italians of airships and aeroplanes, mechanical transport, searchlights in field works, watch dogs in wire entanglements, and other novelties.

In brief, this is a most interesting little book for every soldier.

'Our Cavalry.' Major-General M. F. Rimington, C.V.O., C.B. (Macmillan and Co., London.) 5s.

'Our Cavalry' is full of sound theory and advice, based on the practical experience of many years' service, combined with the deep study of the Cavalry literature of all nations. The theory and advice is not presented in the dull and lifeless manner characteristic of the text-book; full of life, it admirably preserves that enthusiasm and dash so typical of the author.

There is no need for us to recommend a book by so famous a leader of Cavalry. The preface states that it is for junior officers of all arms; in our opinion, however, it might well be read by officers of all ranks, and that with undoubted advantage to both their professional knowledge and *morale*.

The three main lessons are :—

(a) The unison of the three arms and the resolute offensive.  
(b) The necessity of combining the fire-power of Horse Artillery with the shock of Cavalry.

(c) The advisability of forming line by a wheel to a flank rather than by forming to the front.

The book deals with tactics of Cavalry both in small and large bodies and against mounted and dismounted adversaries. Three chapters are devoted to the combination of Horse Artillery and Cavalry, two to the disposition of the Cavalry in a campaign and its action in the general engagement. There is a chapter on detached duties, and another on raids; the remainder deals with the training of the horse and man and his armament. From the above it will be seen that the book is comprehensive. We regret, however, that there is no chapter on reconnaissance from such a noted scout-leader as the Colonel of Rimington's Tigers.

On the subject of Cavalry tactics the author is quite clear, and lays down that, although the 'ideal must be shock action,' there are many occasions when this form of attack will be out of place, and therefore great stress must be laid upon the training of Cavalry in dismounted work. We quite agree with the author's reasons for advocating the employment of the charge when possible. 'Victory is gained, not so much by the numbers killed, as the numbers frightened,' and 'We have to recognise that whilst recourse to shock action demands great resolution, fire action on each successive occasion at an increased distance is always the easy course; whilst the former decides battles and increases our moral, the latter is a sign in many cases of the leader weakening, temporising, or waiting for orders which will never—and he knows it—come.' 'Whatever the cost, whatever the method, he who tries first to handle his enemy is the one with whom "moral," that incalculable factor, will rest.'

In discussing the action of Cavalry *v.* Cavalry, the greatest stress is laid on the necessity of cohesion in the charge, even at the sacrifice of pace and of delaying the deployment till the last possible moment. In an admirable chapter the various methods of forming line, manœuvring till the last minute with the object of causing the enemy to make a false deployment, are discussed, the author coming to the conclusion that a column of masses is the simplest formation for a brigade to manœuvre in, a change of direction of the head being followed by 'an échelon attack to a flank.'

The comparative advantages of Horse Artillery and Mounted Infantry as providers of the fire support of the charge are discussed, the author favouring the Horse Artillery on account of its range, fire control, quicker action, and smaller frontage. We should like to have had his opinion on the employment of machine guns.

In discussing the co-operation of the Horse Artillery the author follows the acknowledged plan—viz. the placing of the guns on the high ground and manœuvring away from them in the low with the object of bringing off a surprise attack at right angles to the fire of the guns; the soundness of this doctrine cannot be questioned, but nor can the difficulty of its application be denied. A little point often forgotten is worthy of note: 'The sight and sound of his own bursting shells will often enlighten the Brigadier as to the position of the enemy's squadrons, and guide him in his attack, on which everything depends.'

In the attack on Infantry, the author would use his Artillery to prevent the enemy sitting still, thus enabling the Cavalry to assert its superior mobility; he is further of opinion that Cavalry with Horse Artillery have a great rôle on the battlefield against Infantry if the conditions are favourable, and he quotes instances in modern war to support this view, with which we cordially agree.

Some drastic methods of curing wild firing in the outposts are given in Chapter XIII., and stress is laid on picketing the enemy rather than watching the ground as a means of security from surprise. As training for this it is suggested that the mounted troops of one garrison should picket their neighbours. 'Let us practise, then, not only our officers but our men in picketing every large body of troops that train within fifty miles of us.'

We hope the chapters on the Training of the Cavalry Officer will be widely read by those who wish to substitute the class-room for the hunting-field, and we would specially direct their attention to the following: 'It is a duty to his country for a Cavalry officer in peace time to take such exercise in the available sports of hunting, pig-sticking, polo, big-game shooting, and other exercises as will keep muscles and lungs in condition and training and his nerves in order'; and 'The high-spirited youngster whom we want must in some respects be treated like a blood horse.'

A chapter on the Training of the Man follows, and in it the author gives his views as to the essentials necessary for war, and, rightly we think, places 'moral and discipline' high on the list. 'It is part of the duty of an officer to attend to the education in moral. It is the duty of every officer to check cynicism and grumbling among his subordinates, and to develop a high moral.' As to armament, he favours the long thrusting sword.

On the subject of the horse the remarks of the author will be listened to with interest. His first contention is that the leader should 'keep a finger on the Equine Pulse,' and 'Further, since the health of the horses is vital to the efficiency of Cavalry, their leader must be willing to take risks in grazing, off-saddling, and foraging for food.' As to the horse itself, he advocates a horse of from fourteen to fifteen hands with a big chest measurement, and in a chapter on its training there is much valuable advice.

We have read this book with great interest; we find in it a valuable addition to Cavalry literature, and we heartily recommend it to all.



'The History of the 16th (the Queen's) Lancers,' price £2 2s., demy quarto, with 44 plates. Apply to Hon. Secretary, 16th Lancer History Fund, Messrs. Cox and Co., 16 Charing Cross, London.

The latest addition to the now fairly long list of Regimental Histories is that of the 16th (the Queen's) Lancers. It is a handsome volume, the work of Colonel Henry Graham, who in its pages narrates the services abroad and at home of his old regiment. The work is issued as privately printed, and may be assumed therefore to be limited in edition and not designed to appeal to the general public.

The history starts with the raising of the regiment in 1759. The officer to whom the task was committed was Lieut.-Colonel (afterwards General) John Burgoyne. The 'letter of service' was dated August 4 in that year. There is, however, in existence another private, though official, letter written to Burgoyne, in which he is given permission to raise this regiment of Light Dragoons after his own particular plan. This letter is not, however, quoted, though that there were differences in the establishment of the regiment from that of its predecessor, the 15th (Elliot's) is certain.

The 16th, the second of the regiments of Light Cavalry in seniority, first saw service at Belleisle in 1761, and this was followed by a campaign in Portugal, where, under Burgoyne's able leadership, the regiment distinguished itself. After a period of home service extending over thirteen years the 16th was ordered to America to take part in the War of Independence. The campaign closed in 1781, and the regiment again returned home. In the French War of 1793 the 16th served under the Duke of York—at least, four troops accompanied that commander. Plenty of fighting fell to their share during the campaign, which lasted for three years. Next came the Peninsular War, and from 1809 the 16th were continuously engaged. Their services in this momentous campaign are well recorded by their historian. At Waterloo more honours accrued to the regiment.

From 1823 to 1846 they served in India, where six honours were added to those already gained by them. After being stationed for the second time in India the 16th was ordered to South Africa, and took their share in the fighting and toilsome travelling of the Boer War. In appendices the changes in the uniform of the regiment and the variations in arms and equipment are given with care and great minuteness. Sporting records are not neglected, and some account of the valuable presentation plate and trophies of sport is inserted. Many useful maps are scattered through the volume, and the illustrations, both in 'three-colour' and 'half-tone,' are numerous.

The register of officers might have included the life-stories of majors, captains, lieutenants, and cornets, as well as of those of the senior ranks. We have not tested the particulars set forth as to the services of the colonels beyond the first one, General John Burgoyne, who raised the regiment. In this, one important detail is wanting, namely, his seven years' exile on the Continent when, after quitting the service as captain, he employed his time in studying the systems and equipments of Light Cavalry in foreign lands.

In conclusion, we can heartily congratulate the regiment on the completion of a history of its distinguished service and the record of its long list of honours so nobly gained in many parts of the world.




5th (P.C.W.) DRAGOON GUARDS.

1826



• DISPLAY •  
• 5<sup>TH</sup> (PCW) •  
DRAGOON GUARDS  
• 1912. •



## NOTES

The Staff of the JOURNAL beg to offer to Lieut.-General Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., the founder of the CAVALRY JOURNAL in 1905, their hearty congratulations on his approaching marriage. Sir Robert is still on the JOURNAL Committee, and takes an active interest in its welfare.

### BOARDED-OUT HORSES

It is officially announced that, with a view to extending the system under which horses from Cavalry regiments are boarded out with private individuals, the Army Council have decided to remove the restriction under which horses could only be boarded out at places within a day's march of the station of the regiment.

The revised conditions may now be summarised as follows :—

Applications for horses should be made to the commanding officer of the nearest Cavalry regiment, or to the Secretary of the War Office. A month's trial is allowed, and every endeavour is made to provide the applicant with a suitable horse. After being finally accepted the horse must be kept for at least twelve months, be well fed and stabled, and should always be kept in good hard condition, so that it could, in case of emergency, at once take its place in the ranks. The person with whom the horse is boarded out must insure it and lodge the insurance policy with the commanding officer of the regiment supplying the horse. All these horses are liable to be called in for military training once in every two years, for a period not exceeding one month, a notice of at least a fortnight being given in each case. Expenses of transit are paid by the War Office. The horses will also be inspected by an officer from time to time, as may be considered necessary.

It is hoped that when these conditions become more widely known, many persons who would like to obtain the use of a good horse on easy terms will avail themselves of the opportunities afforded by this system.

### CAPTAIN LORD W. HILL

The portrait of Captain Lord W. Hill, Royal Scots Greys, is interesting, being in the full dress uniform of the regiment in 1844. (See illustration facing page 503.)

This officer joined the 2nd Dragoons in 1836, exchanging from the 43rd Foot, and was promoted to the rank of Captain in 1843. He was killed in 1844, while hunting in Bramford Park, near Ipswich; his horse having bolted with him dashed him against a tree, with an immediate fatal result. A boy who caught the loose horse mounted it, and was himself thrown a few minutes later against a paling and also killed.

## THE LATE GENERAL SIR CHARLES GOUGH, V.C., G.C.B.

1832—1912

We much regret to chronicle the death of General Sir Charles Gough, who, in his eighty-first year, passed away on September 6, at his residence, Innislonagh, Clonmel, Ireland.

A stalwart soldier, a true builder of the Empire, it is impossible in these few lines to adequately appreciate his many sterling qualities, his self-sacrifice, and his devotion to duty. Space will therefore only admit of a brief outline of his noble and heroic career.

Charles John Stanley Gough, who was born in India in 1832, the son of Mr. George Gough, of the Bengal Civil Service, entered the Indian Army in 1848 as cornet of the 8th Bengal Cavalry. Almost immediately after he was employed in the Punjab Campaign of 1848-9, being present at the actions of Ramnuggur and Sadoolapore, and the battles of Chillianwallah and Goojerat, for which he received the medal with two clasps.

When the Indian Mutiny broke out in 1857 Lieut. Gough, as he then was, was away on leave at Kashmir. He hastened back to join his regiment, only to find it had been already disarmed and dismantled. However, nothing daunted, he obtained service with the Guide Cavalry, then engaged at the siege of Delhi. In the month of June, at the age of twenty-six, he was promoted captain, and in this capacity commanded a squadron of the Guides in Hodson's expedition to Rohtuk. Returning to the Punjab, Captain Gough joined Hodson's Horse, taking an active part in the many trying operations which re-established communication with the army under Sir Colin Campbell, including those of Khurkowda, Azadpore, Gungaree, Puttealee, Mynpoorie, and Shumshabad, where he was severely wounded; but in less than a month afterwards he was again at the head of his squadron at Meangunge, and later at the relief of Lucknow. His services in this campaign were five times mentioned in despatches, and were rewarded with the medal and two clasps, the Victoria Cross, and the brevet of major.

The Victoria Cross was indeed well earned, and was bestowed on him 'for valour,' not for one only, but for four separate and distinct acts of heroism:—

(1) For gallantry in an affair at Khurkowda on August 15, 1857, in which he saved his brother, who was wounded, and killed two of the enemy.

(2) For gallantry on August 18, when he led a troop of the Guide Cavalry in a charge and cut down two of the enemy's sowars, with one of whom he had a desperate hand-to-hand combat.

(3) For gallantry on January 27, 1858, at Shumshabad, where in a charge he attacked one of the enemy's leaders, and pierced him with his sword, which was carried out of his hand in the *mêlée*. He defended himself with his revolver and shot two of the enemy.

(4) For gallantry on February 23, 1858, at Meangunge, where he came to the assistance of Brevet-Major O. H. St. George Anson, and killed his

opponent, immediately afterwards cutting down another of the enemy in the same gallant manner.

During the Bhootan war, 1864-5, he commanded the 5th Bengal Cavalry, and participated at the capture of the Dalingkote and Bala stockades, being awarded the medal and clasp. In 1867 he was promoted lieutenant-colonel, and in 1875 colonel. Three years later he was placed in command of the Cavalry Brigade in the war with Afghanistan, and was present at the capture of Ali Musjid, the action of Futtehabad, and the defence of Jugdulluck Pass.

When in 1879 fresh troubles broke out, leading to the massacre of Cavagnari and his escort at Kabul, Colonel Gough was appointed to the command of the First Brigade, advancing by the Khyber, assisting in the relief of Sherpur and the operations round Shekabad. The transport difficulties were enormous, and his march was perhaps one of the most dangerous and difficult ever undertaken in the annals of our history.

For his valuable services he was once again mentioned in despatches, and received the medal with two clasps, and also the honour of being created a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath.

From 1881-5 Sir Charles was in command of the Hyderabad Contingent, and in this latter year was promoted major-general, and from the following year to 1890 commanded the Oudh Division of the Bengal Army. He became lieutenant-general in 1889 and general in 1894, and was placed on the unemployed supernumerary list a year later.

Sir Charles Gough was advanced to the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath in 1895.

At the time of his death he was colonel of his old regiment, the 5th Cavalry (Indian Army). In 1897 he accepted the honorary colonelcy of the Tipperary R.G.A. (Militia), which regiment has since been disbanded.

Mention must also be made of his prowess as an author, for in 1898 he published a work entitled 'The Sikhs and the Sikh War.'

His brother, the late General Sir Hugh Gough, whom he saved from death at Khurkowda, won the Victoria Cross for his gallantry, as an officer of Hodson's Horse, during a charge against the rebels at Lucknow.

In 1869 he married Harriette, daughter of the late Mr. J. W. Power, M.P., there being two sons. The younger one, Colonel John Gough, also earned the Victoria Cross; this was gained under somewhat curious circumstances during the war in Somaliland in 1903, when in command of a column he assisted two of his officers to bring back a mortally wounded comrade. These two were awarded the V.C., but in making the report he modestly made no mention of his own conduct. The facts of the case were only brought to notice afterwards, when he too received his reward.

This is said to be the only instance in which three members of the same family have been awarded the much-coveted honour.

The last few years Sir Charles Gough spent quietly in retirement in Ireland, leading the life of a country squire, taking a keen interest in all local matters and sports, especially his favourite one of hunting, at which in his younger days he was an adept.

The funeral, which was of a semi-military character, took place at Clonmel.



## YEOMANRY

BY A YEOMANRY COLONEL

Yeomanry officers and all who take an interest in the training and general welfare of Yeomanry will have welcomed the various letters that have recently appeared in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, and a careful study of them will show many ways by which the efficiency of Yeomanry regiments can be improved.

It must be remembered that Yeomanry regiments differ largely in their requirements and capabilities, owing to local influences, and cannot be effectively treated as a whole. This is a point which is not always properly realised by the authorities.

It is, for instance, easy for a London Yeomanry regiment to do the squadron drills and the musketry courses laid down in the regulations on Saturday afternoons and Bank Holidays, because the ranges are convenient, and horses can be got without trouble, and sometimes even the use of the trained horses of a squadron of Regular Cavalry, but in this case it is difficult for the men who compose these regiments to get away from their employment for more than sixteen days for the training.

On the other hand, a county Yeomanry, whose men are scattered over a large area of country, and who are employed in various ways, are unable to assemble in sufficient numbers to conform to the regulations as to mounted drills, and are unable to do the musketry course under their proper leaders or proper conditions for efficiency. These regiments, if allowed to come out for a longer period, say four days extra, could carry out the prescribed mounted drills and extra squadron training, and also the second part of the musketry course, under proper conditions (provided their camp were near a suitable range), which they do not and cannot do at present.

It would, however, be necessary that pay and allowances for these four extra days should be given, and if this were done many commanding officers would certainly welcome this change.

Then there is also another class of Yeomanry regiment who have some town squadrons and some country, who might find some middle course more suitable for their regiments.

Another source of difficulty in a Yeomanry regiment is the messing. This varies very much in regiments, and is often a cause of trouble. Squadron messes run independently under the personal responsibility of the squadron commander seem to answer best, he being given his squadron rations and any of the commanding officer's grant the latter may think fit, and having to find men to do the cooking and fatigues, &c., within the squadron as if on service.

Then, in addition to the canteen, there should be a dry canteen or coffee shop, run by the regiment for choice, or let out to contractors, where any extras could be bought by the men, and the luxuries to be found there would depend on the requirements of the particular regiment. Under this system the squadron would get used to living on their rations, supplemented by what they elect to buy individually or collectively to satisfy their special

requirements. This experience would be a great advantage when on manœuvres or if mobilised.

There is no doubt that Yeomanry generally have greatly improved in efficiency since the South African War, and in some ways since they have been incorporated in the Territorial Army. Commanding officers are, however, in some counties greatly handicapped by their County Associations, who grudge the necessary equipment to a Yeomanry regiment because it is not necessary or suitable for an Infantry regiment or other unit. A Yeomanry regiment surely should not be prevented from getting its equipment complete and learning the use of it so as to be able to mobilise at once thoroughly equipped, because the County Association thinks fit to utilise a portion of the grant made to that regiment for the purpose of supplementing the grant, say, to the Horse Battery, or building up a Reserve Fund.

The funds were administered in most cases far better when left in the hands of the commanding officer, as formerly.

County Associations do not always see their way to completing the equipment that they are supposed to furnish and are given the money for supplying, but the military authorities are not blameless in that respect.

There is a very strong feeling that Yeomanry regiments should be supplied with a weapon in addition to the rifle, as so well advocated by Lord Ashburton, Major Hill-Whitson, and others in this JOURNAL, but that the sword should be made for pointing, not cutting, as there is no time during the training to re-introduce sword exercise, yet having some such weapon would give the men confidence and some chance of defending themselves when mounted, and could not be said to encourage the commanding officer to attempt to train the regiment for shock tactics.

There are also several small details, such as nosebags, which the Ordnance Department refuse to issue, except during the training, and which the men should have as a part of their kit, so as to be able to use when out on long days when doing schemes and training during autumn and winter months.

This Department also refuses applications for the long rifle bucket, not because the authorities wish the Yeomanry regiments to continue to use the short bucket which was issued for the long rifle, and which causes damage to both rifle and horse, however carefully adjusted, but because (even when the County Association does agree to the extra cost) there is a quantity of the old pattern in store that must be used up!

The same reason is given for not calling in the obsolete tripod issued for the machine-guns, which necessitates a man to stand up to his full height in order to fire the gun.

All these small economies disgust commanding officers of Yeomanry regiments, and make them feel, however much trouble they take to try and make their command fit to take the field in a fairly efficient state at short notice, that they could not do so. No one believes that there will be six months to prepare and get properly equipped, even if the various equipments required were forthcoming on mobilisation.

I now come to a very delicate subject—that of the officers. ‘*Qui sapit*,’ whose letter raised the subject of Yeomanry in this JOURNAL, was most



unfair in his criticisms on the officers; yet this, as in the whole Territorial Force, is a very important and difficult question.

Provided the officers you have are good, it is surely better to have vacancies in a regiment than to take officers who are unable to make themselves efficient, in order to fill up the complement. It is difficult to get, in many regiments, the same class of officers that used to join the old Yeomanry, for various reasons; one is that so very much more should be, and is, expected of them. One cannot question the fact that if a Yeomanry officer is to be of any real service in an emergency he must have made it his business to master thoroughly the duties that will be required of him, and this can only be done by hard work and the sacrifice of his leisure in addition to the time given to the annual training of his regiment.

The only way that a Yeomanry officer can learn his work in a practical way is by being attached to a regular regiment, and this the authorities give facilities for up to a point, but it is essential that squadron leaders and junior officers should only be attached to a regular squadron during its squadron training (for the whole period if possible), and officers of higher rank during regimental training. It is no use being attached during the leave season, as is often the case, when nothing is going on beyond the routine barrack duties. It is also a great advantage to an officer to be attached to a regular unit during manœuvres, and I suggest, before being promoted to each step in rank above that of lieutenant, an officer should have had these two experiences and then obtained a certificate as to his knowledge of his duties.

Again, the authorities will not allow officers who, for various reasons, resign their commission in the Regular Cavalry, to join a Yeomanry regiment to complete their service so as to qualify for a pension, &c., but make them join a Special Reserve battalion or one of three Special Yeomanry regiments who naturally seldom have a vacancy (two Irish regiments and the King's Colonials).

This rule seems to require revision, as they would, as a class, be of the greatest value to the commanding officer of a Yeomanry regiment, even if they had on mobilisation to be taken away to go to their old regiment, as they, owing to their previous training in a Regular regiment, know how to act by instinct when points arise, or in an emergency, in a way the Yeomanry officer, however willing and hardworking, cannot acquire without experience.

'Qui sapit' made unfair criticisms on adjutants. They now certainly have plenty to do, though it would be a good thing if officers were only appointed as adjutants who have already served as such in their own regiments. The commanding officer would then get an experienced man, and from the Regular officer's point of view he would get over some of that unsatisfactory period of service when he has to return to ordinary regimental duty, and has little of special interest to do as 'second in command' of a squadron.

It would be in many ways an advantage if adjutants were appointed for only two years, with extension for a limit of three only in exceptional cases, and that it should be obligatory for them to attend manœuvres each

year attached to a Regular regiment, or as assistant umpires, so as to keep themselves up to date and in touch with the latest ideas of the General Staff.

In the old days of the Yeomanry a meeting of commanding officers used to take place once a year, and various points were discussed, and a staff officer from the War Office used to attend and answer any questions and hear any suggestions made, but this meeting has unfortunately been dropped since the Territorial Force has been in existence, and a meeting of officers commanding mounted brigades substituted. This does not answer the same purpose, as the brigadiers have not the same intimate knowledge as the commanding officers, who have studied the various questions for years.

It would seem reasonable that a Yeomanry officer should be appointed (to an honorary position) at the War Office who could be called in and consulted when any new regulations are about to be issued, and explain how they would affect the various conditions of Yeomanry regiments—such a position as is now held in respect to the Territorial Infantry.

I fear these notes are very long, and though some of the suggestions contained in them may not be practicable, yet possibly some good may result by considering the various points raised.

#### ‘ KING EDWARD’S HORSE ’

The following appeared in the *London Gazette* dated August 31:—

‘ His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to approve of the conversion of King Edward’s Horse (the King’s Oversea Dominions Regiment), now a unit of the Territorial Force, into a unit of the Special Reserve, under the title of “ King Edward’s Horse (the King’s Oversea Dominions Regiment). ” ’

#### COMMANDS AND APPOINTMENTS

Major-General M. F. Rimington, C.V.O., C.B., Inspector-General of Cavalry, India, has been gazetted Colonel of the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, vice the late Lieut.-General E. A. Gore.

Major-General Hon. J. H. G. Byng, C.B., M.V.O., the editor of the *CAVALRY JOURNAL* in 1910, has been selected to command the Force in Egypt.

Brigadier-General W. H. Birkbeck, C.B., C.M.G., the editor of the *CAVALRY JOURNAL* in 1908 and 1909, has been appointed Director of Remounts in the Q.M.G. Department of the War Office.

#### THE CAVALRY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION

The office of the above Association has now been moved to 20 Victoria Street, London, S.W., where all future communications should be addressed.

## THE CARE OF HORSES IN SOUTH AFRICA

By THE SUB-EDITOR, *South Africa*

The statistical and general report of the Army Veterinary Service tends to show that Army horse-flesh is heir to more disease and wear and tear in South Africa than in other garrisons of the Empire. Thus we find that an average taken within the last two years shows an annual wastage per cent. of strength of :—

10·54 in South Africa.

7·32 in United Kingdom.

4·51 in India.

4·37 in Egypt.

The average sick time to each animal in the Army being 23½ days during the year in South Africa, 21½ days in the United Kingdom or Egypt, and 17 days in India.

To account for these figures it must be remembered that the Army horses now in South Africa are either a collection of old imported horses or are South African-bred horses, which have in many cases been worked as two- and three-year-olds, and which are often not up to the weight which they are asked to carry. The training season is of longer duration in the South African garrison than elsewhere; the manœuvres take place at the coldest season of the year, during which the horses are often bivouacked in a night temperature of many degrees of frost, preventing adequate rest; and during the warmth of the day, when the horses would naturally lie down, they are necessarily kept at work. A drain on the system results, with probable debility, leading to injury or the foundation of disease.

The description and quality of forage obtainable in South Africa is not all that might be desired for horses in constant work, including fast work, but we must accustom the horse to feed on the staple produce of the country. For this purpose mealies should be fed whole, because under service conditions they cannot be crushed or soaked. Care should be taken not to water the horse after feeding the maize, owing to the consequent swelling of the grain, but in cold weather before a long and waterless march the horse may be safely watered if two hours have elapsed after the early-morning feed of 3 lb. of mealies.

As many of the mounted riflemen of the sub-continent breed their own horses, it may be noted that, owing to the deficiency in mineral matter of mealies, brood mares and young stock should not be fed on them.

Good oats are superior to mealies for fast work, and compressed forage formed of bruised chaff of oat and wheat hay, if properly damped and fed to the horse in a manger, is strongly recommended for horses at hard work or in training.

The lucerne hay is not generally as well saved as formerly, and causes the majority of colic cases.

Oat hay is generally cut too late and, owing to the consequent loss of proteid, the straw is not relished by the horse, and a great part is left

uneaten. The grain also is liable to get shaken out in transit, and thus much of it is lost.

Bran should always be carried with every detachment for feeding sick or exhausted horses.

The grasses of South Africa are highly nutritious, and, being drier than grass in England, less has to be consumed to furnish the needful amount of nourishment. In spring where the veld has been burnt, however, the young shoots of grass contain so much water that the grass-fed horse will be incapable of work without excessive sweating and distress, and the trooper should rigorously prevent his horse from feeding on such grass during halts.

If corn is limited to one feed a day, keep it for the night feed, and graze the horses at the midday halt. Any horses that refuse to be caught will then, being hungry, come to the nosebag.

In many parts of the sub-continent the hardness of the ground causes and increases lameness; the prevalence of holes and barbed wire leads to injuries, especially during night operations; add to these the existence, peculiar to the continent of Africa, of horse-sickness, of certain disease-transmitting insects and poisonous plants, and we may conclude that much of the sickness which might elsewhere be classed as preventible cannot in South Africa be fairly considered avoidable or reducible.

In peace time horses may be effectively protected against infection from some of the most serious diseases by avoiding camping out during the unhealthy seasons, as may be seen from the following percentages of the total horses constantly sick in the South African garrison :—

Lameness . . . . .	41'84	Fistula . . . . .	0'37
Wounds and contusions . . . . .	25'18	Colic . . . . .	1'48
Fractures . . . . .	1'85	Other digestive disorders . . . . .	3'00
Capped elbows . . . . .	4'44	Fever . . . . .	1'12
Galls . . . . .	3'71	Debility . . . . .	1'12
Tumours . . . . .	0'37	Biliary fever . . . . .	0'74
Abscess . . . . .	2'96	&c., &c.	

Such returns show that the mortality from African 'horse-sickness' has been reduced almost to extinction by the assiduous precautions of the Army authorities, and although mules and sheep may be immunised by inoculation, as far as that disease is concerned, the horse is still liable to suffer from it if exposed under active service conditions. The disease has been known in South Africa between the 20th and 27th degrees of latitude since 1780, and horses, asses, mules, quaggas, goats, and sheep have been counted among its victims. David Livingstone stated that he found koodoo and gnu which had also died of horse-sickness in its most virulent form. In Rhodesia, in the German south-west, and in bush veld its ravages are most destructive in the low-lying districts. It is favoured by a humid atmosphere with high daily temperature, and in years when these conditions are abnormally pronounced its limits extend in suitable localities as far south in the Free State as Bloemfontein. It was not until after the victory of Omdurman that horse-sickness was recognised north of the Equator,

and its prevalence in the Nile basin south of 12 degrees North latitude was first verified during the rainy season of 1899 by a series of *post-mortem* examinations on sheep, mules, and horses.

The disease is only directly contagious, and frost kills it. It is generally contracted by animals grazing after sundown and before grass is dry from dew. Hence in the Soudan the superstitious Arabs attribute the cause of the disease to the baneful light of an evil star which, it is supposed, attains its greatest brilliancy and malignancy during the rainy season, is only seen at night by man, but is apparent to the superior vision of the horse during the morning and late afternoon. In order to preserve the horse from the imagined fatal effects of seeing the star, he is only taken out of the stable during five or six hours in the middle of the day, and is fed on sun-dried forage.

Horse-sickness is most destructive in South Africa in January and February. It appears to be transmitted by a blood-sucking insect. Eight days after the horse has been inoculated with the disease fever appears, and during the eighth day the normal temperature of 98.4° Fahr. of the healthy animal rises from 99° to 104°. On the tenth day it rises to 106°, and before the last stage falls again to from 104° to 100°, before death rising to 107°.

There are three separate aspects, either of which the disease may assume when it attains its most active stage. These will be referred to by their Dutch names :—

1. In *Dun paard ziekte* (yellow horse-sickness) extreme uneasiness is evidenced; within an hour breathing is affected, the flanks heave violently, the mouth and nostrils eject a cloud of white foam, perhaps a foot long; the horse staggers, falls, and dies almost immediately.

2. In *Dikkop ziekte* (thick or swollen head sickness) the hollows above the eyes become filled; eventually the neck, head, and lips become distended; the teeth of the lower jaw become thus exposed, and a cloud of foam issues before death.

3. In *Blautong* (blue tongue) the visible swelling is confined to the mouth and tongue. This is the form which sheep usually suffer from.

*Post-mortem*.—Slit open the windpipe, it will be found full of froth. If you wish to proceed further, skin the neck to expose the jugular vein; it will be found marked with lines of yellow fluid, which exudes, and portions of which are of the consistency of gelatin. The pericardium contains an excess of fluid; if pricked the fluid squirts out. The fluid which permeates the vital organs will be found to be yellow, and may be slightly tinged with blood; it may amount to 100 to 140 oz. If the lung is cut across, froth appears in the cavities; if held up to the light, bands of a yellow colour appear toward the free edges. In the congested variety, extravasated blood appears in the veins. The spleen is enlarged. The coat of the stomach is often patched with purple or crimson. No true inflammatory phenomena appear, but acute venous congestion with blood plasma.

*Treatment*.—Æther or strong stimulant.

*Preventive treatment*.—Arsenic up to five grains, administered daily by the veterinary surgeon. Protection may be provided by smoking the entrances to and interior of the stable, by mosquito-netting, by keeping on

the nosebag at night, and by covering the thin skin surfaces with tar. The horse should not be led to water until the sun has dissipated the miasma and driven nocturnal insects to shelter. Many farmers only water their horses at noon, and drive them on to high ground for the night.

So-called 'salted' horses, having recovered from horse-sickness, may be expected to be immune for one or more years; they are generally broken-winded and wanting in spirit, and some months after their recovery suffer from successive attacks of fever which appear to be connected with the original disease.

There are many poisonous plants to be met with in Africa, and it is remarkable that whereas cattle and imported horses eat them with fatal results, the South African horse may be left to graze among them in safety, for instinct seems to warn him to feed only on the nutritive grasses.

The tulip, or tulip grass, is in reality a species of iris, but even the indigenous horse is sometimes deceived by the grass-like appearance of the young sprouts. The blue and the yellow varieties are found on low-lying ground, growing to a height of two feet. The leaves and flowers are poisonous, and rapidly take effect, causing great abdominal pain and swelling, followed by death within eight hours if not treated.

*Treatment.*—Rapid purging by means of eserine salicylate. Soda carbonate has been given with good results.

Water at gold-mines often contains cyanide, which is deadly poison to man or beast; hence no water near or running from a gold-mine, even if several miles distant, should be used for watering horses without careful investigation. The poison takes effect at once, so that if cattle are seen drinking from the stream without evil effects it is not dangerously polluted.

When the mounted rifleman is on active service he realises the truth of General de Brack's words that 'the dragoon must only live for his horse, which is his legs, safety, honour, and reward.' The following details of campaigning horse management will claim his constant attention: (1) Watering and feeding; (2) care of feet; (3) backs and girths; (4) care of



POISONOUS SOUTH  
AFRICAN YELLOW  
TULIP GRASS  
(*Homeria Pallida*).



REIN FASTENED WITH DRAW HITCH.

of precaution with vicious kickers.

A great reduction of casualties is attained by use of the air-line, or

horses in camp. It is only necessary to remark with regard to the last subject that about 25 per cent. of all casualties and 75 per cent. of the most serious injuries occur in the horse lines in bivouac, due generally to projecting picket pegs, to sandy ground which fails to hold pegs because they are not properly buried in it, to head-ropes and heel-ropes being fastened too long, to lack

elevated picketing rope, to which horses are attached on opposite sides by the head-strap or rein, in preference to the head-rope, which soon wears out and frays. If wagons cannot be utilised to fasten the end of the long picketing rope to, and the ground is too rocky to admit of pegs being driven, the ends should be secured to sacks filled with earth or stones. Horses should be secured so as to eliminate the possibility of stampedes, but in order that they may be quickly released in case of alarm or of grass fires, the knots should be finished with a draw hitch.

Wire-cutters should be in possession of every detachment, if only to liberate horses that may accidentally become entangled in barbed wire.

### COMPETITION

WE have received an interesting account of a night-patrol competition carried out by the 17th (D.C.O.) Lancers in India.

Thirteen teams, of a patrol leader and three men each, competed.

The course was a rectangular one of about twenty miles.

The country near Sialkot is very flat, intersected here and there by a few nullahs and an occasional bog.

The view is much restricted by trees and native villages.

There was a three-quarter moon during the night of the competition, and the sky was occasionally overcast by clouds.

The test proved the accuracy and rapidity with which it is possible to move across country at night.

The conditions of the competition and the information as to the position of certain stars were not published until three hours before dark, to make the test as practicable as possible. Stars are far more accurate guides than the ordinary compass.

The following was the table published prior to the competition :—

<i>Time</i>	<i>Star</i>	<i>Bearing</i>
11 P.M. to 12 M.N.	Vega	60 to 65 degrees E.N.E.
12 M.N. to 1 A.M.	Altair	Due East
12.30 P.M.	Regulus	Due West
1.30 A.M.	Regulus	80 degrees W.N.W.
1.30 A.M.	Arcturus	20 degrees S. of true W. <i>i.e.</i> Magnetic bearing 250 degrees
2.30 A.M.	Arcturus	10 degrees S. of true W. <i>i.e.</i> Magnetic bearing 260 degrees
3 to 3.30 A.M.	Arcturus	Due West

N.B.—North star is always truth North.

In this connection readers of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL are referred to our issue for April 1912, and we hope to publish shortly further information by the officer commanding 17th Lancers.

The time of the winning patrol was 19½ miles in one hour and thirty-one minutes, exclusive of three compulsory halts of ten minutes each at the three control stations.




## A NEW SADDLE

Lieut.-Colonel A. S. Arnold, 26th (K.G.O.) Light Cavalry, sends us a cutting from the *Veterinary Record*, describing an invention of a Cavalry numnah, together with his experience of same. He says: We have tried this exhaustively in my regiment, and it has also been tried in several others, both British and Indian Cavalry, always with the same result, *i.e.* that it can be used on bad sore backs without interfering at all with the healing of these injuries. I have been using a similar numnah for hunting for the last three years with great success, and others are doing the same, on horses which would otherwise continually be unridable from sore backs. It would seem that here is an invention of a very practical nature which in a great war will keep thousands of men mounted who would otherwise be dismounted owing to saddle injuries. Our Cavalry saddle is an excellent one, but in the South African War it did not prevent the occurrence of saddle injuries on a large scale. Of the twenty thousand horses which, according to the *Times History of the War*, were constantly in hospital, it is perhaps a low estimate that one-tenth of these were saddle injuries. If this is true, then two thousand horses were constantly out of action for sore backs, or always more than sufficient to have horsed an entire Cavalry Brigade.

It is well known to our readers that the subject of saddles and saddle galls is one of the deepest interest to the Army Veterinary Corps and to the Army at large. So far no saddle is known which will not gall; pneumatic panels give some hope in that direction, but there are structural difficulties.

It is, therefore, with peculiar pleasure that we place before our readers the latest in gall-preventing saddles, devised by Major Eassie, D.S.O., A.V.C., and which is said to protect the back so effectively that horses suffering from injuries may continue at work without retarding the healing of the part. Major Eassie has provided the horse with a metal skin, which is placed on top of the felt saddle-cloth used on all Army horses (known as a numnah). The saddle rests directly on the metal surface, while between it and the skin lies the numnah. In the illustration, A is the saddle-tree, resting on B, a thin metal plate which takes the shape of the back, and of suitable width and curve at its various parts; C is the felt numnah to which the armour plate is secured. The friction between the saddle and the back is expended on the metal surface.



Trials made of this contrivance in India have yielded most satisfactory results, and so far no disadvantages have been disclosed. We wish it every success; the idea is in accordance with physiological necessity and is most ingenious.



## NEW ZEALAND

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to confer upon the 3rd (Auckland) Mounted Rifles the honour of becoming Colonel-in-Chief, and has approved of the 2nd (Wellington) Mounted Rifles being in future designated Queen Alexandra's 2nd Mounted Rifles.

## DEFENCE FORCE MILITARY COLLEGE, BLOEMFONTEIN

The following is an account of the *personnel* of the training staff of the Military College, which was formally opened by General Smuts (Minister of Finance and Defence), as well as of the class under their instruction, which may be found interesting to our readers, especially to those who served through the South African War.

## THE STAFF

**Brigadier-General George Gray Aston, C.B., A.D.C.**, superintending instruction. Entered Royal Marine Artillery 1879, Brevet-Colonel 1905. Employed in the Naval Intelligence Department at the Admiralty on its establishment 1887 to 1890. Passed the Staff College 1891. Professor at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 1896-99. D.A.A.G. Staff College, 1904-6. Member of the Foreign Intelligence Committee, 1886. Gunnery Manual Committee, 1892. Secretary to Naval Reserves Committee, Admiralty, 1902. Served Soudan, 1884. South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, medal with two clasps, Brev. Lieut.-Colonel). F.R.G.S., A.D.C. to H.M. the King.

**Major J. J. Collyer, C.M.R.**, Commandant.

**Lieut.-Colonel M. du Toit (O.F.S. Commissioner of Police)**, Instructional Staff. Served in Staats Artillery with distinction. Was terribly wounded in the engagement at Dundee, where he served with remarkable gallantry. Went to Cape Town on parole to recuperate.

**Major P. C. B. Skinner**, late General Staff Instructional Staff. Saw considerable service during the late war with the Northampton Regiment.

**Captain T. Kroon**, as Quartermaster. Saw considerable service in the Staats Artillery. Was supervisor for two years of the Chinese cordon, and held the position of Quartermaster in the Staats Artillery.

**Captain P. C. Paff** is attached for translation work, and held a commission in the Staats Artillery.

## OFFICERS ATTENDING SCHOOL

The *personnel* of the officers is as follows :—

**Major T. H. Blew**, Natal Militia. **Captain L. F. Collender**.

**Inspector Ben Bouwer**, District Commandant, Heidelberg.

**Captain G. A. Brand**, son of President Brand of O.F.S., General during the war, and now in charge of the cattle guards on the Drakensberg (O.F.S.).

**Captain J. H. Breytenbach**. Holds a commission in the Southern Mounted Rifles. Went with the Coronation contingent.

Sub-Inspector J. J. de Jager, Waterberg District. Member of the Coronation contingent.

Major G. M. de Waal, Northern District Mounted Rifles, Natal. With Transvaal forces in the late war.

Captain W. H. C. Grothaus, Staats Artillery.

Captain W. F. P. Groves. Held a commission in the Royal Artillery, was stationed at Standerton after the war, now farming in the Waterberg.

Major G. G. H. Helbert. Held a commission in the S.A.C. Now Adjutant in Natal Carbineers. Major W. L. Harvie, Adjutant Wit Rifles.

Captain A. H. Hirsch. P.A. Guards, Port Elizabeth. Lieut. A. G. Brink.

Captain G. Hodgson. Major E. T. Humphreys. Lieut. G. J. du Preez.

Major F. A. Jones, D.S.O., Welsh Regiment. Adjutant S.A.R.E.C.

Captain G. C. J. Kemp, Piet Retief. Served under General de la Rey. Commanded Boer forces in field as a General.

Lieut. J. W. G. Liepoldt. Was a journalist on the *S.A. News* as a young man, commanded a Maxim contingent during the war under General Viljoen.

Sub-Inspector C. W. B. Lewis, Natal Police.

Lieut.-Colonel J. Lewis, C.M.G., V.D. Thirty-two years' service at Volunteering. Served throughout the late Boer war and the Langeberg campaign with the D.E.O.V.R., which he now commands.

Inspector S. C. Maritz, Piet Retief. One of the irreconcilables at the end of the war in the Cape, and went into German territory. Considerable comment was passed at the time he received his appointment in the police.

Captain R. M. McCluskie. Captain T. C. Nieuwoudt. Captain Vlok.

Lieut. A. H. Nussey was Adjutant to General De Wet during the war, and was present in the Northern Free State on the occasion when the Imperial Forces all but captured President Steyn. Now in the Agricultural Department.

Captain J. J. Pienaar. At present Inspector of Brands and Fencing.

Lieut. J. Joubert Pienaar. Lieut. H. M. Pike, C.M.R.

Major J. L. Pretorius, Staats Artillery, Superintendent of Burgher Police, Fieldcornet and subsequently Fencing Inspector.

Major G. R. Richards, Natal Carbineers. Attended Staff College Course, Camberley. Formerly M.L.A. Natal.

Lieut. J. B. Rowe, Assistant Private Secretary to General Botha, was Adjutant to him during the war.

Lieut. C. L. Rutherford, C.M.R. Lieut. A. W. Taylor, C.M.R.

Lieut. E. E. F. Simkins, Cornet, S.A.C. Lieut. S. H. Oberholzer.

Lieut.-Colonel E. Smedley Williams, O.C. Kaffrarian Rifles. Obtained rank from private to head of the regiment in ten years. Saw service in Langeberg campaign and S.A. war.

Lieut. J. H. Snyman. Sub-Inspector W. N. Stewart, O.F.S. Police.

Lieut. R. Stopford, C.M.R. Captain G. T. Suttie. Lieut. P. v. d. Byl.

Major W. G. C. Tanner, P.S.C., Natal Carbineers. Saw service with the Scottish Horse during the late war.

Major E. F. Thackeray. Served in the 11th Hussars and subsequently in the B.S.A.P. During the war he served in the Protectorate Regiment, K.F.S., and the S.A.C. Now Adjutant of the Southern Mounted Rifles.

Sub-Inspector F. E. Watermeyer, C.M.R. Lieut. H. T. Watkins.

## FOREIGN

*Austria-Hungary.*—The Cavalry Divisions have lately been re-numbered; thus the First is at Temesvar, the Second at Pozsony, the Third at Vienna, the Fourth at Lemberg, the Sixth at Jaroslav, the Seventh at Cracow, the Eighth at Stanislav, and the Tenth at Buda-Pesth. The numbers Fifth and Ninth are as yet unappropriated, but will be allotted, it is expected, to Divisions of Honved Cavalry.

*France.*—The question of Cavalry reinforcements for Morocco has occasioned some anxiety during the past summer. During June last the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Chasseurs d'Afrique, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Spahis, all had the majority of their squadrons in or about Casa Blanca, while there remained in Algeria only eleven squadrons of Chasseurs, of which five were dépôt squadrons, and eight squadrons of Spahis, three of which were dépôt squadrons; in Tunisia there were no more than nine squadrons altogether. For some years past the Cavalry in Northern Africa has hardly been sufficiently numerous for the work required of it, and it is probable that for some time to come squadrons will continue to be a great deal detached, and hopes are therefore expressed that there will be an early creation of fresh units, notably of Spahis.

*Greece.*—In the scheme elaborated by General Eydoux for the reorganisation of the Greek Army, the country will be divided into four military zones, each zone being formed into three districts. Each zone will provide a complete Division, comprising three Infantry regiments of three battalions each, one regiment of Field Artillery and Departmental Services. Other troops not contained in the Division will be recruited from the country generally. The Cavalry will consist of three regiments, each of five squadrons, each squadron having an establishment of five officers and 120 of other ranks.

*Italy.*—Certain augmentations are to be noticed in the establishments of four of the Italian Cavalry regiments; thus the Lodi regiment, No. 15, receives a sixth squadron; the Lucca regiment, No. 16, a sixth and a seventh squadron; while the regiments numbered 18 and 19 receive each a sixth squadron.

*Russia.*—The Cavalry has lately received a new 'Training Manual,' that dating from 1896 no longer being considered to fit the conditions of modern battle-leading and methods of fighting.

In the preparation of the new 'Cavalry Training' the endeavour has been made—without altogether breaking away from that which is not actually in opposition to present ideas and to which the Cavalry has for years past been accustomed—mainly to enlarge and modernise the old regulations, and at the same time in some degree to alter them, and in the following way:—

1. In a separate part of the 'Manual' to give, by examples, sound principles as to the methods of employment of Cavalry in action and as to battle-leading under various conditions.

2. To indicate the different formations to be adopted in the attack on Infantry and Artillery, and also for movement in close country and under hostile fire, as are called for by the conditions of the modern battle.

3. To do away with all such movements, formations, and changes of formation as are not suited for the field, and, where possible, to simplify the regulations for changes of formation.

4. To lay down the principle that, in regard to direction, movement, and changes of formation, individual units invariably conform to their commander.

5. To bring the regulations as to dismounted action into line with those introduced in 1908 for the Infantry, whereby the leading of the fire-fight devolves upon small units—section or group. (By the new regulations the section contains two groups.)

By examples in the different chapters, and by the general tenor of the whole regulations, to convey to all ranks, from highest to lowest, the conviction that under all circumstances, mounted or on foot, energy and determination to advance form the main security for success.

In Part I., which treats of the individual training of the Cavalryman, the regulations and directions for the training of the man have been amplified by means of more up-to-date instructions with a view to aiming at the evolution of active, independent men, fit to fight in the field either mounted or dismounted.

In Part II. is contained everything to do with the efficiency of units, from the section to the largest Cavalry bodies, so far as concerns mounted or foot work. This part also includes instructions for the Lava attack, inspections, ceremonial, and Cavalry signals.

Part III. is new and contains instructions for ensuring the attainment of general fighting efficiency. The new 'Manual,' like that published in 1898, is comprised in two volumes, of which one contains the first Part, and the other Parts II. and III. with appendices; each volume is provided with explanatory notes, as in the 'Infantry Manual,' which serve as guides for the correct employment of the new methods.

Volume II. (Parts II. and III.) is rather larger than its predecessor of 1908, despite the fact that the new regulations are generally more compressed; but this is explained by certain additions which have been made—thus: (a) The Section and Dismounted Drill (from Part I. of the 1896 'Manual'); (b) instructions for the Lava attack; (c) the whole of the new Part III.—the Attack; and (d) explanatory remarks. Further, while the old arrangement of contents has been retained, a much larger type has been used so as to make it more easy to read and study.

Parts II. and III. are intended for the Cavalry proper, as well as for the Cossacks. A feature of the new 'Manual' is the statement of the duties which fall to the Cavalry, while the foundation upon which the efficiency of Cavalry in war is based is carefully set forth in the introduction to the different sections of the 'Cavalry Training.' In the introduction, too, care is taken to limit the possibility of effecting any alteration in the regulations by building up round them anything like stereotyped forms of action. All are enjoined to follow the *spirit* of the regulations, and not to cling blindly to the mere *letter* of them. In other words, plenty of room is left for the cultivation of individual initiative.

Much stress is laid upon the personality of the leader of Cavalry, and especially upon his capacity for rapid decision upon well-considered undertakings and for their instant execution, without fear of the responsibility thereby accepted. The principal *method* of Cavalry employment is mounted; its main duty is to co-operate shoulder to shoulder with the other arms in the battle so as to help to attain the desired end. The attack in Lava—heretofore confined only to use by the Cossacks—is now extended to the whole Cavalry. It is laid down as an axiom that for this description of attack detached squadrons and detachments not larger than a regiment are to be employed. It is insisted upon that the Lava is not a mere single *formation*, but a *method of fighting* admitting of the employment of several formations. The *moment* of employment depends altogether upon correct appreciation of the situation and the most effective use of the best means—not merely with the commander, but with the subordinate units down to the simple private riding in their ranks.

The following are the basic principles for Part III. :—The Combat : In consequence of the changes in the conditions of the modern fight, the Cavalry, like all the other arms, is obliged to adopt new fighting formations. Its formations and lines of battle must be thinner and with increased intervals, so far as the local conditions permit. The use of close, compact forms of fight, which permitted of the commander retaining a hold on his squadrons until just before they are launched to the charge, is a thing of the past. In place of the old-time attack upon the enemy by masses of Cavalry from a short distance, there will be the concerted action of powerful Cavalry units working to one end by separate bodies, receiving each its own mission, and concentrated often from considerable distances apart.

Under all conditions the conduct of the advanced troops has now assumed increased importance, both as concerns reconnaissance of the hostile army and screening the movements of our own forces.

By the division of the Cavalry bodies into groups the initiative of the subordinate commanders has assumed increased importance, as has also the ability to co-ordinate the efficiency of all bodies for the attainment of a common purpose. Owing to the special character of the arm—its sudden, opportune, and rapid attack—all decisions of the leader should admit of the widest interpretation of what is meant by combination, while securing the unity of action of all parts of his command.

The new Part III. of the 'Manual' is intended to point out the main conditions upon which depends the fighting efficiency of the mounted arm. It begins by recapitulating the various duties of the Cavalry commander; gives examples of the useful employment of Cavalry mounted and dismounted and against all arms; and also lays down certain principles for the employment of Artillery and machine-guns in the Cavalry battle. It is, however, emphasised that none of these examples which are given are intended to be accepted as ready-made recipes for guidance in every possible circumstance which may arise; but they are only to be looked upon as general examples, the use of which depends altogether upon the capability of the commander, and in just such measure as the conditions of the combat differ in example and actuality.

*Turkey.*—A society has lately been formed, under the presidentship of Ahmed Riza Bey, formerly President of the Chamber, for the improvement of the horse of the country. The War Minister and the Inspector of Cavalry are members of this society, and the Sultan has given land for the laying-out of a racecourse. The society is financed by contributions from the Departments of War, Commerce, and Agriculture, from the City of Constantinople, and from private subscribers. There are now to be created four Remount Commissions, under the War Ministry, and these will act in concert with the new society. Each Commission will purchase the remounts, required by the particular troops serving in the district it administers, at the ages of three to eight years. The export of animals likely to be suitable as remounts is now forbidden. At one time there were four Government stud-farms, but at the present moment only one is in existence. These are now all four to be re-established, and each will contain one hundred selected stallions, the purchase price of which is not to exceed £25 to £30 (Turkish). These will tour for covering mares in the district served by the stud-farms. Each farm will be under charge of a Cavalry officer. Attached to each farm will be a remount depôt, containing not more than 500 animals, and which is intended to receive and to keep for twelve months the three- and four-year olds purchased by the Remount Commissions. For the present, and until a regular establishment can be created and provided, a Cavalry squadron will be detached for duty at every remount depôt.

Each of the fourteen Turkish Cavalry brigades is to be supplied with a machine-gun detachment. The brigades at Constantinople and Salonica will be the first to be thus provided. The detachment will comprise two sections, each with two Maxims and an ammunition-waggon. The whole of the *personnel* of the detachment will be mounted. Each gun has four horses, one carrying the gun itself and the others the ammunition boxes.

A new regiment of Turkish Cavalry has now been created at Erzeroum, and numbered 39; it is intended to serve as an instructional corps for the Kurdish regiments of auxiliary Cavalry. It has been formed by transfers from the 20th, 22nd, and 24th Regiments.

*United States.*—A new field forge has recently been introduced, which is intended to make squadrons independent in regard to the ordinary repairs of saddlery, &c. It is carried on a pack-saddle, which sustains on one side a pannier containing the tools of the farrier and saddler, and on the other side an anvil and hammer in leathern cases. The pannier can be used as a bench by the saddler, or as a support for the stitching clamp.

A new sabre is on the eve of introduction, which is claimed to be a combination of the best models of cut-and-thrust weapons. The blade has a length of rather over thirty-one inches, and is double-edged for a certain distance from the point for the purpose of assisting penetration. The guard is similar to that of a foil, and affords complete protection to the hand. The scabbard is of wood, covered with leather and cased with olive green linen. The mouthpiece is made specially large to facilitate the 'return.'

## SPORTING NOTES

## POLO

The Subalterns' Cup Regimental Tournament, played at Ranelagh, secured an excellent entry of eleven teams. Results :—

20th Hussars beat the Royal Horse Guards. The latter had to scratch after the second period owing to an accident to Mr. Combe, and having no substitute available.

The Royal Scots Greys easily beat the Coldstream Guards.

The 9th Lancers beat the 2nd Life Guards.

The 11th Hussars scratched to the 20th Hussars.

The final between the 9th Lancers (last year's winners) and the 20th Hussars was a keen contest, the sides being most evenly matched. Goals were being scored alternately, and at the end of the fifth period the score was six all. During the last chukker, when the score was seven all, the Lancers hit the winning goal of a very fine game. Final score, eight to seven. Teams :—

9th Lancers : Messrs. R. L. Benson, G. H. Phipps-Hornby, A. N. Edwards, and J. G. Porter (back).

20th Hussars : Messrs. J. C. Darling, C. G. Mangles, S. Barne, and H. M. Soames (back).

A cup for the best-trained polo pony played in the final was awarded to Mr. C. G. Mangles' Twilight.

Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, Inspector of Cavalry, presented the cups.

The King's Coronation Cup, played at Ranelagh, was won by the Old Cantabs, who in the final defeated the Royal Horse Guards by ten goals to four. The Blues were not in their best form, but the Old Cantabs played brilliantly. Capt. Heseltine had two falls, which did not affect his good play. Teams :—

Old Cantabs : Capt. Heseltine, Mr. Freake, Mr. Buckmaster, and Lord Wodehouse (back).

R.H.G. : Capt. Bowlby, Capt. Lord A. Innes-Ker, Capt. H. E. Brassey, and Capt. J. F. Harrison (back).

The Army Cup final, played at Ranelagh, was between the Dragoon Guards (Past and Present) and the Hussars (Past and Present), the former winning by five goals to four. Teams :—

Dragoon Guards : Capt. Heseltine, Capt. C. E. Hornby, Major Matthew-Lannowe, and Capt. C. F. Hunter (back).

Hussars : Capt. C. McG. Dunbar, Sir C. Lowther, Major P. D. Fitzgerald, and Mr. A. P. Schreiber (back).

Only three teams competed, the Brigade of Guards being the other team. It was a good match, and only close on time that Capt. Heseltine made the winning hit for the Dragoon Guards.

There was a good game for the final of the Irish Inter-Regimental Tournament at Dublin between two teams from the 5th Lancers. This resulted in their 'A' team beating their 'B' team by five goals to four. At half-time 'A' team led by four goals to one, after which 'B' team had the best of the game and were only just beaten. Teams :—

'A' team, 5th Lancers : Hon. C. Alexander, Mr. Ramsden, Mr. Robinson, and Mr. Wordsworth (back).

'B' team : Mr. Cunninghame, Mr. Rice, Mr. Batten-Pooll, and Mr. McDougall (back).

The Autumn Open Tournament of the Cavalry School, Netheravon, despite bad weather, produced some capital polo. The final between the Apostles and Fittleton Manor (received one goal) was a close game, which the former won by six goals to four and so became the first holders of the new challenge cup. Teams :—

Apostles : The Hon. E. H. Wyndham, Mr. B. Osborne, Mr. G. F. Reynolds, and Mr. W. Johnson (back).

Fittleton Manor : Messrs. J. N. Preston-Whyte, C. W. Turner, G. F. H. Brooke, and Capt. R. Davis (back).

Mr. B. Osborne (15th Hussars) played well for the winners, and Mr. Geoffrey Brooke (16th Lancers), of horse-jumping fame, for the losers. The Ablington House team, for which Colonel John Vaughan and Mr. H. K. D. Evans (4th Hussars) played a great game, were just knocked out in the semi-finals.

The final for the Irish Regimental Cup, played at Dublin, was a good match between the 5th Dragoon Guards and the 4th Hussars, the former winning by three goals to one. Teams :—

5th Dragoon Guards : Mr. Winterbottom, Major Winwood, Capt. Black, and Lieut.-Colonel Ansell (back).

4th Hussars : Capt. Mockett, Capt. Brodie, Capt. Stokes, and Capt. Bell (back).

#### ABROAD

The South African Inter-Regimental Polo Tournament was played at Potchefstroom the end of May. Results :—

12th Royal Lancers beat Royal Dragoons seven goals to two.

15th Hussars beat Carabiniers six goals to two.

Final : 15th Hussars beat 12th Lancers nine goals to five.

Teams :—

15th Hussars : Mr. R. P. Wells, Mr. J. Godman, Capt. Hon. J. D. Y. Bingham, Mr. M. A. Muir.

12th Lancers : Capt. T. R. Badger, Capt. A. B. Reynolds, Mr. E. H. Leatham, Capt. R. B. Wood.

The South African Subalterns' Tournament, played at Potchefstroom in June, resulted as follows :—

Royal Dragoons beat 24th Regiment five goals to three.

15th Hussars beat Carabiniers six goals to three.

12th Royal Lancers beat Royal Dragoons eleven goals to two.



The final was a keenly contested match between the 12th Lancers and the 15th Hussars, the former winning, after extra time, by five goals to four. Teams :—

12th Lancers : Messrs. Hornby, Bryant, Leatham, and Charrington.

Royals : Messrs. Grenfell, Hewett, Wilson, Fitzgerald, and Edwards.

The South African Championship Tournament was won by the Buccaneers, who defeated the 15th Hussars by eight goals to one. Teams :—

Buccaneers : Capt. Badger (12th Lancers), Major Watson and Mr. Kennard (of the Carabiniers), and Capt. Wood (12th Lancers).

15th Hussars : Mr. Wells, Mr. Godman, Capt. Hon. J. Bingham, and Mr. Muir.

There are now five polo clubs established in Jamaica—viz., at Kingston, Garrison, St. Mary, St. Anne, and St. Catherine. The two former are in the suburbs at Kingston. The ponies are nearly all thoroughbred, rather small and light, but very handy. £30 or £35 will generally buy a made pony. The game has been played for twenty years, and is very popular among the planters. The All-Jamaica Polo Association holds two tournaments annually, in January and June, for senior and junior teams. At the last June tournament all the clubs sent teams for the Senior Cup, which was won by St. Anne's Club, and the same club won the Junior. The Garrison team is not a strong one this year, and composed chiefly of officers of the 2nd W.I.R.

In India the final of the Bangalore Tournament was between the Deccan Horse and the 7th Hussars, the former winning after a hard game by three goals to one. The Maharajah of Mysore presented the cups to the winners.

There were sixteen entries for the Quetta Junior Handicap Tournament, which was a great success. A close game was witnessed for the final between the Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 23rd Cavalry 'B' team, the former winning by five goals to four. Teams :—

R.I.F. : Lieut. G. Elton, Lieut. G. Hennessy, Capt. and Adjutant A. Incledon-Webber, Major F. Greer (back).

23rd Cavalry Brigade : Capt. W. Allen, Lieut. W. Lowry Corry, Capt. C. Kirkwood, and Capt. C. Cameron (back).

At the conclusion Lieut.-General H. Sclater, C.B., congratulated the teams, and Mrs. Sclater presented the trophy to the winners.

### PIG-STICKING

Although making a late start, owing to the Durbar, the Inniskilling Dragoons have had great sport with the pig this their first season at Muttra, having killed upwards of 300 already.

Muttra is an ideal station in India, as, in addition to the splendid sport of pig-sticking, there is big-game shooting, small-game shooting of all kinds within an hour's ride, coursing, and polo, besides the first chance of active service on the frontier in case of any trouble arising.

## HORSE-SHOWS

In the Olympic Games which took place at Stockholm this summer, Great Britain was represented in the military riding and jumping competitions by Colonel P. Kenna, V.C., Lieut. Scott (4th Hussars), Lieut. Radcliffe-Nash (16th Lancers), and Lieut. Lawrence (18th Hussars). Unfortunately Lieut. Lawrence had a bad fall in the military steeplechase, sustaining concussion of the brain, and was unable to take further part in the competitions. The result of the quintette of events by military officers was Sweden 1st, Germany 2nd, America 3rd. In the individual competitions Lieut. Nordlander (Sweden) was first, with Capt. Von Krochow (Germany) second, and Capt. Carion (France) third.

At the annual sports at Milton, Wiltshire, a horse-jumping competition, open to officers stationed at Tidworth, Bulford, or Netheravon, was won by Lieut. L. P. Thwaite's well-known Prussian Eagle, with Lieut. G. G. Marshall's (11th Hussars) Keynote second. Another competition open to warrant and non-commissioned officers was won by Staff-Sergeant-Major Stevens, of the Cavalry School, on Tommy, with Sergeant Wyborn, 20th Hussars, second on Bronco. In the tent-pegging competition Sergeant Kunkler, 19th Hussars, was a good winner.

At the Dublin Horse Show the military jumping competition for a cup and prizes of £50, £30, £20, £10, and £5 was again a great success, and resulted as follows: First, Lieut. T. C. Harman's (20th Hussars) Mickey Free; second, Capt. I. D. Batten's (5th Royal Fusiliers) Burgi; third, Major C. L. Graham's (4th Hussars) Victor; fourth, Capt. M. Crawshay's (5th Dragoon Guards) Sue; fifth Lieut. C. E. Walker's (R.H.A.) Hare Nut. The champion event for similar prizes was won by Capt. Ian Bullough's French Pastry, with Lieut. J. C. Harman's Mickey Free second, Capt. Bryan Cooper's Giles third, and Mr. McMorras' Heart's Delight fourth.

This great horse-show was as popular as ever this year, but the weather was deplorable. Owing to the sodden state of the ground, the popular Polo Tournaments, which usually take place during the Horse-Show week, had to be abandoned.

## LAWN TENNIS

## THE ARMY CHAMPIONSHIPS

This tournament was played at the Queen's Club, West Kensington. The final of the doubles was a great struggle between Capt. Creswell and A. R. F. Kingscote, R.G.A., and Capt. Jones and Capt. Bell, A.S.C., the former winning after over two hours' play. Scores: 8-10, 4-6, 7-5, 6-2, 10-8. The Army Singles Challenge Cup was won by Mr. A. R. F. Kingscote, R.G.A., who, in the final, defeated Capt. A. Bergers, A.S.C., and retained the championship. Scores: 6-3 6-0, 6-2.

## BISLEY

At the fifty-third annual Imperial rifle meeting at Bisley the coveted King's Prize of £250, the National Rifle Association gold medal and gold badge, were won by Private A. G. Fulton, Queen's Westminsters. Chaplain G. Fenn (5th Essex) was second, and Lance-Sergeant Carden (Sussex Yeomanry) third. It was a most exciting finish. As the end of the contest drew near, the spectators comprised the Secretary of State for War, Colonel Seely, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, the Lord Mayor of London and Sheriffs, Major-General Lord Cheylesmore, and other well-known personages. Sergeant Harvey, the South African, winner of the silver medal in the first stage, was not doing well, and the great Scottish shot, Ommundsen, winner of the bronze medal, was unfortunate with a faulty cartridge. Chaplain Fenn made a 'possible' at the 800 yards range, and led the silver medallist by one point. At the 1000 yards range Fulton was behind Chaplain Fenn, Sergeant Harvey, and Lance-Corporal Wilson, of the London Scottish. Chaplain Fenn finished with a grand total of 334, and seemed a sure winner. With his last shot to fire, young Fulton required a bull's-eye to win by one point, and when this was signalled back a tremendous roar of cheering broke the breathless silence.

Colonel Seely, standing upon a chair, said: 'Lord Cheylesmore has asked me on behalf of the National Rifle Association to congratulate you, Private Fulton, on winning the King's Prize,' and then called 'Three cheers for the winner,' who was at once chaired and carried off in triumph around the camp to the strains of 'See the Conquering Hero Comes.' Another important match—the St. George's—was won by Lance-Corporal H. A. Mann (of the Hon. Artillery Company), Captain W. Forrest (of Canada) second, and Sergeant H. Hislop (5th Royal Scots) third.

The Roberts Cup was won by the 3rd Rifle Brigade first team.

The Yeomanry Inter-Regimental, open to teams of four of any rank from any one Yeomanry unit, was won by the Middlesex Yeomanry first team—Trumpeter I. H. Welmsley, Sergeant H. H. Belsey, Second-Lieut. Carus-Wilson, and Lieut. F. C. Mason. The Ayrshire Yeomanry was second.

The prize distribution was made by the Lord Mayor of London, who pinned the gold medal on Private Fulton's breast. Four lady shots were amongst the prize-winners. Lord Cheylesmore proposed a vote of thanks to the donors of the prizes, the Lord Mayor for presiding, and the Colonials for coming over to compete. In reply, the Lord Mayor said he would tell his colleagues on the Corporation what excellent work was being done at Bisley; it was pleasant to see so many sons from the Colonies, and to note how well the ladies had acquitted themselves at the butts. The time was coming when all would be taught the use of the rifle. To know how to shoot would add to the mental and the physical education of the race and to the greater security of the country.







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